Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK for Linux* OS

Developer Reference
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## Revision History

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<tr>
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<th>Revision Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>SGX Linux 1.5 release</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>SGX Linux 1.6 release</td>
<td>September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>SGX Linux 1.7 release</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
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Introduction

Intel provides the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK Developer Reference for software developers who wish to harden their application's security using Intel Software Guard Extensions technology.

This document covers an overview of the technology, tutorials, tools, sample code as well as API reference.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK from Intel is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries and tools that enables the software developer to write and debug Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions applications in C/C++.

NOTE

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) technology is only available on 6th Generation Intel(R) Core(TM) Processor (codenamed Skylake) or newer.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Technology Overview

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is an Intel technology whose objective is to enable a high-level protection of secrets. It operates by allocating hardware-protected memory where code and data reside. The protected memory area is called an enclave. Data within the enclave memory can only be accessed by the code that also resides within the enclave memory space. Enclave code can be invoked via special instructions. An enclave can be built and loaded as a shared object on Linux* OS.

NOTE:

The enclave file can be disassembled, so the algorithms used by the enclave developer will not remain secret.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions technology has a hard limit on the protected memory size, typically 64 MB or 128 MB. As a result, the number of active enclaves (in memory) is limited. Depending on the memory footprint of each enclave, use cases suggest that 5-20 enclaves can reside in memory simultaneously.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Security Properties

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against software attacks:
  - The enclave memory cannot be read or written from outside the enclave regardless of current privilege level and CPU mode
(ring3/user-mode, ring0/kernel-mode, SMM, VMM, or another enclave). The abort page is returned in such conditions.

- An enclave can be created with a debug attribute that allows a special debugger (Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions debugger) to view its content like a standard debugger. Production enclaves (non-debug) cannot be debugged by software or hardware debuggers.
- The enclave environment cannot be entered via classic function calls, jumps, register manipulation or stack manipulation. The only way to call an enclave function is via a new instruction that performs several protect checks. Classic function calls initiated by enclave code to functions inside the enclave are allowed.
- CPU mode can only be 32 or 64 bit when executing enclave code. Other CPU modes are not supported. An exception is raised in such conditions.

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against known hardware attacks:
  - The enclave memory is encrypted using industry-standard encryption algorithms with replay protection.
  - Tapped memory or connecting the DRAM modules to another system will only give access to encrypted data.
  - The memory encryption key changes every power cycle randomly (for example, boot/sleep/hibernate). The key is stored within the CPU and it is not accessible.
  - Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is not designed to handle side channel attacks or reverse engineering. It is up to the Intel(R) SGX developers to build enclaves that are protected against these types of attack.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions uses strong industry-standard algorithms for signing enclaves. The signature of an enclave characterizes the content and the layout of the enclave at build time. If the enclave's content and layout are not correct per the signature, then the enclave will fail to be initialized and, hence, will not be executed. If an enclave is initialized, it should be identical to the original enclave and will not be modified at runtime.
Application Design Considerations

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application design is different from non-Intel(R) SGX application as it requires dividing the application into two logical components:

- Trusted component. The code that accesses the secret resides here. This component is also called an enclave. More than one enclave can exist in an application.
- Untrusted component. The rest of the application including all its modules.¹

The application writer should make the trusted part as small as possible. It is suggested that enclave functionality should be limited to operate on the secret data. A large enclave statistically has more bugs and (user created) security holes than a small enclave.

The enclave code can leave the protected memory region and call functions in the untrusted zone (by a special instruction). Reducing the enclave dependency on untrusted code will also strengthen its protection against possible attacks.

Embracing the above design considerations will improve protection as the attack surface is minimized.

The application designer, as the first step to harnessing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in the application, must redesign or refactor the application to fit these guidelines. This is accomplished by isolating the code module(s) that access any secrets and then moving these modules to a separate package/library. The details of how to create such an enclave are detailed in the tutorials section. You can also see the demonstrations on creating an enclave in the sample code that are shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

Terminology and Acronyms

| AE   | Architectural enclaves. Enclaves that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework. They include the quoting |

¹From an enclave standpoint, the operating system and VMM are not trusted components, either.
| **Attestation** | Prove authenticity. In case of platform attestation, prove the identity of the platform. |
| **CA** | Certificate Authority. |
| **ECALL** | Enclave call. A function call that enters the enclave. |
| **ECDH** | Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman. |
| **EDL** | Enclave Definition Language. |
| **EPID** | Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID. |
| **FIPS** | Federal Information Processing Standards developed by NIST for use in computer systems government-wide. |
| **FIPS 140-2** | Standard that defines security requirements for cryptographic modules and is required for sales to the Federal Governments. |
| **HSM** | Hardware Security Module. |
| **IAS** | Intel(R) Attestation Service. |
| **ISV** | Independent Software Vendor. |
| **KE** | Key Exchange. |
| **LE** | Launch enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the licensing service. |
| **Nonce** | An arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic communication. |
| **OCALL** | Outside call. A function call that calls an untrusted function from an enclave. |
| **PSW** | Platform Software. |
| **PvE** | Provisioning enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) Provision service to handle the provisioning protocol. |
| **QE** | Quoting enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the quoting service. |
| **SGX** | Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. |
| **SigRL** | Signature revocation list |
| **SMK** | Session MAC key. |
| **SP** | Service Provider. |
| **SVN** | Security version number. Used to version security levels of both hardware and software components of the Software Guard Extensions framework. |
| **TCB** | Trusted computing base. Portions of hardware and software that are considered safe and uncompromised. A system protection is
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>improved if the TCB is as small as possible, making an attack harder.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCS</td>
<td>Thread Control Structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Thread Local Storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Transport Layer Security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tested Environments**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions software stack – including the Intel(R) SGX SDK and Platform Software (PSW) have been internally tested* by Intel and shown to work under a number of configurations. See the release notes for a list of supported environments.

Using Intel(R) SGX software under other environments may or may not work.

*The results have been estimated based on Intel internal analysis and are provided for informational purposes only. Any difference in system hardware or software configuration may affect actual performance.
Setting up an Intel(R) Software Guard Extension Project
This topic introduces how to use the features of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK to create and manage Intel(R) SGX application projects.

Creating Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Projects
To create an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project on Linux* OS, you are recommended to start using the directory structure and Makefiles from a sample application in the Intel(R) SGX SDK. In an Intel SGX project, you should normally prepare the following files:

1. Enclave Definition Language (EDL) file - describes enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototype. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for details.
2. Enclave configuration file - contains the information of the enclave metadata. See Enclave Configuration File for details.
3. Signing key files - used to sign an enclave to produce a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as enclave measurement. See Signing Key Files for details.
4. Application and enclave source code - the implementation of application and enclave functions.
5. makefile - it performs the following steps:
   1. Generates edger routines (see Edger8r Tool for details).
   2. Builds the application and enclave.
   3. Signs the enclave (see Enclave Signing Tool for details).
6. Linker script file - it is recommended to use the linker script to hide all unnecessary symbols, and only export enclave_entry, g_global_data, and g_global_data_sim.

Once you understand how an Intel SGX application is built, you may customize the project setup according to your needs.

To develop an Intel SGX application, Intel(R) SGX SDK supports a few non-standard configurations, not present in other SDKs. Enclave Project Configurations explains the various enclave project configurations as well as the corresponding Makefile options.
Enclave Image Generation

An enclave image is a statically linked shared object under Linux* OS, without any external dependencies. You are expected to follow the guidelines below to generate a proper enclave image:

1. Link the tRTS with the --whole-archive option, so that the whole content of the trusted runtime library is included in the enclave;

2. From other libraries, you just need to pull the required symbols. For example, if an enclave requires routines in the trusted standard C and seal libraries:

HW mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice -lsgx_tcrypto -
-end-group
```

Simulation mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice_sim -lsgx_tcrypto --end-group
```

In addition, a linker script is also recommended to hide all unnecessary symbols.

// file: enclave.lds

```
enclave.so
{
    global:
enclave_entry;
g_global_data_sim;
g_peak_heap_used;
local:
*
};
```

The symbol `enclave_entry` is the entry point to the enclave. The symbol `g_global_data_sim` comes from the tRTS simulation library and is required to be exposed for running an enclave in the simulation mode since it distinguishes between enclaves built to run on the simulator and on the hardware. The `sgx_emmt` tool relies on the symbol `g_peak_heap_used to determine the size of the heap that the enclave uses. The symbol `ImageBase` is used by tRTS to compute the base address of the enclave.

Assuming that you have a few object files to be linked into a target enclave, use the command line similar to the following:
$ ld -o enclave.so file1.o file2.o \
-pie -eenclave_entry -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostart-files --no-undefined \ 
--whole-archive -lsgx_trts --no-whole-archive \ 
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc --lsgx_tservice -lsgx_crypto - \ 
-end-group \ 
-Bstatic -Bsymbolic --defsym=__ImageBase=0 --export-dynamic \ 
--version-script=enclave.lds

You are also encouraged to hardening your enclaves, by passing one of the following options to the linker, to put read-only non-executable sections in your own segment:

ld.gold --rosegment

or,

-Wl,-fuse-ld=gold -Wl,--rosegment

**Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in helps the enclave developer to maintain enclaves and untrusted related code inside Eclipse* C/C++ projects.

To get more information on Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in Developer Guide from the Eclipse Help content: Help > Help Contents > SGX Eclipse Plug-in Developer Guide.
Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK Tools

This topic introduces how to use the following tools that the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides:

- **Edger8r Tool**
  Generates interfaces between the untrusted components and enclaves.

- **Enclave Signing Tool**
  Generates the enclave metadata, which includes the enclave signature, and adds such metadata to the enclave image.

- **Enclave Debugger**
  Helps to debug an enclave.

- **Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier**
  Helps to measure the performance of the enclave code.

- **Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**
  Helps to measure the usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

- **CPUSVN Configuration Tool**
  Helps to simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade scenario without modifying the hardware.

**Edger8r Tool**

The Edger8r tool ships as part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It generates edge routines by reading a user-provided EDL file. These edge routines provide the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave. Normally, the tool will run automatically as part of the enclave build process. However, an advanced enclave writer may invoke the Edger8r manually.

When given an EDL file, for example, demo.edl, the Edger8r will by default generate four files:

- **demo_t.h** – It contains prototype declarations for trusted proxies and bridges.
- **demo_t.c** – It contains function definitions for trusted proxies and bridges.
• demo_u.h – It contains prototype declarations for untrusted proxies and bridges.
• demo_u.c – It contains function definitions for untrusted proxies and bridges.

Here is the usage description for the Edger8r tool:

**Syntax:**

```
sgx_edger8r [options] <.edl file> [another .edl file ...]
```

**Arguments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Options]</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--use-prefix</td>
<td>Prefix the untrusted proxy with the enclave name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--header-only</td>
<td>Generate header files only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--search-path &lt;path&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the search path of EDL files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted</td>
<td>Generate untrusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted</td>
<td>Generate trusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the untrusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the trusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--help</td>
<td>Print this help message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If neither --untrusted nor --trusted is specified, the Edger8r will generate both.

Here, the path parameter has the same format as the PATH environment variable, and the enclave name is the base file name of the EDL file (demo in this case).

**CAUTION:**
The ISV must run the Edger8r tool in a protected malware-free environment to ensure the integrity of the tool so that the generated code is not compromised. The ISV is ultimately responsible for the code contained in the enclave and should review the code that the Edger8r tool generates.
**Enclave Signing Tool**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool named `sgx_sign` for you to sign enclaves. In general, signing an enclave is a process that involves producing a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as the enclave measurement. Once an enclave is signed in such structure, the modifications to the enclave file (such as code, data, signature, and so on.) can be detected. The signing tool also evaluates the enclave image for potential errors and warns users about potential security hazards. `sgx_sign` is typically set up by one of the configuration tools included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK and runs automatically at the end of the build process. During the loading process, the signature is checked to confirm that the enclave has not been tampered with and has been loaded correctly.

**Command-Line Syntax**

To run `sgx_sign`, use the following command syntax:

```
sgx_sign <command> [args]
```

All valid commands are listed in the table below. See Enclave Signing Examples for more information.

**Table 1 Signing Tool Commands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>sign</strong></td>
<td>Sign the enclave using the private key in one step.</td>
<td>Required: -enclave, -key, -out&lt;br&gt;Optional: -config</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>gendata</strong></td>
<td>The first step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the enclave signing material to be signed by an external tool. This step dumps the signing material, which consists of the header and body sections of the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic), into a file (256 bytes in total).</td>
<td>Required: -enclave, -out&lt;br&gt;Optional: -config</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>catsig</strong></td>
<td>The second step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the signed enclave with the input signature and</td>
<td>Required: -enclave, -key, -out, -sig, -unsigned&lt;br&gt;Optional: -config</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
public key. The input signature is generated by an external tool based on the data generated by the \texttt{gendata} command. At this step, the signature and buffer sections are generated. The signature and buffer sections together with the header and body sections complete the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic).

All the valid command options are listed below:

\textbf{Table 2 Signing Tool Arguments}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{-enclave &lt;file&gt;}</td>
<td>Specify the enclave file to be signed. It is a required argument for the three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{-config &lt;file&gt;}</td>
<td>Specify the enclave configuration file. It is an optional argument for the three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\texttt{-out &lt;file&gt;}</td>
<td>Specify the output file. It is required for the three commands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sign</td>
<td>The signed enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gendata</td>
<td>The file with the enclave signing material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catsig</td>
<td>The signed enclave file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sign</td>
<td>Private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gendata</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>catsig</td>
<td>Public key.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| -key <file> | Specify the signing key file. See File Formats for detailed description. |
| -sig <file> | Specify the file containing the signature corresponding to the enclave signing material. Only valid for \texttt{catsig} command. |

| - | Specify the file containing the enclave signing material generated |
unsigned <file> by gendata.

Only valid for catsig command.

-ignore-rel-error

By default, sgx_sign provides an error for enclaves with text relocations. You can ignore the error and continue signing by providing this option. But it is recommended you eliminate the text relocations instead of bypassing the error with this option.

The arguments, including options and filenames, can be specified in any order. Options are processed first, then filenames. Use one or more spaces or tabs to separate arguments. Each option consists of an option identifier, a dash (-), followed by the name of the option. The <file> parameter specifies the absolute or relative path of a file.

sgx_sign generates the output file and returns 0 for success. Otherwise, it generates an error message and returns -1.

**Table 3 Enclave Signature Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>HEADERTYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERLEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERVERSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODVENDOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KEYSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODULUSSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENPONENTSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWDEFINED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>MODULUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXPONENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclave Signing Key Management

An enclave project supports different signing methods needed by ISVs during the enclave development life cycle.

- Single-step method using the ISV's test private key:
  The signing tool supports a single-step signing process, which requires the access to the signing key pair on the local build system. However, there is a requirement that any white-listed enclave signing key must be managed in a hardware security module. Thus, the ISV's test private key stored in the build platform will not be white-listed and enclaves signed with this key can only be launched in debug or prerelease mode. In this scenario, the ISV manages the signing key pair, which could be generated by the ISV using his own means. Single-step method is the default signing method for non-production enclave applications, which are created with the Intel SGX project debug and prerelease profiles.

- 2-step method using an external signing tool:
  1. First step: At the end of the enclave build process, the signing tool generates the enclave signing material.

  The ISV takes the enclave signing material file to an external signing platform/facility where the private key is stored, signs the signing material file, and takes the resulting signature file back to the build platform.

  2. Second step: The ISV runs the signing tool with the catsig
command providing the necessary information at the command line to add the hash of the public key and signature to the enclave's metadata section.

The 2-step signing process protects the signing key in a separate facility. Thus it is the default signing method for the Intel SGX project release profile. This means it is the only method for signing production enclave applications.

**File Formats**

There are several files with various formats followed by the different options. The file format details are listed below.

**Table 4 Signing Tool File Formats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclave file</td>
<td>Shared Object</td>
<td>It is a standard Shared Object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed enclave file</td>
<td>Shared Object</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>sgx_sign</em> generates the signed enclave file, which includes the signature, to the enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration file</td>
<td>XML</td>
<td>See Enclave Configuration File.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key file</td>
<td>PEM</td>
<td>Key file should follow the PEM format which contains an unencrypted RSA 3072-bit key. The public exponent must be 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclave hex file</td>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>It is a dump file of the enclave signing material data to be signed with the private RSA key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature file</td>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>It is a dump file of the signature generated at the ISV's signing facility. The signature should follow the RSA-PKCS1.5 padding scheme. The signature should be generated using the v1.5 version of the RSA scheme with an SHA-256 message digest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signing Key Files**

The enclave signing tool only accepts key files in the PEM format and unencrypted. When an enclave project is created for the first time, you have to choose either using an already existing signing key or automatically generating one key for you. When you choose to import a pre-existing key, ensure that such key is in PEM format and unencrypted. If that is not the case, convert the signing key to the format accepted by the Signing Tool first. For instance, the
The following command converts an encrypted private key in PKCS#8/DER format to unencrypted PEM format:

```bash
openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -in private_pkcs8.der -outform PEM -out private_pkcs1.pem
```

Depending on the platform OS, the `openssl` utility might be installed already or it may be shipped with the Intel(R) SGX SDK.

**Enclave Signing Examples**

The following are typical examples for signing an enclave using the one-step or the two-step method. When the private signing key is available at the build platform, you may follow the one-step signing process to sign your enclave. However, when the private key is only accessible in an isolated signing facility, you must follow the two-step signing process described below.

- **One-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key available on the build system:

  ```bash
  sgx_sign sign -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key private.pem
  ```

- **Two-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key stored in an HSM, for instance:

  1. Generate the enclave signing material.
     ```bash
     sgx_sign gendata -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_hash.hex
     ```
  2. At the signing facility, sign the file containing the enclave signing material (`enclave_hash.hex`) and take the resulting signature file (`signature.hex`) back to the build platform.
  3. Sign the enclave using the signature file and public key.
     ```bash
     sgx_sign catsig -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key public.pem -sig signature.hex -unsigned enclave_hash.hex
     ```

The configuration file `config.xml` is optional. If you do not provide a configuration file, the signing tool uses the default configuration values.
A single enclave signing tool is provided, which allows signing 32-bit and 64-bit enclaves. In addition, on Windows* OS sgx_sign supports signing enclaves in both PE and ELF formats.

**OpenSSL* Examples**
The following command lines are typical examples using OpenSSL*.

1. Generate a 3072-bit RSA private key. Use 3 as the public exponent value.

```bash
openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem -3 3072
```

2. Produce the public part of a private RSA key.

```bash
openssl rsa -in private_key.pem -pubout -out public_key.pem
```

3. Sign the file containing the enclave signing material.

```bash
openssl dgst -sha256 -out signature.hex -sign private_key.pem -keyform PEM enclave_hash.hex
```

**Enclave Debugger**
You can leverage the helper script `sgx-gdb` to debug your enclave applications. To debug an enclave on a hardware platform, the `<DisableDebug>` configuration parameter should be set to 0 in the enclave configuration file `config.xml`, and you should set the `Debug` parameter to 1 in the `sgx_create_enclave(...)` that creates the enclave. Debugging an enclave is similar to debugging a shared library. However not all the standard features are available to debug enclaves. The following table lists some unsupported GDB commands for enclave. `sgx-gdb` also supports measuring the enclave stack/heap usage by the Enclave Memory Measurement Tool. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for additional information.

**Table 5 GDB Unsupported Commands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDB Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>info sharedlibrary</td>
<td>Does not show the status of the loaded enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>next/step</td>
<td>Does not allows to execute the next/step outside the enclave from inside the enclave. To go outside the enclave use the finish command.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier

You can use Intel® VTune™ Amplifier Application 2016 Update 2 to measure the performance of SGX applications including the enclave. VTune Amplifier application supports a new analysis type called SGX Hotspots that can be used to profile the SGX Enclave Applications. You can use the default settings of SGX Hotspots to profile the application and the enclave code. Precise event based sampling (PEBS) helps to profile the SGX enclave code. The _PS events represent precise events. You can add _PS events to the collection to profile enclave code. Non precise events would not help with profiling SGX enclave code.

You can use VTune Amplifier to measure the performance of enclave code only when the enclave has been launched as a debug enclave. To launch the enclave as a debug enclave, pass a value of 1 as the second parameter to the sgx_create_enclave function which loads and initializes the enclave as shown below. Use the pre-defined macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG as the parameter, which equals 1 in the DEBUG and the PRE-RELEASE mode.

\[
\text{sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILENAME, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG,} \\
\text{&token, &updated, &global_eid, NULL)}
\]

**NOTE:**

Only use VTune Amplifier to measure the performance in the DEBUG and PRE-RELEASE mode because a DEBUG FLAG value of 1 cannot be passed in to create an enclave in RELEASE configuration.

VTune Amplifier provides two options to profile applications:

- Run the applications using VTune Amplifier. If you use this approach, you do not have to do anything special.
- Attach to an already running process or enclave application. If you use this approach, define the environment variable as follows:
  
  **32bit:**
  
  \[
  \text{INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY32} = \text{<VTune Installation Dir>}/\text{lib32/runtime/ittnotify_{collector}.so}
  \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>call/print</th>
<th>Does not support calling outside the enclave from within an enclave function, or calling inside the enclave from a function in the untrusted domain.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>charset</td>
<td>Only supports GDB's default charset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gcore</td>
<td>Does not support debug enclave with the application dump file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• 64bit:

INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY64 = <VTune Installation Dir>/lib64/runtime/ittnotify_collector.so

Once an enclave is loaded, the invoked ITT API of VTune Amplifier in the uRTS passes information about the enclave to VTune and profiles SGX enclave applications. When you attach VTune Amplifier to the application after invoking ITT API of VTune Amplifier, the module information about the enclave is cached in the ITT dynamic library and is used by the VTune Amplifier application during attach to process. The following table describes the different scenarios of how VTune is used to profile the enclave application.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VTune Amplifier Invocation</th>
<th>Additional Configuration</th>
<th>ITT API Result</th>
<th>uRTS Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launch the application with VTune Amplifier</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach before invoking ITT API for VTune Amplifier profiling check in sgx_createnclave</td>
<td>ITT environment variable is set.</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach after invoking ITT API for VTune Amplifier profiling check in sgx_createnclave</td>
<td>ITT environment variable is not set.</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is not profiling</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API. Even though VTune is running, it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach after invoking ITT API for VTune Amplifier profiling check in sgx_createnclave</td>
<td>ITT environment variable is set.</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and Invoke Module mapping API. Module information is cached in the ITT dynamic library and provided to VTune during attach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITT environment variable is not set.</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is not profiling</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API. Even though VTune is running here it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch the application without VTune Amplifier</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>VTune Amplifier is not profiling</td>
<td>Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**

An enclave is an isolated environment. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool called `sgx_emmt` to measure the real usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

Currently the enclave memory measurement tool provides the following two functions:

1. Get the stack peak usage value for the enclave.
2. Get the heap peak usage value for the enclave.

The tool reports the size of both stack and heap in KB. When you get the accurate stack and heap usage information for your enclaves, you can rework the enclave configuration file based on this information to make full use of the protected memory. See Enclave Configuration File for details.

On Linux* OS, the enclave memory measurement capability is provided by the helper script `sgx-gdb`. The `sgx-gdb` is a GDB extension for you to debug your enclave applications. See Enclave Debugger for details.

To measure how much protected memory an enclave uses, you should leverage `sgx-gdb` to launch GDB with `sgx_emmt` enabled and load the test application which is using the enclave. You may also attach the debugger to a running an Intel SGX application in order to measure the heap and stack sizes of th enclave.

The `sgx-gdb` provides three commands pertaining the `sgx_emmt` tool:
Table 6 Enclave Memory Measurement Tool Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enable sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Enable the enclave memory measurement tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disable sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Disable the enclave memory measurement tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>show sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Show whether the enclave memory measurement tool is enabled or not.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are the typical steps necessary to collect an enclave's memory usage information:

1. Leverage `sgx-gdb` to start a GDB session.
2. Enable the enclave memory measurement function with `enable sgx_emmt`.
3. Load and run the test application which is using the enclave.

**NOTE:**
To collect peak stack/heap usage for an enclave on a hardware platform correctly, you need to make sure the enclave meets the following requirements:

1. The enclave is debuggable. This means that the `<DisableDebug>` configuration parameter in the enclave configuration file should be set to 0.
2. The enclave is launched in the debug mode. To launch the enclave in the debug mode, set the debug flag to 1 when calling `sgx_create_enclave` to load the enclave.
3. You need to export `g_peak_heap_used` in the version script of the enclave.
4. You need to destroy the enclave by using the `sgx_destroy_enclave` API.

**CPUSVN Configuration Tool**
CPUSVN stands for Security Version Number of the CPU, which affects the key derivation and report generation process. CPUSVN is not a numeric concept and will be upgraded/downgraded along with the hardware upgrade/downgrade. To simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade without modifying the hardware, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a CPUSVN configuration tool for you to configure the CPUSVN. The CPUSVN configuration tool is for Intel(R) SGX simulation mode only.

**Command-Line Syntax**
To run the Intel(R) SGX CPUSVN configuration tool, use the following syntax:

`sgx_config_cpusvn [Command]`
The valid commands are listed in the table below:

**Table 7 CPUSVN Configuration Tool Commands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-upgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN upgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-downgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN downgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-reset</td>
<td>Restore the CPUSVN to its default value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enclave Development Basics
This topic introduces the following enclave development basics:

- Writing Enclave Functions
- Calling Functions inside the Enclave
- Calling Functions outside the Enclave
- Linking Enclave with Libraries
- Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries
- Enclave Definition Language Syntax
- Loading and Unloading an Enclave

The typical enclave development process includes the following steps:

1. Define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave in the EDL file.
2. Implement the application and enclave functions.
3. Build the application and enclave. In the build process, Edger8r Tool generates trusted and untrusted proxy/bridge functions. Enclave Signing Tool generates the metadata and signature for the enclave.
4. Run and debug the application in simulation and hardware modes. See Enclave Debugger for more details.
5. Prepare the application and enclave for release.

Writing Enclave Functions
From an application perspective, making an enclave call (ECALL) appears as any other function call when using the untrusted proxy function. Enclave functions are plain C/C++ functions with several limitations.

The user can write enclave functions in C and C++ (native only). Other languages are not supported.

Enclave functions can rely on special versions of the C/C++ runtime libraries, STL, synchronization and several other trusted libraries that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. These trusted libraries are specifically designed to be used inside enclaves.

The user can write or use other trusted libraries, making sure the libraries follow the same rules as the internal enclave functions:

1. Enclave functions can't use all the available 32-bit or 64-bit instructions. To check a list of illegal instructions inside an enclave, see Intel(R)
Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.

2. Enclave functions will only run in user mode (ring 3). Using instructions requiring other CPU privileges will cause the enclave to fault.

3. Function calls within an enclave are possible if the called function is statically linked to the enclave (the function needs to be in the enclave image file). Linux* Shared Objects are not supported.

**CAUTION:**
The enclave signing process will fail if the enclave image contains any unresolved dependencies at build time.

Calling functions outside the enclave is possible using what are called OCALLs. OCALLs are explained in detail in the Calling Functions outside the Enclave section.

**Table 8 Summary of Intel(R) SGX Rules and Limitations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Native C/C++. Enclave interface functions are limited to C (no C++).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to other Shared Objects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to System provided C/C++/STL standard libraries</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A trusted version of these libraries is supplied with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK and they can be used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS API calls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ frameworks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Including MFC*, QT*, Boost* (partially – as long as Boost runtime is not used).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call C++ class methods</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Including C++ classes, static and inline functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic functions</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Supported only if they use supported instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The allowed functions are included in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inline assembly</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Same as the intrinsic functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Template functions</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Support Level</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellipse (...)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varargs (va_list)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only supported in enclave internal functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronization</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a collection of functions/objects for synchronization: spin-lock, mutex, and condition variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threading support</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Creating threads inside the enclave is not supported. Threads that run inside the enclave are created within the (untrusted) application. Spin-locks, trusted mutex and condition variables API can be used for thread synchronization inside the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Local Storage (TLS)</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Only implicitly via __thread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic memory allocation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Enclave memory is a limited resource. Maximum heap size is set at enclave creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ Exceptions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Although they have an impact on performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEH Exceptions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Signals are not supported inside an enclave.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Calling Functions inside the Enclave**

After an enclave is loaded successfully, you get an enclave ID which is provided as a parameter when the ECALLs are performed. Optionally, OCALLs can be performed within an ECALL. For example, assume that you need to compute some secret inside an enclave, the EDL file might look like the following:

```c
// demo.edl
enclave {

    // Add your definition of "secret_t" here
    trusted {
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
```
};

untrusted {
    // This OCALL is for illustration purposes only.
    // It should not be used in a real enclave,
    // unless it is during the development phase
    // for debugging purposes.
    void dump_secret([in] const secret_t* secret);
};

With the above EDL, the sgx_edger8r will generate an untrusted proxy function for the ECALL and a trusted proxy function for the OCALL:

Untrusted proxy function (called by the application):

sgx_status_t get_secret(sgx_enclave_id_t eid, secret_t* secret);

Trusted proxy function (called by the enclave):

sgx_status_t dump_secret(const secret_t* secret);

The generated untrusted proxy function will automatically call into the enclave with the parameters to be passed to the real trusted function get_secret inside the enclave. To initiate an ECALL in the application:

// An enclave call (ECALL) will happen here
secret_t secret;
sgx_status_t status = get_secret(eid, &secret);

The trusted functions inside the enclave can optionally do an OCALL to dump the secret with the trusted proxy dump_secret. It will automatically call out of the enclave with the given parameters to be received by the real untrusted function dump_secret. The real untrusted function needs to be implemented by the developer and linked with the application.
Checking the Return Value

The trusted and untrusted proxy functions return a value of type \texttt{sgx_status_t}. If the proxy function runs successfully, it will return \texttt{SGX_SUCCESS}. Otherwise, it indicates a specific error described in Error Codes section. You can refer to the sample code shipped with the SDK for examples of proper error handling.

Calling Functions outside the Enclave

In some cases, the code within the enclave needs to call external functions which reside in untrusted (unprotected) memory to use operating system capabilities outside the enclave such as system calls, I/O operations, and so on. This type of function call is named OCALL.

These functions need to be declared in the EDL file in the untrusted section. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for more details.

The enclave image is loaded very similarly to how Linux* OS loads shared objects. The function address space of the application is shared with the enclave so the enclave code can indirectly call functions linked with the application that created the enclave. Calling functions from the application directly is not permitted and will raise an exception at runtime.

\textbf{CAUTION:}

The wrapper functions copy the parameters from protected (enclave) memory to unprotected memory as the external function cannot access protected memory regions. In particular, the OCALL parameters are copied into the untrusted stack. Depending on the number of parameters, the OCALL may cause a stack overrun in the untrusted domain. The exception that this event will trigger will appear to come from the code that the \texttt{sgx_eder8r} generates based on the enclave EDL file. However, the exception can be easily detected using the Intel(R) SGX debugger.

\textbf{CAUTION:}

The wrapper functions will copy buffers (memory referenced by pointers) only if these pointers are assigned special attributes in the EDL file.

\textbf{CAUTION:}

Certain trusted libraries distributed with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provide an API that internally makes OCALLs. Currently, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions mutex, condition variable, and CPUID APIs from \texttt{libsgx_tstdc.a} make OCALLs. Similarly, the trusted support library \texttt{libsgx_}
tservice.a, which provides services from the Platform Services Enclave (PSE-Op), also makes OCALLs. Developers who use these APIs must first import the needed OCALL functions from their corresponding EDL files. Otherwise, developers will get a linker error when the enclave is built. See the Importing EDL Libraries for details on how to import OCALL functions from a trusted library EDL file.

**CAUTION:**

To help identify problems caused by missing imports, all OCALL functions used in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK have the suffix `ocall`. For instance, the linker error below indicates that the enclave needs to import the OCALLs `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall()` and `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall()` that are needed in sethread_mutex.obj, which is part of libsgx_tstdc.a.

libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_lock':
sethread_mutex.cpp:109: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall'

libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock':
sethread_mutex.cpp:213: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall'

**CAUTION:**

Accessing protected memory from unprotected memory will result in abort page semantics. This applies to all parts of the protected memory including heap, stack, code and data.

Abort page semantics:

An attempt to read from a non-existent or disallowed resource returns all ones for data (abort page). An attempt to write to a non-existent or disallowed physical resource is dropped. This behavior is unrelated to exception type abort (the others being Fault and Trap).

OCALL functions have the following limitations/rules:

- OCALL functions must be C functions, or C++ functions with C linkage.
- Pointers that reference data within the enclave must be annotated with pointer direction attributes in the EDL file. The wrapper function will
perform shallow copy on these pointers. See Pointers for more information.

- Exceptions will not be caught within the enclave. The user must handle them in the untrusted wrapper function.
- OCALLs cannot have an ellipse (...) or a va_list in their prototype.

**Example 1: The definition of a simple OCALL function**

Step 1 – Add a declaration for foo in the EDL file

```c
// foo.edl
enclave {
    untrusted {
        [cdecl] void foo(int param);
    };
}
```

Step 2 (optional but highly recommended) – write a trusted, user-friendly wrapper. This function is part of the enclave’s trusted code.

The wrapper function ocall_foo function will look like:

```c
// enclave's trusted code
#include "foo_t.h"

void ocall_foo(int param)
{
    // it is necessary to check the return value of foo()
    if (foo(param) != SGX_SUCCESS)
        abort();
}
```

Step 3 – write an untrusted foo function.

```c
// untrusted code

void foo(int param)
{
    // the implementation of foo
}
```

The sgx_edger8r will generate an untrusted bridge function which will call the untrusted function foo automatically. This untrusted bridge and the target untrusted function are part of the application, not the enclave.
Library Development for Enclaves

Trusted library is the term used to refer to a static library designed to be linked with an enclave. The following list describes the features of trusted libraries:

- Trusted libraries are components of an Intel(R) SGX-based solution. They typically undergo a more rigorous threat evaluation and review process than a regular static library.
- A trusted library is developed (or ported) with the specific purpose of being used within an enclave. Therefore, it should not contain instructions that are not supported by the Intel(R) SGX architecture.
- A subset of the trusted library API may also be part of the enclave interface. The trusted library interface that could be exposed to the untrusted domain is defined in an EDL file. If present, this EDL file is a key component of the trusted library.
- A trusted library may have to be shipped with an untrusted library. Functions within the trusted library may make OCALLs outside the enclave. If an external function that the trusted library uses is not provided by the libraries available on the platform, the trusted library will require an untrusted support library.

In summary, a trusted library, in addition to the .a file containing the trusted code and data, may also include an .edl file as well as an untrusted .a file.

This topic describes the process of developing a trusted library and provides an overview of the main steps necessary to build an enclave that uses such a trusted library.

1. The ISV provides a trusted library including the trusted functions (without any edge-routines) and, when necessary, an EDL file and an untrusted support library. To develop a trusted library, an ISV should create an enclave project and choose the library option in the Eclipse plugin. This ensures the library is built with the appropriate settings. The ISV might delete the EDL file from the project if the trusted library only provides an interface to be invoked within an enclave. The ISV should create a standard static library project for the untrusted support library, if required.
2. Add a “from/import” statement with the library EDL file path and name to the enclave EDL file. The import statement indicates which trusted
functions (ECALLs) from the library may be called from outside the enclave and which untrusted functions (OCALLs) are called from within the trusted library. You may import all ECALLs and OCALLs from the trusted library or select a specific subset of them.

A library EDL file may import additional library EDL files building a hierarchical structure. For additional details, See Importing EDL Libraries.

3. During the enclave build process, the `sgx_edger8r` generates proxy/bridge code for all the trusted and untrusted functions. The generated code accounts for the functions declared in the enclave EDL file as well as any imported trusted library EDL file.

4. The trusted library and trusted proxy/bridge functions are linked to the enclave code.

**NOTE:**
If you use the wildcard option to import a trusted library, the resulting enclave contains the trusted bridge functions for all ECALLs and their corresponding implementations. The linker will not be able to optimize this code out.

5. The Intel(R) SGX application is linked to the untrusted proxy/bridge code. Similarly, when the wildcard import option is used, the untrusted bridge functions for all the OCALLs will be linked in.

**Avoiding Name Collisions**
An application may be designed to work with multiple enclaves. In this scenario, each enclave would still be an independent compilation unit resulting in a separate SO file.

Enclaves, like regular SO files, should provide a unique interface to avoid name collisions when an untrusted application is linked with the edge-routines of several enclaves. The `sgx_edger8r` prevents name collisions among OCALL functions because it automatically prepends the enclave name to the names of the untrusted bridge functions. However, ISVs must ensure the uniqueness of the ECALL function names across enclaves to prevent collisions among ECALL functions.

Despite having unique ECALL function names, name collision may also occur as the result of developing an Intel(R) SGX application. This happens because an enclave cannot import another SO file. When two enclaves import the same ECALL function from a trusted library, the set of edge-routines for each
enclave will contain identical untrusted proxy functions and marshaling data structures for the imported ECALL. Thus, the linker will emit an error when the application is linked with these two sets of edge-routines. To build an application with more than one enclave when these enclaves import the same ECALL from a trusted library, ISVs have to:

1. Provide the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`, which will prepend the enclave name to the untrusted proxy function names. For instance, when an enclave uses the local attestation trusted library sample code included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK, the enclave EDL file must be parsed with the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`. See Local Attestation for additional details.
2. Prefix all ECALLs in their untrusted code with the enclave name, matching the new proxy function names.

**Linking Enclave with Libraries**

This topic introduces how to link an enclave with the following types of libraries:

- Dynamic libraries
- Static Libraries
- Simulation Libraries

**Dynamic Libraries**

An enclave shared object must not depend on any dynamically linked library in any way. The enclave loader has been intentionally designed to prohibit dynamic linking of libraries within an enclave. The protection of an enclave is dependent upon obtaining an accurate measurement of all code and data that is placed into the enclave at load time; thus, dynamic linking would add complexity without providing any benefit over static linking.

---

**CAUTION:**

The enclave image signing process will fail if the enclave file has any unresolved dependencies.

---

**Static Libraries**

You can link with static libraries as long as they do not have any dependencies.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of trusted libraries.
Table 9 Trusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_trts.a</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX internals</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_trts_sim.a</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX internals (simulation mode)</td>
<td>Must link when running in simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tstdc.a</td>
<td>Standard C library (math, string, and so on.)</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tsetjmp.a</td>
<td>Provides setjmp and longjmp functions to be used to perform non-local jumps</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tstdcxx.a</td>
<td>Standard C++ libraries, STL</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a</td>
<td>Data seal/unseal (encryption), trusted Architectural Enclaves support, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EC DH) library, and so on.</td>
<td>Must link when using HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</td>
<td>The counterpart of libsgx_tservice.a for simulation mode</td>
<td>Must link when using simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tcrypto.a</td>
<td>Cryptographic library</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tkey_exchange.a</td>
<td>Trusted key exchange library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simulation Libraries
The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides simulation libraries to run application enclaves in simulation mode (Intel(R) SGX hardware is not required). There are an untrusted simulation library and a trusted simulation library. The untrusted simulation library provides the functionality that the untrusted runtime library requires to manage an enclave linked with the trusted simulation library, including the simulation of the Intel(R) SGX instructions executed outside the enclave: ECREATE, EADD, EEXTEND, EINIT, EREMOVE, and EENTER. The trusted simulation library is primarily responsible for simulating the Intel(R) SGX instructions that can execute inside an enclave: EEXIT, EGETKEY, and EREPORT.

NOTE
Simulation mode does not require the Intel SGX support in the CPU. However, the processor must support the SSE 4.1 instructions at least.

Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries
The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of untrusted libraries.

Table 10 Untrusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_urts.so</td>
<td>Provides functionality for applications to manage enclaves</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode. libsgx_urts.so is included in Intel(R) SGX PSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_urts_sim.so</td>
<td>uRTS library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_uae_service.so</td>
<td>Provides both enclaves and untrusted applications access to services provided by the AEs</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode. libsgx_uae_service.so is included in Intel(R) SGX PSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_uae_service_sim.so</td>
<td>Untrusted AE support library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_ukey_exchange.a</td>
<td>Untrusted key exchange library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Definition Language Syntax**

Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files are meant to describe enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototypes. Edger8r Tool uses this file to create C wrapper functions for both enclave exports (used by ECALLs) and imports (used by OCALLs).

**EDL Template**

```c
enclave {
    //Include files

    //Import other edl files

    //Data structure declarations to be used as parameters of the
    //function prototypes in edl
```
trusted {
    // Include header files if any
    // Will be included in enclave_t.h

    // Trusted function prototypes
};

untrusted {
    // Include header files if any
    // Will be included in enclave_u.h

    // Untrusted function prototypes
};

The trusted block is optional only if it is used as a library EDL, and this EDL
would be imported by other EDL files. However the untrusted block is always
optional.

Every EDL file follows this generic format:

enclave {
    // An EDL file can optionally import functions from
    // other EDL files
    from "other/file.edl" import foo, bar;  // selective importing
    from "another/file.edl" import *;      // import all functions

    // Include C headers, these headers will be included in the
    // generated files for both trusted and untrusted routines
    include "string.h"
    include "mytypes.h"

    // Type definitions (struct, union, enum), optional
    struct mysecret {
        int key;
        const char* text;
    };
    enum boolean { FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1 };

    // Export functions (ECALLs), optional for library EDLs
    trusted {
        // Include header files if any
        // Will be included in enclave_t.h

        // Trusted function prototypes
        public void set_secret([in] struct mysecret* psecret);
    };
}
void some_private_func(enum boolean b); // private ECALL (non-root ECALL).
);

// Import functions (OCALLs), optional untrusted {

    //Include header files if any
    //Will be included in enclave_u.h
    //Will be inserted in untrusted header file
    "untrusted.h"

    //Untrusted function prototypes

    // This OCALL is not allowed to make another ECALL.
    void ocall_print();

    // This OCALL can make an ECALL to function
    // "some_private_func".
    int another_ocall([in] struct mysecret* psecret)
    allow(some_private_func);

};

Comments
Both types of C/C++ comments are valid.

Example

enclave {

    include "stdio.h" // include stdio header
    include "../../util.h" /* this header defines some custom public
    types */
}

Include Headers
Include C headers which define types (C structs, unions, typedefs, etc.); otherwise auto generated code cannot be compiled if these types are referenced in EDL. The included header file can be global or belong to trusted functions or untrusted functions only.

A global included header file doesn't mean that the same header file is included in the enclave and untrusted application code. In this case, the enclave will use the stdio.h from the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. While the application code will use the stdio.h shipped with the host compiler.
Using the `include` directive is convenient when developers are migrating existing code to the Intel SGX technology, since data types are defined already in this case. Similar to other IDL languages like Microsoft* interface definition language (MIDL*) and CORBA* interface definition language (OMG-IDL), a user can define data types inside the EDL file and `sgx_edger8r` will generate a C header file with the data type definitions. For a list of supported data types with in EDL, see Basic Types.

**Syntax**

```
include "filename.h"
```

**Example**

```c
enclave {
    include "stdio.h"       // global headers
    include "../..util.h"

    trusted {
        include "foo.h"  // for trusted functions only
    };

    untrusted {
        include "bar.h"  // for untrusted functions only
    };
}
```

**Keywords**

The identifiers listed in the following table are reserved for use as keywords of the Enclave Definition Language.

**Table 11 EDL Reserved Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>char</th>
<th>short</th>
<th>int</th>
<th>float</th>
<th>double</th>
<th>void</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>int8_t</td>
<td>int16_t</td>
<td>int32_t</td>
<td>int64_t</td>
<td>size_t</td>
<td>wchar_t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>uint8_t</td>
<td>uint16_t</td>
<td>uint32_t</td>
<td>uint64_t</td>
<td>unsigned</td>
<td>struct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointer Parameter Handling</td>
<td>in</td>
<td>out</td>
<td>user_check</td>
<td>count</td>
<td>size</td>
<td>readonly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>isptr</td>
<td>sizefunc</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>wstring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Basic Types

EDL supports the following basic types:

- `char`, `short`, `long`, `int`, `float`, `double`, `void`, `int8_t`, `int16_t`, `int32_t`, `int64_t`, `size_t`, `wchar_t`, `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t`, `uint64_t`, `unsigned`, `struct`, `enum`, `union`.

It also supports `long long` and `64-bit` `long double`.

Basic data types can be modified using the C modifiers:

- `const`, `*`, `[[]].`  

Additional types can be defined by including a C header file.

**Structures, Enums and Unions**

Basic types and user defined data types can be used inside the structure/union except it differs from the standard in the following ways:

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```c
enclave{
    //1. Each member of the structure has to be defined separately
    struct data_def_t{
        int a, b, c; // Not allowed
        int a;        // It has to be int a; int b; int c;
    };

    //2. Bit fields in structures/unions are not allowed.
    struct bitfields_t{
        short i : 3;
        short j : 6;
        short k : 7;
    };

    //3. Nested structure definition is not allowed
    struct my_struct_t{
```
int out_val;
float out_fval;
struct inner_struct_t{
  int in_val;
  float in_fval;
};
};

Valid Syntax:

enclave{

  include "user_types.h" // for ufloat: typedef float ufloat

  struct struct_foo_t {
    uint32_t struct_foo_0;
    uint64_t struct_foo_1;
  };

  enum enum_foo_t {
    ENUM_FOO_0 = 0,
    ENUM_FOO_1 = 1
  };

  union union_foo_t {
    uint32_t union_foo_0;
    uint32_t union_foo_1;
    uint64_t union_foo_3;
  };

  trusted {

    public void test_char(char val);
    public void test_int(int val);
    public void test_long(long long val);

    public void test_float(float val);
    public void test_ufloat(ufloat val);
    public void test_double(double val);
    public void test_long_double(long double val);

    public void test_size_t(size_t val);
    public void test_wchar_t(wchar_t val);

    public void test_struct(struct struct_foo_t val);
    public void test_struct2(struct struct_foo_t val);

    public void test_enum(enum enum_foo_t val);
    public void test_enum2(enum enum_foo_t val);

    public void test_union(union union_foo_t val);
    public void test_union2(union union_foo_t val);
  }
}
};

Pointers
EDL defines several attributes that can be used with pointers:

in, out, user_check, string, wstring, size, count, sizefunc, isptr, readonly.

Each of them is explained in the following topics.

---

CAUTION:
The pointer attributes explained in this topic apply to ECALL and OCALL function parameters exclusively, not to the pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function. Thus, pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function are not checked by the edge-routines and must be verified by the enclave and application code.

---

Pointer Handling
Pointers should be decorated with either a pointer direction attribute in, out or a user_check attribute explicitly. The [in] and [out] serve as direction attributes.

- [in] – when [in] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is passed from the calling procedure to the called procedure. For an ECALL the in parameter is passed from the application to the enclave, for an OCALL the parameter is passed from the enclave to the application.
- [out] – when [out] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is returned from the called procedure to the calling procedure. In an ECALL function an out parameter is passed from the enclave to the application and an OCALL function passes it from the application to the enclave.
- [in] and [out] attributes may be combined. In this case the parameter is passed in both directions.

The direction attribute instructs the trusted edge-routines (trusted bridge and trusted proxy) to copy the buffer pointed by the pointer. In order to copy the buffer contents, the trusted edge-routines have to know how much data needs to be copied. For this reason, the direction attribute is usually followed by a size, count or sizefunc modifier. If neither of these is provided nor
the pointer is NULL, the trusted edge-routine assumes a count of one. When a buffer is being copied, the trusted bridge must avoid overwriting enclave memory in an ECALL and the trusted proxy must avoid leaking secrets in an OCALL. To accomplish this goal, pointers passed as ECALL parameters must point to untrusted memory and pointers passed as OCALL parameters must point to trusted memory. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trusted bridge and the trusted proxy will report an error at runtime, respectively, and the ECALL and OCALL functions will not be executed.

You may use the direction attribute to trade protection for performance. Otherwise, you must use the user_check attribute described below and validate the data obtained from untrusted memory via pointers before using it, since the memory a pointer points to could change unexpectedly because it is stored in untrusted memory. However, the direction attribute does not help with structures that contain pointers. In this scenario, you have to validate and copy the buffer contents, recursively if needed, yourself.

**Example**

```java
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_ecall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in([in] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_out([out] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    }
    untrusted {
        void test_ocall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in([in] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    }
}
```

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```java
enclave {
    trusted {
```
// Pointers without a direction attribute
// or 'user_check' are not allowed
public void test_ecall_not(int * ptr);

// Function pointers are not allowed
public void test_ecall_func([in] int (*func_ptr)());
}

In the example shown above:

For ECALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ecall_user_check, the pointer
  ptr will not be verified; you should verify the pointer passed to the trusted function. The buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to inside buffer either.
- [in]: In the function test_ecall_in, a buffer with the same size as the data type of ‘ptr’(int) will be allocated inside the enclave. Content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied into the new allocated memory inside. Any changes performed inside the enclave will not be visible to the untrusted application.
- [out]: In the function test_ecall_out, a buffer with the same size as the data type of ‘ptr’(int) will be allocated inside the enclave, but the content pointed to by ptr, one integer value will not be copied. Instead, it will be initialized to zero. After the trusted function returns, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer pointed to by ptr.
- [in, out]: In the function test_ecall_in_out, a buffer with the same size will be allocated inside the enclave, the content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer.

For OCALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ocall_user_check, the pointer
  ptr will not be verified; the buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to an outside buffer. Besides, the application cannot read/modify the memory pointed to by ptr, if ptr points to enclave memory.
- [in]: In the function test_ocall_in, a buffer with the same size as the data type of ptr(int) will be allocated in the 'application' side (untrusted
Content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied into the newly allocated memory outside. Any changes performed by the application will not be visible inside the enclave.

- **[out]**: In the function `test_ocall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated on the application side (untrusted side) and its content will be initialized to zero. After the untrusted function returns, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied to the enclave buffer pointed to by `ptr`.

- **[in, out]**: In the function `test_ocall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated in the application side, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied into the inside enclave buffer.

The following table summarizes behavior of wrapper functions when using the `in/out` attributes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>ECALL</strong></th>
<th><strong>OCALL</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>user_check</td>
<td>Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy.</td>
<td>Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in</td>
<td>Buffer copied from the application into the enclave. Afterwards, changes will only affect the buffer inside enclave. Safe but slow.</td>
<td>Buffer copied from the enclave to the application. Must be used if pointer points to enclave data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out</td>
<td>Trusted wrapper function will allocate a buffer to be used by the enclave. Upon return, this buffer will be copied to the original buffer.</td>
<td>The untrusted buffer will be copied into the enclave by the trusted wrapper function. Safe but slow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in, out</td>
<td>Combines in and out behavior. Data is copied back and forth.</td>
<td>Same as ECALLs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDL cannot analyze C typedefs and macros found in C headers. If a pointer type is aliased to a type/macro that does not have an asterisk (*), the EDL parser may report an error or not properly copy the pointer’s data.

In such cases, declare the function prototype to use types that have an asterisk.

**Example:**

```c
// Error, PVOID is not a pointer in EDL
```
void foo([in, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK
void foo([in, size=4] void* buffer);
// OK, “isptr” indicates “PVOID” is pointer type
void foo([in, isptr, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK, opaque type, copy by value
// Actual address must be in untrusted memory
void foo(HWND hWnd);

**Pointer Handling in ECalls**

In ECALLs, the trusted bridge checks that the marshaling structure does not overlap with the enclave memory, and automatically allocates space on the trusted stack to hold a copy of the structure. Then it checks that pointer parameters with their full range do not overlap with the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the in attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave and copies the memory pointed to by the pointer from outside to the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the out attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates a buffer in the trusted memory, zeroes the buffer contents to clear any previous data and passes a pointer to this buffer to the trusted function. After the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to untrusted memory. When the in and out attributes are combined, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the trusted memory before calling the trusted function, and once the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to the untrusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

**NOTE:**

When an ECALL with a pointer parameter with out attribute returns, the trusted bridge always copies data from the buffer in enclave memory to the buffer outside. You must clear all sensitive data from that buffer on failure.

Before the trusted bridge returns, it frees all the trusted heap memory allocated at the beginning of the ECALL function for pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted bridge after it returns results in undefined behavior.
**Pointer Handling in OCALLs**

For OCALLs, the trusted proxy allocates memory on the outside stack to pass the marshaling structure and checks that the pointer parameters with their full range are within enclave. When a pointer to trusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave and copies the memory pointed by the pointer from inside the enclave to the untrusted memory. When a pointer to the trusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates a buffer on the untrusted stack, and passes a pointer to this buffer to the untrusted function. After the untrusted function returns, the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the untrusted memory before calling the untrusted function, and after the untrusted function returns the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

When the trusted proxy function returns, it frees all the untrusted stack memory allocated at the beginning of the OCALL function for the pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted proxy after it returns results in undefined behavior.

**Attribute: user_check**

In certain situations, the restrictions imposed by the direction attribute may not support the application needs for data communication across the enclave boundary. For instance, a buffer might be too large to fit in enclave memory and needs to be fragmented into smaller blocks that are then processed in a series of ECALLs, or an application might require passing a pointer to trusted memory (enclave context) as an ECALL parameter.

To support these specific scenarios, the EDL language provides the `user_check` attribute. Parameters declared with the `user_check` attribute do not undergo any of the checks described for `[in]` and `[out]` attributes. However, you must understand the risks associated with passing pointers in and out the enclave, in general, and the `user_check` attribute, in particular. You must ensure that all the pointer checking and data copying are done correctly or risk compromising enclave secrets.
**Buffer Size Calculation**

The generalized formula for calculating the buffer size using these attributes:

\[ \text{Total number of bytes} = \text{count} \times \text{size} \]

- The above formula holds when both `count` and `size:sizefunc` are specified.
- `size` can be specified by either `size` or `sizefunc` attribute.
- If `count` is not specified for the pointer parameter, then it is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e., `count=1`. Then total number of bytes equals to `size:sizefunc`.
- If `size` is not specified, then the buffer size is calculated using the above formula where `size` is `sizeof (element pointed by the pointer)`.

**Attribute: size**

The `size` attribute is used to indicate the buffer size in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute ([in]/[out]) (when there is no `count` attribute specified). This attribute is needed because the trusted bridge needs to know the whole range of the buffer passed as a pointer to ensure it does not overlap with the enclave memory, and to copy the contents of the buffer from untrusted memory to trusted memory and/or vice versa depending on the direction attribute. The size may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function. `size` attribute is generally used for `void` pointers.

**Example**

```
enum
    enclave{
        trusted {

            // Copies '100' bytes
            public void test_size1([in, size=100] void* ptr, size_t len);

            // Copies 'len' bytes
            public void test_size2([in, size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
        }
    }
```

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```
enclave{
    trusted {
```
// size/count/sizefunc attributes must be used with
// pointer direction ([in, out])
void test_attribute_cant([size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
}

**Attribute: sizefunc**

The `sizefunc` attribute modifier depends on a user defined trusted function which is called by the edge-routines to get the number of bytes to be copied. The `sizefunc` has similar functionality as the `sizeof()` operator. An example of where `sizefunc` can be used is for marshaling variable-length structures, which are buffers whose total size is specified by a combination of values stored at well-defined locations inside the buffer (although typically it is at a single location). To prevent “check first, use later” type of attacks, `sizefunc` is called twice. In the first call, `sizefunc` operates in untrusted memory. The second time, `sizefunc` operates in the data copied into trusted memory. If the sizes returned by the two `sizefunc` calls do not match, the trusted bridge will cancel the ECALL and will report an error to the untrusted application. Note that `sizefunc` must not be combined with the `size` attribute. `sizefunc` cannot be used with `out` alone, however `sizefunc` with both `in` and `out` is accepted. Additionally, users cannot define `sizefunc` as `strlen` or `wcslen`. In all these scenarios, the `sgx_edger8r` will throw an error. Strings should not be passed with the `sizefunc` modifier, but with the `string` or `wstring` keyword. `sizefunc` can be used with the `count` attribute which gives the total length to be equal to `sizefunc` * `count`. The following is the prototype of the trusted `sizefunc` that you need to define inside the enclave:

```c
size_t sizefunc_function_name(const parameter_type * p);
```

Where `parameter_type` is the data type of the parameter annotated with the `sizefunc` attribute. If you do not provide the definition of the `sizefunc` function, the linker will report an error.

---

**NOTE**

The function implementing a `sizefunc` should validate the input pointer carefully, before using it. Since the function is called before the pointer is checked by the generated code.

**Example**

```c
enclave{
    trusted {
```
// Copies get_packet_size bytes
// User must provide a function definition that matches
// size_t get_packet_size(const void* ptr);
void test_sizefunc([in, sizefunc=get_packet_size] void* ptr);

// Copies (get_packet_size * cnt) bytes
void test_sizefunc2(
    [in, sizefunc=get_packet_size, count=cnt] void* ptr,
    unsigned cnt);
}

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    include "user_types.h"

trusted {
    // Cannot use sizefunc and size together
    void test_sizefunc_size(  
        [in, size=100, sizefunc=packet_len] header* h);

    // Cannot use strlen or wcslen as sizefunc
    void test_sizefunc_strlen([in, sizefunc=strlen] header* h);  
    void test_sizefuncwcslen([in, sizefuncwcslen] header* h);
}

Attribute: count

The count attribute is used to indicate a block of sizeof element pointed by the pointer in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute. The count and size attribute modifiers serve the same purpose. The number of bytes copied by the trusted bridge or trusted proxy is the product of the count and the size of the data type to which the parameter points. The count may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function.

The size and count attribute modifiers may also be combined. In this case, the trusted edge-routine will copy a number of bytes that is the product of the count and size parameters (size*count) specified in the function declaration in the EDL file.

Example

enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies cnt * sizeof(int) bytes
        public void test_count([in, count=cnt] int* ptr, unsigned cnt);
    }
}
// Copies cnt * len bytes
public void test_count_size([in, count=cnt, size=len] int* ptr, unsigned cnt, size_t len);
);

Strings

The attributes string and wstring indicate that the parameter is a NULL terminated C string or a NULL terminated wchar_t string, respectively. To prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, the trusted edge-routine first operates in untrusted memory to determine the length of the string. Once the string has been copied into the enclave, the trusted bridge explicitly NULL terminates the string. The size of the buffer allocated in trusted memory accounts for the length determined in the first step as well as the size of the string termination character.

NOTE

The string and wstring attributes must not be combined with any other modifier such as size, count or sizefunc. string and wstring cannot be used with out alone. In all these cases, the sgx_edger8r will report an error. However, string and wstring with both in and out are accepted.

Example

enclave {

    trusted {

        // Cannot use [out] with "string/wstring" alone
        // Using [in], or [in, out] is acceptable
        public void test_string([in, out, string] char* str);

        public void test_wstring([in, out, wstring] char* wstr);

        public void test_const_string([in, string] const char* str);

    };

}

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {

    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;

    trusted {


In the first example, when the string attribute is used for function `test_string`, `strlen(str)+1` is used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave. The extra byte is for null termination.

In the function `test_wstring`, `wcslen(str)+1` (two-byte units) will be used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave.

**User Defined Data Types**

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports user defined data types, but should be defined in a header file. Any basic datatype which is typedef'ed into another becomes a user defined data type.

Some user data types need to be annotated with special EDL attributes, such as `isptr`, `isary` and `readonly`. If one of these attributes is missing when a user-defined type parameter requires it so, the compiler will emit a compilation error in the code that `sgx_edger8r` generates.

- When there is a user defined data type for a pointer, `isptr` is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is a pointer. See Pointers for more information.

- When there is a user defined data type for arrays, `isary` is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is an array. See Arrays for more information.

- When an ECALL or OCALL parameter is a user defined type of a pointer to a const data type, the parameter should be annotated with the `readonly` attribute.

**Example**

enclave {

include "user_types.h" // for typedef void * pBuf;
    // and typedef void const * pBuf2;
    // and typedef int uArray[10];

trusted {

    public void test_isptr(
        [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf pBufptr,
        size_t len);

    public void test_isptr_readonly(
        [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
        pBuf2ptr,
        size_t len);

    public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr,
        size_t len);
    }
};

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {

    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
    // and typedef int uArray[10];

trusted {

    // Cannot use [out] when using [readonly] attribute
    void test_isptr_readonly_cant(
        [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
        pBuf2ptr,
        size_t len);

    // User-defined array types need "isary"
    public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr,
        size_t len);
    }
};

In the function test_isptr_readonly,pBuf2 (typedef void const * pBuf2) is a user defined pointer type, so isptr is used to indicate that it is a user defined type. Also, the pBuff2ptr is readonly, so you cannot use the out attribute. The size attribute indicates the number of bytes to be copied to the enclave memory.

**const Keyword**

The EDL language accepts the **const** keyword with the same meaning as the **const** keyword in the C standard. However, the support for this keyword is limited in the EDL language. It may only be used with pointers and as the outermost qualifier. This satisfies the most important usage in Intel(R) SGX,
is to detect conflicts between const pointers (pointers to const data) with the out attribute. Other forms of the const keyword supported in the C standard are not supported in the EDL language.

Arrays
The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports multidimensional, fixed-size arrays to be used in data structure definition and parameter declaration. Zero-length array and flexible array member, however, are not supported. The special attribute isary is used to designate function parameters that are of a user defined type array.

Example

```c
enclave {
    include "user_types.h"  //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {
        public void test_array([in] int arr[4]);
        public void test_array_multi([in] int arr[4][4]);
        public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
    }
}
```

Unsupported Syntax:

```c
enclave {
    include "user_types.h"  //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {
        // Flexible array is not supported
        public void test_flexible(int arr[][4]);

        // Zero-length array is not supported.
        public void test_zero(int arr[0]);

        // User-defined array types need "isary"
        public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
    }
}
```
Support for arrays also includes attributes [in], [out] and [user_check], which are similar in usage to the pointers.

Preprocessor Capability
The EDL language supports macro definition and conditional compilation directives. To provide this capability, the sgx_edger8r first uses the compiler preprocessor to parse the EDL file. Once all preprocessor tokens have been translated, the sgx_edger8r then parses the resulting file as regular EDL language. This means that developers may define simple macros and use conditional compilation directives to easily remove debug and test capabilities from production enclaves, reducing the attack surface of an enclave. See the following EDL example.

```c
#define SGX_DEBUG

enclave {
    trusted {
        // ECALL definitions
    }
    untrusted {
        // OCALL definitions
    }
    #ifdef SGX_DEBUG
        void print([in, string] const char * str);
    #endif
}
```

The current sgx_edger8r does not propagate macro definitions from the EDL file into the generated edge-routines. As a result, you need to duplicate macro definitions in both the EDL file as well as in the compiler arguments or other source files.

We recommend you only use simple macro definitions and conditional compilation directives in your EDL files.

The sgx_edger8r uses gcc to parse macros and conditional compilation directives that might be in the EDL file. You may override the default search behavior or even specify a different preprocessor with the --preprocessor option.

Propagating errno in OCALLs
OCALLs may use the propagate_errno attribute. When you use this attribute, the sgx_edger8r produces slightly different edge-routines. The errno
variable inside the enclave, which is provided by the trusted Standard C library, is overwritten with the value of errno in the untrusted domain before the OCALL returns. The trusted errno is updated upon OCALL completion regardless whether the OCALL was successful or not. This does not change the fundamental behavior of errno. A function that fails must set errno to indicate what went wrong. A function that succeeds, in this case the OCALL, is allowed to change the value of errno.

Example

```c
enclave {
    include "sgx_stdio_stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions

    trusted {
        public void test_file_io(void);
    }

    untrusted {

        FILE * fopen(
            [in,string] const char * filename,
            [in,string] const char * mode) propagate_errno;

        int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream) propagate_errno;

        size_t fwrite(
            [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buffer,
            size_t size,
            size_t count,
            [user_check]FILE * stream) propagate_errno;
    }
}
```

Importing EDL Libraries

You can implement export and import functions in external trusted libraries, akin to static libraries in the untrusted domain. To add these functions to an enclave, use the enclave definition language (EDL) library import mechanism.

Use the EDL keywords from and import to add a library EDL file to an enclave EDL file is done.

The from keyword specifies the location of the library EDL file. Relative and full paths are accepted. Relative paths are relative to the location of the EDL file.
The `import` keyword specifies the functions to import. An asterisk (*) can be used to import all functions from the library. More than one function can be imported by writing a list of function names separated by commas.

**Syntax**

```
from "lib_filename.edl" import func_name, func2_name;
```

Or

```
from "lib_filename.edl" import *;
```

**Example**

```enclave {
    from "secure_comms.edl" import send_email, send_sms;
    from ". '/../sys/other_secure_comms.edl" import *
};
```

A library EDL file may import another EDL file, which in turn, may import another EDL file, creating a hierarchical structure as shown below:

```// enclave.edl
enclave {
    from "other/file_L1.edl" import *; // Import all functions
};
```

```
// Trusted library file_L1.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L2.edl" import *

    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
    }
};
```

```
// Trusted library file_L2.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L3.edl" import *

    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
    }
};
```
trusted {
    public void test_ptr(int* ptr);
};

// Trusted library file_L3.edl
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_float(float flt);
    }
};

Granting Access to ECalls
The default behavior is that ECALL functions cannot be called by any of the untrusted functions.
To enable an ECALL to be directly called by application code as a root ECALL, the ECALL should be explicitly decorated with the `public` keyword to be a public ECALL. Without this keyword, the ECALLs will be treated as private ECALLs, and cannot be directly called as root ECALLs.

Syntax
trusted {
    public <function prototype>;
};

An enclave EDL must have one or more public ECALLs, otherwise the Enclave functions cannot be called at all and `sgx_edger8r` will report an error in this case.
To grant an OCALL function access to an ECALL function, specify this access using the `allow` keyword. Both public and private ECALLs can be put into the allow list.

Syntax
untrusted {
    <function prototype> allow (func_name, func2_name, ...);
};

Example
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void clear_secret();
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
        void set_secret([in] secret_t* secret);
    };
    untrusted {
        void replace_secret(
            [in] secret_t* new_secret,
            [out] secret_t* old_secret)
        allow (set_secret, clear_secret);
    };
};

In the above example, the untrusted code is granted different access permission to the ECALLs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECALL</th>
<th>called as root ECALL</th>
<th>called from replace_secret</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clear_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set_secret</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Configuration File**

The enclave configuration file is an XML file containing the user defined parameters of an enclave. This XML file is part of the enclave project. A tool named *sgx_sign* uses this file as an input to create the signature and metadata for the enclave. Here is an example of the configuration file:

```
<EnclaveConfiguration>
    <ProdID>100</ProdID>
    <ISVSVN>1</ISVSVN>
    <StackMaxSize>0x50000</StackMaxSize>
    <HeapMaxSize>0x100000</HeapMaxSize>
    <TCSNum>1</TCSNum>
    <TCSPolicy>1</TCSPolicy>
    <DisableDebug>0</DisableDebug>
    <MiscSelect>0</MiscSelect>
    <MiscMask>0xFFFFFFFF</MiscMask>
</EnclaveConfiguration>
```

The table below lists the elements defined in the configuration file. All of them are optional. Without a configuration file or if an element is not present in the configuration file, the default value will be used.

**Table 13 Enclave Configuration Default Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ProdID</td>
<td>ISV assigned Product ID.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISVSVN</td>
<td>ISV assigned SVN.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSNum</td>
<td>The number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSPolicy</td>
<td>TCS management policy.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 – TCS is bound to the untrusted thread.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 – TCS is not bound to the untrusted thread.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StackMaxSize</td>
<td>The maximum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.</td>
<td>0x40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HeapMaxSize</td>
<td>The maximum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.</td>
<td>0x100000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DisableDebug</td>
<td>Enclave cannot be debugged.</td>
<td>0 - Enclave can be debugged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiscSelect</td>
<td>The desired Misc feature.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiscMask</td>
<td>The mask bits for the Misc feature.</td>
<td>0xFFFFFFFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MiscSelect and MiscMask are for future functional extension. Currently, MiscSelect must be 0. Otherwise the corresponding enclave may not be loaded successfully.

To avoid wasting the valuable protected memory resource, you can properly adjust the StackMaxSize and HeapMaxSize by using the measurement tool sgx_emmt. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for details.

An Eclipse* plug-in named SGX Update Configuration is provided to help you easily edit your configuration file. See the Intel(R) SGX Eclipse* Plug-in User's Guide from the Eclipse's Help content for details.

If there is no enough stack for the enclave, ECALL returns the error code SGX _ ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN. This error code gives the information to enclave writer that the StackMaxSize may need further adjustment.

**Enclave Project Configurations**

Depending on the development stage you are at, choose one of the following project configurations to build an enclave:

- Simulation: Under the *simulation* mode the enclave can be either built with debug or release compiler settings. However, in both cases the enclave is launched in the *enclave debug* mode. The Eclipse* plugin
provides the **SGX Simulation** and **SGX Simulation Debug** configuration options to enable compiling and launching the enclave in the simulation mode. From the command line, an enclave can be built in this mode by passing `SGX_DEBUG=1` for debug simulation and no parameters for release simulation. This is the default build mode. Single-step signing is the default method to sign a simulation enclave.

- **Debug:** When the **SGX Hardware Debug** configuration option is selected for an enclave project in Eclipse* plugin, the enclave is compiled in the debug mode and the resulting enclave file will contain debug information and symbols. To use this configuration for an enclave, set `SGX_MODE=HW` and `SGX_DEBUG=1` as parameters to the Makefile during the build. Choosing this project configuration also allows the enclave to be launched in the **enclave debug** mode. This is facilitated by enabling the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` that is passed as one of the parameters to the `sgx_create_enclave` function. Single-step method is the default signing method for this project configuration. The signing key used in this mode does not need to be white-listed.

- **Prerelease:** When you choose the **SGX Hardware Prerelease** configuration option for an enclave project, Eclipse* plugin will build the enclave in release mode with compiler optimizations applied. An enclave is built in this mode by setting `SGX_MODE=HW` and `SGX_PRERELEASE=1` in the Makefile during build. Under this configuration, the enclave is launched in **enclave debug** mode. The Makefile of the sample application defines the `EDEBUG` flag when `SGX_PRERELEASE=1` is passed as a command line parameter to the Makefile during build. When the `EDEBUG` preprocessor flag is defined, it enables the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`, which in turn, launches the enclave in the **enclave debug** mode. Single-step method is also the default signing method for the **Prerelease** project configuration. Like in the **Debug** configuration, the signing key does not need to be white-listed either.

- **Release:** The **SGX Hardware Release** configuration option for an Eclipse plugin enclave project compiles the enclave in the release mode and launches the enclave in the **enclave release** mode. This is done by disabling the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`. This mode is enabled in enclave by passing `SGX_MODE=HW` to the Makefile while building the project. `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is only enabled when `NDEBUG` is not defined or `EDEBUG` is
defined. In the debug configuration NDEBUG is undefined and hence SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is enabled. In the prerelease configuration NDEBUG and EDEBUG are both defined, which enables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. In the release mode, configuration NDEBUG is defined and hence it disables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG thereby launching the enclave in enclave release mode. Two-step method is the default signing method for the Release configuration. The enclave needs to be signed with a white-listed key.

For additional information on the different enclave signing methods, see Enclave Signing Tool and Enclave Signing Examples

**Loading and Unloading an Enclave**

Enclave source code is built as a shared object. To use an enclave, the enclave.so should be loaded into protected memory by calling the API sgx_create_enclave(). The enclave.so must be signed by sgx_sign. When loading an enclave for the first time, the loader will get a launch token and save it back to the in/out parameter token. The user can save the launch token into a file, so that when loading an enclave for the second time, the application can get the launch token from the saved file. Providing a valid launch token can enhance the load performance. To unload an enclave, the user must call sgx_destroy_enclave() interface with parameter sgx_enclave_id_t.

The sample code to load and unload an Enclave is shown below.

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include "sgx Urts.h"

#define ENCLAVE_FILE_T("Enclave.signed.so")

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid;
    sgx_status_t ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
    sgx_launch_token_t token = {0};
    int updated = 0;

    // Create the Enclave with above launch token.
```
ret = sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILE, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token, &updated, &eid, NULL);
if (ret != SGX_SUCCESS) {
    printf("App: error %#x, failed to create enclave.\n", ret);
    return -1;
}

// A bunch of Enclave calls (ECALL) will happen here.

// Destroy the enclave when all Enclave calls finished.
if (SGX_SUCCESS != sgx_destroy_enclave(eid))
    return -1;

return 0;

Handling Power Events
The protected memory encryption keys that are stored within an SGX-enabled CPU are destroyed with every power event, including suspend and hibernation.

Thus, when a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all enclave data will not be accessible after that. As a result, when the system resumes, any subsequent ECALL will fail returning the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST. This specific error code indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An SGX application should have the capability to handle any power transition that might occur while the enclave is loaded in protected memory. To handle the power event and resume enclave execution with minimum impact, the application must be prepared to receive the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST when an ECALL fails. When this happens, one and only one thread from the application must destroy the enclave, sgx_destroy_enclave(), and reload it again, sgx_create_enclave(). In addition, to resume execution from where it was when the enclave was destroyed, the application should periodically seal and save enclave state information on the platform and use this information to restore the enclave to its original state after the enclave is reloaded.

The Power Transition sample code included in the SDK demonstrates this procedure.
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sample Code
After installing the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK, the sample code can be found from $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode.

- The SampleEnclave project shows how to create an enclave.
- The LocalAttestation project shows how to use the Intel Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange library to establish a trusted channel between two enclaves running on the same platform.
- The RemoteAttestation project shows how to use the Intel remote attestation and key exchange library in the remote attestation process.

Sample Enclave
The project SampleEnclave is designed to show you how to write an enclave from scratch. This topic demonstrates the following basic aspects of enclave features:

- Initialize and destroy an enclave
- Create ECALLs and/or OCALLs
- Call trusted libraries inside the enclave

The source code is shipped with an installation package of the Intel(R) SGX SDK in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/SampleEnclave. A Makefile is provided to build the SampleEnclave on Linux.

NOTE:
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Initialize an Enclave
Before establishing any trusted transaction between an application and an enclave, the enclave itself needs to be correctly created and initialized by calling sgx_create_enclave provided by the uRTS library.

Saving and Retrieving the Launch Token
A launch token needs to be passed to sgx_create_enclave for enclave initialization. If the launch token was saved in a previous transaction, it can be retrieved and used directly. Otherwise, you can provide an all-0 buffer. sgx_create_enclave will attempt to create a valid launch token if the input is not
valid. After the enclave is correctly created and initialized, you may need to save the token if it has been updated. The fourth parameter of sgx_create_enclave indicates whether or not an update has been performed.

The launch token should be saved in a per-user directory or a registry entry in case it would be used in a multi-user environment.

**ECALL/OCALL Functions**

This sample demonstrates basic EDL syntax used by ECALL/OCALL functions, as well as using trusted libraries inside the enclave. You may see [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for syntax details and [Trusted Libraries](#) for C/C++ support.

**Destroy an Enclave**

To release the enclave memory, you need to invoke `sgx_destroy_enclave` provided by the `sgx_urts` library. It will recycle the EPC memory and untrusted resources used by that enclave instance.

**Power Transition**

If a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all the enclave data will be inaccessible. Consequently, when the system is resumed, each of the in-process ECalls and the subsequent ECalls will fail with the error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST` which indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project should have the capability to handle the power transition which might impact its behavior. The project named *PowerTransition* describes one method of developing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions projects that handle power transitions. See [ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry](#) for more info.

*PowerTransition* demonstrates the following scenario: an enclave instance is created and initialized by one main thread and shared with three other child threads; The three child threads repeatedly ECALL into the enclave, manipulate secret data within the enclave and backup the corresponding encrypted data outside the enclave; After all the child threads finish, the main thread destroys the enclave and frees the associated system resources. If a power transition happens, one and only one thread will reload the enclave and restore the secret data inside the enclave with the encrypted data that was saved outside and then continues the execution.
The `PowerTransition` sample code is released with Intel(R) SGX SDK in
`$(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/PowerTransition`. A Makefile is
provided to build the sample code on Linux* OS.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is
required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if admin-
istrator permission cannot be granted.

**ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry**
After a power transition, an Intel(R) SGX error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_-
LOST` will be returned for the current ECALL. To handle the power transition
and continue the project without impact, you need to destroy the invalid
enclave to free resources first and then retry with a newly created and ini-
tialized enclave instance, as depicted in the following figure.

![Power Transition Handling Flow Chart](image)

**Figure 1 Power Transition Handling Flow Chart**

**ECALLs in Demonstration**

`PowerTransition` demonstrates handling the power transition in two types of
ECALLs:

1. Initialization ECALL after enclave creation.
2. Normal ECALL to manipulate secrets within the enclave.

**Initialization ECALL after Enclave Creation**

`PowerTransition` illustrates one initialization ECALL after enclave creation
which is shown in the following figure:
Figure 2 Enclave Initialization ECall after Enclave Creation Flow Chart

sgx_create_enclave is a key API provided by the uRTS library for enclave creation. For sgx_create_enclave, a mechanism of power transition handling is already implemented in the uRTS library. Therefore, it is unnecessary to manually handle power transition for this API.

NOTE:
To concentrate on handling a power transition, PowerTransition assumes the enclave file and the launch token are located in the same directory as the application. See Sample Enclave for how to store the launch token properly.

Normal ECALL to Process Secrets within the Enclave
This is the most common ECALL type into an enclave. PowerTransition demonstrates the power transition handling for this type of ECALL in a child thread after the enclave creation and initialization by the main thread, as depicted in the figure below. Since the enclave instance is shared by the child threads, it is required to make sure one and only one child thread to re-creates and re-initializes the enclave instance after the power transition and the others utilize the re-created enclave instance directly. PowerTransition confirms this point by checking whether the Enclave ID is updated.
**Figure 3 Regular ECALL Flow Chart**

**NOTE:**
During the ECALL process, it is recommended to back up the confidential data as cipher text outside the enclave frequently. Then we can use the backup data to restore the enclave to reduce the power transition impacts.

**Attestation**
In the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions architecture, attestation refers to the process of demonstrating that a specific enclave was established on the platform. The Intel(R) SGX Architecture provides two attestation mechanisms:

- One creates an authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform referred to as local attestation.
- The second mechanism extends local attestation to provide assertions to 3rd parties outside the platform referred to as remote attestation. The remote attestation process leverages a quoting service.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides APIs used by applications to implement the attestation process.
Local Attestation

Local attestation refers to two enclaves on the same platform authenticating to each other using the SGX REPORT mechanism before exchanging information. In an Intel(R) SGX application, multiple enclaves might collaborate to perform certain functions. After the two enclaves verify the counterpart is trustworthy, they can exchange information on a protected channel, which typically provides confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. The local attestation and protected channel establishment uses the REPORT based Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* protocol.

You can find a sample solution shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK at $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/Local_Attestation directory. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

The sample code shows an example implementation of local attestation, including protected channel establishment and secret message exchange using enclave to enclave function call as an example.

**Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation Flow**

The local attestation sample in the SDK uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library to establish a protected channel between two enclaves. The DH key exchange APIs are described in sgx_dh.h. The key exchange library is part of the Intel(R) SGX application SDK trusted libraries. It is statically linked with the enclave code and exposes APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. The library is combined with other libraries and is built into the final library called libsgx_tservice.a that is part of the SDK release.
The figure above represents the usage of DH key exchange library. A local attestation flow consists of the following steps:

1. ISV Enclave 1 calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
2. The Enclave 1 does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2.
4. Enclave 2 in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
5. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library to generate DH Message 1
   \[ ga \parallel \text{TARGETINFO Enclave 2} \]
6. DH Message 1 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
7. Enclave 1 processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library API and generates DH Message 2 \[ gb \parallel \text{[Report Enclave 1} (h(ga || gb)) \text{]} \text{SMK}. \]
8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2 giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting DH Message 3.
10. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library API to process DH Message 2 and generates DH Message 3 \[ \text{[ReportEnclave2} (h(gb || ga)) \parallel \text{Optional Payload]} \text{SMK}. \]
11. DH Message 3 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
12. Enclave 2 uses the key exchange library to process DH Message 3 and establish the session.
13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

**Protected Channel Establishment**

The following figure illustrates the interaction between two enclaves, namely the source enclave and the destination enclave, to establish a session. The application initiates a session between the source enclave and the destination enclave by doing an ECALL into the source enclave, passing in the enclave id of the destination enclave. Upon receiving the enclave id of the destination enclave, the source enclave does an OCALL into the core untrusted code which then does an ECALL into the destination enclave to exchange the messages required to establish a session using ECDH Key Exchange* protocol.
Secret Message Exchange and Enclave to Enclave Call

The following figure illustrates the message exchange between two enclaves. After the establishment of the protected channel, session keys are used to encrypt the payload in the message(s) being exchanged between the source and destination enclaves. The sample code implements interfaces to encrypt
the payload of the message. The sample code also shows the implementation of an enclave calling a function from another enclave. Call type, target function ID, total input parameter length and input parameters are encapsulated in the payload of the secret message sent from the caller (source) Enclave and the callee (destination) enclave. As one enclave cannot access memory of another enclave, all input and output parameters, including data indirectly referenced by a parameter needs to be marshaled across the two enclaves. The sample code uses Intel(R) SGX SDK trusted cryptographic library to encrypt the payload of the message. Through such encryption, message exchange is just the secret and in case of the enclave to enclave call is the marshaled destination enclave’s function id, total parameter length and all the parameters. The destination enclave decrypts the payload and calls the appropriate function. The results of the function call are encrypted using the session keys and sent back to the source enclave.
Remote Attestation

Generally speaking, Remote Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a remote provider or producer of some sort. With Intel(R) SGX, Remote Attestation software includes the
app's enclave and the Intel-provided Quoting Enclave (QE) and Provisioning Enclave (PvE). The attestation HW is the Intel(R) SGX enabled CPU.

Remote Attestation alone is not enough for the remote party to be able to securely deliver their service (secrets or assets). Securely delivering services also requires a secure communication session. Remote Attestation is used during the establishment of such a session. This is analogous to how the familiar SSL handshake includes both authentication and session establishment.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes sample code showing:

- How an application enclave can attest to a remote party.
- How an application enclave and the remote party can establish a secure session.

The SDK includes a remote session establishment or key exchange (KE) libraries that can be used to greatly simplify these processes.

You can find the sample code for remote attestation in the directory $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/RemoteAttestation.

**NOTE:**
To run the sample code in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Intel(R) SGX uses an anonymous signature scheme, Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID), for authentication (for example, attestation). The supplied key exchange libraries implement a Sigma-like protocol for session establishment. Sigma is a protocol that includes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but also addresses the weaknesses of DH. The protocol Intel(R) SGX uses differs from the Sigma protocol that's used in IKE v1 and v2 in that the Intel(R) SGX platform uses EPID to authenticate while the service provider uses PKI. (In Sigma, both parties use PKI.) Finally, the KE libraries require the service provider to use an ECDSA, not an RSA, key pair in the authentication portion of the protocol and the libraries use ECDH for the actual key exchange.

**Remote Key Exchange (KE) Libraries**

The RemoteAttestation sample in the SDK uses the remote KE libraries as described above to create a remote attestation of an enclave, and uses that
attestation during establishment of a secure session (a key exchange).

There are both untrusted and trusted KE libraries. The untrusted KE library is provided as a static library, libsgx_ukey_exchange.a. The Intel(R) SGX application needs to link with this library and include the header file sgx_ukey_exchange.h, containing the prototypes for the APIs that the KE trusted library exposes.

**NOTE:**

If you are unable to use either of the two pre-built untrusted key exchange static libraries, the source code for a sample untrusted key exchange library is included in the isv_app subfolder of the Remote Attestation sample application that is shipped with this SDK.

The trusted KE library is also provided as a static library. As a trusted library, the process for using it is slightly different than that for the untrusted KE library. The main difference relates to the fact that the trusted KE library exposes ECALLs called by the untrusted KE library. This means that the library has a corresponding EDL file, sgx_tkey_exchange.edl, which has to be imported in the EDL file for the application enclave that uses the library. We can see this in code snippet below, showing the complete contents of app_enclave.edl, the EDL file for the app enclave in the sample code.

```c
enclave {
    from "sgx_tkey_exchange.edl" import *
    include "sgx_key_exchange.h"
    include "sgx_trts.h"
    trusted {
        public sgx_status_t enclave_init_ra(
            int b_pse,
            [out] sgx_ra_context_t *p_context);
        public sgx_status_t enclave_ra_close(
            sgx_ra_context_t context);
    };
}
```

It's worth noting that sgx_key_exchange.h contains types specific to remote key exchange and must be included as shown above as well as in the untrusted code of the application that uses the enclave. Finally, sgx_tkey_exchange.h is a header file that includes prototypes for the APIs that the trusted library exposes, but that are not ECALLs, i.e., APIs called by ISV code in the application enclave.
Remote Attestation and Protected Session Establishment

This topic describes the functionality of the remote attestation sample in detail.

NOTE:

In the sample code, the service provider is modeled as a Shared Object, service_provider.so. The sample service provider does not depend on Intel (R) SGX headers, type definitions, libraries, and so on. This was done to demonstrate that the Intel SGX is not required in any way when building a remote attestation service provider.
Figure 7 Remote Attestation and Trust Channel Establishment Flow

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) application would typically begin by requesting service (for example, media streaming) from a service provider (SP) and the SP would respond with a challenge. This is not shown in the figure. The figure begins with the app’s reaction to the challenge.
1. The flow starts with the app entering the enclave that will be the endpoint of the KE, passing in b_pse, a flag indicating whether the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
2. If b_pse is true, then the isv enclave shall call trusted AE support library with sgx_create_pse_session() to establish a session with PSE.
3. Code in the enclave calls sgx_ra_init(), passing in the SP’s ECDSA public key, g_sp_pub_key, and b_pse. The integrity of g_sp_pub_key is a public key is important so this value should just be built into isv_enclave.
4. Close PSE session by sgx_close_pse_session() if a session is established before. The requirement is that, if the app enclave uses Platform Services, the session with the PSE must already be established before the app enclave calls sgx_ra_init().
5. sgx_ra_init() returns the KE context to the app enclave and the app enclave returns the context to the app.
6. The application calls sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id() and sends the value returned in p_extended_epid_group_id to the server in msg0.
7. The server checks whether the extended EPID group ID is supported. If the ID is not supported, the server aborts remote attestation.

**NOTE:**
Currently, the only valid extended EPID group ID is zero. The server should verify this value is zero. If the EPID group ID is not zero, the server aborts remote attestation.

8. The application calls sgx_ra_get_msg1(), passing in this KE’s context. Figure 3 shows the app also passing in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to sgx_ra_get Ga, exposed by the TKE. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.
9. sgx_ra_get_msg1() builds an S1 message = (ga || GID) and returns it to the app.
10. The app sends S1 to the service provider (SP) by ra_network_send_receive(), it will call sp_ra_proc_msg1_req() to process S1 and generate S2.
11. Application eventually receives S2 = gb || SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga) || CMAC\textsubscript{SMK}(gb}
12. The application calls `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()`, passing in S2 and the context.
13. The code in `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()` builds 
   \[ S3 = \text{CMAC}_{SMK}(M) \mid M \]
   where \( M = ga \mid \text{PS\_SECURITY\_PROPERTY} \mid \text{QUOTE} \) and returns it.
   Platform Services Security Information is included only if the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
14. Application sends the msg3 to the SP by `ra_network_send_receive()`, and the SP verifies the msg3.
15. SP returns the verification result to the application.

At this point, a session has been established and keys exchanged. Whether the service provider thinks the session is secure and uses it depends on the security properties of the platform as indicated by the S3 message. If the platform's security properties meet the service provider's criteria, then the service provider can use the session keys to securely deliver a secret and the app enclave can consume the secret any time after it retrieves the session keys by calling `sgx_ra_get_keys()` on the trusted KE library. This is not shown in the figure, nor is the closing of the session. Closing the session requires entering the app enclave and calling `sgx_ra_close()` on the trusted KE library, among other app enclave-specific cleanup.

**Remote Attestation with a Custom Key Derivation Function (KDF)**

By default, the platform software uses the KDF described in the definition of the `sgx_ra_get_keys` API when the `sgx_ra_init` API is used to generate the remote attestation context. If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK). The decision to use a different KDF is a policy of the ISV, but it should be approved by the ISV's security process.

**Debugging a Remote Attestation Service Provider**

As an ISV writing the remote attestation service provider, you may want to debug the message flow. One way to do this would be to provide pre-generated messages that can be replayed and verified. However, note that S1 message = (GID || ga) includes the random component ga generated inside an enclave. Also, the remote attestation service provider generates a random public+private key pair as part of its msg2 generation, but without
any interaction with Intel(R) SGX. Finally, each of these has state or context that is associated with cryptographic operations and is used to ensure that certain calls being made are in the correct order and that the state is consistent. These characteristics help protect the remote attestation flow against attacks, but also make it more difficult to replay pre-generated messages.

To overcome these, the cryptographic library is modified and used (only) by the sample service provider. Any time that key generation, signing, or other operation requests a random number, the number 9 is returned. This means that the crypto functions from libsample_libcrypto.so are predictable and cryptographically weak. If we can replay msg1 send from the isv_app, the sample service_provider. will always generate the exact same msg2. We now have a sufficient system to replay messages sent by the isv_app and have it verify that the responses sent by the remote service are the expected ones.

To replay messages and exercise this verification flow, pass in 1 or 2 as a command-line argument when running the sample application isv_app. The isv_app will ignore errors generated by the built-in checks in the Intel SGX. Developers wishing to debug their remote attestation service provider should be able to temporarily modify their cryptographic subsystem to behave in a similar manner as the libsample_libcrypto.so and replay the pre-computed messages stored in sample_messages.h. The responses from their own remote attestation service provider should match the ones generated by ours, which are also stored in sample_messages.h.

**NOTE**

Do not use the sample cryptographic library provided in this sample in production code.

Using a Different Extended EPID Group for Remote Attestation

The Intel(R) SGX platform software can generate Quotes signed by keys belonging to a more than one extended EPID Group. Before remote attestation starts, the ISV Service provider (SP) needs to know which extended EPID Group the PSW supports. The ISV SP will use this information to request Quote generation and verification in the correct extended EPID Group. The API sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id returns the extended EPID Group ID. The ISV application should query the currently configured extended EPID Group ID from the platform software using this API and sending it to the ISV SP. The ISV SP then knows which extended EPID Group to use for remote attestation. If the ISV SP does not support the provided extended EPID Group, it will terminate the remote attestation attempt.
Library Functions and Type Reference
This topic includes the following sub-topics to describe library functions and type reference for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- Untrusted Library Functions
- Trusted Libraries
- Function Descriptions
- Types and Enumerations
- Error Codes

Untrusted Library Functions
The untrusted library functions can only be called from application code - outside the enclave.

The untrusted libraries built for the hardware mode contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as the prefix, is defined when the library is built. The string version consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all untrusted libraries shipped in a given Intel (R) SGX PSW/SDK release have the same version number and allows quick identification of the untrusted libraries linked into an untrusted component.

For instance, libsgx_urts.so contains a string version SGX_URTS_VERSION_1.0.0.0. The last digit varies depending on the specific Intel SGX PSW/SDK release number.

Enclave Creation and Destruction
These functions are used to either create or destroy enclaves:

- sgx_create_enclave
- sgx_destroy_enclave

Quoting Functions
These functions allow application enclaves to ensure that they are running on an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions environment.

NOTE:
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.
- Untrusted Key Exchange Functions -

These functions allow exchanging of secrets between ISV's server and enclaves. They are used in concert with the trusted Key Exchange functions.

**NOTE:**

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- sgx_ra_get_msg1
- sgx_ra_proc_msg2
- sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id

- Untrusted Platform Service Function -

This function helps ISVs determine what Intel(R) SGX Platform Services are supported by the platform.

**NOTE:**

To run this function in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- sgx_get_ps_cap

- Intel(R) Launch Control Functions -

Use `sgx_get_whitelist_size` to get the size of current Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. Use `sgx_get_whitelist` to get the chain.

- sgx_get_whitelist_size
- sgx_get_whitelist

- Trusted Libraries -

The trusted libraries are static libraries that linked with the enclave binary. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK ships with several trusted libraries that cover domains such as standard C/C++ libraries, synchronization, encryption and more.

These functions/objects can only be used from within the enclave.
Trusted libraries built for HW mode (for example, not for simulation) contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as prefix, is defined when the SDK is built and consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all trusted libraries shipped in a given SDK release will have the same version number and allows quick identification of the trusted libraries linked into an enclave.

For instance, `libsgx_tstdc.a` contains a string version like `SGX_TSTDC_VERSION_1.0.0.0`. Of course, the last digits vary depending on the SDK release.

**CAUTION:**
Do not link the enclave with any untrusted library including C/C++ standard libraries. This action will either fail the enclave signing process or cause a runtime failure due to the use of restricted instructions.

**Trusted Runtime System**
The Intel(R) SGX trusted runtime system (tRTS) is a key component of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It provides the enclave entry point logic as well as other functions to be used by enclave developers.

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions
- Custom Exception Handling

**Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions**
The tRTS provides the following helper functions for you to determine whether a given address is within or outside enclave memory.

- `sgx_is_within_enclave`
- `sgx_is_outside_enclave`

The tRTS provides a wrapper to the RDRAND instruction to generate a true random number from hardware. The C/C++ standard library functions `rand` and `srand` functions are not supported within an enclave because they only provide pseudo random numbers. Instead, enclave developers should use the `sgx_read_rand` function to get true random numbers.

- `sgx_read_rand`
**Custom Exception Handling**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. When one of the enclave supported hardware exceptions occurs within the enclave, the registered exception handlers will be called in a specific order until an exception handler reports that it has handled the exception. For example, issuing a CPUID instruction inside an Enclave will result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can call `sgx_register_exception_handler` to register a function of type `sgx_exception_handler_t` to respond to this exception. To check a list of enclave supported exceptions, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in HW mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

**NOTE:**

OCALLs are not allowed in the exception handler.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling only saves general purpose registers in `sgx_exception_info_t`. You should be careful when touching other registers in the exception handlers.

**Note:**

If the exception handlers can not handle the exceptions, `abort()` is called. `abort()` makes the enclave unusable and generates another exception.

The Custom Exception Handling APIs are listed below:

- `sgx_register_exception_handler`
- `sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

**Custom Exception Handler for CPUID Instruction**

If an ISV requires using the CPUID information within an enclave, then the enclave code must make an OCALL to perform the CPUID instruction in the untrusted application. The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides two functions in the library `sgx_tstdc` to obtain CPUID information through an OCALL:
• sgx_cpuid
• sgx_cpuid_ex

In addition, the Intel SGX SDK also provides the following intrinsics which call the above functions to obtain CPUID data:

• __cpuid
• __cpuidex

Both the functions and intrinsics result in an OCALL to the uRTS library to obtain CPUID data. The results are returned from an untrusted component in the system. It is recommended that threat evaluation be performed to ensure that CPUID return values are not problematic. Ideally, sanity checking of the return values should be performed.

If an ISV's enclave uses a third party library which executes the CPUID instruction, then the ISV would need to provide a custom exception handler to handle the exception generated from issuing the CPUID instruction (unless the third party library registers its own exception handler for CPUID support). The ISV is responsible for analyzing the usage of the specific CPUID result provided by the untrusted domain to ensure it does not compromise the enclave security properties. Recommended implementation of the CPUID exception handler involves:

1. ISV analyzes the third party library CPUID usages, identifying required CPUID results.
2. ISV enclave code initialization routine populates a cache of the required CPUID results inside the enclave. This cache might be maintained by the RTS or by ISV code.
3. ISV enclave code initialization routine registers a custom exception handler.
4. The custom exception handler, when invoked, examines the exception information and faulting instruction. If the exception is caused by a CPUID instruction:
   1. Retrieve the cached CPUID result and populate the CPUID instruction output registers.
   2. Advance the RIP to bypass the CPUID instruction and complete the exception handling.
Trusted Service Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library named sgx_tservice for secure data manipulation and protection. The sgx_tservice library provides the following trusted functionality and services:

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions
- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions
- Untrusted Platform Service Function
- Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions

The sgx_tservice library provides functions for getting specific keys and for creating and verifying an enclave report. The API functions are listed below:

- sgx_get_key
- sgx_create_report
- sgx_verify_report

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions

The sgx_tservice library provides the following functions:

- Exposes APIs to create sealed data which is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
- Exposes an API to unseal sealed data inside the enclave.
- Provides APIs to authenticate and verify the input data with AES-GMAC.

See the following related topics for more information.

- sgx_seal_data
- sgx_seal_data_ex
- sgx_unseal_data
- sgx_mac_aadata
- sgx_mac_aadata_ex
- sgx_unmac_aadata

The library also provides APIs to help calculate the sealed data size, encrypt text length, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) text length.

- sgx_calc_sealed_data_size
- sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len
- sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len
SealLibrary Introduction

When an enclave is instantiated, it provides protections (confidentiality and integrity) to the data by keeping it within the boundary of the enclave. Enclave developers should identify enclave data and/or state that is considered secret and potentially needs preservation across the following enclave destruction events:

- Application is done with the enclave and closes it.
- Application itself is closed.
- The platform is hibernated or shutdown.

In general, the secrets provisioned within an enclave are lost when the enclave is closed. However if the secret data needs to be preserved during one of these events for future use within an enclave, it must be stored outside the enclave boundary before closing the enclave. In order to protect and preserve the data, a mechanism is in place which allows enclave software to retrieve a key unique to that enclave. This key can only be generated by that enclave on that particular platform. Enclave software uses that key to encrypt data to the platform or to decrypt data already on the platform. Refer to these encrypt and decrypt operations as sealing and unsealing respectively as the data is cryptographically sealed to the enclave and platform.

To provide strong protection against potential key-wear-out attacks, a unique seal key is generated for each data blob encrypted with the `sgx_seal_data` API call. A key ID for each encrypted data blob is stored in clear alongside the encrypted data blob. The key ID is used to re-generate the seal key to decrypt the data blob.

AES-GCM (AES – Advanced Encryption Standard) is utilized to encrypt and MAC-protect the payload. To protect against software-based side channel attacks, the crypto implementation of AES-GCM utilizes AES-NI, which is immune to software-based side channel attacks. The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. If the GCM input contains only data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code), is simply an authentication mode for the input data. The `sgx_mac_aad_data` API call restricts the input to
non-confidential data to provide data origin authentication only. The single output of this function is the authentication tag.

**Example Use Cases**

One example is that an application may start collecting secret state while executing that needs to be preserved and utilized on future invocations of that application. Another example is during application installation, a secret key may need to be preserved and verified upon starting the application.

For these cases the seal APIs can be utilized to seal the secret data (key or state) in the examples above, and then unseal the secret data when needed.

**Sealing**

1. Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.
2. Allocate memory for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.
3. Call `sgx_seal_data` to perform sealing operation
4. Save the sealed data structure for future use.

**Unsealing**

1. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` and `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the size of the buffers to allocate in terms of bytes.
2. Allocate memory for the decrypted text and additional text buffers.
3. Call `sgx_unseal_data` to perform the unsealing operation.

**Trusted Platform Service Functions**

The `sgx_tservice` library provides the following functions that allow an ISV to use platform services and get platform services security property.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

- `sgx_create_pse_session`
- `sgx_close_pse_session`
- `sgx_get_ps_sec_prop`
- `sgx_get_trusted_time`
- `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex`
- `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`
NOTE
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in the simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions
These functions allow an ISV to establish secure session between two enclaves using the EC DH Key exchange protocol.

- sgx_DH_init_session
- sgx_DH_responder_gen_msg1
- sgx_DH_initiator_proc_msg1
- sgx_DH_responder_proc_msg2
- sgx_DH_initiator_proc_msg3

C Standard Library
The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C standard library. The library is named sgx_tstdc (trusted standard C), and can only be used inside an enclave. Standard C headers are located under $(SGXSDKInstallPath)include/tlibc.

sgx_tstdc provides a subset of C99 functions that are ported from the OpenBSD* project. Unsupported functions are not allowed inside an enclave for the following reasons:

- The definition implies usage of a restricted CPU instruction.
- The definition is known to be unsafe or insecure.
- The definition implementation is too large to fit inside an enclave or relies heavily on information from the untrusted domain.
- The definition is compiler specific, and not part of the standard.
- The definition is a part of the standard, but it is not supported by a specific compiler.

See Unsupported C Standard Functions for a list of unsupported C99 definitions within an enclave.

Locale Functions
A trusted version of locale functions is not provided primarily due to the size restriction. Those functions rely heavily on the localization data (normally 1MB to 2MB), which should be preloaded into the enclave in advance to ensure that it will not be modified from the untrusted domain. This practice would
increase the footprint of an enclave, especially for those enclaves not depending on the locale functionality. Moreover, since localization data is not available, wide character functions inquiring enclave locale settings are not supported either.

**Random Number Generation Functions**

The random functions `srand` and `rand` are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. A true random function `sgx_read_rand` is provided in the tRTS library by using the RDRAND instruction. However, in the Intel(R) SGX simulation environment, this function still generates pseudo random numbers because RDRAND may not be available on the hardware platform.

**String Functions**

The functions `strcpy` and `strcat` are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. You are recommended to use `strncpy` and `strncat` instead.

**Abort Function**

The `abort()` function is supported within an enclave but has a different behavior. When a thread calls the abort function, it makes the enclave unusable by setting the enclave state to a specific value that allows the tRTS and application to detect and report this event. The aborting thread generates an exception and exits the enclave, while other enclave threads continue running normally until they exit the enclave. Once the enclave is in the unusable state, subsequent enclave calls and OCALL returns generate the same error indicating that the enclave is no longer usable. After all thread calls abort, the enclave is locked and cannot be recovered. You have to destroy, reload and reinitialize the enclave to use it again.

**Thread Synchronization Primitives**

Multiple untrusted threads may enter an enclave simultaneously as long as more than one thread context is defined by the application and created by the untrusted loader. Once multiple threads execute concurrently within an enclave, they will need some forms of synchronization mechanism if they intend to operate on any global data structure. In some cases, threads may use the atomic operations provided by the processor’s ISA. In the general case, however, they would use synchronization objects and mechanisms similar to those available outside the enclave.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK already supports mutex and conditional variable synchronization mechanisms by means of the following API and data types defined in the **Types and Enumerations** section. Some
functions included in the trusted Thread Synchronization library may make calls outside the enclave (OCALLs). If you use any of the APIs below, you must first import the needed OCALL functions from `sgx_tstdc.edl`. Otherwise, you will get a linker error when the enclave is being built; see Calling Functions outside the Enclave for additional details. The table below illustrates the primitives that the Intel(R) SGX Thread Synchronization library supports, as well as the OCALLs that each API function needs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Function API</th>
<th>OCall Function</th>
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<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_destroy</code></td>
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<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_lock</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
</tr>
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<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_trylock</code></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_mutex_unlock</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Condition Variable Synchro-</strong></td>
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<td><strong>onization</strong></td>
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<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_init</code></td>
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<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_wait</code></td>
<td><code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_events_ocall</code></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_signal</code></td>
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<td><code>sgx_thread_cond_broadcast</code></td>
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<td><strong>Thread Management</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><code>sgx_thread_self</code></td>
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<td><code>sgx_thread_equal</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Query CPUID inside Enclave

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides two functions for enclave developers to query a subset of CPUID information inside the enclave:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuidex`

GCC* Built-in Functions

GCC* provides built-in functions with optimization purposes. When GCC recognizes a built-in function, it will generate the code more efficiently by leveraging its optimization algorithms. GCC always treats functions with `__builtin__` prefix as built-in functions, such as `__builtin_malloc`, `__builtin_strncpy`, and so on. In many cases, GCC tries to use the built-in variant for standard C functions, such as `memcpy`, `strncpy`, and `abort`. A call to the C library function is generated unless the `-fno-builtin` compiler option is specified.

GCC optimizes built-in functions in certain cases. If GCC does not expand the built-in function directly, it will call the corresponding library function (without the `__builtin__` prefix). The trusted C library must supply a version of the functions to ensure the enclave is always built correctly.

The trusted C library does not contain any function considered insecure (for example, `strcpy`) or that may contain illegal instructions in Intel SGX (for example, `fprintf`). However, the ISV should be aware that GCC may introduce security risks into an enclave if the compiler inlines the code corresponding to an insecure built-in function. In this case, the ISV may use the `-fno-builtin` or `-fno-builtin-function` options to suppress any unwanted built-in code generation.

See Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions within an enclave for a list of unsupported GCC built-ins.

Non-Local Jumps

The C standard library provides a pair of functions, `setjmp` and `longjmp`, that can be used to perform non-local jumps. `setjmp` saves the current program state into a data structure. `longjmp` can later use this data structure to restore the execution context. This means that after `longjmp`, execution continues at the `setjmp` call site.

Since `setjmp/longjmp` may transfer execution from one function to a predetermined location in another function, normal stack unwinding does not
occur. As a result, you must use this functionality carefully, ensuring that an enclave only calls `setjmp` in a valid context. You should also perform extensive security validation to ascertain that the enclave never uses these functions in such a way it could result in undefined behavior. Typical use of `setjmp/longjmp` is the implementation of an exception mechanism (error handling). However, you must never use these functions in C++ programs. You should use the standard CEH instead. You are recommended to review the information provided at cert.org on how to use `setjmp/longjmp` securely.

As a precaution, the Intel® SGX SDK includes the `setjmp/longjmp` functionality in its own library, rather than within the trusted C library. In this way, enclaves will not incorporate this functionality by mistake. To access this functionality, you must explicitly give the linker the specific library.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>setjmp.h</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tsetjmp.a</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**C++ Language Support**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library for C++ support inside the enclave. C++ developers would utilize advanced C++ features that require C++ runtime libraries.

The ISO/IEC 14882:2003 C++ standard is chosen as the baseline for the Intel (R) Software Guard Extensions SDK trusted library. Most of standard C++ features are fully supported inside the enclave, and including:

1. Dynamic memory management with new/delete;
2. Global initializers are supported (usually used in the construction of global objects);
3. Run-time Type Identification (RTTI);
4. C++ exception handling inside the enclave.

Currently, global destructors are not supported due to the reason that EPC memory will be recycled when destroying an enclave.

**NOTE**

C++ objects are not supported in enclave interface definitions. If an application needs to pass a C++ object across the enclave boundary, you are recommended to store the C++ object’s data in a C struct and marshal the data across the enclave interface. Then you need to instantiate the C++ object.
inside the enclave with the marshaled C struct passed in to the constructor (or you may update existing instantiated objects with appropriate operators).

**C++ Standard Library**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C++ standard library (including STL) that conforms to the C++03 standard. The library is ported from STLport.

As for the C++ standard library, most functions will work just as its untrusted counterpart, but here is a high level summary of features that are not supported inside the enclave:

1. I/O related functions and classes, like `<iostream>`;
2. Functions depending on a locale library;
3. Any other functions that require system calls.

However, only C functions can be used as the language for trusted and untrusted interfaces. While you can use C++ to develop your enclaves, you should not pass C++ objects across the enclave boundary.

**Cryptography Library**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted cryptography library named `sgx_tcrypto`. It includes the cryptographic functions used by other trusted libraries included in the SDK, such as the `sgx_tservice` library. Thus, the functionality provided by this library is somewhat limited.

- `sgx_sha256_msg`
- `sgx_sha256_init`
- `sgx_sha256_update`
- `sgx_sha256_get_hash`
- `sgx_sha256_close`
- `sgx rijndael128GCM_encrypt`
- `sgx rijndael128GCM_decrypt`
- `sgx rijndael128_cmac_msg`
- `sgx cmac128_init`
- `sgx cmac128_update`
- `sgx cmac128_final`
- `sgx cmac128_close`
- `sgx aes_ctr_encrypt`
- `sgx aes_ctr_decrypt`
- `sgx ecc256_open_context`
• sgx_ecc256_close_context
• sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair
• sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey
• sgx_ecc256_check_point
• sgx_ecdsa_sign
• sgx_ecdsa_verify

**Trusted Key Exchange Functions**

These functions allow an ISV to exchange secrets between its server and its enclaves. They are used in concert with untrusted Key Exchange functions.

• sgx_ra_init
• sgx_ra_init_ex
• sgx_ra_get_keys
• sgx_ra_close

**Function Descriptions**

This topic describes various functions including their syntax, parameters, return values, and requirements.

**NOTE**

When an API function lists an EDL in its requirements, users need to explicitly import such library EDL file in their enclave's EDL.

**sgx_create_enclave**

Loads the enclave using its file name and initializes it using a launch token.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr
);
```

**Parameters**

`file_name [in]`
Name or full path to the enclave image.

debug [in]
The valid value is 0 or 1.
0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.
1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is not under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 1 by default.

launch_token [in/out]
A pointer to an sgx_launch_token_t object used to initialize the enclave to be created. Must not be NULL. The caller can provide an all-0 buffer as the sgx_launch_token_t object, in which case, the function will attempt to create a valid sgx_launch_token_t object and store it in the buffer. The caller should store the sgx_launch_token_t object and re-use it in future calls to create the same enclave. Certain platform configuration changes can invalidate a previously stored sgx_launch_token_t object. If the token provided is not valid, the function will attempt to update it to a valid one.

launch_token_updated [out]
The output is 0 or 1. 0 indicates the launch token has not been updated. 1 indicates the launch token has been updated.

enclave_id [out]
A pointer to an sgx_enclave_id_t that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

misc_attr [out, optional]
A pointer to an sgx_misc_attribute_t structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
The enclave was loaded and initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE**
The enclave file is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ‘enclave_id’, ‘updated’ or ‘token’ parameter is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave()`.

**SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS**
The enclave file can't be opened. It may be caused by enclave file not being found or no privilege to access the enclave file.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA**
The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupt or missing.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION**
The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE**
The signature for the enclave is not valid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
The protected memory has run out. For example, a user is creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or we cannot load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NO_DEVICE**
The SGX device is not valid. This may be caused by the SGX driver not being installed or the SGX driver being disabled.

**SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT**
During enclave creation, there is a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread. The loader may fail to map virtual address. If this error code is encountered, create the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY**
The SGX driver or low level system is busy when creating the enclave. If this error code is encountered, we suggest creating the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE**

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. For example, a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE**

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but is not privileged.

**SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE**

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL**

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC**

The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

The `sgx_create_enclave` function will load and initialize the enclave using the enclave file name and a launch token. If the launch token is incorrect, it will get a new one and save it back to the input parameter “token”, and the parameter “updated” will indicate that the launch token was updated.
If both enclave and launch token are valid, the function will return a value of SGX_SUCCESS. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the enclave_id parameter.

The library libsgx_urts.a provides this function to load an enclave with Intel(R) SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library libsgx_urts_sim.a exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation enclave. Running in simulation mode does not require Intel(R) SGX hardware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. A compromised loader or operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

**Requirements**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_urts.a or libsgx_urts_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_destroy_enclave**

The sgx_destroy_enclave function destroys an enclave and frees its associated resources.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_enclave(
    const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id
);
```

**Parameters**

- **enclave_id [in]**
  
  An enclave ID or handle that was generated by sgx_create_enclave.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  
  The enclave was unloaded successfully.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID
The enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the
enclave has already been destroyed.

Description
The sgx_destroy_enclave function destroys an enclave and releases its
associated resources and invalidates the enclave ID or handle.

The function will block until no other threads are executing inside the enclave.

It is highly recommended that the sgx_destroy_enclave function be
called after the application has finished using the enclave to avoid possible
deadlocks.

The library libsgx_urts.a exposes this function to destroy a previously cre-
ated enclave in hardware mode, while libsgx_urts_sim.a provides a sim-
ulative counterpart.

See more details in Loading and Unloading an Enclave.

Requirements

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_urts.a or libsgx_urts_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_init_quote

sgx_init_quote returns information needed by an Intel(R) SGX application
to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote(
    sgx_target_info_t *p_target_info,
    sgx_epid_group_Id_t *p_gid
);
```

Parameters

**p_target_info [out]**

Allows an enclave for which the quote is being created, to create report that
only QE can verify.

**p_gid [out]**

ID of platform's current EPID group.
Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All of the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
The EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_init_quote` is the first thing an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application does in the process of getting a quote of an enclave. The content of `p_target_info` changes when the QE changes. The content of `p_gid` changes when the platform SVN changes.
It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_uae_service.h</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_uae_service.a or libsgx_uae_service_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_get_quote_size

sgx_get_quote_size returns the required buffer size for the quote.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

Parameters

**p_sig_rl** [in]
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

**p_quote_size** [out]
Indicate the size of quote buffer.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The p_quote_size pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call sgx_get_quote, call sgx_get_quote_size first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements
**sgx_get_quote**

gsx_get_quote generates a linkable or un-linkable QUOTE.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote(
    const sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_sign_type_t quote_type,
    const sgx_spid_t *p_spid,
    const sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce,
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    sgx_report_t *p_qe_report,
    sgx_quote_t *p_quote,
    uint32_t quote_size
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_report [in]**
  Report of enclave for which quote is being calculated.

- **quote_type [in]**
  
  - **SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE** for unlinkable quote or **SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE** for linkable quote.

- **p_spid [in]**
  ID of service provider.

- **p_nonce [in]**
  Optional nonce, if **p_qe_report** is not NULL, then nonce should not be NULL as well.

- **p_sig_rl [in]**
  Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

- **sig_rl_size [in]**
  Size of **p_sig_rl**, in bytes. If the **p_sig_rl** is NULL, then **sig_rl_size** shall be 0.
**p_qe_report [out]**
Optional output. If not NULL, report of QE target to the calling enclave will be copied to this buffer, and in this case, nonce should not be NULL as well.

**p_quote [out]**
The major output of get_quote, the quote itself, linkable or unlinkable depending on quote_type input. quote cannot be NULL.

**quote_size [in]**
Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call sgx_get_quote_size first.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
The EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**
The EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.
SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
Both EPID Member and Verifier need to know the Group Public Key and the EPID Parameters used. These values not being returned by either \texttt{sgx\_init\_quote()} or \texttt{sgx\_get\_quote()} reflects the reliance on the Intel(R) Attestation Service (IAS). With the IAS in place, simply sending the GID to the IAS (through the Intel(R) SGX application and PS) is sufficient for the IAS to know which public key and parameters to use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY} is returned.

Requirements

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</table>

\texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1}
\texttt{sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1} is used to get the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave should use \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init} or \texttt{sgx\_ra\_init\_ex} function to create the remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1(
    sgx\_ra\_context\_t context,
    sgx\_enclave\_id\_t eid,
    sgx\_ecall\_get\_ga\_trusted\_t p\_get\_ga,
    sgx\_ra\_msg1\_t *p\_msg1
);
\end{verbatim}
Parameters

context [in]
Context returned by the sgx_ra_init or sgx_ra_init_ex function inside the application enclave.

eid [in]
ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

p_get_ga [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_get_ga generated by sgx_edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_tkey_exchange library and import sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_get_ga.

p_msg1 [out]
Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED
The EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

**Requirements**

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<td>Library</td>
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</table>

**sgx_ra_proc_msg2**

`sgx_ra_proc_msg2` is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use `sgx_ra_get_keys` function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use `sgx_ra_close` function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a
time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it
does not receive message 3.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_proc_msg2(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t p_proc_msg2,
    sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t p_get_msg3,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    uint32_t msg2_size,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t **pp_msg3,
    uint32_t *p_msg3_size
);
```

Parameters

**context [in]**
Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

**eid [in]**
ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

**p_proc_msg2 [in]**
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**p_get_msg3 [in]**
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_msg3`.

**p_msg2 [in]**
`sgx_ra_msg2_t` message 2 from the service provider received by application.

**msg2_size [in]**
The length of `p_msg2` (in bytes).
pp_msg3 [out]
sgx_ra_msg3_t message 3 to be sent to the service provider. The message buffer is allocated by the sgx_ukey_exchange library. The caller should free the buffer after use.

p_msg3_size [out]
The length of pp_msg3 (in bytes).

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
The EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**
The EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.
SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
The signature is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH
Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH
Indicates key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The sgx_ra_proc_msg2 processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

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sgx_report_attestation_status

sgx_report_attestation_status reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to decide whether a TCB update is required. It is recommended to always call sgx_report_attestation_status after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB).

The attestation_status indicates whether the ISV server decided to trust the enclave or not.
The value `pass:0` indicates that the ISV server trusts the enclave. If the ISV server trusts the enclave and platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will not take actions to correct the TCB that will cause negative user experience such as long latencies or requesting a TCB update.

The value `fail:!=0` indicates that the ISV server does not trust the enclave. If the ISV server does not trust the enclave or platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will take all actions to correct the TCB which may incur long latencies and/or request the application to update one of the SGX’s TCB components. It is the ISV’s responsibility to provide the TCB component updates to the client platform.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_report_attestation_status (  
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info
    int attestation_status,
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_platform_info [in]**
  Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server.

- **attestation_status [in]**
  The value indicates whether remote attestation succeeds or fails. If attestation succeeds, the value is 0. If it fails, the value will be others.

- **p_update_info [out]**
  Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of `sgx_report_attestation_status` is `SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED`.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  All the outputs are generated successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALIDParameterValue**
  Any of the pointers are invalid.
SGX_ERROR AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
This service is temporarily unavailable.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The application calls sgx_report_attestation_status after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id
The function sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id reports which extended EPID Group the client uses by default. The key used to sign a Quote will be a member of the extended EPID Group reported in this API.
Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id(
    uint32_t *p_extended_epid_group_id
);
```

Parameters

- `p_extended_epid_group_id [out]`
  The extended EPID Group ID.

Return value

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  All the outputs are generated successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  The `p_extended_epid_group_id` pointer is invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
  Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
  The AE service did not respond.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
  A request to AE service timed out.

- **SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
  An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The application uses this value to tell the ISV Service Provider which extended EPID Group to use during remote attestation.

Requirements

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_get_ps_cap**

`sgx_get_ps_cap` returns the platform service capability of the platform.
Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_cap(
    sgx_ps_cap_t* p_sgx_ps_cap
);
```

Parameters

p_sgx_ps_cap [out]

A pointer to `sgx_ps_cap_t` structure indicates the platform service capability of the platform.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `ps_cap` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILBLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

Description

Before using Platform Services provided by the trusted Architecture Enclave support library, you need to call `sgx_get_ps_cap` first to get the capability of the platform.

Requirements

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**sgx_get_whitelist_size**

`sgx_get_whitelist_size` returns the required buffer size for the white-list.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist_size(
    uint32_t *p_whitelist_size
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_whitelist_size [out]`

Indicate the size of white-list buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist_size` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The white-list is invalid.

**Description**

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_get_whitelistsize`, you must determine the required buffer size using `sgx_get_whitelist_size`. The size returned by `sgx_get_whitelist_size` is then used to allocate memory on the stack using `malloc` or similar functions. This approach allows you to dynamically allocate memory as needed, making it easier to handle cases where the size of the quote is unknown or can vary at runtime.
ist, call \texttt{sgx\_get\_whitelist\_size} first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

**Requirements**

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</table>

\texttt{sgx\_get\_whitelist}

\texttt{sgx\_get\_whitelist} returns the white-list used by \texttt{aesm\_service}.

**Syntax**

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_get\_whitelist(
    uint8\_t \*p\_whitelist,
    uint32\_t whitelist\_size
);
\end{verbatim}

**Parameters**

- \texttt{p\_whitelist [out]}
  The white-list.
- \texttt{whitelist\_size [in]}
  Indicate the size of white-list buffer. To get the size, call \texttt{sgx\_get\_whitelist\_size} first.

**Return value**

- \texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}
  All the outputs are generated successfully.
- \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}
  The \texttt{p\_whitelist} pointer is invalid or \texttt{p\_whitelist\_size} is not correct.
- \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY}
  The requested service is temporarily not available.
- \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY}
  Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.
- \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE}
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The white-list is invalid.

**Description**
You can get current white-list used by `aesm_service`.

**Requirements**

<table>
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</table>

**sgx_is_within_enclave**
The `sgx_is_within_enclave` function checks that the buffer located at the pointer `addr` with its length of `size` is an address that is strictly within the calling enclave address space.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_is_within_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

**Parameters**

- **addr [in]**
The start address of the buffer.

- **size [in]**
The size of the buffer.

**Return value**

- **1**
The buffer is strictly within the enclave address space.

- **0**
The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

**Description**

*sgx_is_within_enclave* simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. Given a function pointer, you sometimes need to confirm whether such a function is within the enclave. In this case, it is recommended to use *sgx_is_within_enclave* with a size of 1.

**Requirements**

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*sgx_is_outside_enclave*

The *sgx_is_outside_enclave* function checks that the buffer located at the pointer *addr* with its length of *size* is an address that is strictly outside the calling enclave address space.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_is_outside_enclave (const void *addr,
                           size_t size
           );
```

**Parameters**

*addr [in]*

The start address of the buffer.

*size [in]*

The size of the buffer.

**Return value**

1

The buffer is strictly outside the enclave address space.

0

The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.
Description

sgx_is_outside_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_read_rand

The sgx_read_rand function is used to generate a random number inside the enclave.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(
    unsigned char *rand,
    size_t length_in_bytes
);
```

Parameters

**rand [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the random number. The pointer cannot be NULL. The rand buffer can be either within or outside the enclave, but it is not allowed to be across the enclave boundary or wrapped around.

**length_in_bytes [in]**

The length of the buffer (in bytes).

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Invalid input parameters detected.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the valid random number generation process.
Description
The `sgx_read_rand` function is provided to replace the C standard pseudo-random sequence generation functions inside the enclave, since these standard functions are not supported in the enclave, such as `rand`, `srand`, etc. For HW mode, the function generates a real-random sequence; while for simulation mode, the function generates a pseudo-random sequence.

Requirements

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</table>

`sx_register_exception_handler`

`sx_register_exception_handler` allows developers to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is equal to 1) or append the handler to the handler chain.

Syntax

```c
void* sx_register_exception_handler(
    int is_first_handler,
    sx_exception_handler_t exception_handler
);
```

Parameters

`is_first_handler [in]`
Specify the order in which the handler should be called. If the parameter is nonzero, the handler is the first handler to be called. If the parameter is zero, the handler is the last handler to be called.

`exception_handler [in]`
The exception handler to be called

Return value

**Non-zero**
Indicates the exception handler is registered successfully. The return value is an open handle to the custom exception handler.

**NULL**
The exception handler was not registered.
**Description**

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. You can write your own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. For example, a CPUID instruction inside an enclave will effectively result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can have an exception handler to prevent the enclave from being trapped into an exception condition. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` allows you to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is nonzero) or append the handler to the handler chain.

After calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` to prepend an exception handler, a subsequent call to this function may add another exception handler at the beginning of the handler chain. Therefore the order in which exception handlers are called does not only depend on the value of the `is_first_handler` parameter, but more importantly depends on the order in which exception handlers are registered.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in hardware mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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</table>

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler` is used to unregister a custom exception handler.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_unregister_exception_handler(
    void* handler
);
```

**Parameters**

`handler [in]`
A handle to the custom exception handler previously registered using the \texttt{sgx_register_exception_handler} function.

Return value

Non-zero

The custom exception handler is unregistered successfully.

0

The exception handler was not unregistered (not a valid pointer, handler not found).

Description

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. An enclave developer can write their own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling \texttt{sgx_unregister_exception_handler} allows developers to unregister an exception handler that was registered earlier.

Requirements

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
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\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\texttt{sgx_spin_lock}

The \texttt{sgx_spin_lock} function acquires a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
uint32_t sgx_spin_lock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
\end{verbatim}

Parameters

\texttt{lock [in]}

The trusted spin lock object to be acquired.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is acquired.

Description
sgx_spin_lock modifies the value of the spin lock by using compiler atomic operations. If the lock is not available to be acquired, the thread will always wait on the lock until it can be acquired successfully.

Requirements

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sgx_spin_unlock

The sgx_spin_unlock function releases a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_spin_unlock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

Parameters

lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be released.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is released.

Description

sgx_spin_unlock resets the value of the spin lock, regardless of its current state. This function simply assigns a value of zero to the lock, which indicates the lock is released.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_thread_mutex_init

The sgx_thread_mutex_init function initializes a trusted mutex object within the enclave.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_init(
```
sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex,
const sgx_thread_mutexattr_t * unused
);

Parameters

mutex [in]
The trusted mutex object to be initialized.

unused [in]
Unused parameter reserved for future user defined mutex attributes. [NOT USED]

Return value

0
The mutex is initialized successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

Description

When a thread creates a mutex within an enclave, sgx_thread_mutex_init simply initializes the various fields of the mutex object to indicate that the mutex is available. sgx_thread_mutex_init creates a non-recursive mutex. The results of using a mutex in a lock or unlock operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to sgx_thread_mutex_init returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a trusted mutex, it is recommended statically initializing the mutex with the macro SGX_THREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, SGX_THREAD_NON_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, of, or SGX_THREAD_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER instead.

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sgx_thread_mutex_destroy

The sgx_thread_mutex_destroy function destroys a trusted mutex object within an enclave.
Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_destroy(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

**mutex [in]**
The trusted mutex object to be destroyed.

Return value

0
The mutex is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

EBUSY
The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

Description

`sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` resets the mutex, which brings it to its initial status. In this process, certain fields are checked to prevent releasing a mutex that is still owned by a thread or on which threads are still waiting.

**NOTE:**
Locking or unlocking a mutex after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a mutex is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

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**sgx_thread_mutex_lock**
The `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` function locks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.
Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_lock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]
The trusted mutex object to be locked.

Return value

0
The mutex is locked successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted mutex object is invalid.

Description

To acquire a mutex, a thread first needs to acquire the corresponding spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread checks whether the mutex is available. If the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue the thread will now become the owner of the mutex. To confirm its ownership, the thread updates the refcount and owner fields. If the mutex is not available, the thread searches the queue. If the thread is already in the queue, but not at the head, it means that the thread has previously tried to lock the mutex, but it did not succeed and had to wait outside the enclave and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. If the thread is trying to lock the mutex for the first time, it will update the waiting queue and make an OCALL to get suspended. Note that threads release the spin lock after acquiring the mutex or before leaving the enclave.

**NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

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</table>
sgx_thread_mutex_trylock

The `sgx_thread_mutex_trylock` function tries to lock a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_trylock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

**mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be try-locked.

Return value

**0**

The mutex is locked successfully.

**EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

**EBUSY**

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

Description

A thread may check the status of the mutex, which implies acquiring the spin lock and verifying that the mutex is available and that the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue. When this happens, the thread acquires the mutex, releases the spin lock and returns 0. Otherwise, the thread releases the spin lock and returns EINVAL/EBUSY. The thread is not suspended in this case.

**NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

Requirements
The `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock` function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_unlock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t *mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

- **mutex [in]**
  The trusted mutex object to be unlocked.

**Return value**

- **0**
  The mutex is unlocked successfully.
- **EINVAL**
  The trusted mutex object is invalid or it is not locked by any thread.
- **EPERM**
  The mutex is locked by another thread.

**Description**

Before a thread releases a mutex, it has to verify it is the owner of the mutex. If that is the case, the thread decreases the refcount by 1 and then may either continue normal execution or wakeup the first thread in the queue. Note that to ensure the state of the mutex remains consistent, the thread that is awakened by the thread releasing the mutex will then try to acquire the mutex almost as in the initial call to the `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` routine.

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</table>
**sgx_thread_cond_init**

The `sgx_thread_cond_init` function initializes a trusted condition variable within the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_init(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    const sgx_thread_condattr_t * unused
);
```

**Parameters**

**cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable.

**attr [in]**

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined condition variable attributes. [NOT USED]

**Return value**

0

The condition variable is initialized successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

**Description:**

When a thread creates a condition variable within an enclave, it simply initializes the various fields of the object to indicate that the condition variable is available. The results of using a condition variable in a wait, signal or broadcast operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_cond_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a condition variable, it is recommended statically initializing the condition variable with the macro `SGX_THREAD_COND_INITIALIZER`.

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</table>
**sgx_thread_cond_destroy**

The `sgx_thread_cond_destroy` function destroys a trusted condition variable within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_destroy(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

**Parameters**

**cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable to be destroyed.

**Return value**

0

The condition variable is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

EBUSY

The condition variable has pending threads waiting on it.

**Description**

The procedure first confirms that there are no threads waiting on the condition variable before it is destroyed. The destroy operation acquires the spin lock at the beginning of the operation to prevent other threads from signaling to or waiting on the condition variable.

**NOTE**

Acquiring or releasing a condition variable after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a condition variable is destroyed, it must be recreated before it can be used again.

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**sgx_thread_cond_wait**

The `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function waits on a condition variable within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_wait(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

- **cond [in]**
  The trusted condition variable to be waited on.

- **mutex [in]**
  The trusted mutex object that will be unlocked when the thread is blocked in the condition variable.

**Return value**

- **0**
  The thread waiting on the condition variable is signaled by other thread (without errors).

- **EINVAL**
  The trusted condition variable or mutex object is invalid or the mutex is not locked.

- **EPERM**
  The trusted mutex is locked by another thread.

**Description:**

A condition variable is always used in conjunction with a mutex. To wait on a condition variable, a thread first needs to acquire the condition variable spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread updates the condition variable waiting queue. To avoid the lost wake-up signal problem, the condition variable spin lock is released after the mutex. This order ensures the function atomically releases the mutex and causes the calling thread to block on the condition variable, with respect to other threads accessing the mutex and the condition variable. After releasing the condition variable spin lock, the thread
makes an OCALL to get suspended. When the thread is awakened, it acquires the condition variable spin lock. The thread then searches the condition variable queue. If the thread is in the queue, it means that the thread was already waiting on the condition variable outside the enclave, and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock, makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. Otherwise, another thread has signaled or broadcasted the condition variable and this thread may proceed. Before returning, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock and acquires the mutex, ensuring that upon returning from the function call the thread still owns the mutex.

**NOTE**

Threads check whether they are in the queue to make the Intel SGX condition variable robust against attacks to the untrusted event.

A thread may have to do up to two OCALLs throughout the `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function call.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_thread_cond_signal**

The `sgx_thread_cond_signal` function wakes a pending thread waiting on the condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_signal(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

**Parameters**

- `cond [in]`
  The trusted condition variable to be signaled.

**Return value**

- 0
  One pending thread is signaled.

**EINVAL**
The trusted condition variable is invalid.

**Description**

To signal a condition variable, a thread starts acquiring the condition variable spin-lock. Then it inspects the status of the condition variable queue. If the queue is empty it means that there are not any threads waiting on the condition variable. When that happens, the thread releases the condition variable and returns. However, if the queue is not empty, the thread removes the first thread waiting in the queue. The thread then makes an OCALL to wake up the thread that is suspended outside the enclave, but first the thread releases the condition variable spin-lock. Upon returning from the OCALL, the thread continues normal execution.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_thread_cond_broadcast**

The `sgx_thread_cond_broadcast` function wakes all pending threads waiting on the condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_broadcast(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

**Parameters**

`cond` [in]

The trusted condition variable to be broadcasted.

**Return value**

0

All pending threads have been broadcasted.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid.

ENOMEM

Internal memory allocation failed.
Description

Broadcast and signal operations on a condition variable are analogous. The only difference is that during a broadcast operation, the thread removes all the threads waiting on the condition variable queue and wakes up all the threads suspended outside the enclave in a single OCALL.

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sgx_thread_self

The `sgx_thread_self` function returns the unique thread identification.

Syntax

```c
sgx_thread_t sgx_thread_self(
    void
);```

Return value

The return value cannot be NULL and is always valid as long as it is invoked by a thread inside the enclave.

Description

The function is a simple wrap of `get_thread_data()` provided in the tRTS, which provides a trusted thread unique identifier.

**NOTE:**

This identifier does not change throughout the life of an enclave.

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</table>

sgx_thread_equal

The `sgx_thread_equal` function compares two thread identifiers.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_equal(sgx_thread_t t1,
    sgx_thread_t t1, ```
sgx_thread_t t2
);

Return value
A nonzero value if the two thread IDs are equal, 0 otherwise.

Description
The function compares two thread identifiers provided by sgx_thread_self to
determine if the IDs refer to the same trusted thread.

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sgx_cpuid
The sgx_cpuid function performs the equivalent of a cpuid() function call or
intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for
the information about supported features.

NOTE:
This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuid(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf
);

Parameters
cpuinfo [in, out]
The information returned in an array of four integers. This array must be loc-
ated within the enclave.

leaf [in]
The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

**Description**

This function provides the equivalent of the cpuid() function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information that is returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. sgx_cpuid performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see [Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual](https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-64-and-ia-32-architectures-software-developer-s-manual.html) for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leaves. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

---

**NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

---

**Requirements**

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**sgx_cpuidex**

The *sgx_cpuidex* function performs the equivalent of a *cpuid_ex()* function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

---

**NOTE:**

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.
```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuidex(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf,
    int subleaf
);
```

Parameters

cpuinfo [in, out]
The information returned in an array of four integers. The array must be located within the enclave.

leaf [in]
The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

subleaf [in]
The sub-leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

Description

This function provides the equivalent of the `cpuid()` function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking `oc_cpuidex` to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

**NOTE**
1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

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**sgx_get_key**

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key using the input information. This function is a wrapper for the SGX EGETKEY instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_key(
    const sgx_key_request_t *key_request,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**

**key_request [in]**

A pointer to a `sgx_key_request_t` object used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within the enclave. See details on the `sgx_key_request_t` to understand initializing this structure before calling this function.

**key [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic key output. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within enclave memory.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:
- `key_request` buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
- `key` buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
- `key_request` and `key_request->key_policy` should not have any reserved bits set.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Indicates an error that the enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE
Indicates the `key_request` requests a key for a `KEYNAME` which the enclave is not authorized.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN
Indicates `key_request->cpu_svn` is beyond platform CPUSVN value

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN
Indicates `key_request->isv_svn` is greater than the enclave's ISVSVN

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME
Indicates `key_request->key_name` is an unsupported value

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the key generation process.

Description

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key from the processor specific key hierarchy with the `key_request` information. If the function fails with an error code, the key buffer will be filled with random numbers. The `key_request` structure needs to be initialized properly to obtain the requested key type. See `sgx_key_request_t` for structure details.

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**sgx_create_report**

The `sgx_create_report` function tries to use the information of the target enclave and other information to create a cryptographic report of the enclave. This function is a wrapper for the SGX EREPORT instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_report(
    const sgx_target_info_t *target_info,
    const sgx_report_data_t *report_data,
    sgx_report_t *report
);
```

**Parameters**

**target_info [in]**

A pointer to the `sgx_target_info_t` object that contains the information of the target enclave, which will be able to cryptographically verify the report calling `sgx_verify_report`.

- If the pointer value is `NULL`, `sgx_create_report` retrieves information about the calling enclave, but the generated report cannot be verified by any enclave.
- If the pointer value is `not NULL` the `target_info` buffer must be within the enclave.

See `sgx_target_info_t` for structure details.

**report_data [in]**

A pointer to the `sgx_report_data_t` object which contains a set of data used for communication between the enclaves. This pointer is allowed to be `NULL`. If it is not `NULL` the `report_data` buffer must be within the enclave. See `sgx_report_data_t` for structure details.

**report [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic report of the enclave. The pointer cannot be `NULL` and the report buffer must be within the enclave. See `sgx_report_t` for structure details.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

An error is reported if any of the parameters are non-NULL pointers but the memory is not within the enclave or the reserved fields of the data structure are not set to zero.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Indicates that the enclave is out of memory.

**Description**

Use the function `sgx_create_report` to create a cryptographic report that describes the contents of the calling enclave. The report can be used by other enclaves to verify that the enclave is running on the same platform. When an enclave calls `sgx_verify_report` to verify a report, it will succeed only if the report was generated using the `target_info` for said enclave. This function is a wrapper for the SGX EREPORT instruction.

Before the source enclave calls `sgx_create_report` to generate a report, it needs to populate `target_info` with information about the target enclave that will verify the report. The target enclave may obtain this information calling `sgx_create_report` with a NULL pointer for `target_info` and pass it to the source enclave at the beginning of the inter-enclave attestation process.

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**sgx_verify_report**

The `sgx_verify_report` function provides software verification for the report which is expected to be generated by the `sgx_create_report` function.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_verify_report(
    const sgx_report_t * report
);
```

**Parameters**
report[in]
A pointer to an sgx_report_t object that contains the cryptographic report to be verified. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Verification success: The input report was generated using a target_info that matches the one for the enclave making this call.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The report object is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**
Indicates report verification error.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the report verification process.

Description
The sgx_verify_report performs a cryptographic CMAC function of the input sgx_report_data_t object in the report using the report key. Then the function compares the input report MAC value with the calculated MAC value to determine whether the report is valid or not.

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**sgx_calc_sealed_data_size**
The sgx_calc_sealed_data_size function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(
    const uint32_t add_mac_txt_size,
    const uint32_t txt_encrypt_size
);
```
Parameters

add_mac_txt_size [in]
Length of the optional additional data stream in bytes. The additional data will not be encrypted, but will be part of the MAC calculation.

txt_encrypt_size [in]
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. This data will also be part of the MAC calculation.

Return value
If the function succeeds, the return value is the minimum number of bytes that need to be allocated for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. If the function fails, the return value is 0xFFFFFFFF. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description
The function calculates the number of bytes to allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The calculation includes the fixed portions of the structure as well as the two input data streams: encrypted text and optional additional MAC text.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len
The sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the additional_MAC_text buffer output from the sgx_unseal_data function.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```
Parameters

**p_sealed_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the sgx_seal_data function.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the optional additional MAC data buffer is returned. If this function fails, the return value is 0xFFFFFFFF. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the output MAC data buffer returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len**

The sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

**p_sealed_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the sgx_seal_data function.

Return value
If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the encrypted data buffer is returned. Otherwise, the return value is 0xFFFFF.F. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

**Description**

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_seal_data**

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**additional_MACtext_length [in]**

Length of the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

**p_additional_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional_MACtext_length must be zero in this case).
NOTE:
This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

**text2encrypt_length [in]**
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

**p_text2encrypt [in]**
Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

**sealed_data_size [in]**
Number of bytes allocated for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The calling code should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**
Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed data.

NOTE:
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`. 
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**

The `sgx_seal_data` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to encrypt the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to preserve secret data after the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data blob can be unsealed on future instantiations of the enclave.

The additional data buffer will not be encrypted but will be part of the MAC calculation that covers the encrypted data as well. This data may include information about the application, version, data, etc which can be utilized to identify the sealed data blob since it will remain plain text.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer and text2encrypt buffers must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_seal_data_ex**

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted. This is the expert mode version of function `sgx_seal_data`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
```
const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);  

Parameters

key_policy [in]

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function sgx_seal_data uses the MRSIGNER policy.

Key policy name Value Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

attribute_mask [in]

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t to determine which attributes will be checked. Function sgx_seal_data uses flags=0xfffffffffffffff3, xfrm=0.

misc_mask [in]

The misc mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

additional_MACtext_length [in]

Length of the additional data to be MAC'ed in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p_addtional_MACtext [in]

Pointer to the additional data to be MAC'ed of variable length. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional_MACtext_length must be zero in this case).

NOTE:
This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

`text2encrypt_length [in]`
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

`p_text2encrypt [in]`
Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted of variable length. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

`sealed_data_size [in]`
Number of bytes allocated for `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize helper function `sgx_calcsealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

`p_sealed_data [out]`
Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calcsealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calcsealed_data_size`. 
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**
The `sgx_seal_data_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_seal_data`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_seal_data` and the default values provided for key policy (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Users of this function should have a clear understanding of the impact on using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in `sgx_seal_data`.

**Requirement**

<table>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unseal_data**
This function is used to AES-GCM decrypt the input sealed data structure. Two output data sets result: one is the decrypted data; the second is the optional additional data that was part of the GCM MAC calculation but was not encrypted. This function provides the converse of `sgx_seal_data` and `sgx_seal_data_ex`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unseal_data(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
    uint8_t * p_decrypted_text,
    uint32_t * p_decrypted_text_length
);
```
Parameters

**p_sealed_data [in]**
Pointer to the sealed data buffer to be AES-GCM decrypted. Must be within the enclave.

**p_addtional_MACtext [out]**
Pointer to the additional data part of the MAC calculation. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_mac_add_text_len` to determine the required buffer size to allocate. (NULL pointer can be passed, if `additional_MACtext_length` is zero).

**p_addtional_MACtext_length [in, out]**
Pointer to the length of the additional MAC data buffer in bytes. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_mac_add_text_len` to determine the minimum required buffer size. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream.

**p_decrypted_text [out]**
Pointer to the decrypted data buffer which needs to be allocated by the calling code. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

**p_decrypted_text_length [in, out]**
Pointer to the length of the decrypted data buffer in byte. The buffer length of `p_decrypted_text` must be specified in `p_decrypted_text_length` as input. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:
• If `additional_mactext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_mactext` cannot be NULL.
• `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot across the enclave boundary.
• `p_decrypted_text` and `p_decrypted_text_length` must be within the enclave.
• `p_decrypted_text` and `p_additional_MACText` buffer must be big enough to receive the decrypted data.
• `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
• Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the sealed data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the sealed data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

The tag verification failed during unsealing. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or sealed data blob corruption. This error is also reported if other corruption of the sealed data structure is detected.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

**Description**

The `sgx_unseal_data` function AES-GCM decrypts the sealed data so that the enclave data can be restored. This function can be utilized to restore secret data that was preserved after an earlier instantiation of this enclave saved this data.

The calling code needs to allocate the additional data buffer and the decrypted data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for these buffers, helper functions `sgx_get_mac_add_text_len` and `sgx_get_
encrypt_txt_len are provided. The decrypted text buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>sgx_tseal.h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_mac_aadata**

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

- **additional_MACtext_length [in]**
  Length of the plain text to provide authentication for in bytes.

- **p_additional_MACtext [in]**
  Pointer to the plain text to provide authentication for.

  **NOTE:**
  This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

- **sealed_data_size [in]**
  Number of bytes allocated for the sealed_data_t structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size.

- **p_sealed_data [out]**
  Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed_data_t structure.

  **NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure, or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The `sgx_mac_aadata` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to generate the authentication tag based on the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The data origin authentication can be demonstrated on future instantiations of the enclave using the MAC stored into the data blob.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

Requirements
**Header** | `sgx_tseal.h`  
---|---  
**Library** | `libsgx_tservice.a` or `libsgx_tservice_sim.a` (simulation)  

### `sgx_mac_aadata_ex`

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC. This is the expert mode version of the function `sgx_mac_aadata`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgxsealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**key_policy [in]**

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x00-01</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x00-02</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**attribute_mask [in]**

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of `sgx_attributes_t` to determine which attributes will be checked. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses flag `s=0xfffffffffffffff3, xfrm=0`.

**misc_mask [in]**

The MISC_SELECT mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**additional_MACtext_length [in]**
Length of the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed in bytes.

**p_additional_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed of variable length.

**NOTE:**
This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

**sealed_data_size [in]**
Number of bytes allocated for the `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**
Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mac_text` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.
**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**

The `sgx_mac_aadata_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_mac_aadata`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_mac_aadata` and the default values provided for `key_policy` (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Before you use this function, you should have a clear understanding of the impact of using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in `sgx_mac_aadata`.

**Requirement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unmac_aadata**

This function is used to verify the authenticity of the input sealed data structure using AES-GMAC. This function verifies the MAC generated with `sgx_mac_aadata` or `sgx_mac_aadata_ex`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unmac_aadata(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_sealed_data [in]**
  Pointer to the sealed data structure to be authenticated with AES-GMAC. Must be within the enclave.

- **p_addtional_MACtext [out]**
Pointer to the plain text data stream that was AES-GMAC protected. You should call the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_text_len` to determine the required buffer size to allocate.

**p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the plain text data stream in bytes. Upon successful tag matching, `sgx_unmac_data` sets this parameter with the actual length of the plaintext stored in `p_additional_MACtext`.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The authentication tag in the `sealed_data_t` structure matches the expected value.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

This parameter indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers must be big enough to receive the plain text data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffers must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

The tag verification fails. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or corruption of the `sealed_data_t` structure.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.
Description

The `sgx_unmac_aadata` function verifies the tag with AES-GMAC. Use this function to demonstrate the authenticity of data that was preserved by an earlier instantiation of this enclave.

You need to allocate additional data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for additional data buffers, use the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_text_len`.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`sgx_sha256_msg`

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

Parameters

**p_src [in]**
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p_hash [out]**
A pointer to the output 256bit hash resulting from the SHA256 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.
Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The SHA256 hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Input pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The SHA256 hash calculation failed.

Description

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a SHA256 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

Requirements

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<thead>
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<th>sgx_tcbrypto.h</th>
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</table>

**sgx_sha256_init**

`sgx_sha256_init` returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is `sgx_sha256_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_init(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle
);

Parameters

p_sha_handle [out]
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The SHA256 state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The pointer p_sha_handle is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The SHA256 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

Calling sgx_sha256_init is the first set in performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA256 state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, sgx_sha256_close should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Requirements
sgx_sha256_update performs a SHA256 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the sha_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

sha_handle [in]
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The input parameter(s) are NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA256 hash calculation.

Description
This function should be used as part of a SHA256 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA256 hash is needed over a single data set, function \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_msg} should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_init} function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA256 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_get\_hash} should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

Requirements

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\texttt{sgx\_sha256\_get\_hash}

\texttt{sgx\_sha256\_get\_hash} obtains the SHA256 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_update}).

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_sha256\_get\_hash(  
    sgx\_sha\_state\_handle\_t sha\_handle,  
    sgx\_sha256\_hash\_t* p\_hash  
);  
\end{verbatim}

Parameters

\texttt{sha\_handle [in]}

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

\texttt{p\_hash [out]}

This is a pointer to the 256-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value
**SGX_SUCCESS**
The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The pointers are NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The SHA256 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function returns the hash after performing the SHA256 calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_sha256_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA256 state used in the `sgx_sha256_update` calls must be passed in as input.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_sha256_close**
`sgx_sha256_close` cleans up and deallocates the SHA256 state that was allocated in function `sgx_sha256_init`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**sha_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.
Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The SHA256 state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The input handle is NULL.

Description

Calling `sgx_sha256_close` is the last step after performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA256 calculation state.

Requirements

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**sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt**

`sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-GCM encryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
);
```

Parameters

**p_key [in]**
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.
**p_src [in]**
A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

**src_len [in]**
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

**p_dst [out]**
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**p_iv [in]**
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

**iv_len [in]**
Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

**p_aad [in]**
A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

**aad_len [in]**
Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

**p_out_mac [out]**
This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt**

sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM decryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(
```
const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
const uint8_t *p_src,
uint32_t src_len,
uint8_t *p_dst,
const uint8_t *p_iv,
uint32_t iv_len,
const uint8_t *p_aad,
uint32_t aad_len,
const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);

Parameters

p_key [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]
Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]
A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.
aad_len [in]
Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

p_in_mac [in]
This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt).

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH
The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description
The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about
64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg

The **sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg** function performs a standard 128 bit CMAC hash over the input data buffer.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t *p_mac
);
```

Parameters

**p_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

\textbf{p\_mac [out]}  
A pointer to the output 128-bit hash resulting from the CMAC calculation. This pointer must be non-NUL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

\textbf{Return value}

\textbf{SGX\_SUCCESS}  
The CMAC hash function is performed successfully.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}  
The key, source or MAC pointer is NULL.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY}  
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED}  
An unexpected internal cryptography library.

\textbf{Description}

The \texttt{sgx\_rijndaell128\_cmac\_msg} function performs a standard CMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 128-bit version of the CMAC hash is supported.

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a CMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NUL.

\textbf{Requirements}

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</table>
sgx_cmac128_init

sgx_cmac128_init returns an allocated and initialized CMAC algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the CMAC hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommended call is sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax

sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_init(
    const sgx_cmac128bit_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t* p_cmac_handle
);

Parameters

p_key [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_cmac_handle [out]
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC 128-bit hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The CMAC hash state is successfully allocated and initialized.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The key or handle pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description
Calling \texttt{sgx\_cmac128\_init} is the first set in performing a CMAC 128-bit hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the CMAC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, \texttt{sgx\_cmac128\_close} should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

### Requirements

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</table>

\texttt{sgx\_cmac128\_update}

\texttt{sgx\_cmac128\_update} performs a CMAC 128-bit hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the \texttt{cmac\_handle} contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

### Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_cmac128\_update(
    const uint8\_t \*p\_src,
    uint32\_t src\_len,
    sgx\_cmac\_state\_handle\_t cmac\_handle
);
\end{verbatim}

### Parameters

\begin{itemize}
    \item \texttt{p\_src [in]}
        A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.
    \item \texttt{src\_len [in]}
        Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.
    \item \texttt{cmac\_handle [in]}
        \end{itemize}
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The source pointer or cmac handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the CMAC hash calculation.

**NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is not freed (CMAC handle). In this case, call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

Description

This function should be used as part of a CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over multiple datasets. If a CMAC hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx rijndael128_cmac128_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_cmac128_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the CMAC state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_cmac128_final` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

Requirements

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</table>
**sgx_cmac128_final**

`sgx_cmac128_final` obtains the CMAC 128-bit hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_cmac128_update`).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_final(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t* p_hash
);
```

**Parameters**

**cmac_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

**p_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 128-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The hash pointer or CMAC handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The CMAC state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

---

**NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is freed (CMAC handle). In this case, please call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

**Description**
This function returns the hash after performing the CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_cmac128_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to CMAC state used in the `sgx_cmac128_update` calls must be passed in as input.

**Requirements**

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`sgx_cmac128_close`  
`sgx_cmac128_close` cleans up and deallocates the CMAC algorithm context state that was allocated in function `sgx_cmac128_init`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_close(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t hmac_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

`cmac_handle [in]`

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The CMAC state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The CMAC handle is NULL.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_cmac128_close` is the last step after performing a CMAC hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used for storing the CMAC algorithm context state.
Requirements

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**sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt**

`sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-CTR encryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_ctr_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR encryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

**src_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

**p_ctr [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

**ctr_inc_bits [in]**

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

**p_dst [out]**
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

This function encrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the encryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt**

sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-CTR decryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst
);

Parameters

p_key [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR decryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length of the input data stream to be decrypted.

p_ctr [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

ctr_inc_bits [in]
Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

This function decrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the decryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/stream, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ecc256_open_context**

sgx_ecc256_open_context returns an allocated and initialized context for the elliptic curve cryptosystem over a prime finite field, GF(p). This context must be created prior to calling sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair or sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey. When the calling code has completed its set of ECC operations, sgx_ecc256_close_context should be called to cleanup and deallocate the ECC context.

**NOTE:**

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_open_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t *p_ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

p_ecc_handle [out]
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

SGX_SUCCESS

The ECC256 GF(p) state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The ECC context state was not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

*sgx Ecc256 Open Context* is utilized to allocate and initialize a 256-bit GF(p) cryptographic system. The caller does not allocate memory for the ECC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the ECC cryptographic function using this cryptographic system is completed or any error occurs, *sgx Sha256 Close Context* should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Public key cryptography successfully allows to solving problems of information safety by enabling trusted communication over insecure channels. Although elliptic curves are well studied as a branch of mathematics, an interest to the cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves is constantly rising due to the advantages that the elliptic curve algorithms provide in the wireless communications: shorter processing time and key length.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) implement a different way of creating public keys. As elliptic curve calculation is based on the addition of the rational points in the (x,y) plane and it is difficult to solve a discrete logarithm from these points, a higher level of safety is achieved through the cryptographic schemes that use the elliptic curves. The cryptographic systems that encrypt
messages by using the properties of elliptic curves are hard to attack due to the extreme complexity of deciphering the private key.

Using of elliptic curves allows shorter public key length and encourages cryptographers to create cryptosystems with the same or higher encryption strength as the RSA or DSA cryptosystems. Because of the relatively short key length, ECCs do encryption and decryption faster on the hardware that requires less computation processing volumes.

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**sgx_ecc256_close_context**

sgx_ecc256_close_context cleans up and deallocates the ECC 256 GF (p) state that was allocated in function sgx_ecc256_open_context.

**NOTE:**

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_close_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

**ecc_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The ECC 256 GF(p) state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

**Description**

`sgx_ecc256_close_context` is used by calling code to deallocate memory used for storing the ECC 256 GF(p) state used in ECC cryptographic calculations.

**Requirements**

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</tr>
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</table>

**sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair**

`sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair` generates a private/public key pair on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. The calling code is responsible for allocating memory for the public and private keys. `sgx_ecc256_open_context` must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_private [out]**

A pointer to the private key which is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_public [out]**

A pointer to the public key which is an elliptic curve point such that:
public key = private key * G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

`ecc_handle [in]`
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key or public key is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function populates private/public key pair. The calling code allocates memory for the private and public key pointers to be populated. The function generates a private key `p_private` and computes a public key `p_public` of the elliptic cryptosystem over a finite field GF(p).

The private key `p_private` is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

The public key `p_public` is an elliptic curve point such that `p_public = p_private * G`, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

The context of the point `p_public` as an elliptic curve point must be created by using the function `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

**Requirements**
Header  |  sgx_tcrypto.h
Library |  libsgx_tcrypto.a or libsgx_tcrypto_opt.a

\textbf{sgx\_ecc256\_compute\_shared\_dhkey}

\textit{sgx\_ecc256\_compute\_shared\_dhkey} generates a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\textit{p\_private\_b} [in]

A pointer to the local private key.

\textit{NOTE:}

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

\textit{p\_public\_ga} [in]

A pointer to the remote public key.

\textit{NOTE:}

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

\textit{p\_shared\_key} [out]

A pointer to the secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

\textit{NOTE:}

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

\textit{ecc\_handle} [in]
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function computes the Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number sharedKey, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (sharedKey). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key pubKeyA by using her private key privKeyA: \( \text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} \cdot G \), where \( G \) is the base point of the elliptic curve.
2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.
3. Bob calculates his own public key pubKeyB by using his private key

\[ \text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} \times G, \] where G is a base point of the elliptic curve.

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.

5. Alice gets Bob’s public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyA. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob’s public key and applies the following formula:

\[ \text{shareKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} \times \text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyA} \times \text{privKeyB} \times G. \]

6. Bob gets Alice’s public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyB. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice’s public key and applies the following formula:

\[ \text{shareKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{privKeyA} \times G. \]

As the following equation is true \( \text{privKeyA} \times \text{privKeyB} \times G = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{privKeyA} \times G \), the result of both calculations is the same, that is, the equation \( \text{shareKeyA} = \text{shareKeyB} \) is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

Shared secret shareKey is an x-coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context}.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ecc256_check_point**

\text{sgx_ecc256_check_point} checks whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

\[
\text{sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_check_point}(
    \text{const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_point},
\]

- 190 -
const sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle,
int *p_valid
);

Parameters

**p_point [in]**
A pointer to the point to perform validity check on.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**p_valid [out]**
A pointer to the validation result.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The validation process is performed successfully. Check p_valid to get the validation result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
If the input ecc handle, p_point or p_valid is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

*sgx_ecc256_check_point* validates whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system.

The typical validation result is one of the two values:
1 - The input point is valid
0 – The input point is not valid

Requirements

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sgx_ecdsa_sign

sgx_ecdsa_sign computes a digital signature with a given private key over an input dataset.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

**p_data [in]**
A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

**data_size [in]**
The size of the data to be signed.

**p_private [in]**
A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_signature [out]**
A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. If the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the input private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which the given function computes.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The keys can be generated and set up by the function: \texttt{sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair}.

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: \texttt{sgx_ecc256_open_context}. 
Requirements

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**sgx_ecdsa_verify**

`sgx_ecdsa_verify` verifies the input digital signature with a given public key over an input dataset.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_data [in]**

A pointer to the signed dataset to verify.

**data_size [in]**

The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

**p_public [in]**

A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_signature [in]**

A pointer to the signature to be verified.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_result [out]**
A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p_result to get the verification result.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which could be created by function: sgx_ecdsa_sign. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

SGX_ECVValid - Digital signature is valid

SGX_ECInvalidSignature - Digital signature is not valid

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: sgx_ecc256_open_context.
Requirements

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**sgx_create_pse_session**

sgx_create_pse_session creates a session with the PSE.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_pse_session(
    void
);
```

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Session is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.
SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description
An Intel(R) SGX enclave first calls `sgx_create_pse_session()` in the process to request platform service.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` is returned.

Requirements

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`sgx_close_pse_session`

`sgx_close_pse_session` closes a session created by `sgx_create_pse_session`.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_close_pse_session(
    void
);
```

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Session is closed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description
An Intel(R) SGX enclave calls `sgx_close_pse_session()` when there is no need to request platform service.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_get_ps_sec_prop**

`sgx_get_ps_sec_prop` gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop(
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t* security_property
);
```

**Parameters**

**security_property [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Security property is returned successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**Description**

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.
Requirements

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</table>

**sgx_get_trusted_time**

sgx_get_trusted_time gets trusted time from the AE service.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_trusted_time(
    sgx_time_t* current_time,
    sgx_time_source_nonce_t* time_source_nonce
);
```

**Parameters**

**current_time [out]**

Trusted Time Stamp in seconds relative to a reference point. The reference point does not change as long as the `time_source_nonce` has not changed. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**time_source_nonce [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the nonce which indicates time source. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Trusted time is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

current_time contains time in seconds and time_source_nonce contains nonce associate with the time. The caller should compare time_source_nonce against the value returned from the previous call of this API if it needs to calculate the time passed between two readings of the Trusted Timer. If the time_source_nonce of the two readings do not match, the difference between the two readings does not necessarily reflect time passed.

The caller should call sgx_create_pse_session to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex**

sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex creates a monotonic counter.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex(
    uint16_t owner_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t * owner_attribute_mask,
    sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```
Parameters

owner_policy [in]
The owner policy of the monotonic counter.

- 0x1 means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter
- 0x2 means enclave with same measurement can access the monotonic counter
- 0x3 means enclave with same measurement as well as signing key can access the monotonic counter.
- Owner policy values of 0x0 or any bits set beyond bits 0 and 1 will cause SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

owner_attribute_mask [in]
Mask of owner attribute, in the format of sgx_attributes_t.

counter_uuid [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Monotonic counter is created successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the parameters is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP
Monotonic counters are used out.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by the architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` to create a monotonic counter with the given `owner_policy` and `owner_attribute_mask`.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of monotonic counters (MC) an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an SGX application should record the MC UUID that `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the
MC service after uninstalling the SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

**NOTE**
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
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</table>

*sgx_create_monotonic_counter*

*sgx_create_monotonic_counter* creates a monotonic counter with default owner policy and default user attribute mask.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter(
    sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

**Parameters**

**counter_uuid [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**counter_value [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Monotonic counter is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.
SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP
Monotonic counters are used out.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

Call `sgx_create_monotonic_counter` to create a monotonic counter with the default owner policy 0x1, which means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter and default `owner_attribute_mask 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCB`.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the
memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of MCs an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an SGX application should record the MC UUID that \texttt{sgx_create_monotonic_counter} returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

\textbf{NOTE}

One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

\textbf{Requirements}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Header} & \texttt{sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl} \tabularnewline
\hline
\textbf{Library} & \texttt{libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)} \tabularnewline
\hline
\end{tabular}

\texttt{sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter}

\texttt{sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter} destroys a monotonic counter created by \texttt{sgx_create_monotonic_counter} or \texttt{sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex}.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\texttt{counter_uuid [in]}

The monotonic counter ID to be destroyed.

\textbf{Return value}

\texttt{SGX_SUCCESS}
Monotonic counter is destroyed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND**

The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT**

The enclave doesn’t have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter` after a monotonic counter is not needed anymore.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.
sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Destroying a Monotonic Counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter increments a monotonic counter value by 1.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]
The Monotonic Counter ID to be incremented.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the Monotonic Counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Monotonic Counter is incremented successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND**
The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT**
The enclave does not have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call **sgx_increment_monotonic_counter** to increase a monotonic counter value by 1.

The caller should call **sgx_create_pse_session** to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.
sgx_increment_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Incrementing a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_read_monotonic_counter

sgx_read_monotonic_counter returns the value of a monotonic counter.

This API is only available in simulation mode.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]
The monotonic counter ID to be read.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Monotonic counter is read successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.
SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND
the Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by the user or the Architectural Enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description
Call sgx_read_monotonic_counter to read the value of a monotonic counter.

The caller should call sgx_create_pse_session to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

sgx_read_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Requirements

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</table>
**sgx_ra_init**

The `sgx_ra_init` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)**
  The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

- **b_pse [in]**
  If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_session` before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

- **p_context [out]**
  The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
  Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
  The session is invalid or ended by the server.
**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

<table>
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</table>

**sgx_ra_init_ex**

The `sgx_ra_init_ex` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process while it allows the use of a custom defined Key Derivation Function (KDF).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init_ex(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,  
    int b_pse,  
    sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t derive_key_cb,  
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)**

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**b_pse [in]**

If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_session` before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

**derive_key_cb [in]**

This a pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype of `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t`. This function takes the Diffie-Hellman shared
secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK).

**p_context [out]**
The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
The session is invalid or ended by the server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**
This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ra_get_keys**
The `sgx_ra_get_keys` function is used to get the negotiated keys of a remote attestation and key exchange session. This function should only be called after the service provider accepts the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 3 produced by `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_keys(
```
```c
sgx_ra_context_t context,
sgx_ra_key_type_t type,
sgx_ra_key_128_t *p_key
);
```

**Parameters**

**context [in]**

Context returned by *sgx_ra_init*.

**type [in]**

The type of the keys, which can be *SGX_RA_KEY_SK*, *SGX_RA_KEY_MK*, or *SGX_RA.VK*.

If the RA context was generated by *sgx_ra_init*, the returned *SGX_RA_KEY_MK*, *SGX_RA_KEY_SK* or *SGX_RA.VK* is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave using the following Key Derivation Function (KDF):

\[
\text{KDK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0, gab x-coordinate})
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.VK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK}, 0x01||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.MK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK}, 0x01||'MK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
\text{SGX_RA_KEY.SK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK}, 0x01||'SK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The *key0* used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of **0x00**. The plain text used in the Key derivation calculation is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format. The plain text used in each key calculation includes:

- a counter (**0x01**)
- a label: the ASCII representation of one of the strings 'VK', 'MK' or 'SK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (**0x80**)

If the RA context was generated by the *sgx_ra_init_ex* API, the KDF used to generate *SGX_RA_KEY_MK*, *SGX_RA_KEY_SK* and *SGX_RA.VK* is defined
in the implementation of the call back function provided to the \texttt{sgx_ra_init_ex} function.

\textbf{p_key [out]}
The key returned.

\textbf{Return value}

\textbf{SGX_SUCCESS}
Indicates success.

\textbf{SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER}
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

\textbf{SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE}
Indicates this API is invoked in incorrect order, it can be called only after a success session has been established. In other words, \texttt{sgx_ra_proc_msg2} should have been called and no error returned.

\textbf{Description}
After a successful key exchange process, this API can be used in the enclave to get specific key associated with this remote attestation and key exchange session.

\textbf{Requirements}

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</table>

\textbf{sgx_ra_close}
Call the \texttt{sgx_ra_close} function to release the remote attestation and key exchange context after the process is done and the context isn't needed anymore.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_close(
    const sgx_ra_context_t context
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\textbf{context [in]}
Context returned by \texttt{sgxRaInit}.

Return value

\textbf{SGX\_SUCCESS}

Indicates success.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}

Indicates the context is invalid.

Description

At the end of a key exchange process, the caller needs to use this API in an enclave to clear and free memory associated with this remote attestation session.

Requirements

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</table>

\texttt{sgx\_dh\_init\_session}

Initialize DH secure session according to the caller's role in the establishment.

Syntax

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t sgx\_dh\_init\_session(
    sgx\_dh\_session\_role\_t role,
    sgx\_dh\_session\_t * session
);
\end{verbatim}

Parameters

\textbf{role [in]}

Indicates which role the caller plays in the secure session establishment.

The value of role of the initiator of the session establishment must be \texttt{SGX\_DH\_SESSION\_INITIATOR}.

The value of role of the responder of the session establishment must be \texttt{SGX\_DH\_SESSION\_RESPONDER}.

\textbf{session [out]}
A pointer to the instance of the DH session which contains entire information about session establishment.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Session is initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
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**sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1**
Generates MSG1 for the responder of DH secure session establishment and records ECC key pair in session structure.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1(
    sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg1 [out]**
A pointer to an sgx_dh_msg1_t msg1 buffer. The buffer holding the msg1 message, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.
The DH msg1 contains the responder's public key and report based target info.

**dh_session [in/out]**
A pointer that points to the instance of `sgx_dh_session_t`. The buffer holding the DH session information, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

**NOTE**
As output, the DH session structure contains the responder's public key and private key for the current session.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
MSG1 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1**
The initiator of DH secure session establishment handles msg1 sent by responder and then generates msg2, and records initiator's ECC key pair in DH session structure.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1(
    const sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```
Parameters

msg1 [in]
Point to dh message 1 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

msg2 [out]
Point to dh message 2 buffer, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in/out]
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
msg1 is processed and msg2 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2**

The responder handles msg2 sent by initiator and then derives AEK, updates session information and generates msg3.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2(
    const sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * initiator_identity
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg2 [in]**

Point to dh message 2 buffer generated by session initiator, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**msg3 [out]**

Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder in this function, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**dh_session [in/out]**
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**aek [out]**
A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_key_128bit_t`. The aek is derived as follows:

\[
\text{KDK} := \text{CMAC}(\text{key0}, \text{LittleEndian}(\text{gab x-coordinate}))
\]

\[
\text{AEK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK}, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**initiator_identity [out]**
A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t`. Identity information of initiator includes isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
msg2 is processed and msg3 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3**
The initiator handles msg3 sent by responder and then derives AEK, updates session information and gets responder's identity information.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3(
    const sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * responder_identity
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg3 [in]**
Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**dh_session [in]**

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**aek [out]**

A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_key_128bit_t`. The aek is derived as follows:

\[
\text{KDK} := \text{CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))} \\
\text{AEK} = \text{AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)}
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**responder_identity [out]**

Identity information of responder including isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek or the `msg3_body.additional_prop` field of msg3.

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.
Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The function is done successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Types and Enumerations

This topic introduces the types and error codes in the following topics:

- Type Descriptions
- Error Codes

Type Descriptions

This topic section describes the following data types provided by the Intel(R) SGX:

- sgx_enclave_id_t
- sgx_status_t
- sgx_launch_token_t
- sgx_exception_vector_t
- sgx_exception_type_t
- sgx_cpu_context_t
- sgx_exception_info_t
- sgx_exception_handler_t
- sgx_spinlock_t
- sgx_thread_t
- sgx_thread_mutex_t
- sgx_thread_mutexattr_t
- sgx_thread_cond_t
- sgx_thread_condattr_t
- sgx_misc_select_t
- sgx_attributes_t
- sgx_misc_attribute_t
- sgx_isv_svn_t
- sgx_cpu_svn_t
- sgx_key_id_t
- sgx_key_128bit_t
- sgx_key_request_t
- sgx_measurement_t
- sgx_mac_t
- sgx_report_data_t
- sgx_prod_id_t
- sgx_target_info_t
- sgx_report_body_t
- sgx_report_t
- sgx_aes_gcm_data_t
- sgx密封_data_t
- sgx_epid_group_id_t
- sgx_basename_t
- sgx_quote_t
- sgx_quote_sign_type_t
- sgx_spid_t
- sgx_quote_nonce_t
- sgx_time_source_nonce_t
- sgx_time_t
- sgx_ps_cap_t
- sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t
- sgx_mc_uuid_t
- sgx_ra_context_t
- sgx_ra_key_128_t
- sgx_ra_key_type_t
• `sgx_ra_msg1_t`
• `sgx_ra_msg2_t`
• `sgx_ra_msg3_t`
• `sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t`
• `sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t`
• `sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t`
• `sgx_platform_info_t`
• `sgx_update_info_bit_t`
• `sgx_dh_msg1_t`
• `sgx_dh_msg2_t`
• `sgx_dh_msg3_t`
• `sgx_dh_msg3_body_t`
• `sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t`
• `sgx_dh_session_role_t`
• `sgx_dh_session_t`

**sgx_enclave_id_t**

An enclave ID, also referred to as an enclave handle. Used as a handle to an enclave by various functions.

Enclave IDs are locally unique, i.e. within the platform, and the uniqueness is guaranteed until the next machine restart.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint64_t sgx_enclave_id_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_eid.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_status_t**

Specifies the return status from an Intel SGX function call. For a list containing all possible values of this data type, see Error Codes.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _status_t {...} sgx_status_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_error.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_launch_token_t**

An opaque type used to hold enclave license information. Used by `sgx_create_enclave` to initialize an enclave. The license is generated by the enclave licensing service.

See more details in **Loading and Unloading an Enclave**.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_launch_token_t[1024];
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_urts.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_exception_vector_t**

The `sgx_exception_vector_t` enumeration contains the enclave supported exception vectors. If the exception vector is #BP, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum __sgx_exception_vector_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DE = 0, /* DIV and DIV instructions */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DB = 1, /* For Intel use only */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BP = 3, /* INT 3 instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BR = 5, /* BOUND instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_UD = 6, /* UD2 instruction or reserved opcode */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_MF = 16, /* x87 FPU floating-point or WAIT/FWAI instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_AC = 17, /* Any data reference in memory */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_XM = 19, /* SSE/SSE2/SSE3 floating-point instruction */
} sgx_exception_vector_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_exception_type_t**

The `sgx_exception_type_t` enumeration contains values that specify the exception type. If the exception vector is #BP (BreakPoint), the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _sgx_exception_type_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE = 3,
    SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE = 6,
} sgx_exception_type_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_cpu_context_t**

The `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure contains processor-specific register data. Custom exception handling uses `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure to record the CPU context at exception time.

**Syntax**

```c
#if defined (_M_X64) || defined (__x86_64__)

typedef struct _cpu_context_t
{
    uint64_t rax;
    uint64_t rcx;
    uint64_t rdx;
    uint64_t rbx;
    uint64_t rsp;
    uint64_t rbp;
    uint64_t rsi;
    uint64_t rdi;
    uint64_t r8;
    uint64_t r9;
    uint64_t r10;
    uint64_t r11;
    uint64_t r12;
    uint64_t r13;
    uint64_t r14;
    uint64_t r15;
    uint64_t rflags;
    uint64_t rip;
} sgx_cpu_context_t;
```
typedef struct _cpu_context_t
{
    uint32_t eax;
    uint32_t ecx;
    uint32_t edx;
    uint32_t ebx;
    uint32_t esp;
    uint32_t ebp;
    uint32_t esi;
    uint32_t edi;
    uint32_t eflags;
    uint32_t eip;
} sgx_cpu_context_t;
#endif

Members
rax, rcx, rdx, rbx, rsp, rbp, rsi, rdi, r8 – r15
64-bit general purpose registers
rflags
64-bit program status and control register
rip
64-bit instruction pointer
ea, ecx, edx, ebx, esp, ebp, esi, edi
32-bit general purpose registers
eflags
32-bit program status and control register
eip
32-bit instruction pointer
Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_exception_info_t
A structure of this type contains an exception record with a description of the exception and processor context record at the time of exception.

Syntax
typedef struct _exception_info_t
{
  sgx_cpu_context_t cpu_context;
  sgx_exception_vector_t exception_vector;
  sgx_exception_type_t exception_type;
} sgx_exception_info_t;

**Members**

**cpu_context**
The context record that contains the processor context at the exception time.

**exception_vector**
The reason the exception occurs. This is the code generated by a hardware exception.

**exception_type**
The exception type.

*SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE (3)* indicates a HW exception.
*SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE (6)* indicates a SW exception.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_exception_handler_t**

Callback function that serves as a custom exception handler.

**Syntax**

typedef int (* sgx_exception_handler_t) (sgx_exception_info_t *info);

**Members**

**info**

A pointer to *sgx_exception_info_t* structure that receives the exception information.

**Return value**

*EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH (0)*
The exception handler did not handle the exception and the RTS should call the next exception handler in the chain.

**EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION (-1)**

The exception handler handled the exception and the RTS should continue the execution of the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_spinlock_t**

Data type for a trusted spin lock.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef volatile uint32_t sgx_spinlock_t;
```

**Members**

`sgx_spinlock_t` defines a spin lock object inside the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_spinlock.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_thread_t**

Data type to uniquely identify a trusted thread.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uintptr * sgx_thread_t;
```

**Members**

`sgx_thread_t` is an opaque data type with no member fields visible to users. This data type is subject to change. Thus, enclave code should not rely on the contents of this data object.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_thread.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_thread_mutex_t**

Data type for a trusted mutex object.
Syntax

typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex
{
    size_t m_refcount;
    uint32_t m_control;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_mutex_t;

Members

m_control
Flags to define whether a mutex is recursive or not.

m_refcount
Reference counter of the mutex object. It will be increased by 1 if the mutex is successfully acquired, and be decreased by 1 if the mutex is released.

**NOTE**
The counter will be greater than one only if the mutex is recursive.

m_lock
The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the mutex object.

m_owner
The thread that currently owns the mutex writes its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a mutex releases it.

m_queue
Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the ownership of the mutex. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_thread.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_thread_mutexattr_t
Attribute for the trusted mutex object.
**Syntax**

typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_mutexattr_t;

**Members**

**m_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_thread.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_thread_cond_t**

Data type for a trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

typedef struct sgx_thread_cond
{
    sgx_spinlock_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_cond_t;

**Members**

**m_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the condition variable.

**m_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting on the condition variable. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_thread.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_thread_condattr_t**  
Attribute for the trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond_attr  
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_condattr_t;
```

**Members**

**m_dummy**  
Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_thread.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_misc_select_t**  
Enclave misc select bits. The value is 4 byte in length. Currently all the bits are reserved for future extension.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_attributes.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_attributes_t**  
Enclave attributes definition structure.

---

**NOTE**  
When specifying an attributes mask used in key derivation, at a minimum the flags that should be set are INITED, DEBUG and RESERVED bits.

---

**NOTE**  
The XGETBV instruction can be executed to determine the register sets which are part of the XSAVE state which corresponds to the xfrm value of attributes. Since the save state is dependent on the host system and operating system, an attributes mask generally does not include these bits (XFRM is set to 0).

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_attributes_t
```
{  
    uint64_t flags;
    uint64_t xfrm;
} sgx_attributes_t;

Members

flags

Flags is a combination of the following values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_INITTED 0x0000000000000001ULL</td>
<td>The enclave is initialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_DEBUG 0x0000000000000002ULL</td>
<td>The enclave is a debug enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_MODE64BIT 0x0000000000000004ULL</td>
<td>The enclave runs in 64 bit mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY 0x0000000000000010ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a provision key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_LICENSE_KEY 0x0000000000000020ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a license key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_RESERVED 0xffffffffffffffffffc8ull</td>
<td>A mask used to ensure that reserved bits are zero. Reserved bits are bit 3 and bits 6-63.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xfrm

Similar to XCR0, xfrm is a combination of the following values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_LEGACY 0x0000000000000003ULL</td>
<td>FPU and SSE states are saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_AVX 0x0000000000000006ULL</td>
<td>AVX state is saved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Requirements

Header sgx_attributes.h

sgx_misc_attribute_t

Enclave misc_select and attributes definition structure.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_misc_attributes_t
```c
{
    sgx_attributes_t secs_attr;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
} sgx_misc_attribute_t;
```

**Members**

**secs_attr**
The Enclave attributes.

**misc_select**
The Enclave misc select configuration.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_attributes.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_isv_svn_t**
ISV security version. The value is 2 bytes in length. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_cpu_svn_t**

`sgx_cpu_svn_t` is a 128-bit value representing the CPU security version. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

**Syntax**

```c
#define SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE 16
typedef struct _sgx_cpu_svn_t {
    uint8_t svn[SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE];
} sgx_cpu_svn_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
sgx_key_id_t

sgx_key_id_t is a 256 bit value used in the key request structure. The value is generally populated with a random value to provide key wear-out protection.

Syntax

```c
#define SGX_KEYID_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_key_id_t {
    uint8_t id[SGX_KEYID_SIZE];
} sgx_key_id_t;
```

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

sgx_key_128bit_t

A 128 bit value that is used to store a derived key from for example the sgx_get_key function.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_key_request_t

Data structure of key request which is used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. This is the input parameter for the sgx_get_key function.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _key_request_t {
    uint16_t key_name;
    uint16_t key_policy;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint16_t reserved1;
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask;
    uint8_t reserved2[436];
} sgx_key_request_t;
```

Members
**key_name**

The name of the key requested. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_LICENSE</td>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>License key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Provisioning key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Provisioning seal key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_REPORT</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>Report key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>Seal key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**key_policy**

Identify which inputs are required to be used in the key derivation. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

If MRENCLAVE is used, then that key can only be rederived by that particular enclave.

**NOTE**

If MRSIGNER is used, then another enclave with the same ISV_SVN could derive the key as well which is useful for applications that instantiate more than one enclave and would like to pass data. The key derived could be used in the encryption process for the data passed between the enclaves.

**isv_svn**

The ISV security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**reserved1**

Reserved for future use. Must be zero.
**cpu_svn**
The TCB security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**attribute_mask**
The attributes mask used to determine which enclave attributes must be included in the key. It only impacts the derivation of seal key, provisioning key and provisioning seal key. See the definition of `sgx_attributes_t`.

**key_id**
Value for key wear-out protection. Generally initialized with a random number.

**misc_mask**
The misc mask used to determine which enclave misc select must be included in the key. Reserved for future function extension.

**reserved2**
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_measurement_t**

*sgx_measurement_t* is a 256-bit value representing the enclave measurement.

### Syntax

```c
#define SGX_HASH_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_measurement_t {
    uint8_t m[SGX_HASH_SIZE];
} sgx_measurement_t;
```

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_mac_t**

This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
sgx_report_data_t

sgx_report_data_t is a 512-bit value used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave. This is one of the inputs to the sgx_create_report function.

Syntax

#define SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE 64
typedef struct _sgx_report_data_t {
    uint8_t d[SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_report_data_t;

Requirements

Header: sgx_report.h

sgx_prod_id_t

A 16-bit value representing the ISV enclave product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

Requirements

Header: sgx_report.h

sgx_target_info_t

Data structure of report target information. This is an input to function sgx_create_report and sgx_init_quote which is used to identify the enclave (its measurement and attributes) which will be able to verify the REPORT that is generated.

Syntax

typedef struct _targe_info_t {
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    uint8_t reserved1[4];
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved2[456];
} sgx_target_info_t;

Members

mr_enclave
The enclave hash of the target enclave

attributes

The attributes of the target enclave

reserved1

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

misc_select

The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

reserved2

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_report_body_t

This data structure, which is part of the sgx_report_t structure, contains information about the enclave.

Syntax

typedef struct _report_body_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved1[28];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint8_t reserved4[60];
    sgx_report_data_t report_data;
} sgx_report_body_t;

Members

cpu_svn

The security version number of the host system TCB (CPU).
misc_select
The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

reserved1
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

attributes
The attributes for the enclave. See sgx_attributes_t for the definitions of these flags.

mr_enclave
The measurement value of the enclave.

reserved2
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

mr_signer
The measurement value of the public key that verified the enclave.

reserved3
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

isv_prod_id
The ISV Product ID of the enclave.

isv_svn
The ISV security version number of the enclave.

reserved4
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

report_data
A set of data used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_report_t**
Data structure that contains the report information for the enclave. This is the output parameter from the `sgx_create_report` function. This is the input parameter for the `sgx_init_quote` function.

**Syntax**
```c
typedef struct _report_t
{
    sgx_report_body_t body;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
} sgx_report_t;
```

**Members**

**body**
The data structure containing information about the enclave.

**key_id**
Value for key wear-out protection.

**mac**
The CMAC value of the report data using report key.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_aes_gcm_data_t**
The structure contains the AES GCM* data, payload size, MAC* and payload.

**Syntax**
```c
typedef struct _aes_gcm_data_t
{
    uint32_t payload_size;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    uint8_t payload_tag[SGX_SEAL_TAG_SIZE];
    uint8_t payload[];
} sgx_aes_gcm_data_t;
```
Members

payload_size
Size of the payload data which includes both the encrypted data followed by the additional authenticated data (plain text). The full payload array is part of the AES GCM MAC calculation.

reserved
Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

payload_tag
AES-GMAC of the plain text, payload, and the sizes

payload
The payload data buffer includes the encrypted data followed by the optional additional authenticated data (plain text), which is not encrypted.

**NOTE**
The optional additional authenticated data (MAC or plain text) could be data which identifies the seal data blob and when it was created.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

*sgx_sealed_data_t*
Sealed data blob structure containing the key request structure used in the key derivation. The data structure has been laid out to achieve 16 byte alignment. This structure should be allocated within the enclave when the seal operation is performed. After the seal operation, the structure can be copied outside the enclave for preservation before the enclave is destroyed. The sealed_data structure needs to be copied back within the enclave before unsealing.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _sealed_data_t {
    sgx_key_request_t key_request;
    uint32_t plain_text_offset;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    sgx_aes_gcm_data_t aes_data;
} sgx_sealed_data_t;
```
Members

**key_request**
The key request used to derive the seal key.

**plain_text_offset**
The offset within the `aes_data` structure payload to the start of the optional additional MAC text.

**reserved**
Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

**aes_data**
Structure contains the AES GCM data (payload size, MAC, and payload).

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_epid_group_id_t**
Type for EPID group id

**Syntax**

typedef uint8_t sgx_epid_group_id_t[4];

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_basename_t**
Type for base name used in `sgx_quote`.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _basename_t

{  
    uint8_t name[32];
} sgx_basename_t;

Members
name
The base name used in `sgx_quote`.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

`sgx_quote_t`
Type for quote used in remote attestation.

Syntax

typedef struct _quote_t
{
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t sign_type;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t qe_svn;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pce_svn;
    uint32_t xeid;
    sgx_basename_t basename;
    sgx_report_body_t report_body;
    uint32_t signature_len;
    uint8_t signature[];
} sgx_quote_t;

Members

version
The version of the quote structure.

sign_type
The indicator of the EPID signature type.

epid_group_id
The EPID group id of the platform belongs to.

qe_svn
The svn of the QE.

pce_svn
The svn of the PCE.

xeid
The extended EPID group ID.

**basename**
The base name used in sgx_quote.

**report_body**
The report body of the application enclave.

**signature_len**
The size in byte of the following signature.

**signature**
The place holder of the variable length signature.

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_quote_sign_type_t**
Enum indicates the quote type, linkable or un-linkable

**Syntax**

```
typedef enum {
    SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE,
    SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE
} sgx_quote_sign_type_t;
```

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_spid_t**
Type for a service provider ID.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _spid_t
{
    uint8_t id[16];
} sgx_spid_t;
```

**Members**

**id**
The ID of the service provider.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

`sgx_quote_nonce_t`

This data structure indicates the quote nonce.

Syntax

```c
typedef struct _sgx_quote_nonce
{
    uint8_t rand[16];
} sgx_quote_nonce_t;
```

Members

`rand`

The 16 bytes random number used as nonce.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

`sgx_time_source_nonce_t`

Nonce of time source. It's opaque to users.

Syntax

```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_time_source_nonce_t[32];
```

Requirements

<table>
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</thead>
</table>

`sgx_time_t`

Type for trusted time.

Syntax

```c
typedef uint64_t sgx_time_t;
```

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
sgx_ps_cap_t
Type indicating the platform service capability.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_ps_cap_t
{
    uint32_t ps_cap0;
    uint32_t ps_cap1;
} sgx_ps_cap_t;

Members
ps_cap0
Bit 0 : Trusted Time service
Bit 1 : Monotonic Counter service
Bit 2-31 : Reserved

ps_cap1
Bit 0-31 : Reserved

Requirements

| Header    | sgx_uae_service.h |

sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t
Security property descriptor of platform service. It's opaque to users.

Syntax

typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc
{
    uint8_t sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc[256];
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t;

Requirements

| Header    | sgx_tae_service.h |

sgx_mc_uuid_t
The data structure of a monotonic counter.
Syntax
#define SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE 3
#define SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE 13
typedef struct _mc_uuid
{
    uint8_t counter_id[SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE];
    uint8_t nonce[SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE];
} sgx_mc_uuid_t;

Members
counter_id
ID number of the monotonic counter.
nonce
Nonce associated with the monotonic counter.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_tae_service.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_ra_context_t
Type for a context returned by the key exchange library.

Syntax
typedef uint32_t sgx_ra_context_t;

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_key_exchange.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_ra_key_128_t
Type for 128 bit key used in remote attestation.

Syntax
typedef uint8_t sgx_ra_key_128_t[16];

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_key_exchange.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t` function should take the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK). Implementation of the function should return the appropriate return value.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t(*sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t)(
    const sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t* p_shared_key,
    uint16_t kdf_id,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_smk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_sk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_mk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_vk_key
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_shared_key** [in]
  The the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

- **kdf_id** [in]
  Key Derivation Function ID.

- **p_smk_key** [out]
  The output SMK.

- **p_sk_key** [out]
  The output SK.

- **p_mk_key** [out]
  The output MK.

- **p_vk_key** [out]
  The output VK.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.
**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**
A pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tkey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ra_key_type_t**
Enum of the key types used in remote attestation.

**Syntax**

typedef enum _sgx_ra_key_type_t
{
    SGX_RA_KEY_SK = 1,
    SGX_RA_KEY_MK,
    SGX_RA_KEY_VK,
} sgx_ra_key_type_t;

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ra_msg1_t**
This data structure describes the message 1 that is used in remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg1_t
{

Members

g_a (Little Endian)
The public EC key of an application enclave, based on NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

gid (Little Endian)
ID of the EPID group of the platform belongs to.

Requirements

| Header          | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_msg2_t
This data structure describes the message 2 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_spid_t spid;
    uint16_t quote_type;
    uint16_t kdf_id;
    sgx_ec256_signature_t sign_gb_ga;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    uint32_t sig_rl_size;
    uint8_t sig_rl[];
} sgx_ra_msg2_t;

Members

g_b (Little Endian)
Public EC key of service provider, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

spid
ID of the service provider

quote_type (Little Endian)
Indicates the quote type, linkable (1) or un-linkable (0).

**kdf_id (Little Endian)**

Key derivation function id.

**sign_gbga (Little Endian)**

ECDSA Signature of \( g_b || g_a \), using the service provider’s ECDSA private key corresponding to the public key specified in `sgx_ra_init` or `sgx_ra_init_ex` function, where \( g_b \) is the public EC key of the service provider and \( g_a \) is the public key of application enclave, provided by the application enclave, in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

**mac**

AES-CMAC of \( gb, spid \) 2-byte TYPE, 2-byte KDF-ID, and `sign_gbga` using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

\[
KDK = \text{AES-CMAC}(key0, \text{LittleEndian}(gab \ x\text{-coordinate}))
\]

\[
SMK = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK).

**sig_rl_size**

Size of the `sig_rl`, in bytes.

**sig_rl**

Pointer to the EPID Signature Revocation List Certificate of the EPID group identified by the `gid` in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

**Requirements**
sgx_ra_msg3_t
This data structure describes message 3 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg3_t
{
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop;
    uint8_t quote[];
} sgx_ra_msg3_t;

Members

mac
AES-CMAC of g_a, ps_sec_prop, GID, and quote[], using SMK. SMK is derived follows:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

g_a (Little Endian)
Public EC key of application enclave
ps_sec_prop

Security property of the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service. If the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service security property information is not required in the remote attestation and key exchange process, this field will be all 0s.

quote

Quote returned from sgx_get_quote. The first 32-byte report_body.report_data field in Quote is set to SHA256 hash of ga, gb and VK, and the second 32-byte is set to all 0s. VK is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))

SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80).

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

Requirements

| Header  | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ecall_get Ga_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_exchange.edl.

Syntax

typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get Ga_trusted_t) (sgx_enclave_id_t eid, int* retval,
sgx_ra_context_t context,
sgx_ec256_public_t *g_a // Little Endian
);

Note that the 4th parameter this function takes should be in little endian format.

Requirements

| Header            | sgx_ukey_exchange.h |

sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_exchange.edl.

Syntax

typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    const sgx_target_info_t *p_qe_target,
    sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce
);

Requirements

| Header            | sgx_ukey_exchange.h |

sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_exchange.edl.

Syntax

typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint32_t quote_size,
    sgx_report_t* qe_report,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t *p_msg3,
    uint32_t msg3_size
);
**Requirements**

| Header          | sgx_ukey_exchange.h |

**sgx_platform_info_t**

This opaque data structure indicates the platform information received from Intel Attestation Server.

**Syntax**

```c
#define SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE 101
typedef struct _platform_info
{
    uint8_t platform_info[SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE];
} sgx_platform_info_t;
```

**Members**

- **platform_info**
  The platform information.

**Requirements**

| Header          | sgx_quote.h |

**sgx_update_info_bit_t**

Type for information of what components of SGX need to be updated and how to update them.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _update_info_bit
{
    int ucodeUpdate;
    int csmeFwUpdate;
    int pswUpdate;
} sgx_update_info_bit_t;
```

**Members**

- **ucodeUpdate**
  Whether the ucode needs to be updated.
- **csmeFwUpdate**
Whether the csme firmware needs to be updated.

**pswUpdate**

Whether the platform software needs to be updated.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_DH_msg1_t**

Type for MSG1 used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_DH_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_target_info_t target;
} sgx_DH_msg1_t;
```

**Members**

**g_a (Little Endian)**

Public EC key of responder enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**target**

Report target info to be used by the peer enclave to generate the Intel(R) SGX report in the message 2 of the DH secure session protocol.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_DH_msg2_t**

Type for MSG2 used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_DH_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
```
Members

g_b (Little Endian)
Public EC key of initiator enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

report
Intel(R) SGX report of initiator enclave of DH session establishment. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_a and g_b, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]
AES-CMAC value of g_b, report, 2-byte KDF-ID, and 0x00s using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

\[ \text{KDK} = \text{AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))} \]
\[ \text{SMK} = \text{AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)} \]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:
- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_dh_msg3_t
Type for MSG3 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_t
{  
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
    sgx_dh_msg3_body_t msg3_body;
} sgx_dh_msg3_t;

Members

**cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]**

CMAC value of message body of MSG3, using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))

SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**msg3_body**

Variable length message body of MSG3.

Requirements

| Header | sgx_dh.h |

**sgx_dh_msg3_body_t**

Type for message body of the MSG3 structure used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
{
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint32_t additional_prop_length;
    uint8_t additional_prop[0];
}
Members

report

Intel(R) SGX report of responder enclave. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_b and g_a, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

additional_prop_length

Length of additional property field in bytes.

additional_prop[0]

Variable length buffer holding additional data that the responder enclave may provide.

Requirements

| Header | sgx_dh.h |

sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t

Type for enclave identity of initiator or responder used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t

{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    uint8_t reserved_1[32];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved_2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved_3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
} sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t;

Members

cpu_svn
Security version number of CPU.
reserved_1[32]
Reserved 32 bytes.
attributes
SGX attributes of enclave.

mr_enclave
Measurement of enclave.
reserved_2[32]
Reserved 32 bytes.

mr_signer
Measurement of enclave signer.
reserved_3[96]
Reserved 96 bytes.

isv_prod_id (Little Endian)
Product ID of ISV enclave.

isv_svn (Little Endian)
Security version number of ISV enclave.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_dh_session_role_t
Type for role of establishing a DH secure session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef enum _sgx_dh_session_role_t
{
    SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR,
    SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
} sgx_dh_session_role_t;
Members

**SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR**
Initiator of a DH session establishment.

**SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER**
Responder of a DH session establishment.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_dh_session_t**
Type for session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_t
{
    uint8_t sgx_dh_session[SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_session_t;

Members

**sgx_dh_session**
Data of DH session.

The array size of sgx_dh_session SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE is defined as 200 bytes.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Error Codes

Table 14 Error code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Error Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>SGX_SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED</td>
<td>An unexpected error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_</td>
<td>The parameter is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX Error Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003 SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY</td>
<td>There is not enough memory available to complete this operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004 SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST</td>
<td>The enclave is lost after power transition or used in child process created by fork().</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0005 SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE</td>
<td>The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1001 SGX_ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION</td>
<td>The ECALL/OCALL function index is incorrect.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1003 SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_TCS</td>
<td>The enclave is out of TCS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1006 SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_CRASHED</td>
<td>The enclave has crashed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1007 SGX_ERROR ECALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td>ECALL is not allowed at this time. For examples:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ECALL is not public.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ECALL is blocked by the dynamic entry table.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A nested ECALL is not allowed during global initialization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1008 SGX_ERROR_OCALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td>OCALL is not allowed during exception handling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1009 SGX_ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN</td>
<td>Stack overrun occurs within the enclave.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2000 SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL</td>
<td>The enclave contains an undefined symbol.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2001 SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE</td>
<td>The enclave image is incorrect.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2002 SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID</td>
<td>The enclave ID is invalid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2003 SGX_ERROR_</td>
<td>The signature is invalid.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Message</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE</td>
<td>The enclave is signed as product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC</td>
<td>There is not enough EPC available to load the enclave or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete the operation requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NODEVICE</td>
<td>Cannot open device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT</td>
<td>Page mapping failed in driver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2009</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA</td>
<td>The metadata is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200C</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY</td>
<td>Device is busy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200D</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION</td>
<td>Metadata version is inconsistent between uRTS and <code>sgx_sign</code> or the uRTS is incompatible with the current platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200E</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE</td>
<td>The target enclave (32/64 bit or HS/Sim) mode is incompatible with the uRTS mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200F</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS</td>
<td>Can't open enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2010</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC</td>
<td>The MiscSelect/MiscMask settings are incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH</td>
<td>Indicates report verification error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE</td>
<td>The enclave is not authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN</td>
<td>The CPU SVN is beyond the CPU SVN value of the platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN The ISV SVN is greater than the ISV SVN value of the enclave.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME Unsupported key name value.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT The request to AE service timed out.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB Indicates an EPI D blob verification error.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEDGE Enclave has no privilege to get launch token.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED The EPI D group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE Network connecting or proxy setting issue is encountered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID The session is invalid or ended by server.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400a</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_BUSY The requested service is temporarily not available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400c</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400d</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT The caller does not have the access right to the specified VMC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400e</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No monotonic counter is available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400f</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monotonic counters reached quota limit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4011</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key derivation function does not match during key exchange.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix
This topic provides the following reference information:

- Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Libraries
- Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions
- Unsupported C Standard Functions
- Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions
- Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves
The following GCC* options are not supported to build enclaves.

Table 15 Unsupported GCC Compiler Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-fopenmp</td>
<td>Options controlling C dialect.</td>
<td>Depends on Pthreads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fgnu-tm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Depends on libitm (transactional memory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fhosted</td>
<td></td>
<td>OS functions not supported within enclaves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fuse-cxa-atexit</td>
<td>Options controlling C++ dialect.</td>
<td>Depends on atexit(), which is not supported within an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Options controlling objective-C and objective-C++.</td>
<td>Objective C/C++ not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Options for debugging a program.</td>
<td>All options because of runtime support required. Separate Intel(R) SGX debugger support provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fmudflap, -fmudflapth, -fmudflapir</td>
<td>Optimization options.</td>
<td>Dependent on libmudflap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fexec-charset, -fwide-exec-charset, -x objective-c</td>
<td>Options controlling the pre-processor.</td>
<td>Only providing partial support for UTF-8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Objective-C is not supported within an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-lobc</td>
<td>Linker options.</td>
<td>Objective C not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pie, -s</td>
<td>Used for executables.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-shared-libgcc, static-libgcc</td>
<td>Enclaves cannot depend on libgcc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-static-libstdc++</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX version of the C++ standard library.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-T script</td>
<td>Need to control the format of enclave code.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mglIBC</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for GNU*/Linux* options.</td>
<td>Intel SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX compatible C standard library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-muclibc, -mbionic, -android, -tno-android-cc, -tno-android-l1d</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-msft-float</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for Intel &amp; AMD* x86-x64 options.</td>
<td>Run-time emulation of floating point is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-m96bit-long-double</td>
<td>96-bit not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mthreads</td>
<td>Depends on mingwthrd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mcmodel=small, -mcmodel=kernel, -mcmodel=medium, -mcmodel=large</td>
<td>Linker will fail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for Intel &amp; AMD* x86-x64 Windows* options</td>
<td>All options because these are only used with Cygwin* or MinGW*.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fbounds-check</td>
<td>Options for code generation conventions</td>
<td>Currently for Java* and Fortran* front-ends, not C/C++.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -fPIE</td>
<td>Only pertains to executable files.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -pie</td>
<td>Compilation option -fpie and linking option -pie cannot be used at the same time under simulation mode if TLS support is required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -shared -fpic</td>
<td>Compilation option -fpie and linking option -shared -fpic cannot be used at the same time under both simulation mode and 64-bit hardware mode if TLS support is required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-finstrument-functions</td>
<td>ISV would need to provide support for functions _</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-hotpatch=[n]</td>
<td>This code generation option is not applicable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-xcode</td>
<td>This option does not apply to Intel(R) SGX because for this check to be effective, the source file containing the main program or the dynamic library main function should be compiled with this option enabled. Since this compiler option does not have the intended behavior (host architecture check), then the /Qax or /arch options are recommended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-cilk-serialize -guide-file=[filename]</td>
<td>These advanced optimization options are not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-guide-file-append=[filename]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ipp=[lib] -[no ]opt calloc -[no-]opt-matmul -tbb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-f[no-]instrument-functions -prof-data-order</td>
<td>These profile guided optimizations (PGO) options are not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-no-prof-data-order -prof-dir -prof-file &lt;f&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-func-groups -no-prof-func-groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-func-order -no-prof-func-order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Options for Enclaves

The following Intel(R) compiler options are not supported to build enclaves.

**Table 16 Unsupported Intel Compiler Options**

 cyg_profile_func_enter and cyg_profile_func_exit if this option is needed.

-fsplit-stack Requires libgcc runtime support.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-prof-gen[x] -prof-hotness-threshold=n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-[no]-prof-src-dir -prof-src-root=dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-src-root-cwd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-use [=keyword]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-value-profiling [=keyword]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-profile-functions -profile-loops-s=keyword</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-profile-loops-report [=n]</td>
<td>These optimization report options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tcollect[lib] -tcollect-filter filename</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tcheck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp -openmp-stubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-report {0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-lib=type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-link-k=library -openmp-task=model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-threadprivate=type</td>
<td>These OpenMP* and parallel processing options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-threadprivate=type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Option Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-par-affinity=[modifier,..]type[,permute][,offset]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-par-num-threads=n -par-report[n]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-par-runtime-control[n] -no-par-runtime-control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-par-schedule-keyword[=n] -par-threshold[n]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-parallel -parallel-source-info[=n]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-no-parallel-source-info</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-[no]-inline-calloc</td>
<td>This inline option is not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-check=keyword[, keyword...]</td>
<td>This language option is not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Bdynamic -dynamic-linker -shared-intel</td>
<td>These linker options are not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unsupported Intel(R) Compiler Libraries

The Intel(R) compiler libraries that are not supported within an enclave are:

**Table 17 Unsupported Intel Compiler Libraries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cilkrts.lib</td>
<td>Cilk runtime system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkp.lib</td>
<td>Run-time pointer checker libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkwpwrap.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiomp5mt.lib,</td>
<td>OpenMP* libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiompprof5mt.lib,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiompstubs5mt.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libipgo.lib</td>
<td>Intel(R) Profile-Guide Optim-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK Developer Reference for Linux® OS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pdbx.lib,</td>
<td>Intel(R) Parallel Debugger Extension runtime libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pdbxinst.lib</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libicaio.lib</td>
<td>Asynchronous I/O library.</td>
<td>I/O is not supported in an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libbfp754.lib</td>
<td>Binary floating-point math library.</td>
<td>It is not utilized by the compiler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libmatmul.lib</td>
<td>Matrix multiplication library.</td>
<td>It depends on the OpenMP library.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions

The following table illustrates unsupported GCC* built-in functions inside the enclave. Using any of these built-in functions will result in a linker error during the compilation of the enclave.

The complete list of GCC built-in functions is available at http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.7.2/gcc/X86-Built_002din-Functions.html#X86-Built_002din-Functions.

**Table 18 Unsupported GCC Compiler Built-in Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non supported: Math built-ins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_signbitd32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_finite32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isinf32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isnand32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Supported: String/memory built-ins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_strcat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_stpcpy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Supported: I/O related built-ins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_fprintf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_putc_unlocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_fputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_fwrite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_printf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_puts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not Supported: _builtin_sprintf
Not Supported: _builtin_vsscanf
Not Supported: _builtin_vsscanf
Not Supported: _builtin_vlogint
Not Supported: _builtin_vlogint

Not Supported: Process control built-ins
__builtins_execle
__builtins_execv
__builtins_exit
__builtins_Exit

Non Supported: Object size checking built-ins
__builtins_fprintf
__builtins_vfprintf
__builtins_exit

Non Supported: Miscellaneous built-ins
__builtins_dgettext
__builtins_strfmon

Non Supported: Profiling Hooks
__cyg_profile_func_enter
__cyg_profile_func_exit

Non Supported: TLS Emulation
target.emutls.get_address
target.emutls.register_common

Non supported: Ring 0 built-ins
__writefsbase_u32
__writefsbase_u64
__writegsbase_u32
__writegsbase_u64
__rdpmc
__rdtsc

Non Supported: OpenMP* built-ins
__builtins_omp_get_thread_num
__builtins_omp_get_num_threads
__builtins_OMP_atomic_start
__builtins_OMP_atomic_end
__builtins_OMP_barrier
__builtins_OMP_taskwait
__builtins_OMP_taskyield
__builtins_OMP_critical_start
__builtins_OMP_critical_end
__builtins_OMP_critical_name_start
__builtins_OMP_critical_name_end
__builtins_OMP_loop_dynamic_start
__builtins_OMP_loop_static_start
__builtins_OMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_start
__builtins_OMP_loop_ordered_static_start
__builtins_OMP_loop_ordered_guided_start
### Unsupported C Standard Functions
You cannot use the following Standard C functions within the enclave; otherwise, the compilation would fail.

#### Table 19 Unsupported C Standard Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_static_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_guided_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_static_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_guided_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_static_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_dynamic_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_next</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_guided_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_runtime_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_loop_end_nowait</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_orderd_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_ordered_end</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_end</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_task</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_sections_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_sections_next</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_parallel_sections_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_sections_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_sections_end_nowait</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_single_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_single_copy_start</code></td>
<td><code>__builtin_GOMP_single_copy_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header file</td>
<td>Header file in SGX?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex.h</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fenv.h</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inttypes.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Header file in SGX?</th>
<th>Unsupported Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Macros/Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNoLEASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNuLEASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNxLEASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNdFASTN, SCNiFASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNoFASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNuFASTN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCNdMAX, SCNiMAX,</td>
</tr>
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<td>SCNoMAX,</td>
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<td>SCNuMAX, SCNxMAX,</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>SCNdPTR, SCNiPTR,</td>
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<td>SCNoPTR, SCNuPTR,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>SCNxPTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>LC_ALL, LC_COLLATE,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LC_CTYPE,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LC_MONETARY,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LC_NUMERIC,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LC_TIME, struct lconv</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>setlocale(),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>localeconv()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signal.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>sig_atomic_t, SIG_DFL,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIG_ERR, SIG_IGN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIGABRT, SIGFPE, SIGILL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIGINT, SIGSEGV,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIGTERM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdio.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>fpos_t, _IOFBF, _IOLBF,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>_IONBF, FILENAME_MAX,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FOPEN_MAX, _L_tmpnam,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SEEK_CUR, SEEK_END,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SEEK_SET,</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header file</td>
<td>Header file in SGX?</td>
<td>Unsupported Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macros/Types</td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TMP_MAX, stderr, stdin, stdout</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdlib.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>rand(), srand(), atexit(), exit(), _Exit(), getenv(), system()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>strcpy(), strcat(), strstr()*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tgmath.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>clock(), mktime(), time(), ctime(), gmtime(), localtime()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wchar.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>fwprintf(), fwscanf(), vfwprintf(), vfwscanf(), vsscanf(), vsscanf(), vprintf (), wscanf(), fgetwc(), fgetws(), fputwc(), fputws (), fwrite(), getwc(), getwchar(), putwc(), putwchar(), ungetwc(), wcstod(), wcstoif(), wcstof(), wcstold (), wcstoldl(), wcstoul(), wcstoull(), wcscpy(), wcscat(), wcsftime(), wctype()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wctype.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>iswalnum(), iswalpha(), iswblank(), iswcntrl(), iswdigit(), iswgraph(), iswlower(), iswprint(), iswpunct(), iswspace(), iswupper(), iswdigit(), wctype(), tolower(), toupper(), towctrans(), wctrans()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The trusted standard C library does not support char strstr(const char*, const char*). However, it does support the variant const char* strstr (const char*, const char*) is supported.

**NOTE**

Trusted C library is enhanced to avoid format string attacks. Any attempts to use %n in printf-family functions such as sprintf will result in a run-time error.

**Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions**

The following table lists unsupported C++03 classes and functions inside an enclave. Also, the table does not include unsupported C functions. See Unsupported C Standard Functions for detailed information.

Table 20 Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions
### Unsupported Classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Partially Supported</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stream Iterators</td>
<td>No</td>
<td><code>istream_iterator</code>, <code>ostream_iterator</code>, <code>istreambuf_iterator</code>, <code>ostreambuf_iterator</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input/Output Library</td>
<td>No</td>
<td><code>basic_streambuf</code>, <code>basic_istream</code>, <code>basic_ostream</code>, <code>basic_iosstream</code>, <code>basic_filebuf</code>, <code>basic_ifstream</code>, <code>basic_ofstream</code>, <code>basic_fstream</code>, <code>basic_stringbuf</code>, <code>basic_istringstream</code>, <code>basic_ostringstream</code>, <code>basic_stringstream</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locales</td>
<td>No</td>
<td><code>locale</code>, <code>use_facet</code>, <code>has_facet</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

The following keywords are not supported in an enclave.

**Table 21 Unsupported C and C++ Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transaction Keyword</th>
<th>Transaction Keyword</th>
<th>Transaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__transaction_atomic</code></td>
<td><code>__transaction_relaxed</code></td>
<td><code>__transaction_cancel</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following GCC* specific attributes are not supported in an enclave.

**Table 22 Unsupported GCC* Compiler Attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>destructor</code></td>
<td><code>transaction_callable</code></td>
<td><code>transaction_unsafe</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>transaction_safe</code></td>
<td><code>transaction_may_cancel_outer</code></td>
<td><code>transaction PURE</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>transaction_wrap</code></td>
<td><code>disinterrupt</code></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>