Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK for Linux® OS

Developer Reference
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## Revision History

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<th>Revision Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX Linux 1.5 release</td>
<td>May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX Linux 1.6 release</td>
<td>September 2016</td>
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Introduction
Intel provides the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) SDK Developer Reference for software developers who wish to harden their application's security using Intel Software Guard Extensions technology.

This document covers an overview of the technology, tutorials, tools, sample code as well as API reference.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK from Intel is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries and tools that enables the software developer to write and debug Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions applications in C/C++.

**NOTE**
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions(Intel(R) SGX) technology is only available on 6th Generation Intel(R) Core(TM) Processor or newer.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Technology Overview
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is an Intel technology whose objective is to enable a high-level protection of secrets. It operates by allocating hardware-protected memory where code and data reside. The protected memory area is called an enclave. Data within the enclave memory can only be accessed by the code that also resides within the enclave memory space. Enclave code can be invoked via special instructions. An enclave can be built and loaded as a shared object on Linux* OS.

**NOTE:**
The enclave file can be disassembled, so the algorithms used by the enclave developer will not remain secret.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions technology has a hard limit on the protected memory size, typically 64 MB or 128 MB. As a result, the number of active enclaves (in memory) is limited. Depending on the memory footprint of each enclave, use cases suggest that 5-20 enclaves can reside in memory simultaneously.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Security Properties
- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against software attacks:
  - The enclave memory cannot be read or written from outside the enclave regardless of current privilege level and CPU mode
(ring3/user-mode, ring0/kernel-mode, SMM, VMM, or another enclave). The abort page is returned in such conditions.
- An enclave can be created with a debug attribute that allows a special debugger (Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions debugger) to view its content like a standard debugger. Production enclaves (non-debug) cannot be debugged by software or hardware debuggers.
- The enclave environment cannot be entered via classic function calls, jumps, register manipulation or stack manipulation. The only way to call an enclave function is via a new instruction that performs several protect checks. Classic function calls initiated by enclave code to functions inside the enclave are allowed.
- CPU mode can only be 32 or 64 bit when executing enclave code. Other CPU modes are not supported. An exception is raised in such conditions.

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against known hardware attacks:
  - The enclave memory is encrypted using industry-standard encryption algorithms with replay protection.
  - Tapping the memory or connecting the DRAM modules to another system will only give access to encrypted data.
  - The memory encryption key changes every power cycle randomly (for example, boot/sleep/hibernate). The key is stored within the CPU and it is not accessible.
  - Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is not designed to handle side channel attacks or reverse engineering. It is up to the Intel(R) SGX developers to build enclaves that are protected against these types of attack.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions uses strong industry-standard algorithms for signing enclaves. The signature of an enclave characterizes the content and the layout of the enclave at build time. If the enclave's content and layout are not correct per the signature, then the enclave will fail to be initialized and, hence, will not be executed. If an enclave is initialized, it should be identical to the original enclave and will not be modified at runtime.
**Application Design Considerations**

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application design is different from non-Intel(R) SGX application as it requires dividing the application into two logical components:

- Trusted component. The code that accesses the secret resides here. This component is also called an enclave. More than one enclave can exist in an application.
- Untrusted component. The rest of the application including all its modules.

The application writer should make the trusted part as small as possible. It is suggested that enclave functionality should be limited to operate on the secret data. A large enclave statistically has more bugs and (user created) security holes than a small enclave.

The enclave code can leave the protected memory region and call functions in the untrusted zone (by a special instruction). Reducing the enclave dependency on untrusted code will also strengthen its protection against possible attacks.

Embracing the above design considerations will improve protection as the attack surface is minimized.

The application designer, as the first step to harnessing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in the application, must redesign or refactor the application to fit these guidelines. This is accomplished by isolating the code module(s) that access any secrets and then moving these modules to a separate package/library. The details of how to create such an enclave are detailed in the tutorials section. You can also see the demonstrations on creating an enclave in the sample code that are shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

**Terminology and Acronyms**

| AE | Architectural enclaves. Enclaves that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework. They include the quoting |

---

1 From an enclave standpoint, the operating system and VMM are not trusted components, either.
<p>| <strong>Attestation</strong> | Enclave (QE), provisioning enclave (PvE), launch enclave (LE). |
| <strong>CA</strong> | Certificate Authority. |
| <strong>ECALL</strong> | Enclave call. A function call that enters the enclave. |
| <strong>ECDH</strong> | Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman. |
| <strong>EDL</strong> | Enclave Definition Language. |
| <strong>Intel(R) EPID</strong> | Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID. |
| <strong>FIPS</strong> | Federal Information Processing Standards developed by NIST for use in computer systems government-wide. |
| <strong>FIPS 140-2</strong> | Standard that defines security requirements for cryptographic modules and is required for sales to the Federal Governments. |
| <strong>HSM</strong> | Hardware Security Module. |
| <strong>Attestation Service</strong> | Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. |
| <strong>ISV</strong> | Independent Software Vendor. |
| <strong>KE</strong> | Key Exchange. |
| <strong>LE</strong> | Launch enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the licensing service. |
| <strong>Nonce</strong> | An arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic communication. |
| <strong>OCALL</strong> | Outside call. A function call that calls an untrusted function from an enclave. |
| <strong>Intel(R) SGX PSW</strong> | Platform Software for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. |
| <strong>PvE</strong> | Provisioning enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID) Provision service to handle the provisioning protocol. |
| <strong>QE</strong> | Quoting enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the quoting service. |
| <strong>Intel(R) SGX</strong> | Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. |
| <strong>SigRL</strong> | Signature revocation list |
| <strong>SMK</strong> | Session MAC key. |
| <strong>SP</strong> | Service Provider. |
| <strong>SVN</strong> | Security version number. Used to version security levels of both hardware and software components of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCB</th>
<th>Trusted computing base. Portions of hardware and software that are considered safe and uncompromised. A system protection is improved if the TCB is as small as possible, making an attack harder.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCS</td>
<td>Thread Control Structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Thread Local Storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLS</td>
<td>Transport Layer Security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel(R) SGX SSL</td>
<td>Intel® Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library based on the OpenSSL. Provides cryptographic services for Intel® Software Guard Extensions enclave applications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Setting up an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Project
This topic introduces how to use the features of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK to create and manage Intel(R) SGX application projects.

Creating Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Projects
To create an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project on Linux* OS, you are recommended to start using the directory structure and Makefiles from a sample application in the Intel(R) SGX SDK. In an Intel SGX project, you should normally prepare the following files:

1. Enclave Definition Language (EDL) file - describes enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototype. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for details.
2. Enclave configuration file - contains the information of the enclave metadata. See Enclave Configuration File for details.
3. Signing key files - used to sign an enclave to produce a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as enclave measurement. See Signing Key Files for details.
4. Application and enclave source code - the implementation of application and enclave functions.
5. makefile - it performs the following steps:
   1. Generates edger routines (see Edger8r Tool for details).
   2. Builds the application and enclave.
   3. Signs the enclave (see Enclave Signing Tool for details).
6. Linker script file - it is recommended to use the linker script to hide all unnecessary symbols, and only export enclave_entry, g_global_data, and g_global_data_sim.

Once you understand how an Intel SGX application is built, you may customize the project setup according to your needs.

To develop an Intel SGX application, Intel(R) SGX SDK supports a few non-standard configurations, not present in other SDKs. Enclave Project Configurations explains the various enclave project configurations as well as the corresponding Makefile options.
Enclave Image Generation

An enclave image is a statically linked shared object under Linux* OS, without any external dependencies. You are expected to follow the guidelines below to generate a proper enclave image:

1. Link the tRTS with the --whole-archive option, so that the whole content of the trusted runtime library is included in the enclave;

2. From other libraries, you just need to pull the required symbols. For example, if an enclave requires routines in the trusted standard C and seal libraries:

HW mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice -lsgx_tcbrypto -
-end-group
```

Simulation mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice_sim -lsgx_tcbrypto --end-group
```

In addition, a linker script is also recommended to hide all unnecessary symbols.

```
// file: enclave.lds
enclave.so
{
    global:
    enclave_entry;
    g_global_data_sim;
    g_peak_heap_used;
    local:
    *
};
```

The symbol `enclave_entry` is the entry point to the enclave. The symbol `g_global_data_sim` comes from the tRTS simulation library and is required to be exposed for running an enclave in the simulation mode since it distinguishes between enclaves built to run on the simulator and on the hardware. The `sgx_emmt` tool relies on the symbol `g_peak_heap_used` to determine the size of the heap that the enclave uses. The symbol `__ImageBase` is used by tRTS to compute the base address of the enclave.

Assuming that you have a few object files to be linked into a target enclave, use the command line similar to the following:
$ ld -o enclave.so file1.o file2.o \
-pie -eenclave_entry -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostart-files --no-undefined \ 
--whole-archive -lsgx_trts --no-whole-archive \ 
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc --lsgx_tservice -lsgx_cryptot - 
--end-group \ 
-Bstatic -Bsymbolic --defsymb=__ImageBase=0 --export-dynamic \ 
--version-script=enclave.lds

You are also encouraged to hardening your enclaves, by passing one of the following options to the linker, to put read-only non-executable sections in your own segment:

```
ld.gold --rosegment
```

or,

```
-Wl,-fuse-ld=gold -Wl,--rosegment
```

**Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in helps the enclave developer to maintain enclaves and untrusted related code inside Eclipse* C/C++ projects.

To get more information on Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in Developer Guide from the Eclipse Help content: Help > Help Contents > Intel(R) SGX Eclipse Plug-in Developer Guide.
Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK Tools
This topic introduces how to use the following tools that the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides:

- **Edger8r Tool**
  Generates interfaces between the untrusted components and enclaves.

- **Enclave Signing Tool**
  Generates the enclave metadata, which includes the enclave signature, and adds such metadata to the enclave image.

- **Enclave Debugger**
  Helps to debug an enclave.

- **Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier**
  Helps to measure the performance of the enclave code.

- **Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**
  Helps to measure the usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

- **CPUSVN Configuration Tool**
  Helps to simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade scenario without modifying the hardware.

**Edger8r Tool**
The Edger8r tool ships as part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It generates edge routines by reading a user-provided EDL file. These edge routines provide the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave. Normally, the tool will run automatically as part of the enclave build process. However, an advanced enclave writer may invoke the Edger8r manually.

When given an EDL file, for example, `demo.edl`, the Edger8r will by default generate four files:

- `demo_t.h` – It contains prototype declarations for trusted proxies and bridges.
- `demo_t.c` – It contains function definitions for trusted proxies and bridges.
- demo_u.h – It contains prototype declarations for untrusted proxies and bridges.
- demo_u.c – It contains function definitions for untrusted proxies and bridges.

Here is the usage description for the Edger8r tool:

**Syntax:**

```
sgx_edger8r [options] <.edl file> [another .edl file ...]
```

**Arguments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Options]</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--use-prefix</td>
<td>Prefix the untrusted proxy with the enclave name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--header-only</td>
<td>Generate header files only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--search-path &lt;path&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the search path of EDL files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted</td>
<td>Generate untrusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted</td>
<td>Generate trusted proxy and bridge routines only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--untrusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the untrusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--trusted-dir &lt;dir&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the directory for saving the trusted code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--help</td>
<td>Print this help message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If neither --untrusted nor --trusted is specified, the Edger8r will generate both.

Here, the path parameter has the same format as the PATH environment variable, and the enclave name is the base file name of the EDL file (demo in this case).

**CAUTION:**

The ISV must run the Edger8r tool in a protected malware-free environment to ensure the integrity of the tool so that the generated code is not compromised. The ISV is ultimately responsible for the code contained in the enclave and should review the code that the Edger8r tool generates.
Enclave Signing Tool

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool named sgx_sign for you to sign enclaves. In general, signing an enclave is a process that involves producing a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as the enclave measurement, see Enclave Signature Structure below. Once an enclave is signed in such structure, the modifications to the enclave file (such as code, data, signature, and so on.) can be detected. The signing tool also evaluates the enclave image for potential errors and warns users about potential security hazards. sgx_sign is typically set up by one of the configuration tools included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK and runs automatically at the end of the build process. During the loading process, the signature is checked to confirm that the enclave has not been tampered with and has been loaded correctly. In addition, the signing tool can also be used to report metadata information for a signed enclave.

Table 1 Enclave Signature Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header</td>
<td>HEADERTYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERLEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEADERVERSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODVENDOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KEYSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MODULUSSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENPONENTSIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWDEFINED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RESERVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>MODULUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Command-Line Syntax

To run `sgx_sign`, use the following command syntax:

```
sgx_sign <command> [args]
```

All valid commands are listed in the table below. See [Enclave Signer Usage Examples](#) for more information.

#### Table 2 Signing Tool Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| sign    | Sign the enclave using the private key in one step. | Required: -enclave, -key, -out  
Optional: -config, -dumpfile |
| gendata | The first step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the enclave signing material to be signed by an external tool. This step dumps the signing material, which consists of the header and body sections of the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic), into a file (256 bytes in total). | Required: -enclave, -out  
Optional: -config |
| catsig  | The second step of the 2-step signing process. | Required: |
Generate the signed enclave with the input signature and public key. The input signature is generated by an external tool based on the data generated by the gendata command. At this step, the signature and buffer sections are generated. The signature and buffer sections together with the header and body sections complete the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dump</td>
<td>Get the metadata information for a signed enclave file and dump it to a file specified by -dumpfile option</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the valid command options are listed below:

**Table 3 Signing Tool Arguments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-enclave &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the enclave file to be signed or already signed. It is a required argument for the four commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-config &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the enclave configuration file It is an invalid argument for dump command and an optional argument for the other three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-out &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the output file. It is required for the following three commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-key &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the signing key file. See File Formats for detailed description.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-sig &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the file containing the signature corresponding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Optional: -config, -dumpfile

Required: -enclave, -dumpfile
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-unsigned &lt;file&gt;</td>
<td>Specify the file containing the enclave signing material generated by gendata. Only valid for catsig command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-dumpfile</td>
<td>Specify a file to dump metadata information. It is a required argument for the dump command and an optional argument for sign and catsig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ignore-rel-error</td>
<td>By default, sgx_sign provides an error for enclaves with text relocations. You can ignore the error and continue signing by providing this option. But it is recommended that you eliminate the text relocations instead of bypassing the error with this option.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arguments, including options and filenames, can be specified in any order. Options are processed first, then filenames. Use one or more spaces or tabs to separate arguments. Each option consists of an option identifier, a dash (-), followed by the name of the option. The `<file>` parameter specifies the absolute or relative path of a file.

sgx_sign generates the output file and returns 0 for success. Otherwise, it generates an error message and returns -1.

**Enclave Signing Key Management**

An enclave project supports different signing methods needed by ISVs during the enclave development life cycle.

- Single-step method using the ISV's test private key:

  The signing tool supports a single-step signing process, which requires the access to the signing key pair on the local build system. However, there is a requirement that any white-listed enclave signing key must be managed in a hardware security module. Thus, the ISV's test private key stored in the build platform will not be white-listed and enclaves signed with this key can only be launched in `debug or prerelease` mode. In this scenario, the ISV manages the signing key pair, which could be generated by the ISV using his own means. Single-step method is the default signing method for non-production enclave applications, which are created with the Intel SGX project `debug` and `prerelease` profiles.
2-step method using an external signing tool:

1. First step: At the end of the enclave build process, the signing tool generates the enclave signing material.

   The ISV takes the enclave signing material file to an external signing platform/facility where the private key is stored, signs the signing material file, and takes the resulting signature file back to the build platform.

2. Second step: The ISV runs the signing tool with the catsig command providing the necessary information at the command line to add the hash of the public key and signature to the enclave's metadata section.

The 2-step signing process protects the signing key in a separate facility. Thus it is the default signing method for the Intel SGX project release profile. This means it is the only method for signing production enclave applications.

### File Formats

There are several files with various formats followed by the different options. The file format details are listed below.

#### Table 4 Signing Tool File Formats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclave file</td>
<td>Shared Object</td>
<td>It is a standard Shared Object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed enclave file</td>
<td>Shared Object</td>
<td>sgx_sign generates the signed enclave file, which includes the signature, to the enclave file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configuration file</td>
<td>XML</td>
<td>See Enclave Configuration File.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key file</td>
<td>PEM</td>
<td>Key file should follow the PEM format which contains an unencrypted RSA 3072-bit key. The public exponent must be 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclave hex file</td>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>It is a dump file of the enclave signing material data to be signed with the private RSA key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature file</td>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>It is a dump file of the signature generated at the ISV’s signing facility. The signature should follow the RSA-PKCS#1.5 padding scheme. The signature should be generated using the v1.5 version of the RSA scheme with an SHA-256 message digest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Signing Key Files
The enclave signing tool only accepts key files in the PEM format and unencrypted. When an enclave project is created for the first time, you have to choose either using an already existing signing key or automatically generating one key for you. When you choose to import a pre-existing key, ensure that such key is in PEM format and unencrypted. If that is not the case, convert the signing key to the format accepted by the Signing Tool first. For instance, the following command converts an encrypted private key in PKCS#8/DER format to unencrypted PEM format:

```
openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -in private_pkcs8.der -outform PEM -out private_pkcs1.pem
```

Depending on the platform OS, the openssl* utility might be installed already or it may be shipped with the Intel(R) SGX SDK.

Enclave Signer Usage Examples
The following are typical examples for signing an enclave using the one-step or the two-step method. When the private signing key is available at the build platform, you may follow the one-step signing process to sign your enclave. However, when the private key is only accessible in an isolated signing facility, you must follow the two-step signing process described below.

- **One-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key available on the build system:

  ```
  sgx_sign sign -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key private.pem
  ```

- **Two-step signing process:**
  Signing an enclave using a private key stored in an HSM, for instance:

  1. **Generate the enclave signing material.**
     ```
     sgx_sign gendata -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_hash.hex
     ```
  2. **At the signing facility, sign the file containing the enclave signing material** (`enclave_hash.hex`) and **take the resulting signature file** (`signature.hex`) **back to the build platform.**
3. Sign the enclave using the signature file and public key.
   
   ```bash
   sgx_sign catsig -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key public.pem -sig signature.hex -unsigned enclave_hash.hex
   ```

   The configuration file `config.xml` is optional. If you do not provide a configuration file, the signing tool uses the default configuration values.

   The following example is for generating a report of metadata information for a signed enclave:
   
   ```bash
   sgx_sign dump -enclave enclave_signed.so -dumpfile metadata_info.txt
   ```

   A single enclave signing tool is provided, which allows for operating 32-bit and 64-bit enclaves.

   **OpenSSL* Examples**

   The following command lines are typical examples using OpenSSL*.

   1. Generate a 3072-bit RSA private key. Use 3 as the public exponent value.

   ```bash
   openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem -3 3072
   ```

   2. Produce the public part of a private RSA key.

   ```bash
   openssl rsa -in private_key.pem -pubout -out public_key.pem
   ```

   3. Sign the file containing the enclave signing material.

   ```bash
   openssl dgst -sha256 -out signature.hex -sign private_key.pem -keyform PEM enclave_hash.hex
   ```

   **Enclave Debugger**

   You can leverage the helper script `sgx-gdb` to debug your enclave applications. To debug an enclave on a hardware platform, the `<DisableDebug>`
configuration parameter should be set to 0 in the enclave configuration file config.xml, and you should set the Debug parameter to 1 in the sgx_create_enclave(...) that creates the enclave. Debugging an enclave is similar to debugging a shared library. However not all the standard features are available to debug enclaves. The following table lists some unsupported GDB commands for enclave. sgx-gdb also supports measuring the enclave stack/heap usage by the Enclave Memory Measurement Tool. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for additional information.

Table 5 GDB Unsupported Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDB Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>info sharedlibrary</td>
<td>Does not show the status of the loaded enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>next/step</td>
<td>Does not allow to execute the next/step outside the enclave from inside the enclave. To go outside the enclave use the finish command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>call/print</td>
<td>Does not support calling outside the enclave from within an enclave function, or calling inside the enclave from a function in the untrusted domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charset</td>
<td>Only supports GDB’s default charset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gcore</td>
<td>Does not support debug enclave with the application dump file</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier

You can use Intel® VTune™ Amplifier Application 2016 Update 2 to measure the performance of Intel SGX applications including the enclave. Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application supports a new analysis type called SGX Hotspots that can be used to profile the Intel SGX Enclave Applications. You can use the default settings of SGX Hotspots to profile the application and the enclave code. Precise event based sampling (PEBS) helps to profile the Intel SGX enclave code. The _PS events represent precise events. You can add _PS events to the collection to profile enclave code. Non precise events would not help with profiling Intel SGX enclave code.

You can use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance of enclave code only when the enclave has been launched as a debug enclave. To launch the enclave as a debug enclave, pass a value of 1 as the second parameter to the sgx_create_enclave function which loads and initializes the enclave as shown below. Use the pre-defined macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG as the parameter, which equals 1 in the DEBUG and the PRE-RELEASE mode.

```c
sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILENAME, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token, &updated, &global_eid, NULL);
```
NOTE:
Only use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance in the DEBUG and PRE-RELEASE mode because a DEBUG FLAG value of 1 cannot be passed in to create an enclave in RELEASE configuration.

Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier provides two options to profile applications:

- Run the applications using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier. If you use this approach, you do not have to do anything special.
- Attach to an already running process or enclave application. If you use this approach, define the environment variable as follows:

  - 32bit:
    
    ```
    INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY32 = <VTune Installation Dir>/lib32/runtime/ittnotify Collector.so
    ```
  
  - 64bit:
    
    ```
    INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY64 = <VTune Installation Dir>/lib64/runtime/ittnotify Collector.so
    ```

Once an enclave is loaded, the invoked ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier in the uRTS passes information about the enclave to Intel® VTune™ Amplifier and profiles Intel SGX enclave applications. When you attach Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to the application after invoking ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier, the module information about the enclave is cached in the ITT dynamic library and is used by the Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application during attach to process. The following table describes the different scenarios of how Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is used to profile the enclave application.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier Invocation</th>
<th>Additional Configuration</th>
<th>ITT API Result</th>
<th>uRTS Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launch the application with Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late attach before invoking ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier profiling check in sgx_create_enclave</td>
<td>ITT environment variable is set.</td>
<td>Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling</td>
<td>Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intel(R)</td>
<td>Do not set Debug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Late attach after invoking ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier profiling check in sgx_cereate_enclave | ITT environment variable is set. | Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling | Set Debug OPTIN bit and Invoke Module mapping API. The ITT dynamic library caches the module information and provides it to the Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier during attach to process. |
| ITT environment variable is not set. | Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling | Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API. Even though Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is running, it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable. |
| Launch the application without Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier | N/A | Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling | Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module mapping API. |

**Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**

An enclave is an isolated environment. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool called `sgx_emmt` to measure the real usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.
Currently the enclave memory measurement tool provides the following two functions:

1. Get the stack peak usage value for the enclave.
2. Get the heap peak usage value for the enclave.

The tool reports the size of both stack and heap in KB. When you get the accurate stack and heap usage information for your enclaves, you can rework the enclave configuration file based on this information to make full use of the protected memory. See Enclave Configuration File for details.

On Linux* OS, the enclave memory measurement capability is provided by the helper script sgx-gdb. The sgx-gdb is a GDB extension for you to debug your enclave applications. See Enclave Debugger for details.

To measure how much protected memory an enclave uses, you should leverage sgx-gdb to launch GDB with sgx_emmt enabled and load the test application which is using the enclave. You may also attach the debugger to a running an Intel SGX application in order to measure the heap and stack sizes of the enclave.

The sgx-gdb provides three commands pertaining the sgx_emmt tool:

Table 6 Enclave Memory Measurement Tool Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enable sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Enable the enclave memory measurement tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disable sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Disable the enclave memory measurement tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>show sgx_emmt</td>
<td>Show whether the enclave memory measurement tool is enabled or not.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are the typical steps necessary to collect an enclave’s memory usage information:

1. Leverage sgx-gdb to start a GDB session.
2. Enable the enclave memory measurement function with enable sgx_emmt.
3. Load and run the test application which is using the enclave.

**NOTE:**

To collect peak stack/heap usage for an enclave on a hardware platform correctly, you need to make sure the enclave meets the following requirements:

1. The enclave is debuggable. This means that the <DisableDebug> configuration parameter in the enclave configuration file should be set to 0.
2. The enclave is launched in the debug mode. To launch the enclave in the debug mode, set the debug flag to 1 when calling `sgx_create_enclave` to load the enclave.
3. You need to export `g_peak_heap_used` in the version script of the enclave.
4. You need to destroy the enclave by using the `sgx_destroy_enclave` API.

**CPUSVN Configuration Tool**

CPUSVN stands for Security Version Number of the CPU, which affects the key derivation and report generation process. CPUSVN is not a numeric concept and will be upgraded/downgraded along with the hardware upgrade/downgrade. To simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade without modifying the hardware, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a CPUSVN configuration tool for you to configure the CPUSVN. The CPUSVN configuration tool is for Intel(R) SGX simulation mode only.

**Command-Line Syntax**

To run the Intel(R) SGX CPUSVN configuration tool, use the following syntax:

`sgx_config_cpusvn [Command]`

The valid commands are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-upgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN upgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-downgrade</td>
<td>Simulate a CPUSVN downgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-reset</td>
<td>Restore the CPUSVN to its default value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Enclave Development Basics**

This topic introduces the following enclave development basics:

- Writing Enclave Functions
- Calling Functions inside the Enclave
- Calling Functions outside the Enclave
- Linking Enclave with Libraries
- Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries
- Enclave Definition Language Syntax
- Loading and Unloading an Enclave

The typical enclave development process includes the following steps:

1. Define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave in the EDL file.
2. Implement the application and enclave functions.
3. Build the application and enclave. In the build process, Edger8r Tool generates trusted and untrusted proxy/bridge functions. Enclave Signing Tool generates the metadata and signature for the enclave.
4. Run and debug the application in simulation and hardware modes. See **Enclave Debugger** for more details.
5. Prepare the application and enclave for release.

**Writing Enclave Functions**

From an application perspective, making an enclave call (ECALL) appears as any other function call when using the untrusted proxy function. Enclave functions are plain C/C++ functions with several limitations.

The user can write enclave functions in C and C++ (native only). Other languages are not supported.

Enclave functions can rely on special versions of the C/C++ runtime libraries, STL, synchronization and several other trusted libraries that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. These trusted libraries are specifically designed to be used inside enclaves.

The user can write or use other trusted libraries, making sure the libraries follow the same rules as the internal enclave functions:
1. Enclave functions can’t use all the available 32-bit or 64-bit instructions. To check a list of illegal instructions inside an enclave, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.
2. Enclave functions will only run in user mode (ring 3). Using instructions requiring other CPU privileges will cause the enclave to fault.
3. Function calls within an enclave are possible if the called function is statically linked to the enclave (the function needs to be in the enclave image file). Linux* Shared Objects are not supported.

**CAUTION:**
The enclave signing process will fail if the enclave image contains any unresolved dependencies at build time.

Calling functions outside the enclave is possible using what are called OCALLs. OCALLs are explained in detail in the Calling Functions outside the Enclave section.

**Table 8 Summary of Intel(R) SGX Rules and Limitations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Native C/C++. Enclave interface functions are limited to C (no C++).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to other Shared Objects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/C++ calls to System provided C/C++/STL standard libraries</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A trusted version of these libraries is supplied with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK and they can be used instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS API calls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ frameworks</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Including MFC*, QT*, Boost* (partially – as long as Boost runtime is not used).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call C++ class methods</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Including C++ classes, static and inline functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic functions</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Supported only if they use supported instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The allowed functions are included in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Inline assembly
- **Partially**
- Same as the intrinsic functions.

### Template functions
- **Partially**
- Only supported in enclave internal functions

### Ellipse (...)
- **Partially**
- Only supported in enclave internal functions

### Varargs (va_list)
- **Partially**
- Only supported in enclave internal functions.

### Synchronization
- **Partially**
- The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a collection of functions/objects for synchronization: spin-lock, mutex, and condition variable.

### Threading support
- **Partially**
- Creating threads inside the enclave is not supported. Threads that run inside the enclave are created within the (untrusted) application. Spin-locks, trusted mutex and condition variables API can be used for thread synchronization inside the enclave.

### Thread Local Storage (TLS)
- **Partially**
- Only implicitly via __thread.

### Dynamic memory allocation
- **Yes**
- Enclave memory is a limited resource. Maximum heap size is set at enclave creation.

### C++ Exceptions
- **Yes**
- Although they have an impact on performance.

### SEH Exceptions
- **No**
- The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

### Signals
- **No**
- Signals are not supported inside an enclave.

---

**Calling Functions inside the Enclave**

After an enclave is loaded successfully, you get an enclave ID which is provided as a parameter when the ECALLs are performed. Optionally, OCALLs can be performed within an ECALL. For example, assume that you need to compute some secret inside an enclave, the EDL file might look like the following:

```c
// demo.edl

enclave {
```
With the above EDL, the sgx_edar8r will generate an untrusted proxy function for the ECALL and a trusted proxy function for the OCALL:

Untrusted proxy function (called by the application):

```c
sgx_status_t get_secret(sgx_enclave_id_t eid, secret_t* secret);
```

Trusted proxy function (called by the enclave):

```c
sgx_status_t dump_secret(const secret_t* secret);
```

The generated untrusted proxy function will automatically call into the enclave with the parameters to be passed to the real trusted function `get_secret` inside the enclave. To initiate an ECALL in the application:

```c
// An enclave call (ECALL) will happen here
secret_t secret;
sgx_status_t status = get_secret(eid, &secret);
```

The trusted functions inside the enclave can optionally do an OCALL to dump the secret with the trusted proxy `dump_secret`. It will automatically call out of the enclave with the given parameters to be received by the real untrusted function `dump_secret`. The real untrusted function needs to be implemented by the developer and linked with the application.
Checking the Return Value

The trusted and untrusted proxy functions return a value of type \texttt{sgx\_status\_t}. If the proxy function runs successfully, it will return \texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}. Otherwise, it indicates a specific error described in \textit{Error Codes} section. You can refer to the sample code shipped with the SDK for examples of proper error handling.

Calling Functions outside the Enclave

In some cases, the code within the enclave needs to call external functions which reside in untrusted (unprotected) memory to use operating system capabilities outside the enclave such as system calls, I/O operations, and so on. This type of function call is named OCALL.

These functions need to be declared in the EDL file in the untrusted section. See \textit{Enclave Definition Language Syntax} for more details.

The enclave image is loaded very similarly to how Linux* OS loads shared objects. The function address space of the application is shared with the enclave so the enclave code can indirectly call functions linked with the application that created the enclave. Calling functions from the application directly is not permitted and will raise an exception at runtime.

**CAUTION:**
The wrapper functions copy the parameters from protected (enclave) memory to unprotected memory as the external function cannot access protected memory regions. In particular, the OCALL parameters are copied into the untrusted stack. Depending on the number of parameters, the OCALL may cause a stack overrun in the untrusted domain. The exception that this event will trigger will appear to come from the code that the \texttt{sgx\_eder8r} generates based on the enclave EDL file. However, the exception can be easily detected using the Intel(R) SGX debugger.

**CAUTION:**
The wrapper functions will copy buffers (memory referenced by pointers) only if these pointers are assigned special attributes in the EDL file.

**CAUTION:**
Certain trusted libraries distributed with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provide an API that internally makes OCALLs. Currently, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions mutex, condition variable, and CPUID APIs from \texttt{libsgx\_tstdc.a} make OCALLs. Similarly, the trusted support library \texttt{libsgx\_...}
tservice.a, which provides services from the Platform Services Enclave (PSE-Op), also makes OCALLs. Developers who use these APIs must first import the needed OCALL functions from their corresponding EDL files. Otherwise, developers will get a linker error when the enclave is built. See the Importing EDL Libraries for details on how to import OCALL functions from a trusted library EDL file.

**CAUTION:**
To help identify problems caused by missing imports, all OCALL functions used in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK have the suffix ocall. For instance, the linker error below indicates that the enclave needs to import the OCALLs `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall()` and `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall()` that are needed in `sethread_mutex.obj`, which is part of `libsgx_tstdc.a`.

```
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_lock':
sethread_mutex.cpp:109: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall'
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock':
sethread_mutex.cpp:213: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall'
```

**CAUTION:**
Accessing protected memory from unprotected memory will result in abort page semantics. This applies to all parts of the protected memory including heap, stack, code and data.

Abort page semantics:
An attempt to read from a non-existent or disallowed resource returns all ones for data (abort page). An attempt to write to a non-existent or disallowed physical resource is dropped. This behavior is unrelated to exception type abort (the others being Fault and Trap).

OCALL functions have the following limitations/rules:

- OCALL functions must be C functions, or C++ functions with C linkage.
- Pointers that reference data within the enclave must be annotated with pointer direction attributes in the EDL file. The wrapper function will
perform shallow copy on these pointers. See Pointers for more information.

- Exceptions will not be caught within the enclave. The user must handle them in the untrusted wrapper function.
- OCALLs cannot have an ellipse (...) or a `va_list` in their prototype.

**Example 1: The definition of a simple OCALL function**

Step 1 – Add a declaration for `foo` in the EDL file

```c
// foo.edl
enclave {
    untrusted {
        [cdecl] void foo(int param);
    };
};
```

Step 2 (optional but highly recommended) – write a trusted, user-friendly wrapper. This function is part of the enclave's trusted code.

The wrapper function `ocall_foo` function will look like:

```c
// enclave's trusted code
#include "foo_t.h"
void ocall_foo(int param)
{
    // it is necessary to check the return value of foo()
    if (foo(param) != SGX_SUCCESS)
        abort();
}
```

Step 3 – write an untrusted `foo` function.

```c
// untrusted code
void foo(int param)
{
    // the implementation of foo
}
```

The `sgx_edger8r` will generate an untrusted bridge function which will call the untrusted function `foo` automatically. This untrusted bridge and the target untrusted function are part of the application, not the enclave.
Library Development for Enclaves

Trusted library is the term used to refer to a static library designed to be linked with an enclave. The following list describes the features of trusted libraries:

- Trusted libraries are components of an Intel(R) SGX-based solution. They typically undergo a more rigorous threat evaluation and review process than a regular static library.
- A trusted library is developed (or ported) with the specific purpose of being used within an enclave. Therefore, it should not contain instructions that are not supported by the Intel(R) SGX architecture.
- A subset of the trusted library API may also be part of the enclave interface. The trusted library interface that could be exposed to the untrusted domain is defined in an EDL file. If present, this EDL file is a key component of the trusted library.
- A trusted library may have to be shipped with an untrusted library. Functions within the trusted library may make OCALLs outside the enclave. If an external function that the trusted library uses is not provided by the libraries available on the platform, the trusted library will require an untrusted support library.

In summary, a trusted library, in addition to the .a file containing the trusted code and data, may also include an .edl file as well as an untrusted .a file.

This topic describes the process of developing a trusted library and provides an overview of the main steps necessary to build an enclave that uses such a trusted library.

1. The ISV provides a trusted library including the trusted functions (without any edge-routines) and, when necessary, an EDL file and an untrusted support library. To develop a trusted library, an ISV should create an enclave project and choose the library option in the Eclipse plug-in. This ensures the library is built with the appropriate settings. The ISV might delete the EDL file from the project if the trusted library only provides an interface to be invoked within an enclave. The ISV should create a standard static library project for the untrusted support library, if required.

2. Add a “from/import” statement with the library EDL file path and name to the enclave EDL file. The import statement indicates which trusted
functions (ECALLs) from the library may be called from outside the enclave and which untrusted functions (OCALLs) are called from within the trusted library. You may import all ECALLs and OCALLs from the trusted library or select a specific subset of them.

A library EDL file may import additional library EDL files building a hierarchical structure. For additional details, See Importing EDL Libraries.

3. During the enclave build process, the `sgx_edger8r` generates proxy/bridge code for all the trusted and untrusted functions. The generated code accounts for the functions declared in the enclave EDL file as well as any imported trusted library EDL file.

4. The trusted library and trusted proxy/bridge functions are linked to the enclave code.

**NOTE:**
If you use the wildcard option to import a trusted library, the resulting enclave contains the trusted bridge functions for all ECALLs and their corresponding implementations. The linker will not be able to optimize this code out.

5. The Intel(R) SGX application is linked to the untrusted proxy/bridge code. Similarly, when the wildcard import option is used, the untrusted bridge functions for all the OCALLs will be linked in.

**Avoiding Name Collisions**
An application may be designed to work with multiple enclaves. In this scenario, each enclave would still be an independent compilation unit resulting in a separate SO file.

Enclaves, like regular SO files, should provide a unique interface to avoid name collisions when an untrusted application is linked with the edge-routines of several enclaves. The `sgx_edger8r` prevents name collisions among OCALL functions because it automatically prepends the enclave name to the names of the untrusted bridge functions. However, ISVs must ensure the uniqueness of the ECALL function names across enclaves to prevent collisions among ECALL functions.

Despite having unique ECALL function names, name collision may also occur as the result of developing an Intel(R) SGX application. This happens because an enclave cannot import another SO file. When two enclaves import the same ECALL function from a trusted library, the set of edge-routines for each
enclave will contain identical untrusted proxy functions and marshaling data structures for the imported ECALL. Thus, the linker will emit an error when the application is linked with these two sets of edge-routines. To build an application with more than one enclave when these enclaves import the same ECALL from a trusted library, ISVs have to:

1. Provide the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`, which will prepend the enclave name to the untrusted proxy function names. For instance, when an enclave uses the local attestation trusted library sample code included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK, the enclave EDL file must be parsed with the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`. See Local Attestation for additional details.

2. Prefix all ECALLs in their untrusted code with the enclave name, matching the new proxy function names.

**Linking Enclave with Libraries**

This topic introduces how to link an enclave with the following types of libraries:

- Dynamic libraries
- Static Libraries
- Simulation Libraries

**Dynamic Libraries**

An enclave shared object must not depend on any dynamically linked library in any way. The enclave loader has been intentionally designed to prohibit dynamic linking of libraries within an enclave. The protection of an enclave is dependent upon obtaining an accurate measurement of all code and data that is placed into the enclave at load time; thus, dynamic linking would add complexity without providing any benefit over static linking.

**CAUTION:**

The enclave image signing process will fail if the enclave file has any unresolved dependencies.

**Static Libraries**

You can link with static libraries as long as they do not have any dependencies.

The Intel SGX SDK provides the following collection of trusted libraries.
**Table 9 Trusted Libraries included in the Intel® SGX SDK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_trts.a</td>
<td>Intel® SGX Runtime library</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_trts_sim.a</td>
<td>Intel® SGX Runtime library (simulation mode)</td>
<td>Must link when running in simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tstdc.a</td>
<td>Standard C library (math, string, and so on.)</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tcxx.a,</td>
<td>Standard C++ libraries, STL</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tstdcxx.a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a</td>
<td>Data seal/unseal (encryption), trusted Architectural Enclaves support,</td>
<td>Must link when using HW mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EC DH) library, and so on.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</td>
<td>The counterpart of libsgx_tservice.a for simulation mode</td>
<td>Must link when using simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tcrypto.a</td>
<td>Cryptographic library</td>
<td>Must link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tkey_exchange.a</td>
<td>Trusted key exchange library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx_tprotected.a</td>
<td>Protected File System library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Simulation Libraries**

The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides simulation libraries to run application enclaves in simulation mode (Intel(R) SGX hardware is not required). There are an untrusted simulation library and a trusted simulation library. The untrusted simulation library provides the functionality that the untrusted runtime library requires to manage an enclave linked with the trusted simulation library, including the simulation of the Intel(R) SGX instructions executed outside the enclave: ECREATE, EADD, EEXTEND, EINIT, EREMOVE, and EENTER. The trusted simulation library is primarily responsible for simulating the Intel(R) SGX instructions that can execute inside an enclave: EEXIT, EGETKEY, and EREPORT.
**NOTE**
Simulation mode does not require the Intel SGX support in the CPU. However, the processor must support the Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions 4.1 instructions at least.

**Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries**
The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of untrusted libraries.

**Table 10 Untrusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>libsgx Urts so</td>
<td>Provides functionality for applications to manage enclaves</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx Urts sim so</td>
<td>uRTS library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx Uae Service so</td>
<td>Provides both enclaves and untrusted applications access to services provided by the AEs</td>
<td>Must link when running in HW mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx Uae Service sim so</td>
<td>Untrusted AE support library used in simulation mode</td>
<td>Dynamically linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libsgx Ukey Exchange a</td>
<td>Untrusted key exchange library</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Definition Language Syntax**
Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files are meant to describe enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototypes. *Edger8r Tool* uses this file to create C wrapper functions for both enclave exports (used by ECALLs) and imports (used by OCALLs).

**EDL Template**
```
enclave {
    //Include files
    //Import other edl files
```
// Data structure declarations to be used as parameters of the function prototypes in edl

trusted {
    // Include header files if any
    // Will be included in enclave_t.h
    // Trusted function prototypes
};

untrusted {
    // Include header files if any
    // Will be included in enclave_u.h
    // Untrusted function prototypes
};

The trusted block is optional only if it is used as a library EDL, and this EDL would be imported by other EDL files. However the untrusted block is always optional.

Every EDL file follows this generic format:

enclave {
    // An EDL file can optionally import functions from other EDL files
    from "other/file.edl" import foo, bar;  // selective importing
    from "another/file.edl" import *;  // import all functions

    // Include C headers, these headers will be included in the generated files for both trusted and untrusted routines
    include "string.h"
    include "mytypes.h"

    // Type definitions (struct, union, enum), optional
    struct mysecret {
        int key;
        const char* text;
    };
    enum boolean { FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1 };

    // Export functions (ECALLs), optional for library EDLs
    trusted {
        // Include header files if any
        // Will be included in enclave_t.h
        // Trusted function prototypes
public void set_secret([in] struct mysecret* psecret);

void some_private_func(enum boolean b); // private ECALL
(non-root ECALL).

// Import functions (OCALLs), optional untrusted {

//Include header files if any
//Will be included in enclave_u.h
//Will be inserted in untrusted header file
“untrusted.h”

//Untrusted function prototypes

// This OCALL is not allowed to make another ECALL.
void ocall_print();

// This OCALL can make an ECALL to function
// “some_private_func”.
int another_ocall([in] struct mysecret* psecret)
  allow(some_private_func);

}

Comments
Both types of C/C++ comments are valid.

Example

enclave {
    include “stdio.h” // include stdio header
    include “../../util.h” /* this header defines some custom public
types */
}

Include Headers
Include C headers which define types (C structs, unions, typedefs, etc.); otherwise auto generated code cannot be compiled if these types are referenced in EDL. The included header file can be global or belong to trusted functions or untrusted functions only.

A global included header file doesn't mean that the same header file is included in the enclave and untrusted application code. In this case, the enclave will use the stdio.h from the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions
SDK. While the application code will use the `stdio.h` shipped with the host compiler.

Using the `include` directive is convenient when developers are migrating existing code to the Intel SGX technology, since data types are defined already in this case. Similar to other IDL languages like Microsoft* interface definition language (MIDL*) and CORBA* interface definition language (OMG-IDL), a user can define data types inside the EDL file and `sgx edger8r` will generate a C header file with the data type definitions. For a list of supported data types with in EDL, see Basic Types.

**Syntax**

```c
include "filename.h"
```

**Example**

```c
enclave {
    include "stdio.h" // global headers
    include "../../util.h"

    trusted {
        include "foo.h" // for trusted functions only
    };

    untrusted {
        include "bar.h" // for untrusted functions only
    };
}
```

**Keywords**

The identifiers listed in the following table are reserved for use as keywords of the Enclave Definition Language.

**Table 11 EDL Reserved Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Types</th>
<th>char</th>
<th>short</th>
<th>int</th>
<th>float</th>
<th>double</th>
<th>void</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>int8_t</td>
<td>int16_t</td>
<td>int32_t</td>
<td>int64_t</td>
<td>size_t</td>
<td>wchar_t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uint8_t</td>
<td>uint16_t</td>
<td>uint32_t</td>
<td>uint64_t</td>
<td>unsigned</td>
<td>struct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>union</td>
<td>enum</td>
<td>long</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pointer Parameter Handling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>in</th>
<th>out</th>
<th>user_check</th>
<th>count</th>
<th>size</th>
<th>readonly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Basic Types**

EDL supports the following basic types:

```
char, short, long, int, float, double, void, int8_t, int16_t, int32_t, int64_t, size_t, wchar_t, uint8_t, uint16_t, uint32_t, uint64_t, unsigned, struct, enum, union.
```

It also supports `long long` and 64-bit `long double`.

Basic data types can be modified using the C modifiers:

```
const, *, [],
```

Additional types can be defined by including a C header file.

**Structures, Enums and Unions**

Basic types and user defined data types can be used inside the structure/union except it differs from the standard in the following ways:

**Unsupported Syntax:**

```
enclave{
    // 1. Each member of the structure has to be defined separately
    struct data_def_t{
        int a, b, c; // Not allowed
        // It has to be int a; int b; int c;
    };

    // 2. Bit fields in structures/unions are not allowed.
    struct bitfields_t{
        short i : 3;
        short j : 6;
        short k : 7;
    };
```
/3. Nested structure definition is not allowed
struct my_struct_t{
    int out_val;
    float out_fval;
    struct inner_struct_t{
        int in_val;
        float in_fval;
    }
};

Valid Syntax:

enclave{
    include "user_types.h" //for ufloat: typedef float ufloat

    struct struct_foo_t { 
        uint32_t struct_foo_0;
        uint64_t struct_foo_1;
    };

    enum enum_foo_t {
        ENUM_FOO_0 = 0,
        ENUM_FOO_1 = 1
    };

    union union_foo_t { 
        uint32_t union_foo_0;
        uint32_t union_foo_1;
        uint64_t union_foo_3;
    };

    trusted {
        public void test_char(char val);
        public void test_int(int val);
        public void test_long(long long val);
        
        public void test_float(float val);
        public void test_ufloat(ufloat val);
        public void test_double(double val);
        public void test_long_double(long double val);
        
        public void test_size_t(size_t val);
        public void test_wchar_t(wchar_t val);
        
        public void test_struct(struct struct_foo_t val);
        public void test_struct2(struct struct_foo_t val);
        
        public void test_enum(enum enum_foo_t val);
        public void test_enum2(enum foo_t val);
        
        public void test_union(union union_foo_t val);
    }
public void test_union2(union_foo_t *val);
};

};

Pointers
EDL defines several attributes that can be used with pointers:
in, out, user_check, string, wstring, size, count, size-
func, isptr, readonly.

Each of them is explained in the following topics.

**CAUTION:**
The pointer attributes explained in this topic apply to ECALL and OCALL function parameters exclusively, not to the pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function. Thus, pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function are not checked by the edge-routines and must be verified by the enclave and application code.

**Pointer Handling**
Pointers should be decorated with either a pointer direction attribute in, out or a user_check attribute explicitly. The [in] and [out] serve as direction attributes.

- [in] – when [in] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is passed from the calling procedure to the called procedure. For an ECALL the in parameter is passed from the application to the enclave, for an OCALL the parameter is passed from the enclave to the application.
- [out] – when [out] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is returned from the called procedure to the calling procedure. In an ECALL function an out parameter is passed from the enclave to the application and an OCALL function passes it from the application to the enclave.
- [in] and [out] attributes may be combined. In this case the parameter is passed in both directions.

The direction attribute instructs the trusted edge-routines (trusted bridge and trusted proxy) to copy the buffer pointed by the pointer. In order to copy the buffer contents, the trusted edge-routines have to know how much data needs to be copied. For this reason, the direction attribute is usually followed
by a \texttt{size}, \texttt{count} or \texttt{sizefunc} modifier. If neither of these is provided nor the pointer is NULL, the trusted edge-routine assumes a \texttt{count} of one. When a buffer is being copied, the trusted bridge must avoid overwriting enclave memory in an ECALL and the trusted proxy must avoid leaking secrets in an OCALL. To accomplish this goal, pointers passed as ECALL parameters must point to untrusted memory and pointers passed as OCALL parameters must point to trusted memory. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trusted bridge and the trusted proxy will report an error at runtime, respectively, and the ECALL and OCALL functions will not be executed.

You may use the direction attribute to trade protection for performance. Otherwise, you must use the \texttt{user_check} attribute described below and validate the data obtained from untrusted memory via pointers before using it, since the memory a pointer points to could change unexpectedly because it is stored in untrusted memory. However, the direction attribute does not help with structures that contain pointers. In this scenario, you have to validate and copy the buffer contents, recursively if needed, yourself.

\textbf{Example}

\begin{verbatim}
enclave {  
  trusted {  
    public void test_ecall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);  
    public void test_ecall_in([in] int * ptr);  
    public void test_ecall_out([out] int * ptr);  
    public void test_ecall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);  
  };  
  untrusted {  
    void test_ocall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);  
    void test_ocall_in([in] int * ptr);  
    void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);  
    void test_ocall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);  
  };  
};
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Unsupported Syntax:}

\begin{verbatim}
enclave {
\end{verbatim}
trusted {
    // Pointers without a direction attribute
    // or ‘user_check’ are not allowed
    public void test_ecall_not(int * ptr);

    // Function pointers are not allowed
    public void test_ecall_func([in]int (*func_ptr)());
};

In the example shown above:

For ECALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ecall_user_check, the pointer
  ptr will not be verified; you should verify the pointer passed to the trusted
  function. The buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to inside buffer
  either.
- [in]: In the function test_ecall_in, a buffer with the same size as the
  data type of ‘ptr’(int) will be allocated inside the enclave. Content pointed
  to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied into the new allocated
  memory inside. Any changes performed inside the enclave will not be vis-
  ible to the untrusted application.
- [out]: In the function test_ecall_out, a buffer with the same size as
  the data type of ‘ptr’(int) will be allocated inside the enclave, but the
  content pointed to by ptr, one integer value will not be copied. Instead,
  it will be initialized to zero. After the trusted function returns, the buffer
  inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer pointed to by
  ptr.
- [in, out]: In the function test_ecall_in_out, a buffer with the same
  size will be allocated inside the enclave, the content pointed to by ptr,
  one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer
  inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer.

For OCALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ocall_user_check, the pointer
  ptr will not be verified; the buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to an
  outside buffer. Besides, the application cannot read/modify the memory
  pointed to by ptr, if ptr points to enclave memory.
- [in]: In the function `test_ocall_in`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated in the 'application' side (untrusted side). Content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied into the newly allocated memory outside. Any changes performed by the application will not be visible inside the enclave.

- [out]: In the function `test_ocall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated on the application side (untrusted side) and its content will be initialized to zero. After the untrusted function returns, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied to the enclave buffer pointed to by `ptr`.

- [in, out]: In the function `test_ocall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated in the application side, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied into the inside enclave buffer.

The following table summarizes behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes:

### Table 12 Behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECALL</th>
<th>OCALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>user_check</td>
<td>Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy.</td>
<td>Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in</td>
<td>Buffer copied from the application into the enclave. Afterwards, changes will only affect the buffer inside enclave. Safe but slow.</td>
<td>Buffer copied from the enclave to the application. Must be used if pointer points to enclave data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out</td>
<td>Trusted wrapper function will allocate a buffer to be used by the enclave. Upon return, this buffer will be copied to the original buffer.</td>
<td>The untrusted buffer will be copied into the enclave by the trusted wrapper function. Safe but slow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in, out</td>
<td>Combines in and out behavior. Data is copied back and forth.</td>
<td>Same as ECALLs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDL cannot analyze C typedefs and macros found in C headers. If a pointer type is aliased to a type/macro that does not have an asterisk (*), the EDL parser may report an error or not properly copy the pointer's data.

In such cases, declare the function prototype to use types that have an asterisk.
Example:

// Error, PVOID is not a pointer in EDL
void foo([in, size=4] PVOID buffer);

// OK
void foo([in, size=4] void* buffer);

// OK, “isptr” indicates “PVOID” is pointer type
void foo([in, isptr, size=4] PVOID buffer);

// OK, opaque type, copy by value
// Actual address must be in untrusted memory
void foo(HWND hWnd);

**Pointer Handling in ECALLs**

In ECALLs, the trusted bridge checks that the marshaling structure does not overlap with the enclave memory, and automatically allocates space on the trusted stack to hold a copy of the structure. Then it checks that pointer parameters with their full range do not overlap with the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave and copies the memory pointed to by the pointer from outside to the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates a buffer in the trusted memory, zeroes the buffer contents to clear any previous data and passes a pointer to this buffer to the trusted function. After the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to untrusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the trusted memory before calling the trusted function, and once the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to the untrusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

**NOTE:**

When an ECALL with a pointer parameter with `out` attribute returns, the trusted bridge always copies data from the buffer in enclave memory to the buffer outside. You must clear all sensitive data from that buffer on failure.

Before the trusted bridge returns, it frees all the trusted heap memory allocated at the beginning of the ECALL function for pointer parameters with a
direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted bridge after it returns results in undefined behavior.

**Pointer Handling in OCALLs**

For OCALLs, the trusted proxy allocates memory on the outside stack to pass the marshaling structure and checks that the pointer parameters with their full range are within enclave. When a pointer to trusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave and copies the memory pointed by the pointer from inside the enclave to the untrusted memory. When a pointer to the trusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates a buffer on the untrusted stack, and passes a pointer to this buffer to the untrusted function. After the untrusted function returns, the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the untrusted memory before calling the untrusted function, and after the untrusted function returns the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

When the trusted proxy function returns, it frees all the untrusted stack memory allocated at the beginning of the OCALL function for the pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted proxy after it returns results in undefined behavior.

**Attribute: user_check**

In certain situations, the restrictions imposed by the direction attribute may not support the application needs for data communication across the enclave boundary. For instance, a buffer might be too large to fit in enclave memory and needs to be fragmented into smaller blocks that are then processed in a series of ECALLs, or an application might require passing a pointer to trusted memory (enclave context) as an ECALL parameter.

To support these specific scenarios, the EDL language provides the `user_check` attribute. Parameters declared with the `user_check` attribute do not undergo any of the checks described for `in` and `out` attributes. However, you must understand the risks associated with passing pointers in and out the enclave, in general, and the `user_check` attribute, in particular. You must ensure that all the pointer checking and data copying are done correctly or risk compromising enclave secrets.
Buffer Size Calculation

The generalized formula for calculating the buffer size using these attributes:

\[ \text{Total number of bytes} = \text{count} \times \text{size} \]

- The above formula holds when both count and size/sizefunc are specified.
- size can be specified by either size or sizefunc attribute.
- If count is not specified for the pointer parameter, then it is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e., count=1. Then total number of bytes equals to size/sizefunc.
- If size is not specified, then the buffer size is calculated using the above formula where size is sizeof (element pointed by the pointer).

Attribute: size

The size attribute is used to indicate the buffer size in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute ([in]/[out]) (when there is no count attribute specified). This attribute is needed because the trusted bridge needs to know the whole range of the buffer passed as a pointer to ensure it does not overlap with the enclave memory, and to copy the contents of the buffer from untrusted memory to trusted memory and/or vice versa depending on the direction attribute. The size may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function. size attribute is generally used for void pointers.

Example

enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies '100' bytes
        public void test_size1([in, size=100] void* ptr, size_t len);
        // Copies ‘len’ bytes
        public void test_size2([in, size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
    }
};

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    trusted {

Attribute: sizefunc

The sizefunc attribute modifier depends on a user defined trusted function which is called by the edge-routines to get the number of bytes to be copied. The sizefunc has similar functionality as the sizeof() operator. An example of where sizefunc can be used is for marshaling variable-length structures, which are buffers whose total size is specified by a combination of values stored at well-defined locations inside the buffer (although typically it is at a single location). To prevent “check first, use later” type of attacks, sizefunc is called twice. In the first call, sizefunc operates in untrusted memory. The second time, sizefunc operates in the data copied into trusted memory. If the sizes returned by the two sizefunc calls do not match, the trusted bridge will cancel the ECALL and will report an error to the untrusted application. Note that sizefunc must not be combined with the size attribute. sizefunc cannot be used with out alone, however sizefunc with both in and out is accepted. Additionally, users cannot define sizefunc as strlen or wcslen. In all these scenarios, the sgx_edger8r will throw an error. Strings should not be passed with the sizefunc modifier, but with the string or wstring keyword. sizefunc can be used with the count attribute which gives the total length to be equal to sizefunc * count. The following is the prototype of the trusted sizefunc that you need to define inside the enclave:

```c
size_t sizefunc_function_name(const parameter_type * p);
```

Where parameter_type is the data type of the parameter annotated with the sizefunc attribute. If you do not provide the definition of the sizefunc function, the linker will report an error.

**NOTE**

The function implementing a sizefunc should validate the input pointer carefully, before using it. Since the function is called before the pointer is checked by the generated code.

**Example**

```c
enclave{
    trusted {
```
// Copies get_packet_size bytes
// User must provide a function definition that matches
// size_t get_packet_size(const void* ptr);
void test_sizefunc([in, sizefunc=get_packet_size] void* ptr);

// Copies (get_packet_size * cnt) bytes
void test_sizefunc2(
    [in, sizefunc=get_packet_size, count=cnt] void* ptr,
    unsigned cnt);
}

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    include "user_types.h"

tested {
    // Cannot use sizefunc and size together
    void test_sizefunc_size(
        [in, size=100, sizefunc=packet_len] header* h);

    // Cannot use strlen or wcslen as sizefunc
    void test_sizefunc_strlen([in, sizefunc=strlen] header* h);
    void test_sizefunc_wcslen([in, sizefunc=wcslen] header* h);
}

Attribute: count
The count attribute is used to indicate a block of sizeof element pointed by
the pointer in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute. The
count and size attribute modifiers serve the same purpose. The number of
bytes copied by the trusted bridge or trusted proxy is the product of the
count and the size of the data type to which the parameter points. The count
may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function.

The size and count attribute modifiers may also be combined. In this case,
the trusted edge-routine will copy a number of bytes that is the product of
the count and size parameters (size*count) specified in the function declara-
tion in the EDL file.

Example
enclave{

tested {
    // Copies cnt * sizeof(int) bytes
    public void test_count([in, count=cnt] int* ptr, unsigned
cnt);
}
// Copies cnt * len bytes
public void test_count_size([in, count=cnt, size=len] int* ptr, unsigned cnt, size_t len);
);

Strings
The attributes string and wstring indicate that the parameter is a NULL terminated C string or a NULL terminated wchar_t string, respectively. To prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, the trusted edge-routine first operates in untrusted memory to determine the length of the string. Once the string has been copied into the enclave, the trusted bridge explicitly NULL terminates the string. The size of the buffer allocated in trusted memory accounts for the length determined in the first step as well as the size of the string termination character.

NOTE
The string and wstring attributes must not be combined with any other modifier such as size, count or sizefunc. string and wstring cannot be used with out alone. In all these cases, the sgx_edger8r will report an error. However, string and wstring with both in and out are accepted.

Example
enclave {

called {

    // Cannot use [out] with "string/wstring" alone
    // Using [in], or [in, out] is acceptable
    public void test_string([in, out, string] char* str);

    public void test_wstring([in, out, wstring] char* wstr);

    public void test_const_string([in, string] const char* str);

   );
    

 Unsupported Syntax:

 enclave {
    include "user_types.h" // for typedef void const * pBuf2;

called {

    trusted {


// string/wstring attributes must be used
// with pointer direction
void test_string_cant([string] char* ptr);

// string/wstring attributes cannot be used
// with [out] attribute
void test_string_out([out, string] char* str);

// sizefunc can’t be used for strings, use [string/wstring]
void test_string_sizefunc_cant(
    [in, string, sizefunc=packet_len] header* h);

}

In the first example, when the string attribute is used for function test_string, strlen(str) + 1 is used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave. The extra byte is for null termination.

In the function test_wstring, wcslen(str) + 1 (two-byte units) will be used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave.

User Defined Data Types
The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports user defined data types, but should be defined in a header file. Any basic datatype which is typedef’ed into another becomes a user defined data type.

Some user data types need to be annotated with special EDL attributes, such as isptr, isary and readonly. If one of these attributes is missing when a user-defined type parameter requires it so, the compiler will emit a compilation error in the code that sgx_edger8r generates.

- When there is a user defined data type for a pointer, isptr is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is a pointer. See Pointers for more information.
- When there is a user defined data type for arrays, isary is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is an array. See Arrays for more information.
- When an ECALL or OCALL parameter is a user defined type of a pointer to a const data type, the parameter should be annotated with the readonly attribute.

Example
enclave {

}
include "user_types.h" // for typedef void * pBuf;
   // and typedef void const * pBuf2;
   // and typedef int uArray[10];

trusted {
   
   public void test_isptr(
      [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf pBufptr,
      size_t len);

   public void test_isptr_readonly(
      [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
      pBuf2ptr,
      size_t len);

   public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr,
      size_t len);
};

Unsupported Syntax:

enclave {
   
   include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
   // and typedef int uArray[10];

   trusted {
      // Cannot use [out] when using [readonly] attribute
      void test_isptr_readonly_cant(
         [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
         pBuf2ptr,
         size_t len);
      // User-defined array types need "isary"
      public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr,
         size_t len);
   };

};//

In the function test_isptr_readonly, pBuf2 (typedef void const * pBuf2) is a user defined pointer type, so isptr is used to indicate that it is a user defined type. Also, the pBuf2ptr is readonly, so you cannot use the out attribute. The size attribute indicates the number of bytes to be copied to the enclave memory.

const Keyword

The EDL language accepts the const keyword with the same meaning as the const keyword in the C standard. However, the support for this keyword is limited in the EDL language. It may only be used with pointers and as the outermost qualifier. This satisfies the most important usage in Intel(R) SGX, which
is to detect conflicts between const pointers (pointers to const data) with the out attribute. Other forms of the const keyword supported in the C standard are not supported in the EDL language.

Arrays
The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports multidimensional, fixed-size arrays to be used in data structure definition and parameter declaration. Zero-length array and flexible array member, however, are not supported. The special attribute isary is used to designate function parameters that are of a user defined type array.

Example
enclave {
  include "user_types.h" //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

  trusted {
    public void test_array([in] int arr[4]);
    public void test_array_multi([in] int arr[4][4]);
    public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
  }
};

Unsupported Syntax:
enclave {
  include "user_types.h" //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

  trusted {
    // Flexible array is not supported
    public void test_flexible(int arr[][4]);

    // Zero-length array is not supported.
    public void test_zero(int arr[0]);

    // User-defined array types need "isary"
    public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr, size_t len);
  }
};
Support for arrays also includes attributes [in], [out] and [user_check], which are similar in usage to the pointers.

Preprocessor Capability
The EDL language supports macro definition and conditional compilation directives. To provide this capability, the sgx_edger8r first uses the compiler preprocessor to parse the EDL file. Once all preprocessor tokens have been translated, the sgx_edger8r then parses the resulting file as regular EDL language. This means that developers may define simple macros and use conditional compilation directives to easily remove debug and test capabilities from production enclaves, reducing the attack surface of an enclave. See the following EDL example.

```c
#define SGX_DEBUG

enclave {
    trusted {
        // ECALL definitions
    }
    untrusted {
        // OCALL definitions
        #ifdef SGX_DEBUG
            void print([in, string] const char * str);
        #endif
    }
}
```

The current sgx_edger8r does not propagate macro definitions from the EDL file into the generated edge-routines. As a result, you need to duplicate macro definitions in both the EDL file as well as in the compiler arguments or other source files.

We recommend you only use simple macro definitions and conditional compilation directives in your EDL files.

The sgx_edger8r uses gcc to parse macros and conditional compilation directives that might be in the EDL file. You may override the default search behavior or even specify a different preprocessor with the --preprocessor option.

Propagating errno in OCALLs
OCALLs may use the propagate_errno attribute. When you use this attribute, the sgx_edger8r produces slightly different edge-routines. The errno
variable inside the enclave, which is provided by the trusted Standard C library, is overwritten with the value of `errno` in the untrusted domain before the OCALL returns. The trusted `errno` is updated upon OCALL completion regardless whether the OCALL was successful or not. This does not change the fundamental behavior of `errno`. A function that fails must set `errno` to indicate what went wrong. A function that succeeds, in this case the OCALL, is allowed to change the value of `errno`.

**Example**

```c
enclave {
    include "sgx_stdio_stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions
    trusted {
        public void test_file_io(void);
    };
    untrusted {
        FILE * fopen(
            [in,string] const char * filename,
            [in,string] const char * mode) propagate_errno;
        int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream) propagate_errno;
        size_t fwrite(
            [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buffer,
            size_t size,
            size_t count,
            [user_check]FILE * stream) propagate_errno;
    };
}
```

**Importing EDL Libraries**

You can implement export and import functions in external trusted libraries, akin to static libraries in the untrusted domain. To add these functions to an enclave, use the enclave definition language (EDL) library import mechanism.

Use the EDL keywords `from` and `import` to add a library EDL file to an enclave EDL file is done.

The `from` keyword specifies the location of the library EDL file. Relative and full paths are accepted. Relative paths are relative to the location of the EDL file.
The `import` keyword specifies the functions to import. An asterisk (*) can be used to import all functions from the library. More than one function can be imported by writing a list of function names separated by commas.

**Syntax**

```python
from "lib_filename.edl" import func_name, func2_name;
```

Or

```python
from "lib_filename.edl" import *;
```

**Example**

```python
enclave {
    from "secure_comms.edl" import send_email, send_sms;
    from ".../sys/other_secure_comms.edl" import *
};
```

A library EDL file may import another EDL file, which in turn, may import another EDL file, creating a hierarchical structure as shown below:

```python
// enclave.edl
enclave {
    from "other/file_L1.edl" import *; // Import all functions
};

// Trusted library file_L1.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L2.edl" import *

    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
    }
};

// Trusted library file_L2.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L3.edl" import *
};
```
trusted {            
    public void test_ptr(int* ptr);
    
};

// Trusted library file_L3.edl

enclave {

    trusted {            
        public void test_float(float flt);
    }

};

Granting Access to ECalls

The default behavior is that ECALL functions cannot be called by any of the untrusted functions.

To enable an ECALL to be directly called by application code as a root ECALL, the ECALL should be explicitly decorated with the `public` keyword to be a public ECALL. Without this keyword, the ECALLs will be treated as private ECALLs, and cannot be directly called as root ECALLs.

Syntax

trusted {
    public <function prototype>;
}

An enclave EDL must have one or more public ECALLs, otherwise the Enclave functions cannot be called at all and `sgx_edger8r` will report an error in this case.

To grant an OCALL function access to an ECALL function, specify this access using the `allow` keyword. Both public and private ECALLs can be put into the allow list.

Syntax

untrusted {
    <function prototype> allow (func_name, func2_name, ...);
}

Example
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void clear_secret();
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
        void set_secret([in] secret_t* secret);
    };
    untrusted {
        void replace_secret(
            [in] secret_t* new_secret,
            [out] secret_t* old_secret)
            allow (set_secret, clear_secret);
    };
};

In the above example, the untrusted code is granted different access permission to the ECALLs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECALL</th>
<th>called as root ECALL</th>
<th>called from replace_secret</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clear_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>get_secret</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set_secret</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclave Configuration File**

The enclave configuration file is an XML file containing the user defined parameters of an enclave. This XML file is part of the enclave project. A tool named sgx_sign uses this file as an input to create the signature and metadata for the enclave. Here is an example of the configuration file:

```xml
<EnclaveConfiguration>
    <ProdID>100</ProdID>
    <ISVSVN>1</ISVSVN>
    <StackMaxSize>0x50000</StackMaxSize>
    <StackMinSize>0x2000</StackMinSize>
    <HeapMaxSize>0x100000</HeapMaxSize>
    <HeapMinSize>0x40000</HeapMinSize>
    <HeapInitSize>0x80000</HeapInitSize>
    <TCSNum>3</TCSNum>
    <TCSMaxNum>4</TCSMaxNum>
    <TCSMinPool>2</TCSMinPool>
    <TCSPolicy>1</TCSPolicy>
    <DisableDebug>0</DisableDebug>
    <MiscSelect>0</MiscSelect>
    <MiscMask>0xFFFFFFFF</MiscMask>
</EnclaveConfiguration>
```
The table below lists the elements defined in the configuration file. All of them are optional. Without a configuration file or if an element is not present in the configuration file, the default value will be used.

**Table 13 Enclave Configuration Default Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Default Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ProdID</td>
<td>ISV assigned Product ID.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISVSVN</td>
<td>ISV assigned SVN.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSNum</td>
<td>The number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSMaxNum</td>
<td>The maximum number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCSMinPool</td>
<td>The minimum number of available TCS at any time in the life cycle of an enclave</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TCSPolicy | TCS management policy.  
0 – TCS is bound to the untrusted thread.  
1 – TCS is not bound to the untrusted thread. | 1             |
| StackMinSize | The minimum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.                    | 0x1000        |
| StackMaxSize | The maximum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.                  | 0x40000       |
| HeapInitSize | The initial heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.              | 0x1000000     |
| HeapMinSize  | The minimum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.               | 0x1000        |
| HeapMaxSize  | The maximum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.               | 0x1000000     |
| DisableDebug | Enclave cannot be debugged.                                                | 0 - Enclave can be debugged |
| MiscSelect | The desired Extended SSA frame feature.                                    | 0             |
| MiscMask   | The mask bits of MiscSelect to enforce.                                    | 0xFFFFFFFF    |

MiscSelect and MiscMask are for future functional extension. Currently, MiscSelect must be 0. Otherwise the corresponding enclave may not be loaded successfully.
TCSMaxNum, TCSNum and TCSMinPool are used to determine how many threads will be created once the enclave completes initialization, and how many threads can be created dynamically when the enclave is running. These two kinds of threads will be referred to as static threads and dynamic threads.

StackMaxSize and StackMinSize have different meanings to a static thread and a dynamic thread.

To a static thread, only StackMaxSize is relevant, which determines the maximum amount of stack available.

To a dynamic thread, StackMinSize is the amount of stack available once the thread is created and initialized. The gap between StackMinSize and StackMaxSize is the amount of stack that is not available currently but can be expanded as necessary later. Therefore, StackMaxSize is the total amount of stack a thread can use. StackMinSize can be regarded as the lower limit and StackMaxSize is the upper limit.

When an enclave created with Linux 2.0 SDK is executing on an Intel SGX 2.0 platform that is running INtel SGX 2.0 PSW, HeapMinSize is the amount of heap available once the enclave completes initialization.

HeapMaxSize is the total amount of heap an enclave can use. The gap between HeapMinSize and HeapMaxSize is the amount of heap that is not available currently but can be expanded as necessary later.

When an enclave created with Linux 2.0 SDK is executing on an older Intel SGX platform or a platform running a previous version of PSW, the values are interpreted differently. In this case HeapInitSize is the only relevant field and it indicates the total amount of heap available to an enclave.

Several sample configuration files are provided in SampleEnclave project in order to further clarify the effects of different combinations of the parameter settings.

The total amount of stack and heap actually used by an enclave can be measured by using the measurement tool sgx_emmt. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for details.

An Eclipse* plug-in named Intel(R) SGX Update Configuration is provided to help you easily edit your configuration file. See the Intel(R) SGX Eclipse* Plug-in User's Guide from the Eclipse's Help content for details.

If there is no enough stack for the enclave, ECALL returns the error code SGX_ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN. This error code gives the information to enclave writer that the StackMaxSize may need further adjustment.
Enclave Project Configurations

Depending on the development stage you are at, choose one of the following project configurations to build an enclave:

- **Simulation**: Under the *simulation* mode the enclave can be either built with debug or release compiler settings. However, in both cases the enclave is launched in the *enclave debug* mode. The Eclipse* plugin provides the Intel(R) SGX Simulation and Intel(R) SGX Simulation Debug configuration options to enable compiling and launching the enclave in the simulation mode. From the command line, an enclave can be built in this mode by passing SGX_DEBUG=1 for debug simulation and no parameters for release simulation. This is the default build mode. Single-step signing is the default method to sign a simulation enclave.

- **Debug**: When the Intel(R) SGX Hardware Debug configuration option is selected for an enclave project in Eclipse* plugin, the enclave is compiled in the debug mode and the resulting enclave file will contain debug information and symbols. To use this configuration for an enclave, set SGX_MODE=HW and SGX_DEBUG=1 as parameters to the Makefile during the build. Choosing this project configuration also allows the enclave to be launched in the enclave debug mode. This is facilitated by enabling the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG that is passed as one of the parameters to the sgx_create_enclave function. Single-step method is the default signing method for this project configuration. The signing key used in this mode does not need to be white-listed.

- **Prerelease**: When you choose the Intel(R) SGX Hardware Prerelease configuration option for an enclave project, Eclipse* plugin will build the enclave in release mode with compiler optimizations applied. An enclave is built in this mode by setting SGX_MODE=HW and SGX_PRERELEASE=1 in the Makefile during build. Under this configuration, the enclave is launched in enclave debug mode. The Makefile of the sample application defines the EDEBUG flag when SGX_PRERELEASE=1 is passed as a command line parameter to the Makefile during build. When the EDEBUG preprocessor flag is defined, it enables the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, which in turn, launches the enclave in the enclave debug mode. Single-step method is also the default signing method for the Prerelease project configuration. Like in the Debug configuration, the signing key does not need to be white-listed either.
• Release: The Intel(R) SGX Hardware Release configuration option for an Eclipse plugin enclave project compiles the enclave in the release mode and launches the enclave in the enclave release mode. This is done by disabling the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. This mode is enabled in enclave by passing SGX_MODE=HW to the Makefile while building the project. SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is only enabled when NDEBUG is not defined or EDEBUG is defined. In the debug configuration NDEBUG is undefined and hence SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is enabled. In the prerelease configuration NDEBUG and EDEBUG are both defined, which enables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. In the release mode, configuration NDEBUG is defined and hence it disables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG thereby launching the enclave in enclave release mode. Two-step method is the default signing method for the Release configuration. The enclave needs to be signed with a white-listed key.

For additional information on the different enclave signing methods, see Enclave Signing Tool and Enclave Signer Usage Examples

Loading and Unloading an Enclave

Enclave source code is built as a shared object. To use an enclave, the enclave.so should be loaded into protected memory by calling the API sgx_create_enclave(). The enclave.so must be signed by sgx_sign. When loading an enclave for the first time, the loader will get a launch token and save it back to the in/out parameter token. The user can save the launch token into a file, so that when loading an enclave for the second time, the application can get the launch token from the saved file. Providing a valid launch token can enhance the load performance. To unload an enclave, the user must call sgx_destroy_enclave() interface with parameter sgx_enclave_id_t.

The sample code to load and unload an Enclave is shown below.

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include "sgx_urts.h"

#define ENCLAVE_FILE _T("Enclave.signed.so")

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
{  
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid;  
    sgx_status_t ret = SGX_SUCCESS;  
    sgx_launch_token_t token = {0};  
    int updated = 0;  

    // Create the Enclave with above launch token.  
    ret = sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILE, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token,  
                              &updated, &eid, NULL);  
    if (ret != SGX_SUCCESS) {  
        printf("App: error %#x, failed to create enclave.\n", ret);  
        return -1;  
    }  

    // A bunch of Enclave calls (ECALL) will happen here.  

    // Destroy the enclave when all Enclave calls finished.  
    if(SGX_SUCCESS != sgx_destroy_enclave(eid))  
        return -1;  

    return 0;  
}

Handling Power Events

The protected memory encryption keys that are stored within an Intel SGX-enabled CPU are destroyed with every power event, including suspend and hibernation.

Thus, when a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all enclave data will not be accessible after that. As a result, when the system resumes, any subsequent ECALL will fail returning the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST. This specific error code indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel SGX application should have the capability to handle any power transition that might occur while the enclave is loaded in protected memory. To handle the power event and resume enclave execution with minimum impact, the application must be prepared to receive the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST when an ECALL fails. When this happens, one and only one thread from the application must destroy the enclave, sgx_destroy_enclave(), and reload it again, sgx_create_enclave(). In addition, to resume execution from where it was when the enclave was destroyed, the application should periodically seal and save enclave state information on the
platform and use this information to restore the enclave to its original state after the enclave is reloaded.

The Power Transition sample code included in the SDK demonstrates this procedure.
Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK Sample Code
After installing the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK, the sample code can be found from $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode.

- The SampleEnclave project shows how to create an enclave.
- The Cxx11SGXDemo project shows how to use C++11 library inside the enclave
- The LocalAttestation project shows how to use the Intel Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange library to establish a trusted channel between two enclaves running on the same platform.
- The RemoteAttestation project shows how to use the Intel remote attestation and key exchange library in the remote attestation process.

Sample Enclave
The project SampleEnclave is designed to show you how to write an enclave from scratch. This topic demonstrates the following basic aspects of enclave features:

- Initialize and destroy an enclave
- Create ECALLs and/or OCALLs
- Call trusted libraries inside the enclave

The source code is shipped with an installation package of the Intel(R) SGX SDK in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/SampleEnclave. A Makefile is provided to build the SampleEnclave on Linux.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Initialize an Enclave
Before establishing any trusted transaction between an application and an enclave, the enclave itself needs to be correctly created and initialized by calling sgx_create_enclave provided by the uRTS library.

Saving and Retrieving the Launch Token
A launch token needs to be passed to sgx_create_enclave for enclave initialization. If the launch token was saved in a previous transaction, it can be
retrieved and used directly. Otherwise, you can provide an all-0 buffer. sgx_create_enclave will attempt to create a valid launch token if the input is not valid. After the enclave is correctly created and initialized, you may need to save the token if it has been updated. The fourth parameter of sgx_create_enclave indicates whether or not an update has been performed.

The launch token should be saved in a per-user directory or a registry entry in case it would be used in a multi-user environment.

**ECALL/OCALL Functions**

This sample demonstrates basic EDL syntax used by ECALL/OCALL functions, as well as using trusted libraries inside the enclave. You may see [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for syntax details and [Trusted Libraries](#) for C/C++ support.

**Destroy an Enclave**

To release the enclave memory, you need to invoke `sgx_destroy_enclave` provided by the `sgx_urts` library. It will recycle the EPC memory and untrusted resources used by that enclave instance.

**Power Transition**

If a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all the enclave data will be inaccessible. Consequently, when the system is resumed, each of the in-process ECALLs and the subsequent ECALLs will fail with the error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST` which indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project should have the capability to handle the power transition which might impact its behavior. The project named `PowerTransition` describes one method of developing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions projects that handle power transitions. See [ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry](#) for more info.

`PowerTransition` demonstrates the following scenario: an enclave instance is created and initialized by one main thread and shared with three other child threads; The three child threads repeatedly ECALL into the enclave, manipulate secret data within the enclave and backup the corresponding encrypted data outside the enclave; After all the child threads finish, the main thread destroys the enclave and frees the associated system resources. If a power transition happens, one and only one thread will reload the enclave and restore the
secret data inside the enclave with the encrypted data that was saved outside and then continues the execution.

The *PowerTransition* sample code is released with Intel(R) SGX SDK in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)/SampleCode/PowerTransition. A *Makefile* is provided to build the sample code on Linux* OS.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

**ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry**
After a power transition, an Intel(R) SGX error code *SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST* will be returned for the current ECALL. To handle the power transition and continue the project without impact, you need to destroy the invalid enclave to free resources first and then retry with a newly created and initialized enclave instance, as depicted in the following figure.

![Power Transition Handling Flow Chart](image)

**Figure 1 Power Transition Handling Flow Chart**

**ECALLs in Demonstration**
*PowerTransition* demonstrates handling the power transition in two types of ECALLs:

1. Initialization ECALL after enclave creation.
2. Normal ECALL to manipulate secrets within the enclave.

**Initialization ECALL after Enclave Creation**
*PowerTransition* illustrates one initialization ECALL after enclave creation which is shown in the following figure:
**Figure 2 Enclave Initialization ECall after Enclave Creation Flow Chart**

sgx_create_enclave is a key API provided by the uRTS library for enclave creation. For sgx_create_enclave, a mechanism of power transition handling is already implemented in the uRTS library. Therefore, it is unnecessary to manually handle power transition for this API.

**NOTE:**
To concentrate on handling a power transition, PowerTransition assumes the enclave file and the launch token are located in the same directory as the application. See Sample Enclave for how to store the launch token properly.

**Normal ECALL to Process Secrets within the Enclave**
This is the most common ECALL type into an enclave. PowerTransition demonstrates the power transition handling for this type of ECALL in a child thread after the enclave creation and initialization by the main thread, as depicted in the figure below. Since the enclave instance is shared by the child threads, it is required to make sure one and only one child thread to re-creates and re-initializes the enclave instance after the power transition and the others utilize the re-created enclave instance directly. PowerTransition confirms this point by checking whether the Enclave ID is updated.
**NOTE:**
During the ECALL process, it is recommended to back up the confidential data as cipher text outside the enclave frequently. Then we can use the backup data to restore the enclave to reduce the power transition impacts.

**C++11 Demo**
The project Cxx11SGXDemo is designed to illustrate some of the C++11 library features supported inside the enclave provided by the Intel® SGX SDK and the compiler features supported by GCC. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++11 features currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)/SampleCode/Cxx11SGXDemo. A Makefile is provided to build the Cxx11SGXDemo on Linux.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted.
The sample covers a subset of C++11 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

Table 14 Overview of C++11 features covered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headers</th>
<th>#include &lt;typeinfo&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;functional&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;algorithm&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;unordered_set&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;unordered_map&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;initializer_list&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;tuple&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;memory&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;atomic&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;mutex&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;condition_variable&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#include &lt;map&gt;</td>
</tr>
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<td>Classes</td>
<td>std::function, std::all_of, std::any_of, std::none_of,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::initializer_list, std::unordered_set,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::unordered_map, std::unordered_multiset,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::unordered_multimap, std::tuple,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::shared_ptr, std::unique_ptr, std::auto, std::mutex,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>std::condition_variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiler features</td>
<td>lambda expressions, auto, decltype,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>strongly typed enum classes,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>range-based for statements,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>static_assert, new virtual function controls,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>delegating constructors, variadic templates,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substitution failure is not an error (SFINAE),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rvalue references and move semantics, nullptr type</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attestation

In the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions architecture, attestation refers to the process of demonstrating that a specific enclave was established on the platform. The Intel(R) SGX Architecture provides two attestation mechanisms:

- One creates an authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform referred to as local attestation.
- The second mechanism extends local attestation to provide assertions to 3rd parties outside the platform referred to as remote attestation. The remote attestation process leverages a quoting service.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides APIs used by applications to implement the attestation process.

Local Attestation

Local attestation refers to two enclaves on the same platform authenticating to each other using the Intel SGX REPORT mechanism before exchanging information. In an Intel(R) SGX application, multiple enclaves might collaborate to perform certain functions. After the two enclaves verify the counterpart is trustworthy, they can exchange information on a protected channel, which typically provides confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. The local attestation and protected channel establishment uses the REPORT based Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* protocol.

You can find a sample solution shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK at $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/Local_Attestation directory. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

NOTE:

If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

The sample code shows an example implementation of local attestation, including protected channel establishment and secret message exchange using enclave to enclave function call as an example.

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation Flow

The local attestation sample in the SDK uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library to establish a protected channel between two enclaves. The DH key exchange APIs are described in sgx_dh.h. The key exchange library
is part of the Intel(R) SGX application SDK trusted libraries. It is statically linked with the enclave code and exposes APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. The library is combined with other libraries and is built into the final library called libsgx_tservice.a that is part of the SDK release.

Figure 4 Local Attestation Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library
The figure above represents the usage of DH key exchange library. A local attestation flow consists of the following steps:

1. ISV Enclave 1 calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
2. The Enclave 1 does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2.
4. Enclave 2 in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
5. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library to generate DH Message 1 ga || TARGETINFO Enclave 2.
6. DH Message 1 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
7. Enclave 1 processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library API and generates DH Message 2 gb||[Report Enclave 1(h(ga || gb))]|SMK.
8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2 giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting DH Message 3.
10. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library API to process DH Message 2 and generates DH Message 3 [ReportEnclave2(h(gb || ga)) || Optional Payload]SMK.
11. DH Message 3 is sent back from Enclave2 to Enclave1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
12. Enclave 2 uses the key exchange library to process DH Message 3 and establish the session.
13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

**Protected Channel Establishment**

The following figure illustrates the interaction between two enclaves, namely the source enclave and the destination enclave, to establish a session. The application initiates a session between the source enclave and the destination enclave by doing an ECALL into the source enclave, passing in the enclave id of the destination enclave. Upon receiving the enclave id of the destination enclave, the source enclave does an OCALL into the core untrusted code
which then does an ECALL into the destination enclave to exchange the messages required to establish a session using ECDH Key Exchange protocol.

**Figure 5 Secure Channel Establishment Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library**
Secret Message Exchange and Enclave to Enclave Call

The following figure illustrates the message exchange between two enclaves. After the establishment of the protected channel, session keys are used to encrypt the payload in the message(s) being exchanged between the source and destination enclaves. The sample code implements interfaces to encrypt the payload of the message. The sample code also shows the implementation of an enclave calling a function from another enclave. Call type, target function ID, total input parameter length and input parameters are encapsulated in the payload of the secret message sent from the caller (source) Enclave and the callee (destination) enclave. As one enclave cannot access memory of another enclave, all input and output parameters, including data indirectly referenced by a parameter needs to be marshaled across the two enclaves. The sample code uses Intel(R) SGX SDK trusted cryptographic library to encrypt the payload of the message. Through such encryption, message exchange is just the secret and in case of the enclave to enclave call is the marshaled destination enclave's function id, total parameter length and all the parameters. The destination enclave decrypts the payload and calls the appropriate function. The results of the function call are encrypted using the session keys and sent back to the source enclave.
Remote Attestation

Generally speaking, Remote Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a remote provider or producer of some sort. With Intel(R) SGX, Remote Attestation software includes the
app's enclave and the Intel-provided Quoting Enclave (QE) and Provisioning Enclave (PvE). The attestation HW is the Intel(R) SGX enabled CPU.

Remote Attestation alone is not enough for the remote party to be able to securely deliver their service (secrets or assets). Securely delivering services also requires a secure communication session. Remote Attestation is used during the establishment of such a session. This is analogous to how the familiar SSL handshake includes both authentication and session establishment.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes sample code showing:

- How an application enclave can attest to a remote party.
- How an application enclave and the remote party can establish a secure session.

The SDK includes a remote session establishment or key exchange (KE) libraries that can be used to greatly simplify these processes.

You can find the sample code for remote attestation in the directory $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/RemoteAttestation.

**NOTE:**
To run the sample code in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

**NOTE:**
If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Intel(R) SGX uses an anonymous signature scheme, Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID), for authentication (for example, attestation). The supplied key exchange libraries implement a Sigma-like protocol for session establishment. Sigma is a protocol that includes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but also addresses the weaknesses of DH. The protocol Intel(R) SGX uses differs from the Sigma protocol that's used in IKE v1 and v2 in that the Intel(R) SGX platform uses Intel(R) EPID to authenticate while the service provider uses PKI. (In Sigma, both parties use PKI.) Finally, the KE libraries require the service provider to use an ECDSA, not an RSA, key pair in the authentication portion of the protocol and the libraries use ECDH for the actual key exchange.

**Remote Key Exchange (KE) Libraries**

The RemoteAttestation sample in the SDK uses the remote KE libraries as described above to create a remote attestation of an enclave, and uses that
attestation during establishment of a secure session (a key exchange).

There are both untrusted and trusted KE libraries. The untrusted KE library is provided as a static library, `libsgx_ukey_exchange.a`. The Intel(R) SGX application needs to link with this library and include the header file `sgx_ukey_exchange.h`, containing the prototypes for the APIs that the KE trusted library exposes.

**NOTE:**

If you are unable to use either of the two pre-built untrusted key exchange static libraries, the source code for a sample untrusted key exchange library is included in the `isv_app` subfolder of the Remote Attestation sample application that is shipped with this SDK.

The trusted KE library is also provided as a static library. As a trusted library, the process for using it is slightly different than that for the untrusted KE library. The main difference relates to the fact that the trusted KE library exposes ECALLs called by the untrusted KE library. This means that the library has a corresponding EDL file, `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`, which has to be imported in the EDL file for the application enclave that uses the library. We can see this in code snippet below, showing the complete contents of `app_enclave.edl`, the EDL file for the app enclave in the sample code.

```
enclave {
    from "sgx_tkey_exchange.edl" import *
    include "sgx_key_exchange.h"
    include "sgx_trts.h"
    trusted {
        public sgx_status_t enclave_init_ra(
            int b_pse,
            [out] sgx_ra_context_t *p_context);
        public sgx_status_t enclave_ra_close(
            sgx_ra_context_t context);
    }
}
```

It's worth noting that `sgx_key_exchange.h` contains types specific to remote key exchange and must be included as shown above as well as in the untrusted code of the application that uses the enclave. Finally, `sgx_tkey_exchange.h` is a header file that includes prototypes for the APIs that the trusted library exposes, but that are not ECALLs, i.e., APIs called by ISV code in the application enclave.
Remote Attestation and Protected Session Establishment

This topic describes the functionality of the remote attestation sample in detail.

**NOTE:**

In the sample code, the service provider is modeled as a Shared Object, `service_provider.so`. The sample service provider does not depend on Intel® SGX headers, type definitions, libraries, and so on. This was done to demonstrate that the Intel SGX is not required in any way when building a remote attestation service provider.
Figure 7 Remote Attestation and Trust Channel Establishment Flow

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) application would typically begin by requesting service (for example, media streaming) from a service provider (SP) and the SP would respond with a challenge. This is not shown in the figure. The figure begins with the app's reaction to the challenge.
1. The flow starts with the app entering the enclave that will be the end-point of the KE, passing in `b_pse`, a flag indicating whether the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
2. If `b_pse` is true, then the isv enclave shall call trusted AE support library with `sgx_create_pse_session()` to establish a session with PSE.
3. Code in the enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`, passing in the SP's ECDSA public key, `g_sp_pub_key`, and `b_pse`. The integrity of `g_sp_pub_key` is a public key is important so this value should just be built into isv_enclave.
4. Close PSE session by `sgx_close_pse_session()` if a session is established before. The requirement is that, if the app enclave uses Platform Services, the session with the PSE must already be established before the app enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`.
5. `sgx_ra_init()` returns the KE context to the app enclave and the app enclave returns the context to the app.
6. The application calls `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id()` and sends the value returned in `p_extended_epid_group_id` to the server in msg0.
7. The server checks whether the extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is supported. If the ID is not supported, the server aborts remote attestation.

**NOTE:**
Currently, the only valid extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is zero. The server should verify this value is zero. If the Intel(R) EPID group ID is not zero, the server aborts remote attestation.

8. The application calls `sgx_ra_get_msg1()`, passing in this KE's context. Figure 3 shows the app also passing in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, exposed by the TKE. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.
9. `sgx_ra_get_msg1()` builds an S1 message = `(ga || GID)` and returns it to the app.
10. The app sends S1 to the service provider (SP) by `ra_network_send_receive()`, it will call `sp_ra_proc_msg1_req()` to process S1 and generate S2.
11. Application eventually receives `S2 = gb || SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga) || CMAC_SMK(gb`
|| SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga) || SigRL.

12. The application calls sgx_ra_proc_msg2(), passing in S2 and the context.

13. The code in sgx_ra_proc_msg2() builds S3 = \text{CMAC}_{\text{SMK}}(M) || M where \( M = ga || PS\_\text{SECURITY\_PROPERTY} || \text{QUOTE} \) and returns it. Platform Services Security Information is included only if the app/enclave uses Platform Services.

14. Application sends the msg3 to the SP by \text{ra\_network\_send\_receive}(), and the SP verifies the msg3.

15. SP returns the verification result to the application.

At this point, a session has been established and keys exchanged. Whether the service provider thinks the session is secure and uses it depends on the security properties of the platform as indicated by the S3 message. If the platform's security properties meet the service provider's criteria, then the service provider can use the session keys to securely deliver a secret and the app enclave can consume the secret any time after it retrieves the session keys by calling \text{sgx\_ra\_get\_keys}() on the trusted KE library. This is not shown in the figure, nor is the closing of the session. Closing the session requires entering the app enclave and calling \text{sgx\_ra\_close}() on the trusted KE library, among other app enclave-specific cleanup.

**Remote Attestation with a Custom Key Derivation Function (KDF)**

By default, the platform software uses the KDF described in the definition of the \text{sgx\_ra\_get\_keys} API when the \text{sgx\_ra\_init} API is used to generate the remote attestation context. If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the \text{sgx\_ra\_init\_ex} API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API \text{sgx\_ra\_get\_keys} (SK, MK, and VK). The decision to use a different KDF is a policy of the ISV, but it should be approved by the ISV's security process.

**Debugging a Remote Attestation Service Provider**

As an ISV writing the remote attestation service provider, you may want to debug the message flow. One way to do this would be to provide pre-generated messages that can be replayed and verified. However, not that S1 message = (GID || ga) includes the random component ga generated inside an enclave. Also, the remote attestation service provider generates a random public+private key pair as part of its msg2 generation, but without
any interaction with Intel(R) SGX. Finally, each of these has state or context that is associated with cryptographic operations and is used to ensure that certain calls being made are in the correct order and that the state is consistent. These characteristics help protect the remote attestation flow against attacks, but also make it more difficult to replay pre-generated messages.

To overcome these, the cryptographic library is modified and used (only) by the sample service provider. Any time that key generation, signing, or other operation requests a random number, the number 9 is returned. This means that the crypto functions from libsample_libcrypto.so are predictable and cryptographically weak. If we can replay msg1 send from the isv_app, the sample service_provider. will always generate the exact same msg2. We now have a sufficient system to replay messages sent by the isv_app and have it verify that the responses sent by the remote service are the expected ones.

To replay messages and exercise this verification flow, pass in 1 or 2 as a command-line argument when running the sample application isv_app. The isv_app will ignore errors generated by the built-in checks in the Intel SGX. Developers wishing to debug their remote attestation service provider should be able to temporarily modify their cryptographic subsystem to behave in a similar manner as the libsample_libcrypto.so and replay the pre-computed messages stored in sample_messages.h. The responses from their own remote attestation service provider should match the ones generated by ours, which are also stored in sample_messages.h.

**NOTE**

Do not use the sample cryptographic library provided in this sample in production code.

**Using a Different Extended Intel(R) EPID Group for Remote Attestation**

The Intel(R) SGX platform software can generate Quotes signed by keys belonging to a more than one extended Intel(R) EPID Group. Before remote attestation starts, the ISV Service provider (SP) needs to know which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the PSW supports. The ISV SP will use this information to request Quote generation and verification in the correct extended Intel(R) EPID Group. The API `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id` returns the extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID. The ISV application should query the currently configured extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID from the platform software using this API and sending it to the ISV SP. The ISV SP then knows which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use for remote attestation. If the ISV SP does
not support the provided extended Intel(R) EPID Group, it will terminate the remote attestation attempt.

**Sealed Data**

The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides APIs to encrypt and integrity-protect enclave secrets to store them outside the enclave, such as on disk. The Intel(R) SGX Platform SW provides Monotonic Counter and Trusted Time service to ISV enclaves. The Monotonic Counter can be used to implement replay-protected policy, and the Trusted Time can be used to enforce time based policy. Both of them are in a form of Sealed Data. The requirement of replay-protected data blob and time based policy data blob is quite subtle. The Intel(R) SGX SDK will provide reference code to help ISV to implement them correctly.

The sample code *SealedData* is shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in $(SGXSDKInstallPath)SealedData folder. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

**NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to modify it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

**Replay Protected Policy**

In Enterprise Rights Management (ERM) type usages, an offline activity log might need to be maintained and periodically audited by the enterprise, for example, depending on whether and/or how many times a secret document is viewed or printed offline. If the offline activity log is tampered with or deleted, the ERM application will disable the offline use capability. A functional secure document viewing ERM application is quite complex, involving credential verification, document key provisioning, secure document rendering, secure display and many other security processes.

The Replay Protected policy sample code will not implement a full secure document viewing functionality, instead, it will demonstrate:

- Initializing a replay protected policy, to create an offline activity log together with a secret, protected by a Monotonic Counter.
- Verifying and updating the replay protected policy, to verify and update the activity log before the secret can be used to perform a function.
- Deleting the replay protected policy, to delete the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter after the secret is invalidated.
Initializing a Policy

1. The Enclave creates a new Monotonic Counter using `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`.
2. The Enclave fills the activity log with the sample usage secret and usage data, the Monotonic Counter_UUID and the Monotonic Counter_Value returned by `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`.
3. The Enclave seals the activity log into sealed data using `sgx_seal_data`.

Verifying a Policy

1. The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using `sgx_unseal_data`.
2. The Enclave retrieves the current Monotonic Counter value of the associated Monotonic Counter using `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`. If it fails, abort the operation.
3. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter_Value returned by `sgx_read_monotonic_counter` is the same as the Monotonic Counter_Value in the activity log.
4. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

Updating a Policy

1. The Enclave verifies activity log.
2. The Enclave checks that the secret and usage data inside the activity log has not been invalidated or expired, for example, by comparing the use count in the activity log against a predetermined threshold. If the secret is invalidated or expired, the function that requires the secret will not be rendered.
3. The Enclave increases the Monotonic Counter value of the associated MC using `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`. If it fails, abort the operation.
4. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter value returned in `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter` is equal to the old value, previously returned by `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`, plus one.
5. The Enclave updates the activity log and the Monotonic Counter_Value.
6. The Enclave seals the activity log into Sealed Data using `sgx_seal_data`.
data.
7. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

Deleting a Policy
1. The Enclave follows the process of updating the Replay-Protected Activity Log to set the use counter to the maximum number of uses allowed, before releasing the secret for the last time.
2. User connects to the network to upload the activity log and receives a new secret.
3. The Enclave deletes the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter using `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter`. If it is blocked by the attacker, the associated activity log does not allow releasing of the secret as the secret inside the activity log is invalidated or expired.

Time Based Policy
The sample code demonstrates a proper implementation of a Time-Based Policy in the form of an offline Digital Rights Management (DRM) Key that expires after a certain period of time. The sample code will not implement full DRM functionality. Instead, it demonstrates:

- Creating offline sealed data with the DRM key, a time stamp and the expiration policy.
- Verifying the DRM key has not expired before releasing the key to perform function.

Initializing a Policy
1. The Enclave retrieves the time reference and the time source nonce using `sgx_get_trusted_time`.
2. The Enclave fills the policy structure with the sample usage secret, the time policy, the time reference and the time source nonce returned by `sgx_get_trusted_time`.
3. The Enclave seals the policy structure into Sealed Data using `sgx_seal_data`.

Verifying a Policy
1. The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using `sgx_unseal_data`. 
2. The Enclave retrieves the current time using \texttt{sgx\_get\_trusted\_time}.

3. The Enclave verifies the time source nonce returned by \texttt{sgx\_get\_trusted\_time} is the same as the time source nonce in the policy structure. If not, abort the operation.

4. Calculate time elapsed.

5. Verify the policy. If the time limit has expired, abort the operation.

6. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.
Library Functions and Type Reference
This topic includes the following sub-topics to describe library functions and type reference for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- Untrusted Library Functions
- Trusted Libraries
- Function Descriptions
- Types and Enumerations
- Error Codes

Untrusted Library Functions
The untrusted library functions can only be called from application code - outside the enclave.

The untrusted libraries built for the hardware mode contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as the prefix, is defined when the library is built. The string version consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all untrusted libraries shipped in a given Intel® SGX PSW/SDK release have the same version number and allows quick identification of the untrusted libraries linked into an untrusted component.

For instance, libsgx_urts.so contains a string version SGX_URTS_VERSION_1.0.0.0. The last digit varies depending on the specific Intel SGX PSW/SDK release number.

Enclave Creation and Destruction
These functions are used to either create or destroy enclaves:

- sgx_create_enclave
- sgx_destroy_enclave

Quoting Functions
These functions allow application enclaves to ensure that they are running on an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions environment.

NOTE:
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- `sgx_init_quote`
- `sgx_calc_quote_size`
- `sgx_get_quote_size`
- `sgx_get_quote`
- `sgx_report_attestation_status`

Untrusted Key Exchange Functions
These functions allow exchanging of secrets between ISV's server and enclaves. They are used in concert with the trusted Key Exchange functions.

**NOTE:**
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- `sgx_ra_get_msg1`
- `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`
- `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id`

Untrusted Platform Service Function
This function helps ISVs determine what Intel(R) SGX Platform Services are supported by the platform.

**NOTE:**
To run this function in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- `sgx_get_ps_cap`

Intel(R) SGX Launch Control Functions
This function provides an Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. An Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain contains the signing key(s) of the Intel(R) SGX application enclave(s) allowed to be launched. If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`. Use `sgx_get_whitelist_size` to get the size of
current Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. Use \texttt{sgx_get_whitelist} to get the chain.

- \texttt{sgx_register_wl_cert_chain}
- \texttt{sgx_get_whitelist_size}
- \texttt{sgx_get_whitelist}

**Trusted Libraries**

The trusted libraries are static libraries that linked with the enclave binary. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK ships with several trusted libraries that cover domains such as standard C/C++ libraries, synchronization, encryption and more.

These functions/objects can only be used from within the enclave.

Trusted libraries built for HW mode (for example, not for simulation) contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as prefix, is defined when the SDK is built and consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all trusted libraries shipped in a given SDK release will have the same version number and allows quick identification of the trusted libraries linked into an enclave.

For instance, \texttt{libsgx_tstdc.a} contains a string version like \texttt{SGX_TSTDC-version 1.0.0.0}. Of course, the last digits vary depending on the SDK release.

\begin{center}
**CAUTION:**
\end{center}

Do not link the enclave with any untrusted library including C/C++ standard libraries. This action will either fail the enclave signing process or cause a runtime failure due to the use of restricted instructions.

**Trusted Runtime System**

The Intel(R) SGX trusted runtime system (tRTS) is a key component of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It provides the enclave entry point logic as well as other functions to be used by enclave developers.

- \texttt{Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions}
- \texttt{Custom Exception Handling}
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions

The tRTS provides the following helper functions for you to determine whether a given address is within or outside enclave memory.

- `sgx_is_within_enclave`
- `sgx_is_outside_enclave`

The tRTS provides a wrapper to the RDRAND instruction to generate a true random number from hardware. The C/C++ standard library functions `rand` and `srand` functions are not supported within an enclave because they only provide pseudo random numbers. Instead, enclave developers should use the `sgx_read_rand` function to get true random numbers.

- `sgx_read_rand`

Custom Exception Handling

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. When one of the enclave supported hardware exceptions occurs within the enclave, the registered exception handlers will be called in a specific order until an exception handler reports that it has handled the exception. For example, issuing a CPUID instruction inside an Enclave will result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can call `sgx_register_exception_handler` to register a function of type `sgx_exception_handler_t` to respond to this exception. To check a list of enclave supported exceptions, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in HW mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

**NOTE:**

OCALLs are not allowed in the exception handler.

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling only saves general purpose registers in `sgx_exception_info_t`. You should be careful when touching other registers in the exception handlers.

Note:
If the exception handlers can not handle the exceptions, `abort()` is called. `abort()` makes the enclave unusable and generates another exception.

The Custom Exception Handling APIs are listed below:

- `sgx_register_exception_handler`
- `sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

**Custom Exception Handler for CPUID Instruction**

If an ISV requires using the CPUID information within an enclave, then the enclave code must make an OCALL to perform the CPUID instruction in the untrusted application. The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides two functions in the library `sgx_tstdc` to obtain CPUID information through an OCALL:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuid_ex`

In addition, the Intel SGX SDK also provides the following intrinsics which call the above functions to obtain CPUID data:

- `__cpuid`
- `__cpuidex`

Both the functions and intrinsics result in an OCALL to the uRTS library to obtain CPUID data. The results are returned from an untrusted component in the system. It is recommended that threat evaluation be performed to ensure that CPUID return values are not problematic. Ideally, sanity checking of the return values should be performed.

If an ISV's enclave uses a third party library which executes the CPUID instruction, then the ISV would need to provide a custom exception handler to handle the exception generated from issuing the CPUID instruction (unless the third party library registers its own exception handler for CPUID support). The ISV is responsible for analyzing the usage of the specific CPUID result provided by the untrusted domain to ensure it does not compromise the enclave security properties. Recommended implementation of the CPUID exception handler involves:

1. ISV analyzes the third party library CPUID usages, identifying required CPUID results.
2. ISV enclave code initialization routine populates a cache of the required CPUID results inside the enclave. This cache might be maintained by the RTS or by ISV code.
3. ISV enclave code initialization routine registers a custom exception handler.
4. The custom exception handler, when invoked, examines the exception information and faulting instruction. If the exception is caused by a CPUID instruction:
   1. Retrieve the cached CPUID result and populate the CPUID instruction output registers.
   2. Advance the RIP to bypass the CPUID instruction and complete the exception handling.

**Trusted Service Library**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library named **sgx_tservice** for secure data manipulation and protection. The sgx_tservice library provides the following trusted functionality and services:

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions
- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions
- Untrusted Platform Service Function
- Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

**Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions**

The sgx_tservice library provides functions for getting specific keys and for creating and verifying an enclave report. The API functions are listed below:

- `sgx_get_key`
- `sgx_create_report`
- `sgx_verify_report`

**Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions**

The sgx_tservice library provides the following functions:

- Exposes APIs to create sealed data which is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
• Exposes an API to unseal sealed data inside the enclave.
• Provides APIs to authenticate and verify the input data with AES-GMAC.

See the following related topics for more information.

• sgx_seal_data
• sgx_seal_data_ex
• sgx_unseal_data
• sgx_mac_aadata
• sgx_mac_aadata_ex
• sgx_unmac_aadata

The library also provides APIs to help calculate the sealed data size, encrypt text length, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) text length.

• sgx_calc_sealed_data_size
• sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len
• sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len

SealLibrary Introduction
When an enclave is instantiated, it provides protections (confidentiality and integrity) to the data by keeping it within the boundary of the enclave. Enclave developers should identify enclave data and/or state that is considered secret and potentially needs preservation across the following enclave destruction events:

• Application is done with the enclave and closes it.
• Application itself is closed.
• The platform is hibernated or shutdown.

In general, the secrets provisioned within an enclave are lost when the enclave is closed. However if the secret data needs to be preserved during one of these events for future use within an enclave, it must be stored outside the enclave boundary before closing the enclave. In order to protect and preserve the data, a mechanism is in place which allows enclave software to retrieve a key unique to that enclave. This key can only be generated by that enclave on that particular platform. Enclave software uses that key to encrypt data to the platform or to decrypt data already on the platform. Refer to these encrypt
and decrypt operations as sealing and unsealing respectively as the data is cryptographically sealed to the enclave and platform.

To provide strong protection against potential key-wear-out attacks, a unique seal key is generated for each data blob encrypted with the sgx_seal_data API call. A key ID for each encrypted data blob is stored in clear alongside the encrypted data blob. The key ID is used to re-generate the seal key to decrypt the data blob.

AES-GCM (AES – Advanced Encryption Standard) is utilized to encrypt and MAC-protect the payload. To protect against software-based side channel attacks, the crypto implementation of AES-GCM utilizes Intel® Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (Intel® AES-NI), which is immune to software-based side channel attacks. The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. If the GCM input contains only data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code), is simply an authentication mode for the input data. The sgx_mac_aadata API call restricts the input to non-confidential data to provide data origin authentication only. The single output of this function is the authentication tag.

**Example Use Cases**

One example is that an application may start collecting secret state while executing that needs to be preserved and utilized on future invocations of that application. Another example is during application installation, a secret key may need to be preserved and verified upon starting the application.

For these cases the seal APIs can be utilized to seal the secret data (key or state) in the examples above, and then unseal the secret data when needed.

**Sealing**

1. Use sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.
2. Allocate memory for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.
3. Call sgx_seal_data to perform sealing operation
4. Save the sealed data structure for future use.
Unsealing

1. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` and `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the size of the buffers to allocate in terms of bytes.
2. Allocate memory for the decrypted text and additional text buffers.
3. Call `sgx_unseal_data` to perform the unsealing operation.

Trusted Platform Service Functions

The `sgx_tservice` library provides the following functions that allow an ISV to use platform services and get platform services security property.

**NOTE:**
To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- `sgx_create_pse_session`
- `sgx_close_pse_session`
- `sgx_get_ps_sec_prop`
- `sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex`
- `sgx_get_trusted_time`
- `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex`
- `sgx_create_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter`
- `sgx_read_monotonic_counter`

**NOTE**
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in the simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

These functions allow an ISV to establish secure session between two enclaves using the EC DH Key exchange protocol.

- `sgx_dh_init_session`
- `sgx_dhResponder_gen_msg1`
- sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1
- sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2
- sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3

C Standard Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C standard library. The library is named sgx_tstdc (trusted standard C), and can only be used inside an enclave. Standard C headers are located under $(SGXSDKInstallPath)include/tlibc.

sgx_tstdc provides a subset of C99 functions that are ported from the OpenBSD* project. Unsupported functions are not allowed inside an enclave for the following reasons:

- The definition implies usage of a restricted CPU instruction.
- The definition is known to be unsafe or insecure.
- The definition implementation is too large to fit inside an enclave or relies heavily on information from the untrusted domain.
- The definition is compiler specific, and not part of the standard.
- The definition is a part of the standard, but it is not supported by a specific compiler.

See Unsupported C Standard Functions for a list of unsupported C99 definitions within an enclave.

Locale Functions

A trusted version of locale functions is not provided primarily due to the size restriction. Those functions rely heavily on the localization data (normally 1MB to 2MB), which should be preloaded into the enclave in advance to ensure that it will not be modified from the untrusted domain. This practice would increase the footprint of an enclave, especially for those enclaves not depending on the locale functionality. Moreover, since localization data is not available, wide character functions inquiring enclave locale settings are not supported either.

Random Number Generation Functions

The random functions srand and rand are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. A true random function sgx_read_rand is provided in the tRTS library by using the RDRAND instruction. However, in the Intel(R) SGX
simulation environment, this function still generates pseudo random numbers because RDRAND may not be available on the hardware platform.

**String Functions**
The functions `strcpy` and `strcat` are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. You are recommended to use `strncpy` and `strncat` instead.

**Abort Function**
The `abort()` function is supported within an enclave but has a different behavior. When a thread calls the abort function, it makes the enclave unusable by setting the enclave state to a specific value that allows the tRTS and application to detect and report this event. The aborting thread generates an exception and exits the enclave, while other enclave threads continue running normally until they exit the enclave. Once the enclave is in the unusable state, subsequent enclave calls and OCALL returns generate the same error indicating that the enclave is no longer usable. After all thread calls abort, the enclave is locked and cannot be recovered. You have to destroy, reload and reinitialize the enclave to use it again.

**Thread Synchronization Primitives**
Multiple untrusted threads may enter an enclave simultaneously as long as more than one thread context is defined by the application and created by the untrusted loader. Once multiple threads execute concurrently within an enclave, they will need some forms of synchronization mechanism if they intend to operate on any global data structure. In some cases, threads may use the atomic operations provided by the processor’s ISA. In the general case, however, they would use synchronization objects and mechanisms similar to those available outside the enclave.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK already supports mutex and conditional variable synchronization mechanisms by means of the following API and data types defined in the Types and Enumerations section. Some functions included in the trusted Thread Synchronization library may make calls outside the enclave (OCALLs). If you use any of the APIs below, you must first import the needed OCALL functions from `sgx_tstdc.edl`. Otherwise, you will get a linker error when the enclave is being built; see Calling Functions outside the Enclave for additional details. The table below illustrates the primitives that the Intel(R) SGX Thread Synchronization library supports, as well as the OCALLs that each API function needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function API</th>
<th>OCall Function</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutex Synchronization</th>
<th>sgx_thread_mutex_init</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_mutex_destroy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_mutex_lock</td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_mutex_trylock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_mutex_unlock</td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition Variable Synchronization</td>
<td>sgx_thread_cond_init</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_cond_destroy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_cond_wait</td>
<td>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_events_ocall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_cond_signal</td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_cond_broadcast</td>
<td>sgx_thread_set_multiple_untrusted_events_ocall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread Management</td>
<td>sgx_thread_self</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sgx_thread_equal</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Query CPUID inside Enclave**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides two functions for enclave developers to query a subset of CPUID information inside the enclave:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuidex`

**Secure Functions**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides some secure functions. An enclave project can include `<mbusafecrt.h>` to use them.
See Supported C Secure Functions for a list of supported secure functions definitions within an enclave.

GCC* Built-in Functions

GCC* provides built-in functions with optimization purposes. When GCC recognizes a built-in function, it will generate the code more efficiently by leveraging its optimization algorithms. GCC always treats functions with __builtin__ prefix as built-in functions, such as __builtin_malloc, __builtin_strncpy, and so on. In many cases, GCC tries to use the built-in variant for standard C functions, such as memcpy, strcpy, and abort. A call to the C library function is generated unless the -fno-built-in compiler option is specified.

GCC optimizes built-in functions in certain cases. If GCC does not expand the built-in function directly, it will call the corresponding library function (without the __builtin__ prefix). The trusted C library must supply a version of the functions to ensure the enclave is always built correctly.

The trusted C library does not contain any function considered insecure (for example, strcpy) or that may contain illegal instructions in Intel SGX (for example, fprintf). However, the ISV should be aware that GCC may introduce security risks into an enclave if the compiler inlines the code corresponding to an insecure built-in function. In this case, the ISV may use the -fno-built-in or -fno-built-in-function options to suppress any unwanted built-in code generation.

See Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions within an enclave for a list of unsupported GCC built-ins.

Non-Local Jumps

The C standard library provides a pair of functions, setjmp and longjmp, that can be used to perform non-local jumps. setjmp saves the current program state into a data structure. longjmp can later use this data structure to restore the execution context. This means that after longjmp, execution continues at the setjmp call site.

Since setjmp/longjmp may transfer execution from one function to a predetermined location in another function, normal stack unwinding does not occur. As a result, you must use this functionality carefully, ensuring that an enclave only calls setjmp in a valid context. You should also perform extensive security validation to ascertain that the enclave never uses these functions in such a way it could result in undefined behavior. Typical use of setjmp/longjmp is the implementation of an exception mechanism (error
handling). However, you must never use these functions in C++ programs. You should use the standard CEH instead. You are recommended to review the information provided at cert.org on how to use setjmp/longjmp securely.

**C++ Language Support**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library for C++ support inside the enclave. C++ developers would utilize advanced C++ features that require C++ runtime libraries.

The ISO/IEC 14882: C++ standard is chosen as the baseline for the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK trusted library. Most of standard C++ features are fully supported inside the enclave, and including:

1. Dynamic memory management with new/delete;
2. Global initializers are supported (usually used in the construction of global objects);
3. Run-time Type Identification (RTTI);
4. C++ exception handling inside the enclave.

Currently, global destructors are not supported due to the reason that EPC memory will be recycled when destroying an enclave.

**NOTE**

C++ objects are not supported in enclave interface definitions. If an application needs to pass a C++ object across the enclave boundary, you are recommended to store the C++ object's data in a C struct and marshal the data across the enclave interface. Then you need to instantiate the C++ object inside the enclave with the marshaled C struct passed in to the constructor (or you may update existing instantiated objects with appropriate operators).

**C++ Standard Library**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C++ standard library (including STL) that conforms to the C++11 standard. However, a different version of this library will be linked depending on the Makefile you use to develop enclaves. The newer Makefile version uses sgx_tcxx.a by default, which has been ported from libc++ and supports most C++11 features. On the other hand, previous Makefile versions use sgx_tstdcxx.a. This library was ported from STLport but provides limited C++11 support. If you update an enclave project and want access to all the supported C++11 features, you need to manually add the new C++ trusted lib-
If `sgx_tstdcxx.a` is present, replace it with `sgx_tcxx.a`. Otherwise, simply add `sgx_tcxx.a` to the linker dependency list of the Makefile.

As for the C++ standard library, most functions will work just as its untrusted counterpart, but here is a high level summary of features that are not supported inside the enclave:

1. I/O related functions and classes, like `<iostream>`;
2. Functions depending on a locale library;
3. Any other functions that require system calls.

However, only C functions can be used as the language for trusted and untrusted interfaces. While you can use C++ to develop your enclaves, you should not pass C++ objects across the enclave boundary.

**Cryptography Library**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted cryptography library named `sgx_tcrypto`. It includes the cryptographic functions used by other trusted libraries included in the SDK, such as the `sgx_tservice` library. Thus, the functionality provided by this library is somewhat limited.

- `sgx_sha256_msg`
- `sgx_sha256_init`
- `sgx_sha256_update`
- `sgx_sha256_get_hash`
- `sgx_sha256_close`
- `sgx rijndael128GCM_encrypt`
- `sgx rijndael128GCM_decrypt`
- `sgx rijndael128_cmac_msg`
- `sgx hmac128_init`
- `sgx hmac128_update`
- `sgx hmac128_final`
- `sgx hmac128_close`
- `sgx aes ctr_encrypt`
- `sgx aes ctr_decrypt`
- `sgx ecc256_open_context`
- \textbf{sgx\_ecc256\_close\_context}  
- \textbf{sgx\_ecc256\_create\_key\_pair}  
- \textbf{sgx\_ecc256\_compute\_shared\_dhkey}  
- \textbf{sgx\_ecc256\_check\_point}  
- \textbf{sgx\_ecdsa\_sign}  
- \textbf{sgx\_ecdsa\_verify}  
- \textbf{sgx\_rsa3072\_sign}  
- \textbf{sgx\_rsa3072\_verify}

The trusted cryptography library is based on an underlying general-purpose cryptographic library: Intel\textsuperscript{®} Integrated Performance Primitives (Intel\textsuperscript{®} IPP) library or Intel\textsuperscript{®} Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library (Intel\textsuperscript{®} SGX SSL).

The default build uses precompiled, optimized libraries, which include Intel\textsuperscript{®} IPP libraries. If you want to use Intel\textsuperscript{®} SGX SSL instead of Intel\textsuperscript{®} IPP you should use the non-optimized code implementation. Follow the README.md for detailed instructions.

If you need additional cryptographic functionality, you can use the general-purpose cryptographic library. The underlying trusted libraries are linked into \texttt{libsgx\_tcrypto.a}.

Directly accessing Intel\textsuperscript{®} SGX SSL API is possible after updating Enclave edl and the Application project with the necessary requirement as described in \textit{Intel SGX SSL Developer Guide}, section 2.2. Using Intel\textsuperscript{®} SGX SSL Library.

\textbf{NOTE}

To get internal OpenSSL\textsuperscript{®} error codes you need to build \texttt{sgx\_tcrypto} in DEBUG mode and declare \texttt{extern unsigned long openssl\_last\_err} which holds OpenSSL error code upon failure.

See more information at the \textit{Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library GitHub\textsuperscript{®} repository}.

Known limitations:

- Intel SGX SSL library registers a CPUID exception handler which handles CPUID exceptions on certain leaves:
  - leaf 0x0
• leaf 0x1
• leaf 0x4, sub leaf 0x0
• leaf 0x7, sub leaf 0x0

- Enclaves using one of the mentioned leaves may have a different behavior upon moving from Intel IPP to Intel SGX SSL.
- When running `sgx-gdb` on an enclave built with Intel SGX SSL, several SIGILL signals might be raised (since OpenSSL code has some cpuid instruction calls), `gdb continue` will continue executing your program.

**Trusted Key Exchange Functions**

These functions allow an ISV to exchange secrets between its server and its enclaves. They are used in concert with untrusted Key Exchange functions.

- `sgx_ra_init`
- `sgx_ra_init_ex`
- `sgx_ra_get_keys`
- `sgx_ra_close`

**Intel® Protected File System Library**

Intel® Protected File System Library provides protected files API for Intel® SGX enclaves. It supports a basic subset of the regular C file API and enables you to create files and work with them as you would normally do from a regular application.

With this API, the files are encrypted and saved on the untrusted disk during a write operation, and they are verified for confidentiality and integrity during a read operation.

To encrypt a file, you should provide a file encryption key. This key is a 128 bits key, and is used as a key derivation key, to generate multiple encryption keys. According to “NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions”: “The key that is input to a key derivation function is called a key derivation key. To comply with this Recommendation, a key derivation key shall be a cryptographic key (see Section 3.1). The key derivation key used as an input to one of the key derivation functions
specified in this Recommendation can be generated by an approved cryptographic random bit generator (e.g., by a deterministic random bit generator of the type specified in [5]), or by an approved automated key-establishment process (e.g., as defined in [1] and [2]). For more details, please refer to NIST SP 800-108 document.

Another option is to use automatic keys derived from the enclave sealing key (see disadvantages of this approach in the topic Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API).

- `sgx_fopen`
- `sgx_fopen_auto_key`
- `sgx_fclose`
- `sgx_fread`
- `sgx_fwrite`
- `sgx_fflush`
- `sgx_ftell`
- `sgx_fseek`
- `sgx_feof`
- `sgx_ferror`
- `sgx_clearerr`
- `sgx_remove`
- `sgx_fexport_auto_key`
- `sgx_fimport_auto_key`
- `sgx_fclear_cache`

**Protected FS Usage Limitation**

Since the Protected Files have meta-data embedded in them, only one file handle can be opened for writing at a time, or many file handles for reading. OS protection mechanism is used for protecting against accidentally opening more than one ‘write’ file handle. If this protection is bypassed, the file will get corrupted. An open file handle can be used by many threads inside the same enclave, the APIs include internal locks for handling this and the operations will be executed by one.
Protected FS Error Codes

The Protected File System (FS) API tries to preserve the original C file API errors. A local `errno` (enclave internal) is also set for APIs that require this according to the original C file API documentation.

When the Protected FS API is accessing the OS file system, if an error is returned, that error will be provided back to the caller of the Protected FS API. In addition, when possible, it returns an `EXXX` error code for internal errors (for example, the `EACCES` error code is returned when trying to write a file that was opened as read-only, or `ENOMEM` is returned when an internal attempt to allocate memory fails). Several special error codes were added, like `SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH`, for the cases when the current file name does not match the internal file name. You can find these error codes and their explanations in `sgx_error.h`.

Protected FS Application Layout

The following figure demonstrates how the Protected File System (FS) works inside an Intel® SGX application:
To use the Intel SGX Protected File System libraries:

1. The enclave must be linked with `libsgx_tprotected_fs.a`
2. The application must be linked with `libsgx_uprotected_fs.a`
3. The enclave's EDL file must 'import' all the functions from `sgx_tprotected_fs.edl`
4. The source files should 'include' `sgx_tprotected_fs.h`

**Protected FS S3/S4 Important Note**

To enhance the performance of the Protected File System, cache is used to save the user's data inside the enclave, and only when the cache is full it is flushed to disk.
In case of S3/S4 transitions, data in the cache will be lost (the entire enclave is lost). Therefore, all file handles must be flushed or closed before entering S3/S4. If no action is taken, the file integrity is not harmed, only the latest written data that was not flushed will be lost.

**Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API**

Automatic keys are derived from the enclave sealing key (with MRSIGNER), so the files are bound to all the enclaves signed by the same signer on this particular machine. To transfer a file from one machine to another, you should follow the key export and import procedure below. There are several cases when using automatic keys is not recommended.

- Disaster recovery – trying to open files created on one machine on a different machine will fail (unless you follow the procedure described below). Therefore, automatic disaster recovery may not work properly.
- VM migrations – currently, Intel® SGX does not support automatic enclave keys transfer in VM migration. Therefore, enclaves running on servers that use VM migrations cannot use the auto key API.

**File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API**

For files that were created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`, to transfer a file from one enclave to another, or to another enclave on a different machine, follow this procedure:

1. Close all open handles to the file.
2. Call the `sgx_fexport_auto_key` API. This API returns the last encryption key that was used to encrypt the meta-data node of the file.
3. Transfer the file to the destination enclave, and provide the key in a safe method to that enclave.
4. Call the `sgx_fimport_auto_key` API. This API will re-encrypt the meta-data node with a new encryption key, derived from the local enclave seal key.
5. Open the file with `sgx_fopen_auto_key` as usual.

**Protected FS Security Non-Objectives**

In order to mitigate file swapping attacks (with two valid files), file names are checked during a file open operation (verifies that the current name is equal to the file name the file was created with). However, if two files are created with the same file name, there is no way to protect against such a swapping attack.
Since the files are saved in the regular FS, there is no protection against malicious file deletion or modification – this will only be detected when trying to read or write the modified section from the file (decryption will fail).

There are several things that are not protected when using the Protected FS API, and anyone who can access the OS can see them:

1. File name
2. File size (up to 4KB granularity)
3. File modification date
4. Key type (user or auto)
5. Usage patterns
6. Read/Write offsets

If any of those items might expose sensitive information, and help a potential attacker, the enclave developer should add defense mechanisms on their own to protect against this. For example, an implementation of a “secure browser” should not save the ‘cookies’ with the names of their related websites, because an attacker can learn from that the user’s browsing history.

**TCMalloc Library**

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the TCMalloc library. The library is named `sgx_tcmalloc`, and can only be used inside an enclave. `sgx_tcmalloc` provides high performance memory allocation and deallocation functions that are ported from gperftools-2.5:

- malloc
- free
- realloc
- calloc
- memalign

Do the following to enable TCMalloc in Intel(R) SGX:

1. Set the enclave HeapMaxSize equal or larger than 0x900000 in Enclave.-config.xml.

For example:

```
<HeapMaxSize>0x900000</HeapMaxSize>
```
2. Add "-Wl,--whole-archive lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-archive" into enclave linking options in the Makefile.

For example:

```
Enclave_Link_Flags := $(SGX_COMMON_CFLAGS) -Wl,--no-undefined -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostartfiles -L$(SGX_LIBRARY_PATH) \ 
-Wl,--whole-archive -l$(Trts_Library_Name) -Wl,--no-whole-archive \ 
-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-archive \ 
-Wl,--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tstdcxx -l$(Crypto_Library_Name) -l$(Service_Library_Name) -Wl,--end-group \ 
-Wl,--Bstatic -Wl,--Bsymbolic -Wl,--no-undefined \ 
-Wl,--pie,-eenclave_entry -Wl,--export-dynamic \ 
-Wl,--defsym,__ImageBase=0 \ 
-Wl,--version-script=Enclave/Enclave.lds
```

**NOTE:**
The flags "-Wl,--whole-archive lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-archive" must be inserted before "-Wl,--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tstdcxx -Wl,--end-group".
Otherwise, the enclave build will fail.

### Function Descriptions

This topic describes various functions including their syntax, parameters, return values, and requirements.

**NOTE**
When an API function lists an EDL in its requirements, users need to explicitly import such library EDL file in their enclave's EDL.

**sgx_create_enclave**

Loads the enclave using its file name and initializes it using a launch token.

**Syntax**
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr
);

Parameters

file_name [in]
Name or full path to the enclave image.

debug [in]
The valid value is 0 or 1.
0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.
1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is not under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 1 by default.

launch_token [in/out]
A pointer to an sgx_launch_token_t object used to initialize the enclave to be created. Must not be NULL. The caller can provide an all-0 buffer as the sgx_launch_token_t object, in which case, the function will attempt to create a valid sgx_launch_token_t object and store it in the buffer. The caller should store the sgx_launch_token_t object and re-use it in future calls to create the same enclave. Certain platform configuration changes can invalidate a previously stored sgx_launch_token_t object. If the token provided is not valid, the function will attempt to update it to a valid one.

launch_token_updated [out]
The output is 0 or 1. 0 indicates the launch token has not been updated. 1 indicates the launch token has been updated.

**enclave_id [out]**
A pointer to an `sgx_enclave_id_t` that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

**misc_attr [out, optional]**
A pointer to an `sgx_misc_attribute_t` structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The enclave was loaded and initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE**
The enclave file is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The 'enclave_id', 'updated' or 'token' parameter is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave()`.

**SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS**
The enclave file can't be opened. It may be caused by enclave file not being found or no privilege to access the enclave file.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA**
The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupt or missing.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION**
The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE**
The signature for the enclave is not valid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
The protected memory has run out. For example, a user is creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or we cannot load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NODEVICE**

The Intel SGX device is not valid. This may be caused by the Intel SGX driver not being installed or the Intel SGX driver being disabled.

**SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT**

During enclave creation, there is a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread. The loader may fail to map virtual address. If this error code is encountered, create the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY**

The Intel SGX driver or low level system is busy when creating the enclave. If this error code is encountered, we suggest creating the enclave again.

**SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE**

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. For example, a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE**

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but is not privileged.

**SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE**

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL**

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.
**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC**
The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error is detected.

**Description**
The `sgx_create_enclave` function will load and initialize the enclave using the enclave file name and a launch token. If the launch token is incorrect, it will get a new one and save it back to the input parameter “token”, and the parameter “updated” will indicate that the launch token was updated.

If both enclave and launch token are valid, the function will return a value of `SGX_SUCCESS`. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the enclave_id parameter.

The library `libsgx_urts.a` provides this function to load an enclave with Intel(R) SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library `libsgx_urts_sim.a` exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation enclave. Running in simulation mode does not require Intel(R) SGX hardware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. A compromised loader or operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_urts.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td><code>libsgx_urts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.a</code> (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_destroy_enclave**
The `sgx_destroy_enclave` function destroys an enclave and frees its associated resources.

**Syntax**
```
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_enclave(
)```
const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id
);

Parameters

enclave_id [in]
An enclave ID or handle that was generated by sgx_create_enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The enclave was unloaded successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID
The enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the enclave has already been destroyed.

Description

The sgx_destroy_enclave function destroys an enclave and releases its associated resources and invalidates the enclave ID or handle.

The function will block until no other threads are executing inside the enclave.

It is highly recommended that the sgx_destroy_enclave function be called after the application has finished using the enclave to avoid possible deadlocks.

The library libsgx_urts.a exposes this function to destroy a previously created enclave in hardware mode, while libsgx_urts_sim.a provides a simulative counterpart.

See more details in Loading and Unloading an Enclave.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_init_quote

sgx_init_quote returns information needed by an Intel(R) SGX application to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

Syntax

sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote(
Parameters

p_target_info [out]
Allows an enclave for which the quote is being created, to create report that only QE can verify.

p_gid [out]
ID of platform's current Intel(R) EPID group.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All of the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM**

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_init_quote` is the first thing an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application does in the process of getting a quote of an enclave. The content of `p_target_info` changes when the QE changes. The content of `p_gid` changes when the platform SVN changes.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` is returned.

**Requirements**

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</table>

`sgx_calc_quote_size`

`sgx_calc_quote_size` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_calc_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_sig_rl [in]`

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.
**sig_rl_size [in]**

Size of `p_sig_rl`, in bytes. If `p_sig_rl` is NULL, then `sig_rl_size` will be 0.

**p_quote_size [out]**

Indicate the size of quote buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_quote_size` pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

**Description**

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_calc_quote`, call `sgx_calc_quote_size` first to calculate the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_get_quote_size**

`sgx_get_quote_size` is deprecated. Use the `sgx_calc_quote_size` function instead.

`sgx_get_quote_size` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_sig_rl [in]**
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

*p_quote_size [out]*
Indicate the size of quote buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The p_quote_size pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

**Description**
You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call *sgx_get_quote*, call *sgx_get_quote_size* first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_get_quote**

*sgx_get_quote* generates a linkable or un-linkable QUOTE.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote(
    const sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_sign_type_t quote_type,
    const sgx_spid_t *p_spid,
    const sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce,
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    sgx_report_t *p_ge_report,
    sgx_quote_t *p_quote,
    uint32_t quote_size
);```

**Parameters**
p_report [in]
Report of enclave for which quote is being calculated.

quote_type [in]
SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE for unlinkable quote or SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE for linkable quote.

p_spid [in]
ID of service provider.

p_nonce [in]
Optional nonce, if p_qe_report is not NULL, then nonce should not be NULL as well.

p_sig_rl [in]
Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

sig_rl_size [in]
Size of p_sig_rl, in bytes. If the p_sig_rl is NULL, then sig_rl_size shall be 0.

p_qe_report [out]
Optional output. If not NULL, report of QE target to the calling enclave will be copied to this buffer, and in this case, nonce should not be NULL as well.

p_quote [out]
The major output of get_quote, the quote itself, linkable or unlinkable depending on quote_type input. quote cannot be NULL.

quote_size [in]
Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call sgx_calc_quote_size first.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**
The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM**
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**
Both Intel(R) EPID Member and Verifier need to know the Group Public Key and the Intel(R) EPID Parameters used. These values not being returned by either `sgx_init_quote()` or `sgx_get_quote()` reflects the reliance on the Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. With the Attestation Service in place, simply sending the GID to the Attestation Service
(through the Intel(R) SGX application and PS) is sufficient for the Attestation Service to know which public key and parameters to use.

The purpose of `p_qe_report` is for the ISV enclave to confirm the QUOTE it received is not modified by the untrusted SW stack, and not a replay. The implementation in QE is to generate a REPORT targeting the ISV enclave (target info from `p_report`), with the lower 32Bytes in `report.data` = SHA256(`p_nonce||p_quote`). The ISV enclave can verify the `p_qe_report` and `report.data` to confirm the QUOTE has not be modified and is not a replay. It is optional.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` is returned.

**Requirements**

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<tr>
<td>(simulation)</td>
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</table>

**sgx_ra_get_msg1**

`sgx_ra_get_msg1` is used to get the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave should use `sgx_ra_init` or `sgx_ra_init_ex` function to create the remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_msg1(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t p_get_ga,
    sgx_ra_msg1_t *p_msg1
);
```

**Parameters**

**context [in]**

Context returned by the `sgx_ra_init` or `sgx_ra_init_ex` function inside the application enclave.

**eid [in]**

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.
p_get ga [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get Ga` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get Ga`.

p_msg1 [out]
Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**
The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.
SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to sgx_ra_get_ga, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if SGX_ERROR_BUSY is returned.

Requirements

<table>
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</table>

**sgx_ra_proc_msg2**

sgx_ra_proc_msg2 is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use sgx_ra_get_keys function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use sgx_ra_close function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it does not receive message 3.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_proc_msg2(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
```

Parameters

context [in]
Context returned by sgx_ra_init.

eid [in]
ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

p_proc_msg2 [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t generated by sgx_edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_tkey_exchange library and import the sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_proc_msg2.

p_get_msg3 [in]
Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t generated by sgx_edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_tkey_exchange library and import the sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_get_msg3.

p_msg2 [in]
sgx_ra_msg2_t message 2 from the service provider received by application.

msg2_size [in]
The length of p_msg2 (in bytes).
The length of pp_msg3 (in bytes).

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**
The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED**
The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE**
The signature is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**
Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM**
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**
The `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

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**sgx_report_attestation_status**

The `sgx_report_attestation_status` reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to decide whether a TCB update is required. It is recommended to always call `sgx_report_attestation_status` after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB).

The `attestation_status` indicates whether the ISV server decided to trust the enclave or not.

- The value `pass:0` indicates that the ISV server trusts the enclave. If the ISV server trusts the enclave and platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will not take actions to correct the TCB that will cause negative user experience such as long latencies or requesting a TCB update.
• The value fail!==0 indicates that the ISV server does not trust the enclave. If the ISV server does not trust the enclave or platform services, sgx_report_attestation_status will take all actions to correct the TCB which may incur long latencies and/or request the application to update one of the Intel SGX’s TCB components. It is the ISV’s responsibility to provide the TCB component updates to the client platform.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_report_attestation_status (  
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info  
    int attestation_status,  
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info
);
```

Parameters

**p_platform_info [in]**

Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server.

**attestation_status [in]**

The value indicates whether remote attestation succeeds or fails. If attestation succeeds, the value is 0. If it fails, the value will be others.

**p_update_info [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of sgx_report_attestation_status is SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.
SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
This service is temporarily unavailable.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description
The application calls sgx_report_attestation_status after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id
The function sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id reports which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the client uses by default. The key used to sign a Quote will be a member of the extended Intel(R) EPID Group reported in this API.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id(
    uint32_t *p_extended_epid_group_id
);

Parameters

p_extended_epid_group_id [out]
The extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The p_extended_epid_group_id pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The application uses this value to tell the ISV Service Provider which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use during remote attestation.

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sgx_get_ps_cap

sgx_get_ps_cap returns the platform service capability of the platform.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_cap(
    sgx_ps_cap_t* p_sgx_ps_cap
);

Parameters

p_sgx_ps_cap [out]
A pointer to sgx_ps_cap_t structure indicates the platform service capability of the platform.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The ps_cap pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error is detected.

Description

Before using Platform Services provided by the trusted Architecture Enclave support library, you need to call sgx_get_ps_cap first to get the capability of the platform.

Requirements

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</table>
**sgx_register_wl_cert_chain**

`sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` helps you to provide an Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain. An Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain contains the signing key(s) of the Intel(R) SGX application enclave(s). If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`.

### Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_register_wl_cert_chain(
    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);
```

### Parameters

- **p_whitelist [out]**
  A pointer to the white-list.

- **whitelist_size [in]**
  Size of `p_whitelist`, in bytes.

### Return value

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  All the outputs are generated successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  The White List is invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
  The AE service did not respond.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
  The request to the AE service timed out.

- **SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
  An unexpected error is detected.

### Description
If you have an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key White List Certificate Chain, you need to call `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` once first to launch enclaves.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_get_whitelist_size**

`sgx_get_whitelist_size` returns the required buffer size for the white-list.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist_size(
    uint32_t *p_whitelist_size
);
```

**Parameters**

`p_whitelist_size [out]`

Indicate the size of white-list buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist_size` pointer is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.
SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The white-list is invalid.

Description
You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call sgx_get_whitelist, call sgx_get_whitelist_size first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_get_whitelist

sgx_get_whitelist returns the white-list used by aesm_service.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist(
    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);
```

Parameters

p_whitelist [out]
The white-list.

whitelist_size [in]
Indicate the size of white-list buffer. To get the size, call sgx_get_whitelist_size first.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The p_whitelist pointer is invalid or p_whitelist_size is not correct.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY
The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The white-list is invalid.

Description
You can get current white-list used by aesm_service.

Requirements

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sgx_is_within_enclave

The sgx_is_within_enclave function checks that the buffer located at the pointer addr with its length of size is an address that is strictly within the calling enclave address space.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_is_within_enclave (  
    const void *addr,  
    size_t size  
);  
```

Parameters

addr [in]
The start address of the buffer.
size [in]
The size of the buffer.

Return value
1
The buffer is strictly within the enclave address space.
0
The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

Description
sgx_is_within_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. Given a function pointer, you sometimes need to confirm whether such a function is within the enclave. In this case, it is recommended to use sgx_is_within_enclave with a size of 1.

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sgx_is_outside_enclave
The sgx_is_outside_enclave function checks that the buffer located at the pointer addr with its length of size is an address that is strictly outside the calling enclave address space.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_is_outside_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

Parameters

addr [in]
The start address of the buffer.
size [in]
The size of the buffer.
Return value
1
The buffer is strictly outside the enclave address space.
0
The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

Description
sgx_is_outside_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address.

Requirements

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sgx_read_rand
The sgx_read_rand function is used to generate a random number inside the enclave.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(
    unsigned char *rand,
    size_t length_in_bytes
);
```

Parameters

rand [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the random number. The pointer cannot be NULL. The rand buffer can be either within or outside the enclave, but it is not allowed to be across the enclave boundary or wrapped around.

length_in_bytes [in]
The length of the buffer (in bytes).

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Invalid input parameters detected.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the valid random number generation process.

**Description**

The `sgx_read_rand` function is provided to replace the C standard pseudo-random sequence generation functions inside the enclave, since these standard functions are not supported in the enclave, such as `rand`, `srand`, etc. For HW mode, the function generates a real-random sequence; while for simulation mode, the function generates a pseudo-random sequence.

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**sgx_register_exception_handler**

The `sgx_register_exception_handler` allows developers to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is equal to 1) or append the handler to the handler chain.

**Syntax**

```c
void* sgx_register_exception_handler(
    int is_first_handler,
    sgx_exception_handler_t exception_handler
);
```

**Parameters**

**is_first_handler [in]**

Specify the order in which the handler should be called. If the parameter is nonzero, the handler is the first handler to be called. If the parameter is zero, the handler is the last handler to be called.

**exception_handler [in]**

The exception handler to be called
Return value

Non-zero
Indicates the exception handler is registered successfully. The return value is an open handle to the custom exception handler.

NULL
The exception handler was not registered.

Description
The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. You can write your own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. For example, a CPUID instruction inside an enclave will effectively result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can have an exception handler to prevent the enclave from being trapped into an exception condition. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` allows you to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is nonzero) or append the handler to the handler chain.

After calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` to prepend an exception handler, a subsequent call to this function may add another exception handler at the beginning of the handler chain. Therefore the order in which exception handlers are called does not only depend on the value of the `is_first_handler` parameter, but more importantly depends on the order in which exception handlers are registered.

**NOTE:**
Custom exception handling is only supported in hardware mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

Requirements

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</table>

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler` is used to unregister a custom exception handler.

Syntax
```c
int sgx_unregister_exception_handler(
    void* handler
);
```

**Parameters**

**handler [in]**
A handle to the custom exception handler previously registered using the `sgx_register_exception_handler` function.

**Return value**

**Non-zero**
The custom exception handler is unregistered successfully.

**0**
The exception handler was not unregistered (not a valid pointer, handler not found).

**Description**
The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. An enclave developer can write their own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

**Calling** `sgx_unregister_exception_handler` allows developers to unregister an exception handler that was registered earlier.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_spin_lock**
The `sgx_spin_lock` function acquires a spin lock within the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
uint32_t sgx_spin_lock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

**Parameters**
**lock [in]**
The trusted spin lock object to be acquired.

**Return value**

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is acquired.

**Description**

*sgx_spin_lock* modifies the value of the spin lock by using compiler atomic operations. If the lock is not available to be acquired, the thread will always wait on the lock until it can be acquired successfully.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_spin_unlock**
The *sgx_spin_unlock* function releases a spin lock within the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
uint32_t sgx_spin_unlock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

**Parameters**

**lock [in]**
The trusted spin lock object to be released.

**Return value**

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is released.

**Description**

*sgx_spin_unlock* resets the value of the spin lock, regardless of its current state. This function simply assigns a value of zero to the lock, which indicates the lock is released.

**Requirements**
sgx_thread_mutex_init

The `sgx_thread_mutex_init` function initializes a trusted mutex object within the enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_init(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t *mutex,
    const sgx_thread_mutexattr_t *unused
);
```

**Parameters**

- **mutex [in]**
  The trusted mutex object to be initialized.

- **unused [in]**
  Unused parameter reserved for future user defined mutex attributes. [NOT USED]

**Return value**

- **0**
  The mutex is initialized successfully.

- **EINVAL**
  The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

**Description**

When a thread creates a mutex within an enclave, `sgx_thread_mutex_init` simply initializes the various fields of the mutex object to indicate that the mutex is available. `sgx_thread_mutex_init` creates a non-recursive mutex. The results of using a mutex in a lock or unlock operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_mutex_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a trusted mutex, it is recommended statically initializing the mutex with the macro `SGX_THREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER`, `SGX_THREAD_NON_`
RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, or SGX_THREAD_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER instead.

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**sgx_thread_mutex_destroy**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` function destroys a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_destroy(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

**mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be destroyed.

**Return value**

0

The mutex is destroyed successfully.

**EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

**EBUSY**

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

**Description**

`sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` resets the mutex, which brings it to its initial status. In this process, certain fields are checked to prevent releasing a mutex that is still owned by a thread or on which threads are still waiting.

**NOTE:**
Locking or unlocking a mutex after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a mutex is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

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**sgx_thread_mutex_lock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` function locks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_lock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

**mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be locked.

**Return value**

0

The mutex is locked successfully.

**EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

**Description**

To acquire a mutex, a thread first needs to acquire the corresponding spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread checks whether the mutex is available. If the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue the thread will now become the owner of the mutex. To confirm its ownership, the thread updates the refcount and owner fields. If the mutex is not available, the thread searches the queue. If the thread is already in the queue, but not at the head, it means that the thread has previously tried to lock the mutex, but it did not succeed and had to wait outside the enclave and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread makes an OCALL and
simply goes back to sleep. If the thread is trying to lock the mutex for the first time, it will update the waiting queue and make an OCALL to get suspended. Note that threads release the spin lock after acquiring the mutex or before leaving the enclave.

**NOTE**
A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_thread_mutex_trylock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_trylock` function tries to lock a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_trylock(
   sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

**mutex [in]**
The trusted mutex object to be try-locked.

**Return value**

**0**
The mutex is locked successfully.

**EINVAL**
The trusted mutex object is invalid.

**EBUSY**
The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

**Description**
A thread may check the status of the mutex, which implies acquiring the spin lock and verifying that the mutex is available and that the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue. When this happens, the thread acquires the mutex, releases the spin lock and returns 0. Otherwise, the thread releases the spin lock and returns EINVAL/EBUSY. The thread is not suspended in this case.

NOTE
A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

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</table>

**sgx_thread_mutex_unlock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock` function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_mutex_unlock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t *mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

**mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be unlocked.

**Return value**

0

The mutex is unlocked successfully.

**EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid or it is not locked by any thread.

**EPERM**

The mutex is locked by another thread.
Description
Before a thread releases a mutex, it has to verify it is the owner of the mutex. If that is the case, the thread decreases the refcount by 1 and then may either continue normal execution or wakeup the first thread in the queue. Note that to ensure the state of the mutex remains consistent, the thread that is awakened by the thread releasing the mutex will then try to acquire the mutex almost as in the initial call to the `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` routine.

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sgx_thread_cond_init
The `sgx_thread_cond_init` function initializes a trusted condition variable within the enclave.

Syntax

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_init(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    const sgx_thread_condattr_t * unused
);
```

Parameters

cond [in]
The trusted condition variable.

attr [in]
Unused parameter reserved for future user defined condition variable attributes. [NOT USED]

Return value

0
The condition variable is initialized successfully.

EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

Description:
When a thread creates a condition variable within an enclave, it simply initializes the various fields of the object to indicate that the condition variable is available. The results of using a condition variable in a wait, signal or broadcast operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to \texttt{sgx\_thread\_cond\_init} returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a condition variable, it is recommended statically initializing the condition variable with the macro \texttt{SGX\_THREAD\_COND\_INITIALIZER}.

### Requirements

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**sgx\_thread\_cond\_destroy**
The \texttt{sgx\_thread\_cond\_destroy} function destroys a trusted condition variable within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx\_thread\_cond\_destroy(
    sgx\_thread\_cond\_t * cond
);
```

**Parameters**

**cond [in]**
The trusted condition variable to be destroyed.

**Return value**

**0**
The condition variable is destroyed successfully.

**EINVAL**
The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

**EBUSY**
The condition variable has pending threads waiting on it.

**Description**
The procedure first confirms that there are no threads waiting on the condition variable before it is destroyed. The destroy operation acquires the spin lock at the beginning of the operation to prevent other threads from signaling to or waiting on the condition variable.

**NOTE**
Acquiring or releasing a condition variable after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a condition variable is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

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**sgx_thread_cond_wait**
The `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function waits on a condition variable within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_cond_wait(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters**

**cond** [in]
The trusted condition variable to be waited on.

**mutex** [in]
The trusted mutex object that will be unlocked when the thread is blocked in the condition variable.

**Return value**

0
The thread waiting on the condition variable is signaled by other thread (without errors).

**EINVAL**
The trusted condition variable or mutex object is invalid or the mutex is not locked.

**EPERM**

The trusted mutex is locked by another thread.

**Description:**

A condition variable is always used in conjunction with a mutex. To wait on a condition variable, a thread first needs to acquire the condition variable spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread updates the condition variable waiting queue. To avoid the lost wake-up signal problem, the condition variable spin lock is released after the mutex. This order ensures the function atomically releases the mutex and causes the calling thread to block on the condition variable, with respect to other threads accessing the mutex and the condition variable. After releasing the condition variable spin lock, the thread makes an OCALL to get suspended. When the thread is awakened, it acquires the condition variable spin lock. The thread then searches the condition variable queue. If the thread is in the queue, it means that the thread was already waiting on the condition variable outside the enclave, and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock, makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. Otherwise, another thread has signaled or broadcasted the condition variable and this thread may proceed. Before returning, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock and acquires the mutex, ensuring that upon returning from the function call the thread still owns the mutex.

**NOTE**

Threads check whether they are in the queue to make the Intel SGX condition variable robust against attacks to the untrusted event.

A thread may have to do up to two OCALLs throughout the `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function call.

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**sgx_thread_cond_signal**

The `sgx_thread_cond_signal` function wakes a pending thread waiting on the condition variable.

**Syntax**
int sgx_thread_cond_signal(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);

Parameters

cond [in]
The trusted condition variable to be signaled.

Return value

0
One pending thread is signaled.
EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid.

Description

To signal a condition variable, a thread starts acquiring the condition variable spin-lock. Then it inspects the status of the condition variable queue. If the queue is empty it means that there are not any threads waiting on the condition variable. When that happens, the thread releases the condition variable and returns. However, if the queue is not empty, the thread removes the first thread waiting in the queue. The thread then makes an OCALL to wake up the thread that is suspended outside the enclave, but first the thread releases the condition variable spin-lock. Upon returning from the OCALL, the thread continues normal execution.

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sgx_thread_cond_broadcast

The `sgx_thread_cond_broadcast` function wakes all pending threads waiting on the condition variable.

Syntax

int sgx_thread_cond_broadcast(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
Parameters

cond [in]
The trusted condition variable to be broadcasted.

Return value

0
All pending threads have been broadcasted.
EINVAL
The trusted condition variable is invalid.
ENOMEM
Internal memory allocation failed.

Description

Broadcast and signal operations on a condition variable are analogous. The only difference is that during a broadcast operation, the thread removes all the threads waiting on the condition variable queue and wakes up all the threads suspended outside the enclave in a single OCALL.

Requirements

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sgx_thread_self

The sgx_thread_self function returns the unique thread identification.

Syntax

```c
sgx_thread_t sgx_thread_self(
    void
);
```

Return value

The return value cannot be NULL and is always valid as long as it is invoked by a thread inside the enclave.

Description
The function is a simple wrap of `get_thread_data()` provided in the tRTS, which provides a trusted thread unique identifier.

**NOTE:**
This identifier does not change throughout the life of an enclave.

### Requirements

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**sgx_thread_equal**

The `sgx_thread_equal` function compares two thread identifiers.

**Syntax**

```c
int sgx_thread_equal(sgx_thread_t t1,
                     sgx_thread_t t2)
```

**Return value**

A nonzero value if the two thread IDs are equal, 0 otherwise.

**Description**

The function compares two thread identifiers provided by `sgx_thread_self` to determine if the IDs refer to the same trusted thread.

### Requirements

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**sgx_cpuid**

The `sgx_cpuid` function performs the equivalent of a `cpuid()` function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

**NOTE:**
This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuid()
```
```c
int cpuinfo[4],
int leaf
);
```

**Parameters**

**cpuinfo [in, out]**
The information returned in an array of four integers. This array must be located within the enclave.

**leaf [in]**
The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

**Description**

This function provides the equivalent of the cpuid() function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information that is returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

**NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_cpuidex**

The `sgx_cpuidex` function performs the equivalent of a `cpuid_ex()` function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

**NOTE:**

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuidex(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf,
    int subleaf
);
```

**Parameters**

- **cpuinfo [in, out]**
  The information returned in an array of four integers. The array must be located within the enclave.

- **leaf [in]**
  The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

- **subleaf [in]**
  The sub-leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

**Description**

This function provides the equivalent of the `cpuid()` function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

**NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

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*sgx_get_key*

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key using the input information. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EGETKEY instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_key(
    const sgx_key_request_t *key_request,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

**Parameters**
key_request [in]
A pointer to a sgx_key_request_t object used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within the enclave. See details on the sgx_key_request_t to understand initializing this structure before calling this function.

key [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic key output. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within enclave memory.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

key_request buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
key buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.
key_request and key_request->key_policy should not have any reserved bits set.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Indicates an error that the enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE
Indicates the key_request requests a key for a KEYNAME which the enclave is not authorized.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN
Indicates key_request->cpu_svn is beyond platform CPUSVN value

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN
Indicates key_request->isv_svn is greater than the enclave's ISVSVN

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME
Indicates key_request->key_name is an unsupported value

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the key generation process.

**Description**

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key from the processor specific key hierarchy with the `key_request` information. If the function fails with an error code, the key buffer will be filled with random numbers. The `key_request` structure needs to be initialized properly to obtain the requested key type. See `sgx_key_request_t` for structure details.

**NOTE:**

It is not recommended to use this API to obtain the sealing key. Use the `sgx_seal_data`, `sgx_seal_data_ex`, and `sgx_unseal_data` API instead. The sealing key can change after the platform firmware is updated. The sealing data API generates a data blob (`sgx_sealed_data_t`), which contains all the necessary information to unseal the blob even after updating the platform firmware. Without this information, unsealing may fail.

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**sgx_create_report**

The `sgx_create_report` function tries to use the information of the target enclave and other information to create a cryptographic report of the enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX `EREPORT` instruction.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_report(
    const sgx_target_info_t *target_info,
    const sgx_report_data_t *report_data,
    sgx_report_t *report
);
```

**Parameters**

**target_info [in]**

A pointer to the `sgx_target_info_t` object that contains the information of the target enclave, which will be able to cryptographically verify the report calling `sgx_verify_report`. 
- If the pointer value is NULL, sgx_create_report retrieves information about the calling enclave, but the generated report cannot be verified by any enclave.
- If the pointer value is not NULL the target_info buffer must be within the enclave.

See sgx_target_info_t for structure details.

report_data [in]
A pointer to the sgx_report_data_t object which contains a set of data used for communication between the enclaves. This pointer is allowed to be NULL. If it is not NULL, the report_data buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_data_t for structure details.

report [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic report of the enclave. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_t for structure details.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
An error is reported if any of the parameters are non-NULL pointers but the memory is not within the enclave or the reserved fields of the data structure are not set to zero.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Indicates that the enclave is out of memory.

Description

Use the function sgx_create_report to create a cryptographic report that describes the contents of the calling enclave. The report can be used by other enclaves to verify that the enclave is running on the same platform. When an enclave calls sgx_verify_report to verify a report, it will succeed only if the report was generated using the target_info for said enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EREPORT instruction.

Before the source enclave calls sgx_create_report to generate a report, it needs to populate target_info with information about the target enclave
that will verify the report. The target enclave may obtain this information calling `sgx_create_report` with a NULL pointer for `target_info` and pass it to the source enclave at the beginning of the inter-enclave attestation process.

### Requirements

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### `sgx_verify_report`

The `sgx_verify_report` function provides software verification for the report which is expected to be generated by the `sgx_create_report` function.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_verify_report(
    const sgx_report_t * report
);
```

### Parameters

#### `report[in]`

A pointer to an `sgx_report_t` object that contains the cryptographic report to be verified. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave.

### Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Verification success: The input report was generated using a `target_info` that matches the one for the enclave making this call.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The report object is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

Indicates report verification error.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the report verification process.
Description

The `sgx_verify_report` performs a cryptographic CMAC function of the input `sgx_report_data_t` object in the report using the report key. Then the function compares the input report MAC value with the calculated MAC value to determine whether the report is valid or not.

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`sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`

The `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(
    const uint32_t add_mac_txt_size,
    const uint32_t txt_encrypt_size
);
```

Parameters

`add_mac_txt_size [in]`

Length of the optional additional data stream in bytes. The additional data will not be encrypted, but will be part of the MAC calculation.

`txt_encrypt_size [in]`

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. This data will also be part of the MAC calculation.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the return value is the minimum number of bytes that need to be allocated for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. If the function fails, the return value is 0xFFFFFFFF. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description
The function calculates the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The calculation includes the fixed portions of the structure as well as the two input data streams: encrypted text and optional additional MAC text.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len**

The `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the additional MAC text buffer output from the `sgx_unseal_data` function.

**Syntax**

```c
uint32_t sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_sealed_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the `sgx_seal_data` function.

**Return value**

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the optional additional MAC data buffer is returned. If this function fails, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

**Description**

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the output MAC data buffer returned by the `sgx_unseal_data` function.

**Requirements**
Header | sgx_tseal.h
---|---
Library | libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)

sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len

The `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the `sgx_unseal_data` function.

Syntax

```c
uint32_t sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

p_sealed_data [in]

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated during by the `sgx_seal_data` function.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the encrypted data buffer is returned. Otherwise, the return value is `0xffffffff`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the `sgx_unseal_data` function.

Requirements

Header | sgx_tseal.h
---|---
Library | libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)

sgx_seal_data

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted.
Syntax

\[
\text{sgx\_status\_t \ sgx\_seal\_data(}
\begin{align*}
\text{const uint32\_t \ additional\_MACtext\_length,} \\
\text{const uint8\_t \* p\_additional\_MACtext,} \\
\text{const uint32\_t \ text2encrypt\_length,} \\
\text{const uint8\_t \* p\_text2encrypt,} \\
\text{const uint32\_t \ sealed\_data\_size,} \\
\text{sgx\_sealed\_data\_t \* p\_sealed\_data}
\end{align*}
\)
\]

Parameters

additional\_MACtext\_length [in]
Length of the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p\_additional\_MACtext [in]
Pointer to the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional\_MACtext\_length must be zero in this case).

**NOTE:**
This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

text2encrypt\_length [in]
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

p\_text2encrypt [in]
Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

sealed\_data\_size [in]
Number of bytes allocated for the sgx\_sealed\_data\_t structure. The calling code should utilize helper function sgx\_calc\_sealed\_data\_size to determine the required buffer size.

p\_sealed\_data [out]
Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed data.

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**

The `sgx_seal_data` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to encrypt the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to preserve secret data after the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data blob can be unsealed on future instantiations of the enclave.

The additional data buffer will not be encrypted but will be part of the MAC calculation that covers the encrypted data as well. This data may include
information about the application, version, data, etc which can be utilized to identify the sealed data blob since it will remain plain text

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer and `text2encrypt` buffers must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_seal_data_ex**

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted. This is the expert mode version of function `sgx_seal_data`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

**Parameters**

**key_policy [in]**

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

**Key policy name** Value Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
attribute_mask [in]
Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t to determine which attributes will be checked. Function sgx_seal_data uses flags=0xFF0000000000000B, xfrm=0.

misc_mask [in]
Identifies the mask bits for the Misc feature to enforce. Function sgx_seal_data uses 0xF0000000. The misc mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

additional_MACtext_length [in]
Length of the additional data to be MAC'ed in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p_additional_MACtext [in]
Pointer to the additional data to be MAC'ed of variable length. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional_MACtext_length must be zero in this case).

**NOTE:**
This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

text2encrypt_length [in]
Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

p_text2encrypt [in]
Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted of variable length. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

sealed_data_size [in]
Number of bytes allocated for sealed_data_t structure. The calling code should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]
Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

**NOTE:**
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**
The `sgx_seal_data_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_seal_data`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_seal_data` and the default values provided for key policy (`MR_SIGNER`) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED,
INITED and DEBUG bits. Users of this function should have a clear understanding of the impact on using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in sgx_seal_data.

**Requirement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unseal_data**

This function is used to AES-GCM decrypt the input sealed data structure. Two output data sets result: one is the decrypted data; the second is the optional additional data that was part of the GCM MAC calculation but was not encrypted. This function provides the converse of sgx_seal_data and sgx_seal_data_ex.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unseal_data(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
    uint8_t * p_decrypted_text,
    uint32_t * p_decrypted_text_length
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_sealed_data [in]**
  Pointer to the sealed data buffer to be AES-GCM decrypted. Must be within the enclave.

- **p_additional_MACtext [out]**
  Pointer to the additional data part of the MAC calculation. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary. The calling code should call helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the required buffer size to allocate. (NULL pointer can be passed, if additional_MACtext_length is zero).

- **p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]**
Pointer to the length of the additional MAC data buffer in bytes. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the minimum required buffer size. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream.

**p_decrypted_text [out]**

Pointer to the decrypted data buffer which needs to be allocated by the calling code. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

**p_decrypted_text_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the decrypted data buffer in byte. The buffer length of `p_decrypted_text` must be specified in `p_decrypted_text_length` as input. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_mactext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_mactext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot across the enclave boundary.
- `p_decrypted_text` and `p_decrypted_text_length` must be within the enclave.
- `p_decrypted_text` and `p_addtitional_MACtext` buffer must be big enough to receive the decrypted data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**
The CPUSVN in the sealed data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the sealed data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

The tag verification failed during unsealing. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or sealed data blob corruption. This error is also reported if other corruption of the sealed data structure is detected.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

**Description**

The `sgx_unseal_data` function AES-GCM decrypts the sealed data so that the enclave data can be restored. This function can be utilized to restore secret data that was preserved after an earlier instantiation of this enclave saved this data.

The calling code needs to allocate the additional data buffer and the decrypted data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for these buffers, helper functions `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` and `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` are provided. The decrypted text buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_mac_aadata**

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
)```

- 173 -
const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);

Parameters

additional_MACtext_length [in]
Length of the plain text to provide authentication for in bytes.

p_additional_MACtext [in]
Pointer to the plain text to provide authentication for.

NOTE:
This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but
cannot cross the enclave boundary.

sealed_data_size [in]
Number of bytes allocated for the sealed_data_t structure. The calling
code should utilize the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to
determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]
Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed_data_t structure.

NOTE:
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize
the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size with 0 as the txt_encrypt_size to
determine the required buffer size. The sealed_data_t structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following con-
ditions:

  • p_additional_mac_text buffer can be within or outside the enclave,
    but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure, or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

**Description**

The `sgx_mac_aadata` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to generate the authentication tag based on the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The data origin authentication can be demonstrated on future instantiations of the enclave using the MAC stored into the data blob.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_mac_aadata_ex**

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC. This is the expert mode version of the function `sgx_mac_aadata`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
)
```
Parameters

**key_policy [in]**

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x00-01</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave’s ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x00-02</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave’s SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**attribute_mask [in]**

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of `sgx_attributes_t` to determine which attributes will be checked. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses flag `s=0xfffffffffffffff3, xfrm=0`.

**misc_mask [in]**

The `MISC_SELECT` mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**additional_MACtext_length [in]**

Length of the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed in bytes.

**p_additional_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed of variable length.

---

**NOTE:**

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

**sealed_data_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for the `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p_sealed_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.
NOTE:
The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The `sgx_mac_aadata_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_mac_aadata`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_mac_aadata` and the default values provided for `key_policy(MR_SIGNER)` and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Before you use this function, you should have a clear understanding of the impact of using a policy and/or `attribute_mask` that is different from that in `sgx_mac_aadata`.

Requirement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_unmac_aadata**

This function is used to verify the authenticity of the input sealed data structure using AES-GMAC. This function verifies the MAC generated with `sgx_mac_aadata` or `sgx_mac_aadata_ex`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_unmac_aadata(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_sealed_data [in]**
  
  Pointer to the sealed data structure to be authenticated with AES-GMAC. Must be within the enclave.

- **p_additional_MACtext [out]**
  
  Pointer to the plain text data stream that was AES-GMAC protected. You should call the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the required buffer size to allocate.

- **p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]**
  
  Pointer to the length of the plain text data stream in bytes. Upon successful tag matching, `sgx_unmac_data` sets this parameter with the actual length of the plaintext stored in `p_additional_MACtext`.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  
  The authentication tag in the `sealed_data_t` structure matches the expected value.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
This parameter indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers must be big enough to receive the plain text data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffers must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

**SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH**

The tag verification fails. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or corruption of the `sealed_data_t` structure.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

**Description**

The `sgx_unmac_aadata` function verifies the tag with AES-GMAC. Use this function to demonstrate the authenticity of data that was preserved by an earlier instantiation of this enclave.

You need to allocate additional data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for additional data buffers, use the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len`.

**Requirements**

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<th><code>sgx_tseal.h</code></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td><code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_src [in]**
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p_hash [out]**
A pointer to the output 256bit hash resulting from the SHA256 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The SHA256 hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Input pointers are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The SHA256 hash calculation failed.
Description

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the `Init`, `Update`, `Update`, `Final` procedure should be used to compute a SHA256 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Header</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td><code>libsgx_tcbrypto.a</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`sgx_sha256_init`

`sgx_sha256_init` returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the `Init`, `Update`, `Update`, `Final` process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is `sgx_sha256_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_init(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle
);
```

Parameters

**p_sha_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
The SHA256 state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The pointer p_sha_handle is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The SHA256 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description
Calling sgx_sha256_init is the first set in performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA256 state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, sgx_sha256_close should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Requirements

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tcrypto.a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sgx_sha256_update
sgx_sha256_update performs a SHA256 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the sha_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```
Parameters

\textbf{p\_src [in]}

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

\textbf{src\_len [in]}

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

\textbf{sha\_handle [in]}

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

\textbf{SGX\_SUCCESS}

All the outputs are generated successfully.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER}

The input parameter(s) are NULL.

\textbf{SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED}

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA256 hash calculation.

Description

This function should be used as part of a SHA256 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA256 hash is needed over a single data set, function \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_msg} should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_init} function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA256 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function \texttt{sgx\_sha256\_get\_hash} should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

Requirements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_sha256_get_hash**

sgx_sha256_get_hash obtains the SHA256 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to sgx_sha256_update).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_get_hash(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t* p_hash
);
```

**Parameters**

**sha_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

**p_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 256-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The pointers are NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA256 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function returns the hash after performing the SHA256 calculation over one or more datasets using the sgx_sha256_update function. Memory for
the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA256 state used in the `sgx_sha256_update` calls must be passed in as input.

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**sgx_sha256_close**

`sgx_sha256_close` cleans up and deallocates the SHA256 state that was allocated in function `sgx_sha256_init`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**sha_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_sha256_close` is the last step after performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA256 calculation state.
## Requirements

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## sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt

sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM encryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

### Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
);
```

### Parameters

**p_key [in]**  
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src [in]**  
A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

**src_len [in]**  
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

**p_dst [out]**  
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**p_iv [in]**
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

**iv_len [in]**

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

**p_aad [in]**

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

**aad_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

**p_out_mac [out]**

This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**
The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

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**sgx rijndael128GCM Decrypt**

sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM decryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_key [in]**
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but p_src and p_dst should be NULL and aad_len must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]
Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]
A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

aad_len [in]
Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

p_in_mac [in]
This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt).

Return value
SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.
If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.
If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.
If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.
If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH
The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description
The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

Requirements
sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg
The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard 128bit CMAC hash over the input data buffer.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t *p_mac
);
```

Parameters

**p_key [in]**
A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size must be 128 bits.

**p_src [in]**
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len [in]**
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p_mac [out]**
A pointer to the output 128-bit hash resulting from the CMAC calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The CMAC hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The key, source or MAC pointer is NULL.
SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected internal cryptography library.

Description
The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard CMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 128-bit version of the CMAC hash is supported.

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a CMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

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**sgx_cmac128_init**
`sgx_cmac128_init` returns an allocated and initialized CMAC algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the CMAC hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommended call is `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_init(
    const sgx_cmac128bit_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t* p_cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

`p_key [in]`
A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

**p_cmac_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC 128-bit hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The CMAC hash state is successfully allocated and initialized.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The key or handle pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

Calling `sgx_cmac128_init` is the first set in performing a CMAC 128-bit hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the CMAC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, `sgx_cmac128_close` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

**Requirements**

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sgx_cmac128_update

sgx_cmac128_update performs a CMAC 128-bit hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the cmac_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

**p_src** [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**src_len** [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**cmac_handle** [in]
This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The source pointer or cmac handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the CMAC hash calculation.

**NOTE:**
If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is not freed (CMAC handle). In this case, call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

**Description**
This function should be used as part of a CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over multiple datasets. If a CMAC hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_rijndael128_cmac128_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_cmac128_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the CMAC state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_cmac128_final` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_cmac128_final**

`sgx_cmac128_final` obtains the CMAC 128-bit hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_cmac128_update`).

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_final(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t* p_hash
);
```

**Parameters**

**cmac_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.
p_hash [out]
This is a pointer to the 128-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
The hash is obtained successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The hash pointer or CMAC handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
The CMAC state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

NOTE:
If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is freed (CMAC handle). In this case, please call sgx_cmac128_close to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

Description
This function returns the hash after performing the CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over one or more datasets using the sgx_cmac128_update function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to CMAC state used in the sgx_cmac128_update calls must be passed in as input.

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sgx_cmac128_close
sgx_cmac128_close cleans up and deallocates the CMAC algorithm context state that was allocated in function sgx_cmac128_init.

Syntax
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_close(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);

Parameters

SGX_SUCCESS
The CMAC state was deallocated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
The CMAC handle is NULL.

Description

Calling sgx_cmac128_close is the last step after performing a CMAC hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used for storing the CMAC algorithm context state.

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sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt

sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt performs a Rijndael AES-CTR encryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_ctr_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t cnt_inc_bits,
)
uint8_t *p_dst,
);

Parameters

p_key [in]
A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR encryption operation. The size must be 128 bits.

p_src [in]
A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

src_len [in]
Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

p_ctr [in]
A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

ctr_inc_bits [in]
Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

p_dst [out]
A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description
This function encrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the encryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

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\texttt{sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt}

\texttt{sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt} performs a Rijndael AES-CTR decryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dat
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}

\textbf{p_key [in]}

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR decryption operation. The size \textit{must} be 128 bits.

\textbf{p_src [in]}

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted.

\textbf{src_len [in]}

- 199 -
Specifies the length of the input data stream to be decrypted.

**p_ctr [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

**ctr_inc_bits [in]**

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

**p_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

This function decrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the decryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**
Header  sgx_tcrypto.h
Library  libsgx_tcrypto.a

**sgx_ecc256_open_context**

sgx_ecc256_open_context returns an allocated and initialized context for the elliptic curve cryptosystem over a prime finite field, GF(p). This context must be created prior to calling sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair or sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey. When the calling code has completed its set of ECC operations, sgx_ecc256_close_context should be called to cleanup and deallocate the ECC context.

**NOTE:**
Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_open_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t *p_ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_ecc_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The ECC256 GF(p) state is allocated and initialized properly.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The ECC context state was not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

`sgx_ecc256_open_context` is utilized to allocate and initialize a 256-bit GF(p) cryptographic system. The caller does not allocate memory for the ECC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the ECC cryptographic function using this cryptographic system is completed or any error occurs, `sgx_sha256_close_context` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Public key cryptography successfully allows to solving problems of information safety by enabling trusted communication over insecure channels. Although elliptic curves are well studied as a branch of mathematics, an interest to the cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves is constantly rising due to the advantages that the elliptic curve algorithms provide in the wireless communications: shorter processing time and key length.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) implement a different way of creating public keys. As elliptic curve calculation is based on the addition of the rational points in the (x,y) plane and it is difficult to solve a discrete logarithm from these points, a higher level of safety is achieved through the cryptographic schemes that use the elliptic curves. The cryptographic systems that encrypt messages by using the properties of elliptic curves are hard to attack due to the extreme complexity of deciphering the private key.

Using of elliptic curves allows shorter public key length and encourages cryptographers to create cryptosystems with the same or higher encryption strength as the RSA or DSA cryptosystems. Because of the relatively short key length, ECCs do encryption and decryption faster on the hardware that requires less computation processing volumes.

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`s cgx_ecc256_close_context` cleans up and deallocates the ECC 256 GF (p) state that was allocated in function `sgx_ecc256_open_context`. 
**NOTE:**
Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_close_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**ecc_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The ECC 256 GF(p) state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The input handle is NULL.

**Description**

*sgx_ecc256_close_context* is used by calling code to deallocate memory used for storing the ECC 256 GF(p) state used in ECC cryptographic calculations.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair**

*sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair* generates a private/public key pair on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. The calling code is responsible for allocating memory for the public and private keys. *sgx_ecc256_open_context* must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_private [out]**

A pointer to the private key which is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_public [out]**

A pointer to the public key which is an elliptic curve point such that:

public key = private key * G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

*SGX_SUCCESS*
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private_key or public_key is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**
This function populates private/public key pair. The calling code allocates memory for the private and public key pointers to be populated. The function generates a private key \( p\_private \) and computes a public key \( p\_public \) of the elliptic cryptosystem over a finite field \( GF(p) \).

The private key \( p\_private \) is a number that lies in the range of \([1, n-1]\) where \( n \) is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

The public key \( p\_public \) is an elliptic curve point such that \( p\_public = p\_private \* G \), where \( G \) is the base point of the elliptic curve.

The context of the point \( p\_public \) as an elliptic curve point must be created by using the function \( \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} \).

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey**

\( \text{sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey} \) generates a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```
Parameters

**p_private_b [in]**
A pointer to the local private key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_public_ga [in]**
A pointer to the remote public key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_shared_key [out]**
A pointer to the secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function computes the Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number `sharedKey`, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (`sharedKey`). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key `pubKeyA` by using her private key
   
   `privKeyA`: `pubKeyA = privKeyA * G`, where `G` is the base point of the elliptic curve.

2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.

3. Bob calculates his own public key `pubKeyB` by using his private key
   
   `privKeyB`: `pubKeyB = privKeyB * G`, where `G` is a base point of the elliptic curve.

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.

5. Alice gets Bob's public key and calculates the secret point `shareKeyA`. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob's public key and applies the following formula:
   
   \[ shareKeyA = privKeyA * pubKeyB = privKeyA * privKeyB * G. \]

6. Bob gets Alice's public key and calculates the secret point `shareKeyB`. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice's public key and applies the following formula:
   
   \[ shareKeyB = privKeyB * pubKeyA = privKeyB * privKeyA * G. \]
As the following equation is true \( \text{privKeyA} \times \text{privKeyB} \times G = \text{privKeyB} \times \text{privKeyA} \times G \), the result of both calculations is the same, that is, the equation \( \text{shareKeyA} = \text{shareKeyB} \) is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

Shared secret shareKey is an x-coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: \( \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} \).

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ecc256_check_point**

\( \text{sgx_ecc256_check_point} \) checks whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. \( \text{sgx_ecc256_open_context} \) must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_check_point(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_point,
    const sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle,
    int *p_valid
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_point [in]**

A pointer to the point to perform validity check on.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

`p_valid` [out]
A pointer to the validation result.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The validation process is performed successfully. Check `p_valid` to get the validation result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
If the input ecc handle, `p_point` or `p_valid` is NULL.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

`sgx_ecc256_check_point` validates whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system.

The typical validation result is one of the two values:

1 - The input point is valid
0 – The input point is not valid

Requirements

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**sgx_ecdsa_sign**

`sgx_ecdsa_sign` computes a digital signature with a given private key over an input dataset.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
)```


```c
sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p_data [in]**

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

**data_size [in]**

The size of the data to be signed.

**p_private [in]**

A pointer to the private key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_signature [out]**

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**ecc_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.
**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the input private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which the given function computes.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The keys can be generated and set up by the function: `sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair`.

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_ecdsa_verify**

`sgx_ecdsa_verify` verifies the input digital signature with a given public key over an input dataset.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
)```

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Parameters

**p_data [in]**
A pointer to the signed dataset to verify.

**data_size [in]**
The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

**p_public [in]**
A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_signature [in]**
A pointer to the signature to be verified.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p_result [out]**
A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

**ecc_handle [in]**
This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**
The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check `p_result` to get the verification result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The ECC context handle, public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which could be created by function: `sgx_ecdsa_sign`. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

- **SGX_EC_VALID** - Digital signature is valid
- **SGX_EC_INVALID_SIGNATURE** - Digital signature is not valid

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_rsa3072_sign**

`sgx_rsa3072_sign` computes a digital signature for a given dataset based on RSA 3072 private key.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa3072_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
);
```
Parameters

`p_data [in]`
A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

`data_size [in]`
The size of the data to be signed.

`p_key [in]`
A pointer to the RSA key.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

`p_signature [out]`
A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the RSA 3072 key.
A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_rsa3072_verify**

`sgx_rsa3072_verify` verifies the input digital signature for the given dataset based on the RSA 3072 public key.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t ssgx_rsa3072_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_public_key_t *p_public,
    const sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
    sgx_rsa_result_t *p_result
);
```

**Parameters**

- **p_data [in]**
  A pointer to the signed dataset to be verified.

- **data_size [in]**
  The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

- **p_public [in]**
  A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.
p_signature [in]
A pointer to the signature to be verified.

**NOTE:**
Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_result [out]
A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p_result to get the verification result.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
The public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input RSA 3072 public key.

A digital signature over a message is a buffer of 384-bytes, which could be created by function: sgx_rsa3072_sign. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

**SGX_RSA_VALID** - Digital signature is valid

**SGX_RSA_INVALID_SIGNATURE** - Digital signature is not valid

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</table>
**sgx_create_pse_session**

sgx_create_pse_session creates a session with the PSE.

**Syntax**

```c
void sgx_create_pse_session();
```

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Session is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED**
Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM**
Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**
An Intel(R) SGX enclave first calls `sgx_create_pse_session()` in the process to request platform service.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_close_pse_session**

`sgx_close_pse_session` closes a session created by `sgx_create_pse_session`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_close_pse_session(
    void
);
```

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Session is closed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.
Description

An Intel(R) SGX enclave calls sgx_close_pse_session() when there is no need to request platform service.

Requirements

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</table>

**sgx_get_ps_sec_prop**

sgx_get_ps_sec_prop gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop (  
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t* security_property
);
```

Parameters

**security_property [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Security property is returned successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

Description

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.
The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex**

`sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex` gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service with extended platform service information.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex (    
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t* security_property
)
```

**Parameters**

**security_property [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service and platform service information. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Security property is returned successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**Description**

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.
The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_get_trusted_time**

`sgx_get_trusted_time` gets trusted time from the AE service.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_get_trusted_time(
    sgx_time_t* current_time,
    sgx_time_source_nonce_t* time_source_nonce
);
```

**Parameters**

- `current_time [out]`
  Trust Time Stamp in seconds relative to a reference point. The reference point does not change as long as the `time_source_nonce` has not changed. The pointer cannot be NULL.

- `time_source_nonce [out]`
  A pointer to the buffer that receives the nonce which indicates time source. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
  Trusted time is obtained successfully.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
  Any of the pointers is invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
  Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

- **SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
  The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.
**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

*current_time* contains time in seconds and *time_source_nonce* contains nonce associate with the time. The caller should compare *time_source_nonce* against the value returned from the previous call of this API if it needs to calculate the time passed between two readings of the Trusted Timer. If the *time_source_nonce* of the two readings do not match, the difference between the two readings does not necessarily reflect time passed.

The caller should call *sgx_create_pse_session* to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex**

*sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex* creates a monotonic counter.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex(
    uint16_t owner_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t * owner_attribute_mask,
    sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```
Parameters

owner_policy [in]
The owner policy of the monotonic counter.

- 0x1 means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter
- 0x2 means enclave with same measurement can access the monotonic counter
- 0x3 means enclave with same measurement as well as signing key can access the monotonic counter.
- Owner policy values of 0x0 or any bits set beyond bits 0 and 1 will cause `SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER`

owner_attribute_mask [in]
Mask of owner attribute, in the format of `sgx_attributes_t`.

counter_uuid [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

counter_value [out]
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Monotonic counter is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the parameters is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA**
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP**
Monotonic counters are used out.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**

Session is not created or has been closed by the architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` to create a monotonic counter with the given `owner_policy` and `owner_attribute_mask`.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of monotonic counters (MC) an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should record the MC UUID that `sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex` returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may
restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel(R) SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

**NOTE**
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
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<td>Library</td>
<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**sgx_create_monotonic_counter**

`sgx_create_monotonic_counter` creates a monotonic counter with default owner policy and default user attribute mask.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter(
    sgx_mc_uuid_t *counter_uuid,
    uint32_t *counter_value
);
```

**Parameters**

**counter_uuid [out]**
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**counter_value [out]**
A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Monotonic counter is created successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.
**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA**
The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP**
Monotonic counters are used out.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call `sgx_create_monotonic_counter` to create a monotonic counter with the default owner policy 0x1, which means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter and default owner_attribute_mask 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCB.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the
memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return \texttt{SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY} for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of MCs an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should record the MC UUID that \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter} returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel(R) SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

\textbf{NOTE}
One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Requirements}
\end{center}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Header} & \texttt{sgx\_tae\_service.h} \texttt{sgx\_tae\_service.edl} \\
\hline
\textbf{Library} & \texttt{libsgx\_tservice.a} or \texttt{libsgx\_tservice\_sim.a} (simulation) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter}

\texttt{sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter} destroys a monotonic counter created by \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter} or \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter\_ex}.

\textbf{Syntax}

\begin{verbatim}
sgx\_status\_t\ sgx\_destroy\_monotonic\_counter(
   const\ sgx\_mc\_uuid\_t\ *\ counter\_uuid
);
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{Parameters}
\begin{description}
\item[c\texttt{ounter\_uuid \ [in]}]
The monotonic counter ID to be destroyed.
\end{description}

\textbf{Return value}

\texttt{SGX\_SUCCESS}
Monotonic counter is destroyed successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND**
The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT**
The enclave doesn't have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

**Calling** `sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter` **after a monotonic counter is not needed anymore.**

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.
sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Destroying a Monotonic Counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Requirements

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**sgx_increment_monotonic_counter**

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter increments a monotonic counter value by 1.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

**Parameters**

**counter_uuid [in]**

The Monotonic Counter ID to be incremented.

**counter_value [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the Monotonic Counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Monotonic Counter is incremented successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_BUSY**
The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND**
The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

**SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT**
The enclave does not have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE**
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

**SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT**
A request to the AE service timed out.

**SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE**
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC**
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
 Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

**Description**

Call `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter` to increase a monotonic counter value by 1.

The caller should call `sgx_create_pse_session` to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.
sgx_increment_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Incrementing a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_read_monotonic_counter**

sgx_read_monotonic_counter returns the value of a monotonic counter.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

**Parameters**

**counter_uuid** [in]

The monotonic counter ID to be read.

**counter_value** [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Monotonic counter is read successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.
SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND
the Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID
Session is not created or has been closed by the user or the Architectural Enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT
A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE
Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC
There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description
Call sgx_read_monotonic_counter to read the value of a monotonic counter.

The caller should call sgx_create_pse_session to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

sgx_read_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Requirements

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</table>
sgx_ra_init
The sgx_ra_init function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

Parameters

- **p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)**
The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

- **b_pse [in]**
If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_session` before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

- **p_context [out]**
The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

Return value

- **SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

- **SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

- **SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

- **SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
The session is invalid or ended by the server.
SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

Description

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

Requirements

<table>
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</table>

sgx_ra_init_ex

The `sgx_ra_init_ex` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process while it allows the use of a custom defined Key Derivation Function (KDF).

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init_ex(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t derive_key_cb,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

Parameters

**p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)**

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**b_pse [in]**

If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using `sgx_create_pse_session` before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

**derive_key_cb [in]**

This a pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype of `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t`. This function takes the Diffie-Hellman shared
secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK).

**p_context [out]**
The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID**
The session is invalid or ended by the server.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**
This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_ra_get_keys**
The `sgx_ra_get_keys` function is used to get the negotiated keys of a remote attestation and key exchange session. This function should only be called after the service provider accepts the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 3 produced by `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_keys(
```
```c
sgx_ra_context_t context,
sgx_ra_key_type_t type,
sgx_ra_key_128_t *p_key
);
```

**Parameters**

**context [in]**

Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

**type [in]**

The type of the keys, which can be `SGX_RA_KEY_MK`, `SGX_RA_KEY_SK`, or `SGX_RA.VK`.

If the RA context was generated by `sgx_ra_init`, the returned `SGX_RA_KEY_MK`, `SGX_RA_KEY_SK` or `SGX_RA.VK` is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave using the following Key Derivation Function (KDF):

\[
KDK = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0, gab x-coordinate})
\]

\[
SGX_RA_KEY.VK = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
SGX_RA_KEY.MK = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'MK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

\[
SGX_RA_KEY.SK = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'SK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the Key derivation calculation is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format. The plain text used in each key calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of one of the strings 'VK', 'MK' or 'SK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

If the RA context was generated by the `sgx_ra_init.ex` API, the KDF used to generate `SGX_RA_KEY_MK`, `SGX_RA_KEY_SK` and `SGX_RA.VK` is defined
in the implementation of the call back function provided to the sgx_ra_init_ex function.

p_key [out]
The key returned.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
Indicates this API is invoked in incorrect order, it can be called only after a success session has been established. In other words, sgx_ra_proc_msg2 should have been called and no error returned.

**Description**
After a successful key exchange process, this API can be used in the enclave to get specific key associated with this remote attestation and key exchange session.

**Requirements**

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</table>

**sgx_ra_close**
Call the sgx_ra_close function to release the remote attestation and key exchange context after the process is done and the context isn't needed anymore.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_close(
   sgx_ra_context_t context
);
```

**Parameters**

context [in]
Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Indicates the context is invalid.

**Description**

At the end of a key exchange process, the caller needs to use this API in an enclave to clear and free memory associated with this remote attestation session.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_dh_init_session**

Initialize DH secure session according to the caller's role in the establishment.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_init_session(
    sgx_dh_session_role_t role,
    sgx_dh_session_t * session
);
```

**Parameters**

**role [in]**

Indicates which role the caller plays in the secure session establishment.

The value of role of the initiator of the session establishment must be `SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR`.

The value of role of the responder of the session establishment must be `SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER`.

**session [out]**
A pointer to the instance of the DH session which contains entire information about session establishment.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Session is initialized successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

Requirements

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**sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1**
Generates MSG1 for the responder of DH secure session establishment and records ECC key pair in session structure.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1(
    sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg1 [out]**
A pointer to an sgx_dh_msg1_t msg1 buffer. The buffer holding the msg1 message, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

The DH msg1 contains the responder's public key and report based target info.

**dh_session [in/out]**
A pointer that points to the instance of `sgx_dh_session_t`. The buffer holding the DH session information, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

**NOTE**
As output, the DH session structure contains the responder’s public key and private key for the current session.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
MSG1 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

<table>
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**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1**
The initiator of DH secure session establishment handles msg1 sent by responder and then generates msg2, and records initiator’s ECC key pair in DH session structure.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1(
    const sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```
Parameters

msg1 [in]
Point to dh message 1 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

msg2 [out]
Point to dh message 2 buffer, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in/out]
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS
msg1 is processed and msg2 is generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error occurred.
Requirements

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sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2

The responder handles msg2 sent by initiator and then derives AEK, updates session information and generates msg3.

Syntax

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2(
    const sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * initiator_identity
);
```

Parameters

msg2 [in]

Point to dh message 2 buffer generated by session initiator, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

msg3 [out]

Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder in this function, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in/out]

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**aek [out]**

A pointer that points to instance of sgx_key_128bit_t. The aek is derived as follows:

\[
KDK := \text{CMAC}(\text{key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate)})
\]

\[
AEK = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**initiator_identity [out]**

A pointer that points to instance of sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t. Identity information of initiator includes isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**

msg2 is processed and msg3 is generated successfully.

**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.
**SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE**
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH**
Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

**SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY**
The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED**
An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

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<td>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3**
The initiator handles msg3 sent by responder and then derives AEK, updates session information and gets responder's identity information.

**Syntax**

```c
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3(
    const sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * responder_identity
);
```

**Parameters**

**msg3 [in]**
Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**dh_session [in]**
Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**aeq [out]**
A pointer that points to instance of sgx_key_128bit_t. The aek is derived as follows:

KDK := CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
AEK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**responder_identity [out]**
Identity information of responder including isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek or the msg3_body.additional_prop field of msg3.

**NOTE**
The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value**

**SGX_SUCCESS**
The function is done successfully.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE
The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

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</tr>
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</table>

sgx fopen
The sgx fopen function creates or opens a protected file.

Syntax

```c
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);```

Parameters

filename [in]
The name of the file to be created or opened.

mode [in]
The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of 'r', 'w' or 'a', with possible '+' and possible 'b' (since string functions are currently not supported, 'b' is meaningless).

key [in]
The encryption key of the file. This key is used as a key derivation key, used for deriving encryption keys for the file. If the file is created with sgx fopen, you should protect this key and provide it as input every time the file is opened.
Return value
If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description
sgx_fopen is similar to the C file API fopen. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to sgx_fopen. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fopen documentation.

Requirements

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sgx_fopen_auto_key
The sgx_fopen_auto_key function creates or opens a protected file.

Syntax

```c
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode
);
```

Parameters

filename [in]
The name of the file to be created or opened.

mode [in]
The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of ‘r’, ‘w’ or ‘a’, with possible ‘+’ and possible ‘b’ (since string functions are currently not supported, ‘b’ is meaningless).

Return value
If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and
errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

**Description**

sgx_fopen_auto_key is similar to the C file API fopen. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to sgx_fopen_auto_key. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fopen documentation.

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**sgx_fclose**

The sgx_fclose function closes a protected file handle.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fclose(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

**Return value**

0

The file was closed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation.

**Description**

sgx_fclose is similar to the C file API fclose. It closes an open Protected File handle created with a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key. After a call to this function, the handle is invalid even if an error is returned.
For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fclose documentation.

**Requirements**

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**sgx_fread**

The `sgx_fread` function reads the requested amount of data from the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

**Syntax**

```c
size_t sgx_fread(
    void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

**ptr[out]**

A pointer to a buffer of at least `size*count` bytes, to receive the data read from the file.

**size [in]**

The size of each block to be read.

**count [in]**

The number of blocks to be read.

**stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

The number of blocks of size `size` that were read from the file.

**Description**

`sgx_fread` is similar to the C file API `fread`. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.
For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fread documentation.

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**sgx_fwrite**

The `sgx_fwrite` function writes the given amount of data to the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

**Syntax**

```c
size_t sgx_fwrite(
    const void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

- **ptr [in]**
  A pointer to a buffer of at least `size*count` bytes, that contains the data to write to the file.

- **size [in]**
  The size of each block to be written.

- **count [in]**
  The number of blocks to be written.

- **stream [in]**
  A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

The number of blocks of size `size` that were written to the file.

**Description**

`sgx_fwrite` is similar to the C file API `fwrite`. In case of an error, `sgx_errno` can be called to get the error code.
For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fwrite documentation.

Requirements

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**sgx_fflush**

The `sgx_fflush` function forces a cache flush, and if it returns successfully, it is guaranteed that your changes are committed to a file on the disk.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fflush(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

**stream** [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation. `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fflush` is similar to the C file API `fflush`. This function flushes all the modified data from the cache and writes it to a file on the disk. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code. Note that this function does not clear the cache, but only flushes the changes to the actual file on the disk. Flushing also happens automatically when the cache is full and page eviction is required.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fflush` documentation.

**Requirements**
### sgx_ftell

The `sgx_ftell` function creates or opens a protected file.

**Syntax**

```c
int64_t sgx_ftell(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters**

**stream** [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

If the function succeeds, it returns the current value of the position indicator of the file, otherwise, -1 is returned and `errno` is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

**Description**

`sgx_ftell` is similar to the C file API `ftell`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `ftell` documentation.

**Requirements**

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</table>

### sgx_fseek

The `sgx_fseek` function sets the current value of the position indicator of the file.

**Syntax**

```c
int64_t sgx_fseek(
    SGX_FILE* stream,
    int64_t offset,
    int origin
);
```
Parameters

stream [in]
A file handle that was returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

offset [in]
The new required value, relative to the origin parameter.

origin [in]
The origin from which to calculate the offset (SEEK_SET, SEEK_CUR or SEEK_END).

Return value

0
The operation completed successfully.

-1
There were errors during the operation. sgx_ferror can be called to get the error code.

Description

sgx_fseek is similar to the C file API fseek.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the fseek documentation.

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sgx_f_eof

The sgx_f_eof function tells the caller if the file's position indicator hit the end of the file in a previous read operation.

Syntax

int32_t sgx_f_eof(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
stream [in]
A file handle that was returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value
0
End of file was not reached.
1
End of file was reached.

Description
sgx_feof is similar to the C file API feof.
For more details about this API and its parameters, check the feof documentation.

Requirements

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</table>

sgx_ferror
The sgx_ferror function returns the latest operation error code.

Syntax
int32_t sgx_ferror(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);

Parameters

stream [in]
A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value
The latest operation error code is returned. 0 indicates that no errors occurred.

Description
sgx_ferror is similar to the C file API ferror. In case the latest operation failed because the file is in a bad state, SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS will be returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ferror documentation.

Requirements

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sgx_clearerr

The sgx_clearerr function attempts to repair a bad file status, and also clears the end-of-file flag.

Syntax

void sgx_clearerr(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_auto_key.

Return value

None

Description

sgx_clearerr is similar to the C file API clearerr. This function attempts to repair errors resulted from the underlying file system, like write errors to the disk (resulting in a full cache that cannot be emptied). Call sgx_ferror or sgx_feof after a call to this function to learn if it was successful or not.

sgx_clearerr does not repair errors resulting from a corrupted file, like decryption errors, or from memory corruption, etc.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the clearerr documentation.

Requirements
sgx_remove

The sgx_remove function deletes a file from the file system.

Syntax

```c
int32_t sgx_remove(
    const char* filename,
);
```

Parameters

filename [in]
The name of the file to delete.

Return value

0
The operation completed successfully.

1
An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx_remove is similar to the C file API remove.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the remove documentation.

Requirements

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sgx_fexport_auto_key

The sgx_fexport_auto_key function is used for exporting the latest key used for the file encryption. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Syntax

```c
int32_t sgx_fexport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
```
sgx_key_128bit_t *key

Parameters

filename [in]
The name of the file to be exported. This should be the name of a file created with the sgx_fopen_auto_key API.

key [out]
The latest encryption key.

Return value

0
The operation completed successfully.

1
An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx_fexport_auto_key is used to export the last key that was used in the encryption of the file. With this key you can import the file in a different enclave or system.

NOTE:

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
2. This function only works with files created with sgx_fopen_auto_key.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Requirements

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sgx_fimport_auto_key

The sgx_fimport_auto_key function is used for importing a Protected FS auto key file created on a different enclave or platform. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Syntax
int32_t sgx_fimport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);

Parameters

filename [in]
The name of the file to be imported. This should be the name of a file created with the sgx_fopen_auto_key API, on a different enclave or system.

description

key [in]
The encryption key, exported with a call to sgx_fexport_auto_key in the source enclave or system.

Return value

0
The operation completed successfully.
1
An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx_fimport_auto_key is used for importing a Protected FS file. After this call returns successfully, the file can be opened normally with sgx_fexport_auto_key.

NOTE:

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
2. This function only works with files created with sgx_fopen_auto_key.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Requirements

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sgx_fclear_cache

The `sgx_fclear_cache` function is used for clearing the internal file cache. The function scrubs all the data from the cache, and releases all the allocated cache memory.

**Syntax**

```c
int32_t sgx_fclear_cache(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);```

**Parameters**

*stream [in]*

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, call `sgx_ferror` to get the error code.

**Description**

`sgx_fclear_cache` is used to scrub all the data from the cache and release all the allocated cache memory. If modified data is found in the cache, it will be written to the file on disk before being scrubbed.

This function is especially useful if you do not trust parts of your own enclave (for example, external libraries you linked against, etc.) and want to make sure there is as little sensitive data in the memory as possible before transferring control to the code they do not trust. Note, however, that the `SGX_FILE` structure itself still holds sensitive data. To remove all such data related to the file from memory completely, you should close the file handle.

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**Types and Enumerations**

This topic introduces the types and error codes in the following topics:
Type Descriptions
This topic section describes the following data types provided by the Intel(R) SGX:

- `sgx_enclave_id_t`
- `sgx_status_t`
- `sgx_launch_token_t`
- `sgx_exception_vector_t`
- `sgx_exception_type_t`
- `sgx_cpu_context_t`
- `sgx_exception_info_t`
- `sgx_exception_handler_t`
- `sgx_spinlock_t`
- `sgx_thread_t`
- `sgx_thread_mutex_t`
- `sgx_thread_mutexattr_t`
- `sgx_thread_cond_t`
- `sgx_thread_condattr_t`
- `sgx_misc_select_t`
- `sgx_attributes_t`
- `sgx_misc_attribute_t`
- `sgx_isv_svn_t`
- `sgx_cpu_svn_t`
- `sgx_key_id_t`
- `sgx_key_128bit_t`
- `sgx_key_request_t`
- `sgx_measurement_t`
- `sgx_mac_t`
- `sgx_report_data_t`
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- sgx_dh_msg3_t
- sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
- sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
- sgx_dh_session_role_t
- sgx_dh_session_t

**sgx_enclave_id_t**
An enclave ID, also referred to as an enclave handle. Used as a handle to an enclave by various functions.

Enclave IDs are locally unique, i.e. within the platform, and the uniqueness is guaranteed until the next machine restart.

**Syntax**
```c
typedef uint64_t sgx_enclave_id_t;
```

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**sgx_status_t**
Specifies the return status from an Intel SGX function call. For a list containing all possible values of this data type, see Error Codes.

**Syntax**
```c
typedef enum _status_t { ... } sgx_status_t;
```

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**sgx_launch_token_t**
An opaque type used to hold enclave launch information. Used by `sgx_create_enclave` to initialize an enclave. The license is generated by the Launch Enclave.

See more details in [Loading and Unloading an Enclave.](#)

**Syntax**
```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_launch_token_t[1024];
```
**Requirements**

| Header       | sgx_urts.h |

**sgx_exception_vector_t**

The `sgx_exception_vector_t` enumeration contains the enclave supported exception vectors. If the exception vector is #BP, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _sgx_exception_vector_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DE = 0, /* DIV and DIV instructions */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DB = 1, /* For Intel use only */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BP = 3, /* INT 3 instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BR = 5, /* BOUND instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_UD = 6, /* UD2 instruction or reserved opcode */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_MF = 16, /* x87 FPU floating-point or WAIT/FWAI instruction. */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_AC = 17, /* Any data reference in memory */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_XM = 19, /* SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction */
} sgx_exception_vector_t;
```

**Requirements**

| Header       | sgx_trts_exception.h |

**sgx_exception_type_t**

The `sgx_exception_type_t` enumeration contains values that specify the exception type. If the exception vector is #BP (BreakPoint), the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef enum _sgx_exception_type_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE = 3,
    SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE = 6,
} sgx_exception_type_t;
```
Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_trts_exception.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**sgx_cpu_context_t**

The `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure contains processor-specific register data. Custom exception handling uses `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure to record the CPU context at exception time.

**Syntax**

```c
#if defined (_M_X64) || defined (__x86_64__)
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t 
    {
        uint64_t rax;
        uint64_t rcx;
        uint64_t rdx;
        uint64_t rbx;
        uint64_t rsp;
        uint64_t rbp;
        uint64_t rsi;
        uint64_t rdi;
        uint64_t r8;
        uint64_t r9;
        uint64_t r10;
        uint64_t r11;
        uint64_t r12;
        uint64_t r13;
        uint64_t r14;
        uint64_t r15;
        uint64_t rflags;
        uint64_t rip;
    } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#else
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t 
    {
        uint32_t eax;
        uint32_t ecx;
        uint32_t edx;
        uint32_t ebx;
        uint32_t esp;
        uint32_t ebp;
        uint32_t esi;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t eflags;
        uint32_t eip;
    } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#endif
```
Members
rax, rcx, rdx, rbx, rsp, rbp, rsi, rdi, r8 – r15
64-bit general purpose registers
rflags
64-bit program status and control register
rip
64-bit instruction pointer
eax, ecx, edx, ebx, esp, ebp, esi, edi
32-bit general purpose registers
eflags
32-bit program status and control register
eip
32-bit instruction pointer

Requirements

| Header   | sgx_trts_exception.h |

sgx_exception_info_t
A structure of this type contains an exception record with a description of the exception and processor context record at the time of exception.

Syntax

typedef struct _exception_info_t
{
    sgx_cpu_context_t cpu_context;
    sgx_exception_vector_t exception_vector;
    sgx_exception_type_t exception_type;
} sgx_exception_info_t;

Members

cpu_context
The context record that contains the processor context at the exception time.

exception_vector
The reason the exception occurs. This is the code generated by a hardware exception.

**exception_type**
The exception type.

`SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE(3)` indicates a HW exception.
`SGX_EXCEPTIONSOFTWARE(6)` indicates a SW exception.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_exception_handler_t**
Callback function that serves as a custom exception handler.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef int (*sgx_exception_handler_t)(sgx_exception_info_t *info);
```

**Members**

**info**
A pointer to `sgx_exception_info_t` structure that receives the exception information.

**Return value**

**EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH (0)**
The exception handler did not handle the exception and the RTS should call the next exception handler in the chain.

**EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION (-1)**
The exception handler handled the exception and the RTS should continue the execution of the enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_trts_exception.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_spinlock_t**
Data type for a trusted spin lock.

**Syntax**
typedef volatile uint32_t sgx_spinlock_t;

Members
sgx_spinlock_t defines a spin lock object inside the enclave.

Requirements
| Header       | sgx_spinlock.h |

sgx_thread_t
Data type to uniquely identify a trusted thread.

Syntax
typedef uintptr * sgx_thread_t;

Members
sgx_thread_t is an opaque data type with no member fields visible to users. This data type is subject to change. Thus, enclave code should not rely on the contents of this data object.

Requirements
| Header       | sgx_thread.h |

sgx_thread_mutex_t
Data type for a trusted mutex object.

Syntax
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex
{
    size_t m_refcount;
    uint32_t m_control;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_mutex_t;

Members
m_control
Flags to define whether a mutex is recursive or not.

**m_refcount**

Reference counter of the mutex object. It will be increased by 1 if the mutex is successfully acquired, and be decreased by 1 if the mutex is released.

---

**NOTE**

The counter will be greater than one only if the mutex is recursive.

**m_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the mutex object.

**m_owner**

The thread that currently owns the mutex writes its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a mutex releases it.

**m_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the ownership of the mutex. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_thread.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_thread_mutexattr_t**

Attribute for the trusted mutex object.

**Syntax**

typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_mutexattr_t;

**Members**

**m_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**
**Header**

| Header   | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_cond_t**

Data type for a trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond
{
    sgx_spinlock_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_cond_t;
```

**Members**

**m_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the condition variable.

**m_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting on the condition variable. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_thread.h |

**sgx_thread_condattr_t**

Attribute for the trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_condattr_t;
```

**Members**

**m_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.
Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_thread.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_misc_select_t
Enclave misc select bits. The value is 4 byte in length. Currently all the bits are reserved for future extension.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_attributes.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_attributes_t
Enclave attributes definition structure.

**NOTE**
When specifying an attributes mask used in key derivation, at a minimum the flags that should be set are INITED, DEBUG and RESERVED bits.

**NOTE**
The XGETBV instruction can be executed to determine the register sets which are part of the XSAVE state which corresponds to the xfrm value of attributes. Since the save state is dependent on the host system and operating system, an attributes mask generally does not include these bits (XFRM is set to 0).

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_attributes_t
{
    uint64_t flags;
    uint64_t xfrm;
} sgx_attributes_t;

**Members**

flags
Flags is a combination of the following values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_INITTED</td>
<td>The enclave is initialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0000000000000000ULL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_DEBUG</td>
<td>The enclave is a debug enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_MODE64BIT 0x0000000000000004ULL</td>
<td>The enclave runs in 64 bit mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY 0x00000000000000010ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a provision key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_EINITTOKEN_KEY 0x00000000000000020ULL</td>
<td>The enclave has access to a launch key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_FLAGS_RESERVED 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC8ULL</td>
<td>A mask used to ensure that reserved bits are zero. Reserved bits are bit 3 and bits 6-63.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**xfrm**

Similar to XCRO, xfrm is a combination of the following values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_LEGACY 0x0000000000000003ULL</td>
<td>FPU and Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions states are saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_XFRM_AVX 0x0000000000000006ULL</td>
<td>Intel(R) Advanced Vector Extensions state is saved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Requirements**

Header `sgx_attributes.h`

**sgx_m misc_attribute_t**

Enclave `misc_select` and `attributes` definition structure.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_m misc_attributes_t
{
    sgx_attributes_t secs_attr;
    sgx_m misc_select_t misc_select;
} sgx_m misc_attribute_t;
```

**Members**

**secs_attr**

The Enclave attributes.

**misc_select**

The Enclave misc select configuration.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_attributes.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_isv_svn_t**

ISV security version. The value is 2 bytes in length. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_cpu_svn_t**

`sgx_cpu_svn_t` is a 128-bit value representing the CPU security version. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

**Syntax**

```c
#define SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE 16
typedef struct _sgx_cpu_svn_t {
    uint8_t svn[SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE];
} sgx_cpu_svn_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_key_id_t**

`sgx_key_id_t` is a 256 bit value used in the key request structure. The value is generally populated with a random value to provide key wear-out protection.

**Syntax**

```c
#define SGX_KEYID_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_key_id_t {
    uint8_t id[SGX_KEYID_SIZE];
} sgx_key_id_t;
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_key_128bit_t**

A 128 bit value that is used to store a derived key from for example the `sgx_get_key` function.

**Requirements**

| Header       | sgx_key.h |

**sgx_key_request_t**

Data structure of key request which is used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. This is the input parameter for the `sgx_get_key` function.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _key_request_t {
    uint16_t key_name;
    uint16_t key_policy;
    sgx_isvsvn_t isv_svn;
    uint16_t reserved1;
    sgx_cpusvn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask;
    uint8_t reserved2[436];
} sgx_key_request_t;
```

**Members**

**key_name**

The name of the key requested. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_EINITTOKEN</td>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>Launch key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Provisioning key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Provisioning seal key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_REPORT</td>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>Report key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYSELECT_SEAL</td>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>Seal key</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
key_policy

Identify which inputs are required to be used in the key derivation. Possible values are below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key policy name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave’s ENCLAVE measurement register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>Derive key using the enclave’s SIGNER measurement register</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

If MRENCLAVE is used, then that key can only be rederived by that particular enclave.

**NOTE**

If MRSIGNER is used, then another enclave with the same ISV_SVN could derive the key as well which is useful for applications that instantiate more than one enclave and would like to pass data. The key derived could be used in the encryption process for the data passed between the enclaves.

**isv_svn**

The ISV security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**reserved1**

Reserved for future use. Must be zero.

**cpu_svn**

The TCB security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

**attribute_mask**

The attributes mask used to determine which enclave attributes must be included in the key. It only impacts the derivation of seal key, provisioning key and provisioning seal key. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t.

**key_id**

Value for key wear-out protection. Generally initialized with a random number.

**misc_mask**

The misc mask used to determine which enclave misc select must be included in the key. Reserved for future function extension.
reserved2
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_measurement_t
sgx_measurement_t is a 256-bit value representing the enclave measurement.

Syntax

```c
#define SGX_HASH_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_measurement_t {
    uint8_t m[SGX_HASH_SIZE];
} sgx_measurement_t;
```

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_mac_t
This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sgx_report_data_t
sgx_report_data_t is a 512-bit value used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave. This is one of the inputs to the sgx_create_report function.

Syntax

```c
#define SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE 64
typedef struct _sgx_report_data_t {
    uint8_t d[SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_report_data_t;
```

Requirements
**Header**  
*sgx_report.h*

**sgx_prod_id_t**  
A 16-bit value representing the ISV enclave product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

**Requirements**  

**Header**  
*sgx_report.h*

**sgx_target_info_t**  
Data structure of report target information. This is an input to function *sgx_create_report* and *sgx_init_quote* which is used to identify the enclave (its measurement and attributes) which will be able to verify the REPORT that is generated.

**Syntax**  

typedef struct _target_info_t
{
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    uint8_t reserved1[4];
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved2[456];
} sgx_target_info_t;

**Members**  

**mr_enclave**  
The enclave hash of the target enclave

**attributes**  
The attributes of the target enclave

**reserved1**  
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**misc_select**  
The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**reserved2**  
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.
Requirements

**Header**

```plaintext
sgx_report.h
```

**sgx_report_body_t**

This data structure, which is part of the `sgx_report_t` structure, contains information about the enclave.

**Syntax**

```plaintext
typedef struct _report_body_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved1[28];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint8_t reserved4[60];
    sgx_report_data_t report_data;
} sgx_report_body_t;
```

**Members**

**cpu_svn**

The security version number of the host system TCB (CPU).

**misc_select**

The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

**reserved1**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

**attributes**

The attributes for the enclave. See `sgx_attributes_t` for the definitions of these flags.

**mr_enclave**

The measurement value of the enclave.
reserved2
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

mr_signer
The measurement value of the public key that verified the enclave.

reserved3
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

isv_prod_id
The ISV Product ID of the enclave.

isv_svn
The ISV security version number of the enclave.

reserved4
Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

report_data
A set of data used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave.

Requirements

| Header    | sgx_report.h |

sgx_report_t
Data structure that contains the report information for the enclave. This is the output parameter from the sgx_create_report function. This is the input parameter for the sgx_init_quote function.

Syntax

typedef struct _report_t
{
    sgx_report_body_t body;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
} sgx_report_t;

Members

body
The data structure containing information about the enclave.

**key_id**

Value for key wear-out protection.

**mac**

The CMAC value of the report data using report key.

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_report.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### sgx_aes_gcm_data_t

The structure contains the AES GCM* data, payload size, MAC* and payload.

### Syntax

```c
typedef struct _aes_gcm_data_t
{
    uint32_t payload_size;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    uint8_t payload_tag[SGX_SEAL_TAG_SIZE];
    uint8_t payload[];
} sgx_aes_gcm_data_t;
```

### Members

#### payload_size

Size of the payload data which includes both the encrypted data followed by the additional authenticated data (plain text). The full payload array is part of the AES GCM MAC calculation.

#### reserved

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

#### payload_tag

AES-GMAC of the plain text, payload, and the sizes

#### payload

The payload data buffer includes the encrypted data followed by the optional additional authenticated data (plain text), which is not encrypted.

---

**NOTE**
The optional additional authenticated data (MAC or plain text) could be data which identifies the seal data blob and when it was created.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx sealed data t**

Sealed data blob structure containing the key request structure used in the key derivation. The data structure has been laid out to achieve 16 byte alignment. This structure should be allocated within the enclave when the seal operation is performed. After the seal operation, the structure can be copied outside the enclave for preservation before the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data structure needs to be copied back within the enclave before unsealing.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sealed_data_t
{
    sgx_key_request_t key_request;
    uint32_t plain_text_offset;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    sgx_aes_gcm_data_t aes_data;
} sgx_sealed_data_t;
```

**Members**

**key_request**

The key request used to derive the seal key.

**plain_text_offset**

The offset within the aes_data structure payload to the start of the optional additional MAC text.

**reserved**

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

**aes_data**

Structure contains the AES GCM data (payload size, MAC, and payload).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tseal.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**sgx_epid_group_id_t**

Type for Intel(R) EPID group id

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_epid_group_id_t[4];
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_basename_t**

Type for base name used in sgx_quote.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _basename_t
{
    uint8_t name[32];
} sgx_basename_t;
```

**Members**

**name**

The base name used in sgx_quote.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_quote_t**

Type for quote used in remote attestation.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _quote_t
{
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t sign_type;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t qe_svn;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pce_svn;
    uint32_t xeid;
    sgx_basename_t basename;
}```
Members

version
The version of the quote structure.

sign_type
The indicator of the Intel(R) EPID signature type.

epid_group_id
The Intel(R) EPID group id of the platform belongs to.

qe_svn
The svn of the QE.

pce_svn
The svn of the PCE.

xeid
The extended Intel(R) EPID group ID.

basename
The base name used in sgx_quote.

report_body
The report body of the application enclave.

signature_len
The size in byte of the following signature.

signature
The place holder of the variable length signature.

Requirements

| Header          | sgx_quote.h |

sgx_quote_sign_type_t
Enum indicates the quote type, linkable or un-linkable
**Syntax**

typedef enum {
    SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE,
    SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE
} sgx_quote_sign_type_t;

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_spid_t**

Type for a service provider ID.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _spid_t
{
    uint8_t id[16];
} sgx_spid_t;

**Members**

**id**

The ID of the service provider.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_quote_nonce_t**

This data structure indicates the quote nonce.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_quote_nonce
{
    uint8_t rand[16];
} sgx_quote_nonce_t;

**Members**

**rand**
The 16 bytes random number used as nonce.

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_quote.h |

*sgx_time_source_nonce_t*

Nonce of time source. It's opaque to users.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint8_t sgx_time_source_nonce_t[32];
```

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_tae_service.h |

*sgx_time_t*

Type for trusted time.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef uint64_t sgx_time_t;
```

**Requirements**

| Header   | sgx_tae_service.h |

*sgx_ps_cap_t*

Type indicating the platform service capability.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_ps_cap_t
{
    uint32_t ps_cap0;
    uint32_t ps_cap1;
} sgx_ps_cap_t;
```

**Members**

*ps_cap0*

Bit 0 : Trusted Time service

Bit 1 : Monotonic Counter service
Bit 2 : Reserved
Bit 3 : Secure Message service
Bit 4-31 : Reserved

**ps_cap1**
Bit 0-31 : Reserved

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_uae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t**

Security property descriptor of platform service. It's opaque to users.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc
{
    uint8_t sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc[256];
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t;
```

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t**

Security property descriptor of platform service with extended platform service information.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc_ex
{
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop_desc;
    sgx_measurement_t pse_mrsigner;
    sgx_prod_id_t pse_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pse_isv_svn;
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t;
```

### Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_tae_service.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
sgx_mc_uuid_t
The data structure of a monotonic counter.

Syntax
#define SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE 3
#define SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE 13
typedef struct _mc_uuid
{
    uint8_t counter_id[SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE];
    uint8_t nonce[SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE];
} sgx_mc_uuid_t;

Members
counter_id
ID number of the monotonic counter.
nonce
Nonce associated with the monotonic counter.

Requirements

| Header         | sgx_tae_service.h |

sgx_ra_context_t
Type for a context returned by the key exchange library.

Syntax
typedef uint32_t sgx_ra_context_t;

Requirements

| Header         | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_key_128_t
Type for 128 bit key used in remote attestation.

Syntax
typedef uint8_t sgx_ra_key_128_t[16];
Requirements

| Header       | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t

The `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t` function should take the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK). Implementation of the function should return the appropriate return value.

Syntax

```c
typedef sgx_status_t(*sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t)(
    const sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t* p_shared_key,
    uint16_t kdf_id,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_smk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_sk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_mk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_vk_key
);
```

Parameters

- **p_shared_key** [in]
  The Diffie-Hellman shared secret.
- **kdf_id** [in]
  Key Derivation Function ID.
- **p_smk_key** [out]
  The output SMK.
- **p_sk_key** [out]
  The output SK.
- **p_mk_key** [out]
  The output MK.
- **p_vk_key** [out]
  The output VK.

Return value

**SGX_SUCCESS**
Indicates success.
SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH
Indicates key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY
Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED
Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

Description
A pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype.

Requirements

| Header         | sgx_tkey_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_key_type_t
Enum of the key types used in remote attestation.

Syntax

typedef enum _sgx_ra_key_type_t
{
    SGX_RA_KEY_SK = 1,
    SGX_RA_KEY_MK,
    SGX_RA_KEY_vk,
} sgx_ra_key_type_t;

Requirements

| Header         | sgx_key_exchange.h |

sgx_ra_msg1_t
This data structure describes the message 1 that is used in remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax
typedef struct __sgx_ra_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t gid;
} sgx_ra_msg1_t;

Members

**g_a (Little Endian)**
The public EC key of an application enclave, based on NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**gid (Little Endian)**
ID of the Intel(R) EPID group of the platform belongs to.

Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_key_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ra_msg2_t**
This data structure describes the message 2 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

typedef struct __sgx_ra_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_spid_t spid;
    uint16_t quote_type;
    uint16_t kdf_id;
    sgx_ec256_signature_t sign_gb_ga;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    uint32_t sig_rl_size;
    uint8_t sig_rl[];
} sgx_ra_msg2_t;

Members

**g_b (Little Endian)**
Public EC key of service provider, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**spid**
ID of the service provider

quote_type (Little Endian)
Indicates the quote type, linkable (1) or un-linkable (0).

kdf_id (Little Endian)
Key derivation function id.

sign_gb ga (Little Endian)
ECDSA Signature of \( (g_b||g_a) \), using the service provider's ECDSA private key corresponding to the public key specified in sgx_ra_init or sgx_ra_init_ex function, where \( g_b \) is the public EC key of the service provider and \( g_a \) is the public key of application enclave, provided by the application enclave, in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

mac
AES-CMAC of \( gb, spid \) 2-byte TYPE, 2-byte KDF-ID, and \( sign_gb ga \) using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

\[
KDK = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0, LittleEndian}(gb \text{ x-coordinate})) \\
\text{SMK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
\]

The \text{key0} used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of \( 0x00 \). The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter \( 0x01 \)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length \( 0x80 \)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

sig_rl_size
Size of the \text{sig_rl}, in bytes.

sig_rl
Pointer to the Intel(R) EPI D Signature Revocation List Certificate of the Intel(R) EPI D group identified by the gid in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

Requirements

| Header              | sgx_key_exchange.h |

```
sgx_ra_msg3_t
```

This data structure describes message 3 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg3_t
{
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop;
    uint8_t quote[];
} sgx_ra_msg3_t;

Members

mac

AES-CMAC of g_a, ps_sec_prop, GID, and quote[], using SMK. SMK is derived follows:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))

SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80)
If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

**g_a (Little Endian)**
Public EC key of application enclave

**ps_sec_prop**
Security property of the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service. If the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service security property information is not required in the remote attestation and key exchange process, this field will be all 0s.

**quote**
Quote returned from sgx_get_quote. The first 32-byte report_body.report_data field in Quote is set to SHA256 hash of ga, gb and VK, and the second 32-byte is set to all 0s. VK is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{KDK} &= \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0, LittleEndian}(\text{gab x-coordinate})) \\
\text{SMK} &= \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{KDK, 0x01||’VK’||0x00||0x80||0x00})
\end{align*}
\]

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string ‘SMK’ in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80).

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK).

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sgx_key_exchange.h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *g_a // Little Endian
);
```

Note that the 4th parameter this function takes should be in little endian format.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    const sgx_target_info_t *p_qe_target,
    sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce
);
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t**

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t)(
```
```c
sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
int* retval,
sgx_ra_context_t context,
uint32_t quote_size,
sgx_report_t* qe_report,
sgx_ra_msg3_t *p_msg3,
uint32_t msg3_size
);
```

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_platform_info_t**

This opaque data structure indicates the platform information received from Intel Attestation Server.

**Syntax**

```c
#define SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE 101
typedef struct _platform_info
{
    uint8_t platform_info[SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE];
} sgx_platform_info_t;
```

**Members**

**platform_info**

The platform information.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**sgx_update_info_bit_t**

Type for information of what components of Intel SGX need to be updated and how to update them.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _update_info_bit
{
    int ucodeUpdate;
```
```c
int csmeFwUpdate;
int pswUpdate;
} sgx_update_info_bit_t;
```

**Members**

**ucodeUpdate**
Whether the ucode needs to be updated.

**csmeFwUpdate**
Whether the csme firmware needs to be updated.

**pswUpdate**
Whether the platform software needs to be updated.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_quote.h</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**sgx_dh_msg1_t**
Type for MSG1 used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

```c
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_target_info_t target;
} sgx_dh_msg1_t;
```

**Members**

**g_a (Little Endian)**
Public EC key of responder enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**target**
Report target info to be used by the peer enclave to generate the Intel(R) SGX report in the message 2 of the DH secure session protocol.

**Requirements**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>sgx_dh.h</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
sgx_dh_msg2_t
Type for MSG2 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_msg2_t;

Members

g_b (Little Endian)
Public EC key of initiator enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

report
Intel(R) SGX report of initiator enclave of DH session establishment. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_a and g_b, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]
AES-CMAC value of g_b,report, 2-byte KDF-ID, and 0x00s using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||’SMK’||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian
format
  • a bit length (0x80)

Requirements

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</table>

`sgx_dh_msg3_t`
Type for MSG3 used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_t
{
  uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
  sgx_dh_msg3_body_t msg3_body;
} sgx_dh_msg3_t;

**Members**

`cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]`
CMAC value of message body of MSG3, using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:
  • a counter (0x01)
  • a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
  • a bit length (0x80)

`msg3_body`
Variable length message body of MSG3.

Requirements
Header | sgx_dh.h

sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
Type for message body of the MSG3 structure used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
{
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint32_t additional_prop_length;
    uint8_t additional_prop[0];
} sgx_dh_msg3_body_t;

Members
report
Intel(R) SGX report of responder enclave. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_b and g_a, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

additional_prop_length
Length of additional property field in bytes.

additional_prop[0]
Variable length buffer holding additional data that the responder enclave may provide.

Requirements
Header | sgx_dh.h

sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
Type for enclave identity of initiator or responder used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
{

```c
sgx_cpusvn_t cpu_svn;
uint8_t reserved_1[32];
sgx_attributes_t attributes;
sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
uint8_t reserved_2[32];
sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
uint8_t reserved_3[96];
sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
sgx_isvsvn_t isvsvn;
} sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t;
```

**Members**

**cpu_svn**
Security version number of CPU.

**reserved_1[32]**
Reserved 32 bytes.

**attributes**
Intel SGX attributes of enclave.

**mr_enclave**
Measurement of enclave.

**reserved_2[32]**
Reserved 32 bytes.

**mr_signer**
Measurement of enclave signer.

**reserved_3[96]**
Reserved 96 bytes.

**isv_prod_id (Little Endian)**
Product ID of ISV enclave.

**isv_svn (Little Endian)**
Security version number of ISV enclave.

**Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
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</thead>
</table>
sgx_dh_session_role_t
Type for role of establishing a DH secure session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef enum _sgx_dh_session_role_t
{
    SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR,
    SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
} sgx_dh_session_role_t;

Members

SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR
Initiator of a DH session establishment.

SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
Responder of a DH session establishment.

Requirements

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<tr>
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</table>

sgx_dh_session_t
Type for session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_t
{
    uint8_t sgx_dh_session[SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_session_t;

Members

sgx_dh_session
Data of DH session.

The array size of sgx_dh_session SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE is defined as 200 bytes.
## Requirements

| Header | sgx_dh.h |

## Error Codes

### Table 15 Error code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Error Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x0000</td>
<td>SGX_SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED</td>
<td>An unexpected error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER</td>
<td>The parameter is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY</td>
<td>There is not enough memory available to complete this operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST</td>
<td>The enclave is lost after power transition or used in child process created by fork().</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE</td>
<td>The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION</td>
<td>The ECALL/OCALL function index is incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_TCS</td>
<td>The enclave is out of TCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_CRASHED</td>
<td>The enclave has crashed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ECALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td>ECALL is not allowed at this time. For examples:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ECALL is not public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ECALL is blocked by the dynamic entry table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A nested ECALL is not allowed during global initialization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OCALL_NOT_ALLOWED</td>
<td>OCALL is not allowed during exception handling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1009</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_</td>
<td>Stack overrun occurs within the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2000</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NO_DEVICE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2009</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200C</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200D</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200E</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x200F</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.
The enclave image is incorrect.
The enclave ID is invalid.
The signature is invalid.
The enclave is signed as product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.
There is not enough EPC available to load the enclave or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete the operation requested.
Cannot open device.
Page mapping failed in driver.
The metadata is incorrect.
Device is busy.
Metadata version is inconsistent between uRTS and sgx_sign or the uRTS is incompatible with the current platform.
The target enclave (32/64 bit or HS/Sim) mode is incompatible with the uRTS mode.
Can't open enclave file.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Error Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x2010</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The MiscSelect/MiscMask settings are incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2011</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_LAUNCH_TOKEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The launch token is not correct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicates report verification error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The enclave is not authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPU SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The CPU SVN is beyond the CPU SVN value of the platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISV SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ISV SVN is greater than the ISV SVN value of the enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unsupported key name value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4001</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4002</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The request to AE service timed out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4003</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicates an Intel(R) EPID blob verification error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4004</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEDGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enclave has no privilege to get launch token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4005</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4006</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_NETWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network connecting or proxy setting issue is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETWORK_FAILURE</td>
<td>encountered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4008 SGX_ERROR AE_SESSION_INVALID</td>
<td>The session is invalid or ended by server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400a SGX_ERROR_BUSY</td>
<td>The requested service is temporarily not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400c SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND</td>
<td>The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400d SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT</td>
<td>The caller does not have the access right to the specified VMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400e SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP</td>
<td>No monotonic counter is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x400f SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA</td>
<td>Monotonic counters reached quota limit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4011 SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH</td>
<td>Key derivation function does not match during key exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4012 SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM</td>
<td>Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7001 SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS</td>
<td>The file is in a bad status, run sgx_clearerr to try and fix it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7002 SGX_ERROR_FILE_NO_KEY_ID</td>
<td>The Key ID field is all zeros, cannot re-generate the encryption key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7003 SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH</td>
<td>The current file name is different than the original file name (not allowed, substitution attack).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7004 SGX_ERROR_FILE_NOT_SGX_FILE</td>
<td>The file is not an Intel SGX file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7005 SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_OPEN_RECOVERY_FILE</td>
<td>A recovery file cannot be opened, so the flush operation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7006 SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_WRITE_RECOVERY_FILE</td>
<td>A recovery file cannot be written, so the flush operation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Error Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILE_CANT_WRITE_RECOVERY_FILE</td>
<td>Operation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7007</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_RECOVERY_NEEDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When opening the file, recovery is needed, but the recovery process failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7008</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_FLUSH_FAILED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fflush operation (to the disk) failed (only used when no EXXX is returned).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7009</td>
<td>SGX_ERROR_FILE_CLOSE_FAILED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fclose operation (to the disk) failed (only used when no EXXX is returned).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix
This topic provides the following reference information:

- Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries
- Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions
- Unsupported C Standard Functions
- Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions
- Unsupported C and C++ Keywords
- C++11 Support on Linux* OS

Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves
The following GCC* options are not supported to build enclaves.

Table 16 Unsupported GCC Compiler Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-fopenmp</td>
<td>Options controlling C dialect.</td>
<td>Depends on Pthreads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fgnu-tm</td>
<td>Options controlling C dialect.</td>
<td>Depends on libitm (transactional memory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fhosted</td>
<td>Options controlling C++ dialect.</td>
<td>OS functions not supported within enclaves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fuse-cxa-atexit</td>
<td>Options controlling C++ dialect.</td>
<td>Depends on atexit(), which is not supported within an enclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Options controlling objective-C and objective-C++.</td>
<td>Objective C/C++ not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Options for debugging a program.</td>
<td>All options because of runtime support required. Separate Intel(R) SGX debugger support provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fmudflap, -fmudflapth, -fmudflapir</td>
<td>Optimization options.</td>
<td>Dependent on libmudflap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fexec_charset=charset, -fwide-exec-char-set=charset</td>
<td>Options controlling the pre-processor.</td>
<td>Only providing partial support for UTF-8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-x objective-c</td>
<td>Objective-C is not supported within an enclave.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-lobjc</td>
<td>Linker options.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pie, -s</td>
<td>Objective C not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-shared-libgcc,</td>
<td>Enclaves cannot depend on libgcc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-static-libgcc</td>
<td>Intel(R) SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX version of the C++ standard library.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-static-libstdc++</td>
<td>Need to control the format of enclave code.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-T script</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for GNU*/Linux* options.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mglIBC</td>
<td>Intel SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX compatible C standard library.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-muclibc, -mbionic,</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mandroid, -tno-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>android-cc, -tno-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>android-ld</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-msoft-float</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for Intel &amp; AMD* x86-x64 options.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-m96bit-long-double</td>
<td>Run-time emulation of floating point is not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mtimeads</td>
<td>96-bit not supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mcmodel=small,</td>
<td>Depends on mingwthrd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mcmodel=kernel,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mcmodel=medium,</td>
<td>Linker will fail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-mcmodel=large</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All options</td>
<td>Hardware models and configurations for Intel &amp; AMD* x86-x64 Windows* options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fbounds-check</td>
<td>All options because these are only used with Cygwin* or MinGW*.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -fPIE</td>
<td>Options for code generation conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -pie</td>
<td>Currently for Java* and Fortran* front-ends, not C/C++.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-fpie, -shared -fpic</td>
<td>Only pertains to executable files.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compilation option -fpie and linking option -pie cannot be used at the same time under simulation mode if TLS support is required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compilation option -fpie and linking option -shared -fpic cannot be used at the same time under both simulation mode and 64-bit hardware mode if TLS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Options for Enclaves**

The following Intel(R) C++ Compiler options are not supported to build enclaves.

**Table 17 Unsupported Intel C++ Compiler Options**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-hotpatch=[n]</td>
<td>This code generation option is not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-xcode</td>
<td>This option does not apply to Intel(R) SGX because for this check to be effective, the source file containing the main program or the dynamic library main function should be compiled with this option enabled. Since this compiler option does not have the intended behavior (host architecture check), then the /Qax or /arch options are recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-cilk-serialize -guide-file=[filename]</td>
<td>These advanced optimization options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-guide-file-append [=filename]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-f[no-]instrument-functions -prof-data-order</td>
<td>These Profile-guided Optimization (PGO) options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-no-prof-data-order -prof-dir -prof-file &lt;f&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-func-groups -no-prof-func-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-func-order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-no-prof-func-order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-gen[x]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-hotness-threshold=n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-[no]-prof-src-dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-src-root=dir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-src-root-cwd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[=keyword]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-prof-value-profiling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[=keyword]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-profile-functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-profile-loops=s=keyword</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-profile-loops-report=n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tcollect[lib]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tcollect-filter filename</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-tcheck</td>
<td>These optimization report options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-stubs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-report {0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-report[n]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-lib=type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-link-k=library</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-task=model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-openmp-threadprivate=type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These OpenMP* and parallel processing options are not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Option Description

- **-openmp-threadprivate=type**
- **-par-affinity=[modifier,...]type[,permute][,offset]**
- **-par-num-threads=n -par-report[n]**
- **-par-runtime-control[n] -no-par-runtime-control**
- **-par-schedule-keyword [=n] -par-threshold[n]**
- **-parallel -parallel-source-info [=n]**
- **-no-parallel-source-info**

- **-[no-]inline-calloc**  
  This inline option is not supported.
- **-check=keyword[,keyword...]**  
  This language option is not supported.
- **-Bdynamic -dynamic-linker -shared-intel**  
  These linker options are not supported.

---

**Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries**

The Intel(R) C++ Compiler libraries that are not supported within an enclave are:

**Table 18 Unsupported Intel C++ Compiler Libraries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cilkrts.lib</td>
<td>Intel® Cilk™ runtime system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkp.lib</td>
<td>Run-time pointer checker lib-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libchkpwrap.lib</td>
<td>raries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>libiomp5mt.lib</td>
<td>OpenMP* libraries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
libiompprof5mt.lib,  
libiompstubs5mt.lib

libipgo.lib  Profile-Guided Optimization (PGO) runtime support library.

pdbx.lib,  
pdbxinst.lib  Intel(R) Parallel Debugger Extension runtime libraries.

libicaio.lib  Asynchronous I/O library.  I/O is not supported in an enclave.

libbfp754.lib  Binary floating-point math library.  It is not utilized by the compiler.

libmatmul.lib  Matrix multiplication library.  It depends on the OpenMP library.

Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions
The following table illustrates unsupported GCC* built-in functions inside the enclave. Using any of these built-in functions will result in a linker error during the compilation of the enclave.

The complete list of GCC built-in functions is available at http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.7.2/gcc/X86-Built_002din-Functions.html#X86-Built_002din-Functions.

Table 19 Unsupported GCC Compiler Built-in Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non supported: Math built-ins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_signbitd32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_signbitd64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_signbitd128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_finite32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_finite64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_finite128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isinf32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isinf64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isinf128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isnand32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isnand64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_isnand64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not Supported: String/memory built-ins

|__builtin_strcat|
|__builtin_strcpy|
|__builtin_strdup|

Not Supported: I/O related built-ins

<p>|__builtin_fprintf|
|__builtin_fprintf_unlocked|
|__builtin_putc|
|__builtin_putchar_unlocked|
|__builtin_fputc|
|__builtin_fputs|
|__builtin_fputs_unlocked|
|__builtin_fscanf|
|__builtin_fwrite|
|__builtin_fwrite_unlocked|
|__builtin_printf|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_printf_unlocked</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_putchar</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_putchar_unlocked</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_puts</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_puts_unlocked</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_vsprintf</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_vprintf</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_vscanf</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>_builtin_vsscanf</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not Supported: wctype built-in**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswalnum</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswalpha</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswblank</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswcntrl</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswdigit</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswgraph</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswlower</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswprint</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswpunct</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswspace</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswupper</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_iswxdigit</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_towlower</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_towupper</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not Supported: Process control built-ins**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_execl</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_execlp</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_execve</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_fork</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin_exit</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__Exit</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non Supported: Object size checking built-ins**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__fprintf_chk</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__printf_chk</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__scanf_chk</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__vfprintf_chk</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non Supported: Miscellaneous built-ins**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__dcgettext</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__dgettext</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__gettext</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__strftime</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non Supported: Profiling Hooks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__cyg_profile_func_entry</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__cyg_profile_func_exit</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non Supported: TLS Emulation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>target.emutls.get_address</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>target.emutls.register_common</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non supported: Ring 0 built-ins**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>writefsbase_u32</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>writefsbase_u64</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>writefsbase_u64</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>writegsbase_u32</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>writegsbase_u64</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>rdpmc</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>rdtscp</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non Supported: OpenMP® built-ins**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__omp_get_thread_num</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__omp_get_num_threads</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_atomic_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_atomic_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_barrier</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_taskwait</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_taskyield</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_critical_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_critical_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_critical_name_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_critical_name_end</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>__builtin__GOMP_loop_static_start</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ordered_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.dynamic_next</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.runtime_next</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ordered_runtime_next</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull_dynamic_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.ordered_dynamic_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.ordered_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.ordered_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.ordered_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.next</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.ordered_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.ull.dynamic_next</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.parallel_loop_dynamic_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.parallel_loop_dynamic_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.parallel_loop_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.parallel_runtime_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP_loop.nowait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.ordered_end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.parallel_end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.sections.start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.sections.end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.sections.end.nowait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__builtin_GOMP.single_copy.start</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unsupported C Standard Functions**

You cannot use the following Standard C functions within the enclave; otherwise, the compilation would fail.

**Table 20 Unsupported C Standard Functions**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Header file in Intel SGX?</th>
<th>Unsupported Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| complex.h   | No                        | complex, _complex_I, imaginary, _imaginary_I, 
#pragma STDC CX_LIMITED_RANGE on-off-switch |
| fenv.h      | No                        | fenv_t, fexcept_t, FE_DIVBYZERO, 
FE_INEXACT, FE_INVALID, 
FE_OVERFLOW, FE_UNDERFLOW, 
FE_ALL_EXCEPT, FE_DOWNWARD, 
FE_TONEAREST, FE_TOWARDZERO, 
FE_UPWARD, FE_DFL_ENV, 
#pragma STDC FENV_ACCESS on-off-switch |
| inttypes.h  | Yes                       | SCNdn, SCNIN, SCNoN, 
SCNuN, SCNxN, SCNdLEASTN, |

Macros/Types | Functions |
---|---|
-cos(), cacosf(), cacosl(), casin(), casinf(), casinl() |
catan(), catanf(), catanl(), ccos(), ccosf(), ccosl() |
csin(), csinf(), csinl(), ctan(), ctanf(), ctanl(), 
cosh(), cacoshf(), cacoshl(), casinh(), casinhf(), 
csinhl(), ctanh(), ctanhl(), ccatan(), ccacoth(), 
ccoth(), cccoth(), ccsinh(), ccsinhf(), ccsh(), 
csinh(), csinhf(), ctanh(), ctanhl(), cexp(), cexpf(), cexpl(), 
clog(), clogf(), clogl(), cabs(), cabsf(), cabsl(), 
ccos(), ccosf(), ccosl(), csin(), csinf(), csinl(), 
ctan(), ctanf(), ctanl(), cacosh(), cacoshf(), cacoshl(), 
cosh(), coshf(), cosh(), csinh(), csinhf(), csinh(), 
ctanh(), ctanhl(), stderr(), cexp(), cexpf(), cexpl(), 
clog(), clogf(), clogl(), cabs(), cabsf(), cabsl(), 
clog(), clogf(), clogl(), cabs(), cabsf(), cabsl(), 
cpow(), cpowf(), cpowl(), csqrt(), csqrtf(), csqrtl(), 
carg(), cargf(), cargl(), cimag(), cimagf(), cimagl() |
conj(), conjf(), conjl(), cproj(), cprojf(), cprojl() |
creal(), crealf(), creall() |
cclearexcept(), fegetexcepflag(), 
feraiseexcept(), fetsetexcepflag(), 
fetestexcept(), fegetround(), fetestround(), fegetenv(), feholdexcep(), 
festenv(), feupdateenv() |
wcmtoimax(), wcmtoimax() |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Header file in Intel SGX?</th>
<th>Unsupported Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macros/Types</td>
<td>Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCnILEASTN, SCNoLEASTN,</td>
<td>setlocale(), localeconv()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCNuLEASTN, SCnxLEASTN,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCNdFASTN, SCnFASTN,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCNoFASTN, SCNuFASTN,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCnxFASTN, SCNdMAX,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCnMAX, SCnxMAX,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCNdPTR, SCnPTR,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC_ALL, LC_COLLATE,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC_CTYPE,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC_MONETARY,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC_NUMERIC,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LC_TIME, struct lconv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signal.h</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>signal(), raise()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sig_atomic_t, SIG_DFL,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIG_ERR, SIG_IGN, SIGABRT,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGFPE, SIGILL, SIGINT,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIGSEGV, SIGTERM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdio.h</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>remove(), rename(), tmpfile(), tmpnam()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fpos_t, _IOFBF, _IOLBF,</td>
<td>fclose(), fflush(), fopen(), freopen(),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>_IONBF, FILENAME_MAX,</td>
<td>setbuf(), setvbuf(), fprintf(), fscanf(),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FOPEN_MAX, L_tmpnam,</td>
<td>printf(), scanf(), sprintf(), sscanf(),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|             |                            | vfprintf(), vfsprintf(), vsprintf(), vsSCANf(), vsSCANf(), vsprintf(), vscanf(), vscanf(), vsprintf(), vscanff(), fgetc(), fgets(), getc(), gets(), putc(), putchar(), puts(), ungetc(), fread(), fwrite(), fgetpos(), fseek(), ftell(), fsetpos(),
### Header file in Intel SGX?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Unsupported Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Header file in Intel SGX?</td>
<td>Macros/Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdlib.h Yes</td>
<td>SEEK_CUR, SEEK_END, SEEK_SET, TMP_MAX, stderr, stdin, stdout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string.h Yes</td>
<td>rand(), srand(), atexit(), exit(), _Exit(), getenv(), system()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tgmath.h No</td>
<td>strcpy(), strcat(), strstr()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time.h Yes</td>
<td>clock(), mktime(), time(), ctime(), gmtime(), localtime()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wchar.h Yes</td>
<td>fwprintf(), fwscanf(), swscanf(), vfscanf(), vfwprintf(), vfwscanf(), vsscanf(), vsprintf(), wprintf(), wscanf(), fgetwc(), fgetws(), fputwc(), fputws(), wide(), getwc(), getwchar(), putwc(), putwchar(), ungetwc(), wcsd(), wcstof(), wcstof(), wcstold(), wcstold(), wcstou(), wcstoul(), wcscpy(), wcscat(), wcsftime(), wctob()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wctype.h Yes</td>
<td>iswalnum(), iswalpha(), iswblank(), iswctrl(), iswgraph(), iswlower(), iswprint(), iswpunct(), iswspace(), isupper(), iswxdigit(), wctype(), tolower(), toupper(), towctrans(), wctrans()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The trusted standard C library does not support `char strstr(const char*, const char*)`. However, it does support the variant `const char* strstr (const char*, const char*)` is supported.

### NOTE

 Trusted C library is enhanced to avoid format string attacks. Any attempts to use `%n` in printf-family functions such as `snprintf` will result in a run-time error.

### Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions

The following table lists unsupported C++11 classes and functions inside the enclave.
### Table 21 Utilities library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cstdlib</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>csignal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>csetjmp</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdarg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typeinfo</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>typeindex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type_traits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bitset</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functional</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ctime</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chrono</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstddef</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initializer_list</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tuple</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 22 Dynamic memory management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>memory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scoped_allocator</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23 Numeric limits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cfloat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cinttypes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdint</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 24 Error handling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cassert</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cerrno</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exception</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>nested_exception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Header File</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Unsupported Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stdexcept</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system_error</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25 Strings library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cctype</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstring</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uchar</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wchar</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wcharconv</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>string</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26 Containers library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>array</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deque</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forward_list</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>list</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>queue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stack</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unordered_map</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unordered_set</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vector</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27 Algorithms library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>algorithm</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28 Iterators library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iterator</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29 Numerics library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cfenv</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cmath</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numeric</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>random</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratio</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>valarray</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 30 Input/Output library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cstdio</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fstream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iomanip</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ios</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iosfwd</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>istream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ostream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sstream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>streambuf</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strstream</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 31 Localization library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>clocale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>codecvt</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>locale</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 32 Regular expressions library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regex</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 33 Atomic operations library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>atomic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 34 Thread library**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Table 35 C compatibility headers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header File</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Unsupported Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ccomplex</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ciso646</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This header file is empty in a conforming implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdalign</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cstdbool</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ctgmath</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

The following keywords are not supported in an enclave.

**Table 36 Unsupported C and C++ Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>__transaction_atomic</th>
<th>__transaction_relaxed</th>
<th>__transaction_cancel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The following GCC* specific attributes are not supported in an enclave.

**Table 37 Unsupported GCC* Compiler Attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>destructor</th>
<th>transaction Callable</th>
<th>transaction Unsafe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>transaction Safe</td>
<td>transaction May Cancel Outer</td>
<td>transaction Pure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transaction Wrap</td>
<td>disinterrupt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C++11 Support on Linux* OS

Although C++11 is considered the baseline, the availability of certain C++11 features depends on the GCC* compiler version and/or a specific compiler option. The table below summarizes the C++11 features available when you use the GCC compiler option -std=c++11 and link the enclave with `sgx_tcxx` as the standard C++ library.

**Table 38 Supported C++11 Language Features**
## C++11 Language Feature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alignment support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowing move constructors to throw [noexcept]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidirectional fences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C99 preprocessor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data-dependency ordering: atomics and memory model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared type of an expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default template arguments for function templates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defaulted and deleted functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegating constructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic initialization and destruction with concurrency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit conversion operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit virtual overrides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression SFINAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended friend declarations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending sizeof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extern templates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward declarations for enums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized constant expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheriting constructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initialization of class objects by rvalues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initializer lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inline namespaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambdas: New wording for C++0x lambdas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and unnamed types as template arguments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal support for garbage collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New character types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-static data member initializers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null pointer constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-value references</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range-based for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw string literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right angle brackets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving the SFINAE problem for expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++11 Language Feature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard layout types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static assertions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong compare and exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly-typed enums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Template aliases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thread-local storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicode strings literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal character name literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User-defined literals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variadic templates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>func</strong> predefined identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auto-typed variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long long</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Supported C Secure Functions**

The following table lists supported C secure functions inside the enclave.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header file</th>
<th>Supported C Secure Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mbusafecrt.h</td>
<td>strcat_s(), wcsxcat_s(), strncat_s(), strcpy_s(), wcscpy_s(), strncpy_s(),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wcscpy_s(), strtok_s(), wcstok_s(), wcscnlen(), _itoa_s(), _itoa_s(), _itoa_s(), _</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>utoa_s(), _utoa_s(), _ultoa_s(), _ultow_s(), _i64toa_s(), _i64toa_s(), _ui64toa_s(), _</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ui64toa_s(), sprintf_s(), swprintf_s(), _snprintf_s(), _snwprintf_s(), _vprintf_s(), _</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>_vsnprintf_s(), _vswprintf_s(), _vsnwprintf_s(), memcpy_s(), memmove_s()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>