



# Intel<sup>®</sup> Software Guard Extensions (Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX) SDK for Linux\* OS

**Developer Reference**

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## Revision History

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## Introduction

Intel provides the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK Developer Reference for software developers who wish to harden their application security using the Intel Software Guard Extensions technology.

This document covers an overview of the technology, tutorials, tools, sample code as well as an API reference.

Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries, and tools that enable the software developer to write and debug Intel® Software Guard Extensions applications in C/C++ programming language.

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### **NOTE**

Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) technology is only available on the 6th Generation Intel® Core(TM) Processor or newer.

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## Intel® Software Guard Extensions Technology Overview

Intel® Software Guard Extensions is an Intel technology whose objective is to enable a high-level protection of secrets. It operates by allocating hardware-protected memory where code and data reside. The protected memory area is called an enclave. Data within the enclave memory can only be accessed by the code that also resides within the enclave memory space. Enclave code can be invoked via special instructions. An enclave can be built and loaded as a shared object on Linux\* OS.

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### **NOTE:**

The enclave file can be disassembled, so the algorithms used by the enclave developer will not remain secret.

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Intel® Software Guard Extensions technology has a hard limit on the protected memory size, typically 64 MB or 128 MB. As a result, the number of active enclaves (in memory) is limited. Depending on the memory footprint of each enclave, use cases suggest that 5-20 enclaves can reside in memory simultaneously. Linux\*, however, can increase the protected memory size through paging.

## Intel® Software Guard Extensions Security Properties

- Intel designs the Intel® Software Guard Extensions to protect against software attacks:

- The enclave memory cannot be read or written from outside the enclave regardless of current privilege level and CPU mode (ring3/user-mode, ring0/kernel-mode, SMM, VMM, or another enclave). The abort page is returned in such conditions.
  - An enclave can be created with a debug attribute that allows a debugger to view its content. Production enclaves (non-debug) cannot be debugged by software or hardware debuggers.
  - The enclave environment cannot be entered via classic function calls, jumps, register manipulation or stack manipulation. The only way to call an enclave function is via a new instruction that performs several protect checks. Classic function calls initiated by enclave code to functions inside the enclave are allowed.
  - CPU mode can only be 32 or 64 bit when executing enclave code. Other CPU modes are not supported. An exception is raised in such conditions.
- Intel designs the Intel® Software Guard Extensions to protect against known hardware attacks:
    - The enclave memory is encrypted using industry-standard encryption algorithms with replay protection.
    - Tapping the memory or connecting the DRAM modules to another system will only give access to encrypted data.
    - The memory encryption key changes every power cycle randomly (for example, boot/sleep/hibernate). The key is stored within the CPU and it is not accessible.
    - Intel® Software Guard Extensions is not designed to handle side channel attacks or reverse engineering. It is up to the Intel® SGX developers to build enclaves that are protected against these types of attack.

Intel® Software Guard Extensions uses strong industry-standard algorithms for signing enclaves. The signature of an enclave characterizes the content and the layout of the enclave at build time. If the enclave's content and layout are not correct per the signature, then the enclave will fail to be initialized and, hence, will not be executed. If an enclave is initialized, it should be identical to the original enclave and will not be modified at runtime.

## Application Design Considerations

An Intel® Software Guard Extensions application design is different from non-Intel® SGX application as it requires dividing the application into two logical components:

- Trusted component. The code that accesses the secret resides here. This component is also called an enclave. More than one enclave can exist in an application.
- Untrusted component. The rest of the application including all its modules.<sup>1</sup>

The application writer should make the trusted part as small as possible. It is suggested that enclave functionality should be limited to operate on the secret data. A large enclave statistically has more bugs and (user created) security holes than a small enclave.

The enclave code can leave the protected memory region and call functions in the untrusted zone (by a special instruction). Reducing the enclave dependency on untrusted code will also strengthen its protection against possible attacks.

Embracing the above design considerations will improve protection as the attack surface is minimized.

The application designer, as the first step to harnessing Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK in the application, must redesign or refactor the application to fit these guidelines. This is accomplished by isolating the code module(s) that access any secrets and then moving these modules to a separate package/library. The details of how to create such an enclave are detailed in the tutorials section. You can also see the demonstrations on creating an enclave in the sample code that are shipped with the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK.

## Terminology and Acronyms

AE	Architectural enclaves. Enclaves that are part of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions framework. They include the quoting
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<sup>1</sup>From an enclave standpoint, the operating system and VMM are not trusted components, either.



	enclave (QE), provisioning enclave (PvE), launch enclave (LE)).
Attestation	Prove authenticity. In case of platform attestation, prove the identity of the platform.
CA	Certificate Authority.
ECALL	Enclave call. A function call that enters the enclave.
ECF	Enclave Configuration File.
ECDH	Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman.
EDL	Enclave Definition Language.
Intel® EPID	Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID.
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards developed by NIST for use in computer systems government-wide.
FIPS 140-2	Standard that defines security requirements for cryptographic modules and is required for sales to the Federal Governments.
HSM	Hardware Security Module.
Attestation Service	Attestation Service for Intel® Software Guard Extensions.
ISV	Independent Software Vendor.
KE	Key Exchange.
LE	Launch enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the licensing service.
Nonce	An arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic communication.
OCALL	Outside call. A function call that calls an untrusted function from an enclave.
Intel® SGX PSW	Platform Software for Intel® Software Guard Extensions.
PvE	Provisioning enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel® EPID) Provision service to handle the provisioning protocol.
QE	Quoting enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the quoting service.
Intel® SGX	Intel® Software Guard Extensions.
SigRL	Signature revocation list
SMK	Session MAC key.
SP	Service Provider.
SVN	Security version number. Used to version security levels of both hardware and software components of the Intel® Software Guard

	Extensions framework.
TCB	Trusted computing base. Portions of hardware and software that are considered safe and uncompromised. A system protection is improved if the TCB is as small as possible, making an attack harder.
TCS	Thread Control Structure.
TLS	Thread Local Storage.
TLS	Transport Layer Security.
tRTS	Trusted Run Time System
uRTS	Untrusted Run Time System
Intel® SGX SSL	Intel® Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library based on the OpenSSL. Provides cryptographic services for Intel® Software Guard Extensions enclave applications.

## Setting up an Intel® Software Guard Extensions Project

This topic introduces using the features of Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK to create and manage Intel® SGX application projects.

### Creating Intel® Software Guard Extensions Projects

To create an Intel® Software Guard Extensions project on Linux\* OS, you should follow the directory structure and Makefiles from one of the sample applications in the Intel® SGX SDK. In an Intel SGX project, you should normally prepare the following files:

1. Enclave Definition Language (EDL) file - describes enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototype. See [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for details.
2. Enclave Configuration File (ECF) - contains the information of the enclave metadata. See [Enclave Configuration File](#) for details.
3. Signing key files - used to sign an enclave to produce a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as enclave measurement. See [Signing Key Files](#) for details.
4. Application and enclave source code - the implementation of application and enclave functions.
5. makefile - it performs the following steps:
  1. Generates edger routines (see [Edger8r Tool](#) for details).
  2. Builds the application and enclave.
  3. Signs the enclave (see [Enclave Signing Tool](#) for details).
6. Linker script file - you should use the linker script to hide all unnecessary symbols, and only export `enclave_entry`, `g_global_data`, and `g_global_data_sim`.

Once you understand how an Intel SGX application is built, you may customize the project setup according to your needs.

To develop an Intel SGX application, Intel® SGX SDK supports a few non-standard configurations, not present in other SDKs. [Enclave Project Configurations](#) explains the various enclave project configurations as well as the corresponding Makefile options.

## Enclave Image Generation

An enclave image is a statically linked shared object under Linux OS, without any external dependencies. You must follow the guidelines below to generate a proper enclave image:

1. Link the tRTS with the `--whole-archive` option, so that the whole content of the trusted runtime library is included in the enclave;
2. For other libraries, you just need to pull the required symbols. For example, if an enclave requires routines in the trusted standard C and seal libraries:

HW mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice -lsgx_tcrypto -
-end-group
```

Simulation mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice_sim -lsgx_
tcrypto --end-group
```

In addition, a linker script is also recommended to hide all unnecessary symbols.

```
// file: enclave.lds
enclave.so
{
    global:
    enclave_entry;
    g_global_data_sim;
    g_peak_heap_used;
    g_peak_rsrv_mem_committed;
    local:
    *;
};
```

The symbol `enclave_entry` is the entry point to the enclave. The symbol `g_global_data_sim` comes from the tRTS simulation library and is required to be exposed for running an enclave in the simulation mode since it distinguishes between enclaves built to run on the simulator and on the hardware. The `sgx_emmt` tool relies on the symbol `g_peak_heap_used` to determine the size of the heap that the enclave uses and relies on the symbol `g_peak_rsrv_mem_committed` to determine the size of the reserved memory that the enclave uses. The symbol `__ImageBase` is used by tRTS to compute the base address of the enclave.

Assuming that you have a few object files to be linked into a target enclave, use the command line similar to the following:

```
$ ld -o enclave.so file1.o file2.o \  
-pie -eenclave_entry -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostart-  
files --no-undefined \  
--whole-archive -lsgx_trts --no-whole-archive \  
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc --lsgx_tservice -lsgx_crypto -  
-end-group \  
-Bstatic -Bsymbolic --defsym=__ImageBase=0 --export-  
dynamic \  
--version-script=enclave.lds
```

You are also encouraged to help harden your enclaves, by passing one of the following options to the linker, to put read-only non-executable sections in your own segment:

```
ld.gold --rosegment
```

or,

```
-Wl,-fuse-ld=gold -Wl,--rosegment
```

### Using Intel® Software Guard Extensions Eclipse\* Plug-in

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Eclipse\* Plug-in helps the enclave developer to maintain enclaves and untrusted related code inside Eclipse\* C/C++ projects.

To get more information on Intel® Software Guard Extensions Eclipse\* Plug-in, see Intel® Software Guard Extensions Eclipse\* Plug-in Developer Guide from the Eclipse Help content: **Help > Help Contents > Intel® SGX Eclipse Plug-in Developer Guide**.

## Using Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK Tools

This topic introduces how to use the following tools that the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides:

- **Edger8r Tool**  
Generates interfaces between the untrusted components and enclaves.
- **Enclave Signing Tool**  
Generates the enclave metadata, which includes the enclave signature, and adds such metadata to the enclave image.
- **Enclave Debugger**  
Helps to debug an enclave.
- **Enclave Memory Measurement Tool**  
Helps to measure the usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.
- **CPUSVN Configuration Tool**  
Helps to simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade scenario without modifying the hardware.

### Edger8r Tool

The Edger8r tool ships as part of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK. It generates edge routines by reading a user-provided Enclave Description Language (EDL) file. These edge routines define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave. Normally, the tool runs automatically as part of the enclave build process. However, an advanced enclave writer may invoke the Edger8r manually.

When given an EDL file, for example, `demo.edl`, the Edger8r by default generates four files:

- `demo_t.h` – Contains prototype declarations for trusted proxies and bridges.
- `demo_t.c` – Contains function definitions for trusted proxies and bridges.
- `demo_u.h` – Contains prototype declarations for untrusted proxies and bridges.

- `demo_u.c` – Contains function definitions for untrusted proxies and bridges.

Here is the command line description for the Edger8r tool:

### Syntax:

```
sgx_edger8r [options] <.edl file> [another .edl file ...]
```

### Arguments:

[Options]	Descriptions
<code>--use-prefix</code>	Prefix the untrusted proxy with the enclave name.
<code>--header-only</code>	Generate header files only.
<code>--search-path</code> <path>	Specify the search path of EDL files.
<code>--untrusted</code>	Generate untrusted proxy and bridge routines only.
<code>--trusted</code>	Generate trusted proxy and bridge routines only.
<code>--untrusted-dir</code> <dir>	Specify the directory for saving the untrusted code.
<code>--trusted-dir</code> <dir>	Specify the directory for saving the trusted code.
<code>--help</code>	Print help message showing the command line and options.

If neither `--untrusted` nor `--trusted` is specified, the Edger8r generates both.

Here, the `path` parameter has the same format as the `PATH` environment variable, and the enclave name is the base file name of the EDL file (`demo` in this case).

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### **CAUTION:**

The ISV must run the Edger8r tool in a protected malware-free environment to ensure the integrity of the tool so that the generated code is not compromised. The ISV is ultimately responsible for the code contained in the enclave and should review the code that the Edger8r tool generates.

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### Enclave Signing Tool

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK provides a tool named `sgx_sign` for you to sign enclaves. In general, signing an enclave is a process that involves producing a signature structure that contains enclave properties

such as the enclave measurement (see [Enclave Signature Structure](#) below). Once an enclave is signed in such structure, the modifications to the enclave file (such as code, data, signature, and so on) can be detected. The signing tool also evaluates the enclave image for potential errors and warns you about potential security hazards. `sgx_sign` is typically set up by one of the configuration tools included in the Intel® SGX SDK and runs automatically at the end of the build process. During the loading process, the signature is checked to confirm that the enclave has not been tampered with and has been loaded correctly. In addition, the signing tool can also be used to report metadata information for a signed enclave and to generate the SIGStruct file needed to add the enclave signer to the allowlist.

**Table 1 Enclave Signature Structure**

Section	Name
Header	HEADERTYPE
	HEADERLEN
	HEADERVERSION
	TYPE
	MODVENDOR
	DATE
	SIZE
	KEYSIZE
	MODULUSSIZE
	ENPONENTSIZE
	SWDEFINED
	RESERVED
	Signature
EXPONENT	
SIGNATURE	



Section	Name
Body	MISCSELECT
	MISCMASK
	RESERVED
	ISVFAMILYID
	ATTRIBUTES
	ATTRIBUTEMASK
	ENCLAVEHASH
	RESERVED
	ISVEXTPRODID
	ISVPRODID
	ISVSVN
	Buffer
Q1	
Q2	

### Command-Line Syntax

To run `sgx_sign`, use the following command syntax:

```
sgx_sign <command> [args]
```

All valid commands are listed in the table below. See [Enclave Signer Usage Examples](#) for more information.

**Table 2 Signing Tool Commands**

Command	Description	Arguments
<code>sign</code>	Sign the enclave using the private key in one step.	Required: -enclave, -key, -out  Optional: -config, -dumpfile, -cssfile
<code>gendata</code>	The first step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the enclave signing material to be signed by an external tool. This step dumps the signing material, which consists of the header and body sections of the enclave signature structure (see	Required: -enclave, -out  Optional: -config

	the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic), into a file (256 bytes in total).	
catsig	The second step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the signed enclave with the input signature and public key. The input signature is generated by an external tool based on the data generated by the <code>gendata</code> command. At this step, the signature and buffer sections are generated. The signature and buffer sections together with the header and body sections complete the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic).	Required: -enclave, -key, -out, -sig, -unsigned  Optional: -config, -dumpfile, -cssfile
dump	Get the metadata information for a signed enclave file and dump the metadata to a file specified with the <code>-dumpfile</code> option and the SIGSTRUCT to the file specified by the <code>-cssfile</code> option.	Required: -enclave, -dumpfile  Optional: -cssfile

All the valid command options are listed below:

**Table 3 Signing Tool Arguments**

Arguments	Descriptions	
-enclave <file>	Specify the enclave file to be signed or already signed. It is a required argument for the four commands.	
-config <file>	Specify the enclave configuration file It is an invalid argument for the <code>dump</code> command and an optional argument for the other three commands.	
-out <file>	Specify the output file. It is required for the following three commands.	
	<b>Command</b>	<b>Description</b>
	sign	The signed enclave file.
	gendata	The file with the enclave signing material.
catsig	The signed enclave file.	
-key <file>	Specify the signing key file. See <a href="#">File Formats</a> for detailed description.	

	Command	Description
	sign	Private key.
	gendata	Not applicable.
	catsig	Public key.
-sig <file>		Specify the file containing the signature corresponding to the enclave signing material.  Only valid for <code>catsig</code> command.
-unsigned <file>		Specify the file containing the enclave signing material generated by <code>gendata</code> .  Only valid for the <code>catsig</code> command.
-dumpfile		Specify a file to dump metadata information.  It is a required argument for the <code>dump</code> command and an optional argument for <code>sign</code> and <code>catsig</code>
-cssfile		Specify a file to dump the SIGSTRUCT information.  It is an optional argument for the <code>sign</code> , <code>catsig</code> and <code>dump</code> commands.
-ignore-rel-error		By default, <code>sgx_sign</code> provides an error for enclaves with text relocations. You can ignore the error and continue signing by providing this option. But it is recommended that you eliminate the text relocations instead of bypassing the error with this option.
-ignore-init-sec-error		By default, <code>sgx_sign</code> provides an error for enclaves with <code>.init</code> section. You can ignore the error and continue signing by providing this option. But it is recommended you eliminate the section instead of bypassing the error with this option.
-resign		By default, <code>sgx_sign</code> reports an error if an input enclave has already been signed. You can force <code>sgx_sign</code> to resign the enclave by providing this option
-version		Print the version information and exit.
-help		Print the help information and exit.

The arguments, including options and filenames, can be specified in any order. Options are processed first, then filenames. Use one or more spaces or tabs to separate arguments. Each option consists of an option identifier, a dash (-), followed by the name of the option. The <file> parameter specifies the absolute or relative path of a file.

`sgx_sign` generates the output file and returns 0 for success. Otherwise, it generates an error message and returns -1.

### Enclave Signing Key Management

An enclave project supports different signing methods needed by ISVs during the enclave development life cycle.

- Single-step method using the ISV's test private key:

The signing tool supports a single-step signing process, which requires the access to the signing key pair on the local build system. However, there is a requirement that any enclave signing key added to the allowlist must be managed in a hardware security module. Thus, the ISV's test private key stored in the build platform will not be added to the allowlist and enclaves signed with this key can only be launched in *debug* or *prerelease* mode. In this scenario, the ISV manages the signing key pair, which could be generated by the ISV using his own means. Single-step method is the default signing method for non-production enclave applications, which are created with the Intel SGX project *debug* and *prerelease* profiles.

- 2-step method using an external signing tool:
  1. First step: At the end of the enclave build process, the signing tool generates the enclave signing material.

The ISV takes the enclave signing material file to an external signing platform/facility where the private key is stored, signs the signing material file, and takes the resulting signature file back to the build platform.

2. Second step: The ISV runs the signing tool with the `catsig` command providing the necessary information at the command line to add the hash of the public key and signature to the enclave's metadata section.

The 2-step signing process protects the signing key in a separate facility. Thus it is the default signing method for the Intel SGX project *release* profile. This means it is the only method for signing production enclave applications.

### File Formats

There are several files with various formats followed by the different options. The file format details are listed below.

Table 4 Signing Tool File Formats

File	Format	Description
Enclave file	Shared Object	A standard Shared Object.
Signed enclave file	Shared Object	<code>sgx_sign</code> generates the signed enclave file, which includes the signature, to the enclave file.
Configuration file	XML	See <a href="#">Enclave Configuration File</a> .
Key file	PEM	Key file should follow the PEM format which contains an unencrypted RSA 3072-bit key. The public exponent must be 3.
Enclave hex file	RAW	A dump file of the enclave signing material data to be signed with the private RSA key.
Signature file	RAW	A dump file of the signature generated at the ISV's signing facility. The signature should follow the RSA-PKCS1.5 padding scheme. The signature should be generated using the v1.5 version of the RSA scheme with an SHA-256 message digest.
Metadata file	RAW	A dump file containing the SIGStruct metadata for the signed enclave. This file is submitted when there is a request for Intel to add a production enclave to the allowlist.

### Signing Key Files

The enclave signing tool only accepts key files in the PEM format and that are unencrypted. When an enclave project is created for the first time, you have to choose either using an already existing signing key or automatically generating one key for you. When you choose to import a pre-existing key, ensure that such key is in PEM format and unencrypted. If that is not the case, convert the signing key to the format accepted by the Signing Tool first. For instance, the following command converts an encrypted private key in PKCS#8/DER format to unencrypted PEM format:

```
openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -in private_pkcs8.der -outform PEM -out private_pkcs1.pem
```

Depending on the platform OS, the `openssl*` utility might be installed already or it may be shipped with the Intel® SGX SDK.

## Enclave Signer Usage Examples

The following are typical examples for signing an enclave using the one-step or the two-step method. When the private signing key is available at the build platform, you may follow the one-step signing process to sign your enclave. However, when the private key is only accessible in an isolated signing facility, you must follow the two-step signing process described below.

- One-step signing process:

Signing an enclave using a private key available on the build system:

```
sgx_sign sign -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml
-out enclave_signed.so -key private.pem
```

- Two-step signing process:

Signing an enclave using a private key stored in an HSM, for instance:

1. Generate the enclave signing material.

```
sgx_sign gendata -enclave enclave.so -config con-
fig.xml -out enclave_sig.dat
```

2. At the signing facility, sign the file containing the enclave signing material (`enclave_sig.dat`) and take the resulting signature file (`signature.dat`) back to the build platform.

3. Sign the enclave using the signature file and public key.

```
sgx_sign catsig -enclave enclave.so -config con-
fig.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key public.pem
-sig signature.dat -unsigned enclave_sig.dat
```

The configuration file `config.xml` is optional. If you do not provide a configuration file, the signing tool uses the default configuration values.

The following example illustrates generating a report of metadata information for a signed enclave:

```
sgx_sign dump -enclave enclave_signed.so -dumpfile
metadata_info.txt
```

A single enclave signing tool is provided, which allows for operating with 32-bit and 64-bit enclaves.

## OpenSSL\* Examples

The following command lines are typical examples using OpenSSL\*.

1. Generate a 3072-bit RSA private key. Use 3 as the public exponent value.

```
openssl genrsa -out private_key.pem -3 3072
```

2. Produce the public part of a private RSA key.

```
openssl rsa -in private_key.pem -pubout -out public_key.pem
```

3. Sign the file containing the enclave signing material.

```
openssl dgst -sha256 -out signature.dat -sign private_key.pem -keyform PEM enclave_sig.dat
```

## Enclave Debugger

You can leverage the helper script `sgx-gdb` to debug your enclave applications. To debug an enclave on a hardware platform, set the `<Dis-ableDebug>` configuration parameter should to 0 in the enclave configuration file `config.xml`, and the `Debug` parameter to 1 in the `sgx_create_enclave(...)` that creates the enclave. Debugging an enclave is similar to debugging a shared library. However, not all standard features are available to debug enclaves. The following table lists several unsupported GDB commands. `sgx-gdb` also supports measuring the enclave stack/heap usage by the Enclave Memory Measurement Tool. See the Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for additional information. Note that `sgx-gdb` does not support debugging enclaves created from memory by `sgx_create_enclave_from_buffer_ex` API.

**Table 5 GDB Unsupported Commands**

GDB Command	Description
<code>info sharedlibrary</code>	Does not show the status of the loaded enclave.
<code>next/step</code>	Does not allows to execute the next/step outside the enclave from inside the enclave. To go outside the enclave use the finish command.
<code>call/print</code>	Does not support calling outside the enclave from within an enclave function, or calling inside the enclave from a function in the untrusted

	domain.
charset	Only supports the GDB default charset.
gcore	Does not support debug enclave with the application dump file

## Performance Measurement using Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier

You can use the Intel® VTune™ Amplifier Application 2016 Update 2 and higher to measure the performance of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) applications, including the enclave. The Intel® VTune Amplifier application supports a new analysis type called `SGX Hotspots` that can be used to profile Intel® SGX enclave applications. You can use the default settings of the `SGX Hotspots` to profile the application and the enclave code. The precise event based sampling (PEBS) helps profiling Intel® SGX enclave code. You can add precise events (`_PS` events) to the collection to profile enclave code. Non-precise events cannot help profiling Intel® SGX enclave code.

You can use the Intel® VTune™ Amplifier to measure the performance of the enclave code only when the enclave is launched as a debug enclave. To launch as a debug enclave, pass a value of 1 as the second parameter to the `sgx_create_enclave` function, which loads and initializes the enclave as shown below. Use the pre-defined macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` as the parameter which is automatically set to 1 in `DEBUG` and `PRE-RELEASE` modes.

```
sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILENAME, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG,
&token, &updated, &global_eid, NULL);
```

---

### **NOTE:**

Only use the Intel® VTune™ Amplifier to measure the performance in the `DEBUG` and `PRE-RELEASE` modes because `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` cannot be 1 when launching an enclave in the `RELEASE` configuration.

When you use Intel® VTune™ Amplifier with in-kernel driver, if you have `INT3` instruction in your enclave code, you need to register a signal handler to handle the `SIGTRAP` signal.

---

The Intel® VTune™ Amplifier provides two options to profile applications:

- Run the applications using the Intel® VTune™ Amplifier. If you use this approach, no additional steps required.
- Attach to the running process or the enclave application. If you use this approach, define the environment variable as follows:



- For 64bit:

```
INTEL_LIBITTTNOTIFY64 = <VTune Installation
Dir>/lib64/runtime/ittnotify_collector.so
```

Once the enclave is loaded, the invoked instrumentation and tracing technology (ITT) API of the Intel® VTune™ Amplifier in the uRTS passes information about the enclave to the Intel® VTune Amplifier and profiles the Intel® SGX enclave applications. When you attach the Intel VTune Amplifier to the application after invoking the ITT API of the Intel® VTune Amplifier, the module information about the enclave is cached in the ITT dynamic library and is used by the Intel® VTune Amplifier to attach to the process. The following table describes different scenarios of how the Intel VTune Amplifier is used to profile the enclave application:

Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier Invocation	Additional Configuration	ITT API Result	uRTS Action
Launch the application with the Intel® VTune (TM) Amplifier	N/A	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling	Set the Debug OPTIN bit and invoke the Module mapping API.
Late attach <i>before</i> invoking the ITT API for the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier profiling check in <code>sgx_create_enclave</code>	ITT environment variable is set.	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling	Set the Debug OPTIN bit and invoke the Module mapping API.
	ITT environment variable is not set.	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling	Do not set the Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke the Module mapping API.  Even though the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is running, it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.
Late attach <i>after</i> invoking the ITT API for the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier	ITT environment variable is set.	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is	Set the Debug OPTIN bit and invoke the Module mapping API.

fier profiling check in <code>sgx_create_enclave</code>		profiling	The ITT dynamic library caches the module information and provides it to the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier during attaching to the process.
	ITT environment variable is not set.	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling	Do not set the Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke the Module mapping API.  Even though the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is running, it cannot profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.
Launch the application without the Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier	N/A	Intel® VTune(TM) Amplifier is not profiling	Do not set the Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke the Module mapping API.

### Enclave Memory Measurement Tool

An enclave is an isolated environment. The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool called `sgx_emmt` to measure the real usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

Currently the enclave memory measurement tool provides the following functions:

1. Get the stack peak usage value for the enclave.
2. Get the heap peak usage value for the enclave.
3. Get the reserved memory peak usage value for the enclave.

The tool reports the size of the memory usage in KB. Once you get accurate memory usage information for your enclaves, you can rework the enclave configuration file based on this information to make full use of the protected memory. See [Enclave Configuration File](#) for details.

On Linux\* OS, the enclave memory measurement capability is provided by the helper script `sgx-gdb`. The `sgx-gdb` is a GDB extension for you to debug your enclave applications. See [Enclave Debugger](#) for details.

To measure how much protected memory an enclave uses, you should leverage `sgx-gdb` to launch GDB with `sgx_emmt` enabled and load the test application that is using the enclave. You may also attach the debugger to a running Intel SGX application to measure the memory usage of the enclave.

The `sgx-gdb` provides three commands pertaining the `sgx_emmt` tool:

**Table 6 Enclave Memory Measurement Tool Commands**

Command	Description
<code>enable sgx_emmt</code>	Enable the enclave memory measurement tool.
<code>disable sgx_emmt</code>	Disable the enclave memory measurement tool.
<code>show sgx_emmt</code>	Show whether the enclave memory measurement tool is enabled or not.

Here are the typical steps necessary to collect an enclave's memory usage information:

1. Leverage `sgx-gdb` to start a GDB session.
2. Enable the enclave memory measurement function with `enable sgx_emmt`.
3. Load and run the test application which is using the enclave.

---

**NOTE:**

To collect peak stack/heap/reserved memory usage for an enclave on a hardware platform correctly, make sure the enclave meets the following requirements:

1. The enclave is debuggable. This means that the `<DisableDebug>` configuration parameter in the enclave configuration file should be set to 0.
  2. The enclave is launched in the debug mode. To launch the enclave in the debug mode, set the debug flag to 1 when calling [sgx\\_create\\_enclave](#) to load the enclave.
  3. Export `g_peak_heap_used` and `g_peak_rsrv_mem_committed` in the version script of the enclave.
  4. Destroy the enclave by using the [sgx\\_destroy\\_enclave](#) API.
-

## CPUSVN Configuration Tool

CPUSVN stands for Security Version Number of the CPU, which affects the key derivation and report generation process. CPUSVN is not a numeric concept and will be upgraded/downgraded along with the hardware upgrade/-downgrade. To simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade without modifying the hardware, the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a CPUSVN configuration tool for you to configure the CPUSVN. The CPUSVN configuration tool is for Intel® SGX simulation mode only.

### Command-Line Syntax

To run the Intel® SGX CPUSVN configuration tool, use the following syntax:

```
sgx_config_cpusvn [Command]
```

The valid commands are listed in the table below:

**Table 7 CPUSVN Configuration Tool Commands**

Command	Description
-upgrade	Simulate a CPUSVN upgrade.
-downgrade	Simulate a CPUSVN downgrade.
-reset	Restore the CPUSVN to its default value.

## Enclave Development Basics

This topic introduces the following enclave development basics:

- [Writing Enclave Functions](#)
- [Calling Functions inside the Enclave](#)
- [Calling Functions outside the Enclave](#)
- [Linking Enclave with Libraries](#)
- [Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries](#)
- [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#)
- [Loading and Unloading an Enclave](#)

The typical enclave development process includes the following steps:

1. Define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave in the EDL file.
2. Implement the application and enclave functions.
3. Build the application and enclave. In the build process, [Edger8r Tool](#) generates trusted and untrusted proxy/bridge functions. [Enclave Signing Tool](#) generates the metadata and signature for the enclave.
4. Run and debug the application in simulation and hardware modes. See [Enclave Debugger](#) for more details.
5. Prepare the application and enclave for release.

### Writing Enclave Functions

From an application perspective, making an enclave call (ECALL) appears as any other function call when using the untrusted proxy function. Enclave functions are plain C/C++ functions with several limitations.

The user can write enclave functions in C and C++ (native only). Other languages are not supported.

Enclave functions can rely on special versions of the C/C++ runtime libraries, STL, synchronization and several other trusted libraries that are part of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK. These trusted libraries are specifically designed to be used inside enclaves.

The user can write or use other trusted libraries, making sure the libraries follow the same rules as the internal enclave functions:

1. Enclave functions can't use all the available 32-bit or 64-bit instructions. To check a list of illegal instructions inside an enclave, see [Intel®](#)

[Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.](#)

2. Enclave functions will only run in user mode (ring 3). Using instructions requiring other CPU privileges will cause the enclave to fault.
3. Function calls within an enclave are possible if the called function is statically linked to the enclave (the function needs to be in the enclave image file).Linux\* Shared Objects are not supported.

**CAUTION:**

The enclave signing process will fail if the enclave image contains any unresolved dependencies at build time.

Calling functions outside the enclave is possible using what are called OCALLs. OCALLs are explained in detail in the [Calling Functions outside the Enclave](#) section.

**Table 8 Summary of Intel® SGX Rules and Limitations**

Feature	Supported	Comment
Languages	Partially	Native C/C++. Enclave interface functions are limited to C (no C++).
C/C++ calls to other Shared Objects	No	Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).
C/C++ calls to System provided C/C++/STL standard libraries	No	A trusted version of these libraries is supplied with the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK and they can be used instead.
OS API calls	No	Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).
C++ frameworks	No	Including MFC*, QT*, Boost* (partially – as long as Boost runtime is not used).
Call C++ class methods	Yes	Including C++ classes, static and inline functions.
Intrinsic functions	Partially	Supported only if they use supported instructions.  The allowed functions are included in the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK.
Inline assembly	Partially	Same as the intrinsic functions.
Template func-	Partially	Only supported in enclave internal functions

tions		
Ellipse (...)	Partially	Only supported in enclave internal functions
Varargs (va_ list)	Partially	Only supported in enclave internal functions.
Synchronization	Partially	The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a collection of functions/objects for synchronization: spin-lock, mutex, and condition variable.
Threading support	Partially	Creating threads inside the enclave is not supported. Threads that run inside the enclave are created within the (untrusted) application. Spinlocks, trusted mutex and condition variables API can be used for thread synchronization inside the enclave.
Thread Local Storage (TLS)	Partially	Only implicitly via __thread.
Dynamic memory allocation	Yes	Enclave memory is a limited resource. Maximum heap size is set at enclave creation.
C++ Exceptions	Yes	Although they have an impact on performance.
SEH Exceptions	No	The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See <a href="#">Custom Exception Handling</a> for more details.
Signals	No	Signals are not supported inside an enclave.

## Calling Functions inside the Enclave

After an enclave is loaded successfully, you get an enclave ID, which is provided as a parameter when the ECALLs are performed. Optionally, OCALLs can be performed within an ECALL. For example, assume that you need to compute some secret inside an enclave, the EDL file might look like the following:

```
// demo.edl
enclave {
    // Add your definition of "secret_t" here
    trusted {
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
    }
}
```

```

};
untrusted {
    // This OCALL is for illustration purposes only.
    // It should not be used in a real enclave,
    // unless it is during the development phase
    // for debugging purposes.
    void dump_secret([in] const secret_t* secret);
};
};

```

With the above EDL, the `sgx_edger8r` will generate an untrusted proxy function for the ECALL and a trusted proxy function for the OCALL:

Untrusted proxy function (called by the application):

```
sgx_status_t get_secret(sgx_enclave_id_t eid, secret_t*
secret);
```

Trusted proxy function (called by the enclave):

```
sgx_status_t dump_secret(const secret_t* secret);
```

The generated untrusted proxy function will automatically call into the enclave with the parameters to be passed to the real trusted function `get_secret` inside the enclave. To initiate an ECALL in the application:

```

// An enclave call (ECALL) will happen here
secret_t secret;
sgx_status_t status = get_secret(eid, &secret);

```

The trusted functions inside the enclave can optionally do an OCALL to dump the secret with the trusted proxy `dump_secret`. It will automatically call out of the enclave with the given parameters to be received by the real untrusted function `dump_secret`. The real untrusted function needs to be implemented by the developer and linked with the application.



### Checking the Return Value

The trusted and untrusted proxy functions return a value of type `sgx_status_t`. If the proxy function runs successfully, it will return `SGX_SUCCESS`. Otherwise, it indicates a specific error described in [Error Codes](#) section. You can refer to the sample code shipped with the SDK for examples of proper error handling.

### Calling Functions outside the Enclave

In some cases, the code within the enclave needs to call external functions which reside in untrusted (unprotected) memory to use operating system capabilities outside the enclave such as system calls, I/O operations, and so on. This type of function call is named OCALL.

These functions need to be declared in the EDL file in the untrusted section. See [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for more details.

The enclave image is loaded very similarly to how Linux\* OS loads shared objects. The function address space of the application is shared with the enclave so the enclave code can indirectly call functions linked with the application that created the enclave. Calling functions from the application directly is not permitted and will raise an exception at runtime.

---

#### **CAUTION:**

The wrapper functions copy the parameters from protected (enclave) memory to unprotected memory as the external function cannot access protected memory regions. In particular, the OCALL parameters are copied into the untrusted stack. Depending on the number of parameters, the OCALL may cause a stack overrun in the untrusted domain. The exception that this event will trigger will appear to come from the code that the `sgx_eder8r` generates based on the enclave EDL file. However, the exception can be easily detected using the debugger.

---

#### **CAUTION:**

The wrapper functions will copy buffers (memory referenced by pointers) only if these pointers are assigned special attributes in the EDL file.

---

#### **CAUTION:**

Certain trusted libraries distributed with the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provide an API that internally makes OCALLs. Currently, the Intel® Software Guard Extensions mutex, reader/writer lock, condition variable, and CPUID APIs from `libsgx_tstdc.a` make OCALLs. Similarly, the trusted support

---

---

library `libsgx_tservice.a`, which provides services from the Platform Services Enclave (PSE-Op), also makes OCALLs. Developers who use these APIs must first import the needed OCALL functions from their corresponding EDL files. Otherwise, developers will get a linker error when the enclave is built. See the [Importing EDL Libraries](#) for details on how to import OCALL functions from a trusted library EDL file.

---

**CAUTION:**

To help identify problems caused by missing imports, all OCALL functions used in the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK have the suffix `_ocall`. For instance, the linker error below indicates that the enclave needs to import the OCALLs `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall()` and `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall()` that are needed in `sethread_mutex.obj`, which is part of `libsgx_tstdc.a`.

```
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_lock':
```

```
sethread_mutex.cpp:109: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall'
```

```
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock':
```

```
sethread_mutex.cpp:213: undefined reference to `sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall'
```

---

**CAUTION:**

Accessing protected memory from unprotected memory will result in abort page semantics. This applies to all parts of the protected memory including heap, stack, code and data.

Abort page semantics:

An attempt to read from a non-existent or disallowed resource returns all ones for data (abort page). An attempt to write to a non-existent or disallowed physical resource is dropped. This behavior is unrelated to exception type abort (the others being Fault and Trap).

---

OCALL functions have the following limitations/rules:

- OCALL functions must be C functions, or C++ functions with C linkage.
- Pointers that reference data within the enclave must be annotated with pointer direction attributes in the EDL file. The wrapper function will

perform shallow copy on these pointers. See [Pointers](#) for more information.

- Exceptions will not be caught within the enclave. The user must handle them in the untrusted wrapper function.
- OCALLs cannot have an ellipse (...) or a `va_list` in their prototype.

### Example 1: The definition of a simple OCALL function

Step 1 – Add a declaration for `foo` in the EDL file

```
// foo.edl
enclave {
    untrusted {
        [cdecl] void foo(int param);
    };
};
```

Step 2 (optional but highly recommended) – write a trusted, user-friendly wrapper. This function is part of the enclave's trusted code.

The wrapper function `ocall_foo` function will look like:

```
// enclave's trusted code
#include "foo_t.h"
void ocall_foo(int param)
{
    // it is necessary to check the return value of foo()
    if (foo(param) != SGX_SUCCESS)
        abort();
}
```

Step 3 – write an untrusted `foo` function.

```
// untrusted code
void foo(int param)
{
    // the implementation of foo
}
```

The `sgx_edger8r` will generate an untrusted bridge function which will call the untrusted function `foo` automatically. This untrusted bridge and the target untrusted function are part of the application, not the enclave.

## Library Development for Enclaves

Trusted library is the term used to refer to a static library designed to be linked with an enclave. The following list describes the features of trusted libraries:

- Trusted libraries are components of an Intel® SGX-based solution. They typically undergo a more rigorous threat evaluation and review process than a regular static library.
- A trusted library is developed (or ported) with the specific purpose of being used within an enclave. Therefore, it should not contain instructions that are not supported by the Intel® SGX architecture.
- A subset of the trusted library API may also be part of the enclave interface. The trusted library interface that could be exposed to the untrusted domain is defined in an EDL file. If present, this EDL file is a key component of the trusted library.
- A trusted library may have to be shipped with an untrusted library. Functions within the trusted library may make OCALLs outside the enclave. If an external function that the trusted library uses is not provided by the libraries available on the platform, the trusted library will require an untrusted support library.

In summary, a trusted library, in addition to the `.a` file containing the trusted code and data, may also include an `.edl` file as well as an untrusted `.a` file.

This topic describes the process of developing a trusted library and provides an overview of the main steps necessary to build an enclave that uses such a trusted library.

1. The ISV provides a trusted library including the trusted functions (without any edge-routines) and, when necessary, an EDL file and an untrusted support library. To develop a trusted library, an ISV should create an enclave project and choose the library option in the Eclipse plugin. This ensures the library is built with the appropriate settings. The ISV might delete the EDL file from the project if the trusted library only provides an interface to be invoked within an enclave. The ISV should create a standard static library project for the untrusted support library, if required.
2. Add a “from/import” statement with the library EDL file path and name to the enclave EDL file. The import statement indicates which trusted

functions (ECALLs) from the library may be called from outside the enclave and which untrusted functions (OCALLs) are called from within the trusted library. You may import all ECALLs and OCALLs from the trusted library or select a specific subset of them.

A library EDL file may import additional library EDL files building a hierarchical structure. For additional details, See [Importing EDL Libraries](#).

3. During the enclave build process, the `sgx_edger8r` generates proxy/bridge code for all the trusted and untrusted functions. The generated code accounts for the functions declared in the enclave EDL file as well as any imported trusted library EDL file.
4. The trusted library and trusted proxy/bridge functions are linked to the enclave code.

---

**NOTE:**

If you use the wildcard option to import a trusted library, the resulting enclave contains the trusted bridge functions for all ECALLs and their corresponding implementations. The linker will not be able to optimize this code out.

---

5. The Intel® SGX application is linked to the untrusted proxy/bridge code. Similarly, when the wildcard import option is used, the untrusted bridge functions for all the OCALLs will be linked in.

### Avoiding Name Collisions

An application may be designed to work with multiple enclaves. In this scenario, each enclave would still be an independent compilation unit resulting in a separate SO file.

Enclaves, like regular SO files, should provide a unique interface to avoid name collisions when an untrusted application is linked with the edge-routines of several enclaves. The `sgx_edger8r` prevents name collisions among OCALL functions because it automatically prepends the enclave name to the names of the untrusted bridge functions. However, ISVs must ensure the uniqueness of the ECALL function names across enclaves to prevent collisions among ECALL functions.

Despite having unique ECALL function names, name collision may also occur as the result of developing an Intel® SGX application. This happens because an enclave cannot import another SO file. When two enclaves import the same ECALL function from a trusted library, the set of edge-routines for each

enclave will contain identical untrusted proxy functions and marshaling data structures for the imported ECALL. Thus, the linker will emit an error when the application is linked with these two sets of edge-routines. To build an application with more than one enclave when these enclaves import the same ECALL from a trusted library, ISVs have to:

1. Provide the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`, which will prepend the enclave name to the untrusted proxy function names. For instance, when an enclave uses the local attestation trusted library sample code included in the Intel® SGX SDK, the enclave EDL file must be parsed with the `--use-prefix` option to `sgx_edger8r`. See [Local Attestation](#) for additional details.
2. Prefix all ECALLs in their untrusted code with the enclave name, matching the new proxy function names.

## Linking Enclave with Libraries

This topic introduces how to link an enclave with the following types of libraries:

- Dynamic libraries
- Static Libraries
- Simulation Libraries

### Dynamic Libraries

An enclave shared object must *not* depend on any dynamically linked library in any way. The enclave loader has been intentionally designed to prohibit dynamic linking of libraries within an enclave. The protection of an enclave is dependent upon obtaining an accurate measurement of all code and data that is placed into the enclave at load time; thus, dynamic linking would add complexity without providing any benefit over static linking.

---

#### **CAUTION:**

The enclave image signing process will fail if the enclave file has any unresolved dependencies.

---

### Static Libraries

You can link with static libraries as long as they do not have any dependencies.

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Software Development Kit (Intel® SGX SDK) provides the following collection of trusted libraries.

Table 9 Trusted Libraries included in the Intel® SGX SDK

Name	Description	Comment
libsgx_trts.a	Intel® SGX Runtime library	Must link when running in HW mode
libsgx_trts_sim.a	Intel® SGX Runtime library (simulation mode)	Must link when running in simulation mode
libsgx_tstdc.a	Standard C library (math, string, and so on.)	Must link
libsgx_tcxx.a,	Standard C++ libraries, STL	Optional
libsgx_tservice.a	Data seal/unseal (encryption), trusted Architectural Enclaves support, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EC DH) library, and so on.	Must link when using HW mode
libsgx_tservice_sim.a	The counterpart of libsgx_tservice.a for simulation mode	Must link when using simulation mode
libsgx_tcrypto.a	Cryptographic library	Must link
libsgx_tkey_exchange.a	Trusted key exchange library	Optional
libsgx_tprotected.a	Protected File System library	Optional
libsgx_tswitchless.a	Switchless Enclave Function Calls	Optional
libsgx_pcl.a	Enables Intel® SGX Protected Code Loader for enclave code confidentiality	Optional
libsgx_pclsim.a	Enables Intel® SGX Protected Code Loader for enclave code confidentiality (simulation mode)	Optional

### Simulation Libraries

The Intel® SGX SDK provides simulation libraries to run application enclaves in simulation mode (Intel® SGX hardware is not required). There are an untrusted simulation library and a trusted simulation library. The untrusted simulation library provides the functionality that the untrusted runtime library requires to manage an enclave linked with the trusted simulation library, including the

simulation of the Intel® SGX instructions executed outside the enclave: ECREATE, EADD, EEXTEND, EINIT, EREMOVE, and EENTER. The trusted simulation library is primarily responsible for simulating the Intel® SGX instructions that can execute inside an enclave: EEXIT, EGETKEY, and EREPORT.

---

### **NOTE**

Simulation mode does not require the Intel SGX support in the CPU. However, the processor must support the Intel® Streaming SIMD Extensions 4.1 instructions at least.

---

### **Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of untrusted libraries.

**Table 10 Untrusted Libraries included in the Intel® SGX SDK**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Comment</b>
libsgx_urts.so	Provides functionality for applications to manage enclaves	Must link when running in HW mode.  libsgx_urts.so is included in Intel® SGX PSW
libsgx_urts_sim.so	uRTS library used in simulation mode	Dynamically linked
	Provides both enclaves and untrusted applications access to services provided by the AEs	Must link when running in HW mode.  is included in Intel® SGX PSW
libsgx_uae_service_sim.so	Untrusted AE support library used in simulation mode	Dynamically linked
libsgx_ukey_exchange.a	Untrusted key exchange library	Optional
libsgx_uae_service.so	Provides both enclaves and untrusted applications access to services provided by the AEs	Must link when running in HW mode. This library is being phased out. We recommend start linking with the libraries below and corresponding header files based on



		the services your application needs.
libsgx_launch.so	Provides applications access to launch services provided by the AEs.	Must link when running in HW mode.
libsgx_epid.so	Provides applications access to the EPID provisioning services provided by the AEs.	Must link when running in HW mode.
libsgx_platform.so	Provides applications access to platform services (trusted time and monotonic counter).	Must link when running in HW mode.
libsgx_quote_ex.so		Must link when running in HW mode.

### Enclave Definition Language Syntax

Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files are meant to describe enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototypes. [Edger8r Tool](#) uses this file to create C wrapper functions for both enclave exports (used by ECALLs) and imports (used by OCALLs).

### EDL Template

```
enclave {
    //Include files

    //Import other edl files

    //Data structure declarations to be used as parameters of the
    //function prototypes in edl

    trusted {
        //Include header files if any
        //Will be includedd in enclave_t.h

        //Trusted function prototypes
    }
};
```

```

untrusted {
    //Include header files if any
    //Will be included in enclave_u.hhead

    //Untrusted function prototypes

};
};

```

The trusted block is optional only if it is used as a library EDL, and this EDL would be imported by other EDL files. However the untrusted block is always optional.

Every EDL file follows this generic format:

```

enclave {

    // An EDL file can optionally import functions from
    // other EDL files
    from "other/file.edl" import foo, bar; // selective importing
    from "another/file.edl" import *;     // import all functions

    // Include C headers, these headers will be included in the
    // generated files for both trusted and untrusted routines
    include "string.h"
    include "mytypes.h"

    // Type definitions (struct, union, enum), optional
    struct mysecret {
        int key;
        const char* text;
    };
    enum boolean { FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1 };

    // Export functions (ECALLs), optional for library EDLs
    trusted {
        //Include header files if any
        //Will be included in enclave_t.h

        //Trusted function prototypes

        public void set_secret([in] struct mysecret* psecret);

        void some_private_func(enum boolean b); // private ECALL
        (non-root ECALL).
    };

    // Import functions (OCALLs), optional
    untrusted {

        //Include header files if any

```

```

//Will be included in enclave_u.h
//Will be inserted in untrusted header file
"untrusted.h"

//Untrusted function prototypes

// This OCALL is not allowed to make another ECALL.
void ocall_print();

// This OCALL can make an ECALL to function
// "some_private_func".
int another_ocall([in] struct mysecret* psecret)
    allow(some_private_func);
};
};

```

### Comments

Both types of C/C++ comments are valid.

### Example

```

enclave {
    include "stdio.h" // include stdio header
    include "../util.h" /* this header defines some custom public
    types */
};

```

### Include Headers

Include C headers which define types (C structs, unions, typedefs, etc.); otherwise auto generated code cannot be compiled if these types are referenced in EDL. The included header file can be global or belong to trusted functions or untrusted functions only.

A global included header file doesn't mean that the same header file is included in the enclave and untrusted application code. In the following example, the enclave will use the `stdio.h` from the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK. While the application code will use the `stdio.h` shipped with the host compiler.

Using the `include` directive is convenient when developers are migrating existing code to the Intel SGX technology, since data types are defined already in this case. Similar to other IDL languages like Microsoft\* interface definition language (MIDL\*) and CORBA\* interface definition language (OMG-IDL), a user can define data types inside the EDL file and `sgx_edger8r` will generate a C header file with the data type definitions. For a list of supported data types with in EDL, see [Basic Types](#).

## Syntax

```
include "filename.h"
```

## Example

```
enclave {
    include "stdio.h"      // global headers
    include "../util.h"

    trusted {
        include "foo.h"   // for trusted functions only
    };

    untrusted {
        include "bar.h"   // for untrusted functions only
    };
};
```

## Keywords

The identifiers listed in the following table are reserved for use as keywords of the Enclave Definition Language.

**Table 11 EDL Reserved Keywords**

<b>Data Types</b>					
char	short	int	float	double	void
int8_t	int16_t	int32_t	int64_t	size_t	wchar_t
uint8_t	uint16_t	uint32_t	uint64_t	unsigned	struct
union	enum	long			
<b>Pointer Parameter Handling</b>					
in	out	user_check	count	size	readonly
isptr	string	wstring			
<b>Others</b>					
enclave	from	import	trusted	untrusted	include
public	allow	isary	const	propagate_errno	transition_using_threads

## Basic Types

EDL supports the following basic types:

`char, short, long, int, float, double, void, int8_t, int16_t, int32_t, int64_t, size_t, wchar_t, uint8_t, uint16_t, uint32_t, uint64_t, unsigned, struct, enum, union.`

It also supports `long long` and **64-bit** `long double`.

Basic data types can be modified using the C modifiers:

`const, *, []`.

Additional types can be defined by including a C header file.

### Pointers

EDL defines several attributes that can be used with pointers:

`in, out, user_check, string, wstring, size, count, isptr, readonly.`

Each of them is explained in the following topics.

---

#### **CAUTION:**

The pointer attributes explained in this topic apply to ECALL and OCALL function parameters exclusively, not to the pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function. Thus, pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function are not checked by the edge-routines and must be verified by the enclave and application code.

---

#### Pointer Handling

Pointers should be decorated with either a pointer direction attribute `in, out` or a `user_check` attribute explicitly. The `[in]` and `[out]` serve as direction attributes.

- `[in]` – when `[in]` is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is passed from the calling procedure to the called procedure. For an ECALL the `in` parameter is passed from the application to the enclave, for an OCALL the parameter is passed from the enclave to the application.
- `[out]` – when `[out]` is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is returned from the called procedure to the calling procedure. In an ECALL

function an `out` parameter is passed from the enclave to the application and an OCALL function passes it from the application to the enclave.

- `[in]` and `[out]` attributes may be combined. In this case the parameter is passed in both directions.

The direction attribute instructs the trusted edge-routines (trusted bridge and trusted proxy) to copy the buffer pointed by the pointer. In order to copy the buffer contents, the trusted edge-routines have to know how much data needs to be copied. For this reason, the direction attribute is usually followed by a `size` or `count` modifier. If neither of these is provided nor the pointer is NULL, the trusted edge-routine assumes a `count` of one. When a buffer is being copied, the trusted bridge must avoid overwriting enclave memory in an ECALL and the trusted proxy must avoid leaking secrets in an OCALL. To accomplish this goal, pointers passed as ECALL parameters must point to untrusted memory and pointers passed as OCALL parameters must point to trusted memory. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trusted bridge and the trusted proxy will report an error at runtime, respectively, and the ECALL and OCALL functions will not be executed.

You may use the direction attribute to trade protection for performance. Otherwise, you must use the `user_check` attribute described below and validate the data obtained from untrusted memory via pointers before using it, since the memory a pointer points to could change unexpectedly because it is stored in untrusted memory. However, the direction attribute does not help with structures that contain pointers. In this scenario, you have to validate and copy the buffer contents, recursively if needed, yourself. Alternatively, you can define a structure that can be deep copied. See Structure Deep Copy for more information.

### Example

```
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_ecall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in([in] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_out([out] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    };
    untrusted {
```

```

    void test_ocall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);

    void test_ocall_in([in] int * ptr);

    void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);

    void test_ocall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);

};
};

```

### Unsupported Syntax:

```

enclave {
    trusted {
        // Pointers without a direction attribute
        // or 'user_check' are not allowed
        public void test_ecall_not(int * ptr);

        // Function pointers are not allowed
        public void test_ecall_func([in]int (*func_ptr)());
    };
};

```

In the example shown above:

For ECALL:

- **[user\_check]:** In the function `test_ecall_user_check`, the pointer `ptr` will not be verified; you should verify the pointer passed to the trusted function. The buffer pointed to by `ptr` is not copied to inside buffer either.
- **[in]:** In the function `test_ecall_in`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of 'ptr'(int) will be allocated inside the enclave. Content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied into the new allocated memory inside. Any changes performed inside the enclave will not be visible to the untrusted application.
- **[out]:** In the function `test_ecall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of 'ptr'(int) will be allocated inside the enclave, but the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value will not be copied. Instead, it will be initialized to zero. After the trusted function returns, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer pointed to by `ptr`.

- [in, out]: In the function `test_ecall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated inside the enclave, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer.

For OCALL:

- [user\_check]: In the function `test_ocall_user_check`, the pointer `ptr` will not be verified; the buffer pointed to by `ptr` is not copied to an outside buffer. Besides, the application cannot read/modify the memory pointed to by `ptr`, if `ptr` points to enclave memory.
- [in]: In the function `test_ocall_in`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated in the 'application' side (untrusted side). Content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied into the newly allocated memory outside. Any changes performed by the application will not be visible inside the enclave.
- [out]: In the function `test_ocall_out`, a buffer with the same size as the data type of `ptr(int)` will be allocated on the application side (untrusted side) and its content will be initialized to zero. After the untrusted function returns, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied to the enclave buffer pointed to by `ptr`.
- [in, out]: In the function `test_ocall_in_out`, a buffer with the same size will be allocated in the application side, the content pointed to by `ptr`, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied into the inside enclave buffer.

The following table summarizes behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes:

**Table 12 Behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes**

	<b>ECALL</b>	<b>OCALL</b>
user_check	Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy.	Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy
in	Buffer copied from the application into the enclave. Afterwards, changes will only affect the buffer inside enclave. Safe but slow.	Buffer copied from the enclave to the application. Must be used if pointer points to enclave data.
out	Trusted wrapper function will allocate a	The untrusted buffer will be



	buffer to be used by the enclave. Upon return, this buffer will be copied to the original buffer.	copied into the enclave by the trusted wrapper function. Safe but slow.
in, out	Combines <code>in</code> and <code>out</code> behavior. Data is copied back and forth.	Same as ECALLs.

EDL cannot analyze C typedefs and macros found in C headers. If a pointer type is aliased to a type/macro that does not have an asterisk (\*), the EDL parser may report an error or not properly copy the pointer's data.

In such cases, declare the type with `[isptr]` attribute to indicate that it is a pointer type. See User Defined Data Types for more information.

#### Example:

```
// Error, PVOID is not a pointer in EDL
void foo([in, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK
void foo([in, size=4] void* buffer);
// OK, "isptr" indicates "PVOID" is pointer type
void foo([in, isptr, size=4] PVOID buffer);
// OK, opaque type, copy by value
// Actual address must be in untrusted memory
void foo(HWND hWnd);
```

#### Pointer Handling in ECALLs

In ECALLs, the trusted bridge checks that the marshaling structure does not overlap with the enclave memory, and automatically allocates space on the trusted stack to hold a copy of the structure. Then it checks that pointer parameters with their full range do not overlap with the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave and copies the memory pointed to by the pointer from outside to the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates a buffer in the trusted memory, zeroes the buffer contents to clear any previous data and passes a pointer to this buffer to the trusted function. After the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to untrusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted bridge allocates memory

inside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the trusted memory before calling the trusted function, and once the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to the untrusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

---

**NOTE:**

When an ECALL with a pointer parameter with `out` attribute returns, the trusted bridge always copies data from the buffer in enclave memory to the buffer outside. You must clear all sensitive data from that buffer on failure.

---

Before the trusted bridge returns, it frees all the trusted heap memory allocated at the beginning of the ECALL function for pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted bridge after it returns results in undefined behavior.

### Pointer Handling in OCALLs

For OCALLs, the trusted proxy allocates memory on the outside stack to pass the marshaling structure and checks that the pointer parameters with their full range are within enclave. When a pointer to trusted memory with the `in` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave and copies the memory pointed by the pointer from inside the enclave to the untrusted memory. When a pointer to the trusted memory with the `out` attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates a buffer on the untrusted stack, and passes a pointer to this buffer to the untrusted function. After the untrusted function returns, the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. When the `in` and `out` attributes are combined, the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the untrusted memory before calling the untrusted function, and after the untrusted function returns the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

When the trusted proxy function returns, it frees all the untrusted stack memory allocated at the beginning of the OCALL function for the pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted proxy after it returns results in undefined behavior.

### Attribute: `user_check`

In certain situations, the restrictions imposed by the direction attribute may not support the application needs for data communication across the enclave boundary. For instance, a buffer might be too large to fit in enclave memory

and needs to be fragmented into smaller blocks that are then processed in a series of ECALLs, or an application might require passing a pointer to trusted memory (enclave context) as an ECALL parameter.

To support these specific scenarios, the EDL language provides the `user_check` attribute. Parameters declared with the `user_check` attribute do not undergo any of the checks described for `[in]` and `[out]` attributes. However, you must understand the risks associated with passing pointers in and out the enclave, in general, and the `user_check` attribute, in particular. You must ensure that all the pointer checking and data copying are done correctly or risk compromising enclave secrets.

### Buffer Size Calculation

The generalized formula for calculating the buffer size using these attributes:

```
Total number of bytes = count * size
```

- The above formula holds when both `count` and `size` are specified.
- If `count` is not specified for the pointer parameter, then it is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e., `count=1`. Then total number of bytes equals to `size`.
- If `size` is not specified, then the buffer size is calculated using the above formula where `size` is `sizeof(element pointed by the pointer)`.

### Attribute: size

The `size` attribute is used to indicate the buffer size in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute (`[in]`/`[out]`) (when there is no `count` attribute specified). This attribute is needed because the trusted bridge needs to know the whole range of the buffer passed as a pointer to ensure it does not overlap with the enclave memory, and to copy the contents of the buffer from untrusted memory to trusted memory and/or vice versa depending on the direction attribute. The size may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function. `size` attribute is generally used for `void` pointers.

### Example

```
enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies '100' bytes
        public void test_size1([in, size=100] void* ptr, size_t len);
    }
}
```

```

        // Copies 'len' bytes

        public void test_size2([in, size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
    };
};

```

### Unsupported Syntax:

```

enclave{
    trusted {
        // size/count attributes must be used with
        // pointer direction ([in, out])
        void test_attribute_cant([size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
    };
};

```

### Attribute: count

The count attribute is used to indicate a block of `sizeof` element pointed by the pointer in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute. The `count` and `size` attribute modifiers serve the same purpose. The number of bytes copied by the trusted bridge or trusted proxy is the product of the count and the size of the data type to which the parameter points. The count may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function.

The `size` and `count` attribute modifiers may also be combined. In this case, the trusted edge-routine will copy a number of bytes that is the product of the count and size parameters (`size*count`) specified in the function declaration in the EDL file.

### Example

```

enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies cnt * sizeof(int) bytes
        public void test_count([in, count=cnt] int* ptr, unsigned
            cnt);

        // Copies cnt * len bytes
        public void test_count_size([in, count=cnt, size=len] int*
            ptr, unsigned cnt, size_t len);
    };
};

```

### Strings

The attributes `string` and `wstring` indicate that the parameter is a NULL terminated C string or a NULL terminated `wchar_t` string, respectively. To

prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, the trusted edge-routine first operates in untrusted memory to determine the length of the string. Once the string has been copied into the enclave, the trusted bridge explicitly NULL terminates the string. The size of the buffer allocated in trusted memory accounts for the length determined in the first step as well as the size of the string termination character.

---

### **NOTE**

There are some limitations on the usage of `string` and `wstring` attributes:

- `string` and `wstring` must not be combined with any other modifier such as `size`, or `count`.
  - `string` and `wstring` cannot be used with `out` alone. However, `string` and `wstring` with both `in` and `out` are accepted.
  - `string` can only be used for `char` pointers; while `wstring` can only be used for `wchar_t` pointers.
- 

### Example

```
enclave {

    trusted {

        // Cannot use [out] with "string/wstring" alone
        // Using [in] , or [in, out] is acceptable
        public void test_string([in, out, string] char* str);

        public void test_wstring([in, out, wstring] char* wstr);

        public void test_const_string([in, string] const char* str);

    };
};
```

### Unsupported Syntax:

```
enclave {

    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;

    trusted {

        // string/wstring attributes must be used
        // with pointer direction
        void test_string_cant([string] char* ptr);
        void test_string_cant_usercheck([user_check, string] char*
ptr);

    };

};
```

```

// string/wstring attributes cannot be used
// with [out] attribute
void test_string_out([out, string] char* str);

// string/wstring attributes must be used
// for char/wchar_t pointers
void test_string_out([in, string] void* str);

};
};

```

In the first example, when the `string` attribute is used for function `test_string`, `strlen(str)+1` is used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave. The extra byte is for null termination.

In the function `test_wstring`, `wcslen(str)+1` (two-byte units) will be used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave.

### const Keyword

The EDL language accepts the `const` keyword with the same meaning as the `const` keyword in the C standard. However, the support for this keyword is limited in the EDL language. It may only be used with pointers and as the outermost qualifier. This satisfies the most important usage in Intel® SGX, which is to detect conflicts between `const` pointers (pointers to `const` data) with the `out` attribute. Other forms of the `const` keyword supported in the C standard are not supported in the EDL language.

### Structures, Enums and Unions

Basic types and user defined data types can be used inside the structure/union except it differs from the standard in the following ways:

#### Unsupported Syntax:

```

enclave{
    // 1. Each member of the structure has to be
    // defined separately
    struct data_def_t{
        int a, b, c; // Not allowed
                    // It has to be int a; int b; int c;
    };

    // 2. Bit fields in structures/unions are not allowed.
    struct bitfields_t{
        short i : 3;
        short j : 6;
        short k : 7;
    };
};

```

```

//3. Nested structure definition is not allowed
struct my_struct_t{
    int out_val;
    float out_fval;
    struct inner_struct_t{
        int in_val;
        float in_fval;
    };
};
};
};

```

### Valid Syntax:

```

enclave{

    include "user_types.h" //for ufloat: typedef float ufloat

    struct struct_foo_t {
        uint32_t struct_foo_0;
        uint64_t struct_foo_1;
    };

    enum enum_foo_t {
        ENUM_FOO_0 = 0,
        ENUM_FOO_1 = 1
    };

    union union_foo_t {
        uint32_t union_foo_0;
        uint32_t union_foo_1;
        uint64_t union_foo_3;
    };

    trusted {

        public void test_char(char val);
        public void test_int(int val);
        public void test_long(long long val);

        public void test_float(float val);
        public void test_ufloat(ufloat val);
        public void test_double(double val);
        public void test_long_double(long double val);

        public void test_size_t(size_t val);
        public void test_wchar_t(wchar_t val);

        public void test_struct(struct struct_foo_t val);
        public void test_struct2(struct_foo_t val);

        public void test_enum(enum enum_foo_t val);
        public void test_enum2(enum_foo_t val);

        public void test_union(union union_foo_t val);
        public void test_union2(union_foo_t val);
    }
}

```

```
};
```

```
};
```

---

**NOTE:**

When referencing a structure, enum or union inside the EDL file, you must follow C style and use the corresponding key word `struct`, `enum` or `union`.

---

### Structure Deep Copy

Member pointers in a structure can be decorated with a buffer size attribute `size`, or `count` to indicate deep copy structure instead of shallow copy. When the trusted edge-routines copy the buffer pointed by the structure pointer, they also copy the buffer pointed by the structure member pointer instructed by direction attribute of the structure pointer. The member pointer values are also modified accordingly.

The buffer size of the structure must be a multiple of structure size and the buffer is deep copied as an array of structure. Since function call by value make a shallow copy, deep copy structure is not allowed to call by value. Direction attribute of deep copy structure pointer can be `in` and `in, out`. If a member pointer is not basic type, trusted edge-routines don't deep copy it recursively.

### Example

```
enclave {
    struct struct_foo_t {
        uint32_t count;
        size_t size;
        [count = count, size = size] uint64_t* buf;
    };

    trusted {
        public void test_ecall_deep_copy([in, count = 1] struct
            struct_foo_t * ptr);
    };
};
```

Before calling the `ecall`, prepare the following data in untrusted domain as parameter:

```
struct struct_foo_t foo = { 4, 8, data};

foo.count = 4;
foo.size = 8;
foo.buf = address of data[] in untrusted domain.
data[] = {0x1112131415161718,
```



```

0x2122232425262728,
0x3132333435363738,
0x4142434445464748}

```

After calling the `ecall`, the data in trusted domain will be:

```

struct struct_foo_t foo = { 4, 8, data2};

foo.count = 4;
foo.size = 8;
foo.buf = address of data2[] in trusted domain.
data2[] = {0x1112131415161718,
           0x2122232425262728,
           0x3132333435363738,
           0x4142434445464748}

```

---

### **NOTE:**

When deep copying a pointer parameter with `in` attribute in an `OCALL`, the pointer in the structure, which is the address of a trusted domain, is copied to untrusted domain ephemeraly. You must avoid this scenario if the address is sensitive data .

---

### **Arrays**

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports multidimensional, fixed-size arrays to be used in data structure definition and parameter declaration.

Arrays also should be decorated with the attribute `[in]`, `[out]` or `[user_check]` explicitly, which are similar to the pointers.

---

### **NOTE**

Limitations on the array usage:

- size/count cannot be used for array types
  - `const` cannot be used for array types
  - Zero-length arrays or flexible arrays are not supported by EDL syntax
  - Pointer arrays are not supported by EDL syntax
- 

### **Example**

```

enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {

        public void test_array([in] int arr[4]);

        public void test_array_multi([in] int arr[4][4]);
    }
}

```

```
};
};
```

### Unsupported Syntax:

```
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {

        // Flexible array is not supported
        public void test_flexible(int arr[][4]);

        // Zero-length array is not supported.
        public void test_zero(int arr[0]);

    };
};
```

A special attribute `isary` is used to designate function parameters that are of a user defined type array. See [User Defined Data Types](#) for more information.

### User Defined Data Types

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports user defined data types, but should be defined in a header file. Any basic datatype which is typedef'ed into another becomes a user defined data type.

Some user data types need to be annotated with special EDL attributes, such as `isptr`, `isary` and `readonly`. If one of these attributes is missing when a user-defined type parameter requires it so, the compiler will emit a compilation error in the code that `sgx_edger8r` generates.

- When there is a user defined data type for a pointer, `isptr` is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is a pointer. See [Pointers](#) for more information.
- When there is a user defined data type for arrays, `isary` is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is an array. See [Arrays](#) for more information.
- When an ECALL or OCALL parameter is a user defined type of a pointer to a const data type, the parameter should be annotated with the `readonly` attribute.

---

### **NOTE**

---

---

`isptr`, `isary` and `readonly` can only be used to decorate a user defined data type. Do not use them for any basic types, pointers or arrays.

`readonly` can only be used with `isptr` attribute. Any other usage of `readonly` is not allowed.

---

### Example

```
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" // for typedef void * pBuf;
                          // and typedef void const * pBuf2;
                          // and typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {

        public void test_isptr(
            [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf pBufptr,
            size_t len);

        public void test_isptr_readonly(
            [in, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2 pBuf2ptr,
            size_t len);

        public void test_isary([in, isary] uArray arr);
    };
};
```

### Unsupported Syntax:

```
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
                          // and typedef int uArray[10];

    trusted {
        // Cannot use [out] when using [readonly] attribute
        void test_isptr_readonly_cant(
            [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
            pBuf2ptr,
            size_t len);

        // isptr cannot be used for pointers/arrays
        public void test_isptr_cant1(
            [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf* pBufptr,
            size_t len);
        public void test_isptr_cant2(
            [in, isptr, size=len] void* pBufptr,
            size_t len);

        // User-defined array types need "isary"
        public void test_miss_isary([in] uArray arr);
    };
};
```

```

// size/count attributes cannot be used for user-defined
array types
public void test_isary_cant_size(
    [in, size=len] uArray arr,
    size_t len);,

// isary cannot be used for pointers/arrays
public void test_isary_cant(
    [in, isary] uArray arr[4]);

};
};

```

In the function `test_isptr_readonly`, `pBuf2` (typedef `void const * pBuf2`) is a user defined pointer type, so `isptr` is used to indicate that it is a user defined type. Also, the `pBuf2ptr` is `readonly`, so you cannot use the `out` attribute.

### Preprocessor Capability

The EDL language supports macro definition and conditional compilation directives. To provide this capability, the `sgx_edger8r` first uses the compiler preprocessor to parse the EDL file. Once all preprocessor tokens have been translated, the `sgx_edger8r` then parses the resulting file as regular EDL language. This means that developers may define simple macros and use conditional compilation directives to easily remove debug and test capabilities from production enclaves, reducing the attack surface of an enclave. See the following EDL example.

```

#define SGX_DEBUG

enclave {
    trusted {
        // ECALL definitions
    }
    untrusted {
        // OCALL definitions
#ifdef SGX_DEBUG
        void print([in, string] const char * str);
#endif
    }
}

```

The current `sgx_edger8r` does not propagate macro definitions from the EDL file into the generated edge-routines. As a result, you need to duplicate

macro definitions in both the EDL file as well as in the compiler arguments or other source files.

We recommend you only use simple macro definitions and conditional compilation directives in your EDL files.

The `sgx_edger8r` uses `gcc` to parse macros and conditional compilation directives that might be in the EDL file. You may override the default search behavior or even specify a different preprocessor with the `--preprocessor` option.

### Propagating `errno` in OCALLs

OCALLs may use the `propagate_errno` attribute. When you use this attribute, the `sgx_edger8r` produces slightly different edge-routines. The `errno` variable inside the enclave, which is provided by the trusted Standard C library, is overwritten with the value of `errno` in the untrusted domain before the OCALL returns. The trusted `errno` is updated upon OCALL completion regardless whether the OCALL was successful or not. This does not change the fundamental behavior of `errno`. A function that fails must set `errno` to indicate what went wrong. A function that succeeds, in this case the OCALL, is allowed to change the value of `errno`.

### Example

```
enclave {
    include "sgx_stdio_stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions

    trusted {
        public void test_file_io(void);
    };

    untrusted {

        FILE * fopen(
            [in,string] const char * filename,
            [in,string] const char * mode) propagate_errno;

        int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream) propagate_errno;

        size_t fwrite(
            [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buffer,
            size_t size,
            size_t count,
            [user_check]FILE * stream) propagate_errno;
    };
};
```

### Importing EDL Libraries

You can implement export and import functions in external trusted libraries, akin to static libraries in the untrusted domain. To add these functions to an enclave, use the enclave definition language (EDL) library import mechanism.

Use the EDL keywords `from` and `import` to add a library EDLfile to an enclave EDL file is done .

The `from` keyword specifies the location of the library EDL file. Relative and full paths are accepted. Relative paths are relative to the location of the EDL file. It is recommended to use different names to distinguish the library EDL file and the enclave EDL file.

The `import` keyword specifies the functions to import. An asterisk (\*) can be used to import all functions from the library. More than one function can be imported by writing a list of function names separated by commas.

#### Syntax

```
from "lib_filename.edl" import func_name, func2_name;
```

Or

```
from "lib_filename.edl" import *;
```

#### Example

```
enclave {
    from "secure_comms.edl" import send_email, send_sms;
    from "../sys/other_secure_comms.edl" import *;
};
```

A library EDL file may import another EDL file, which in turn, may import another EDL file, creating a hierarchical structure as shown below:

```
// enclave.edl
enclave {
    from "other/file_L1.edl" import *; // Import all functions
};

// Trusted library file_L1.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L2.edl" import *;
```

```

    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
    };
};

// Trusted library file_L2.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L3.edl" import *;

    trusted {
        public void test_ptr(int* ptr);
    };
};

// Trusted library file_L3.edl
enclave {

    trusted {
        public void test_float(float flt);
    };
};

```

### Granting Access to ECALLs

The default behavior is that ECALL functions cannot be called by any of the untrusted functions.

To enable an ECALL to be directly called by application code as a root ECALL, the ECALL should be explicitly decorated with the `public` keyword to be a public ECALL. Without this keyword, the ECALLs will be treated as private ECALLs, and cannot be directly called as root ECALLs.

### Syntax

```

trusted {
    public <function prototype>;
};

```

An enclave EDL must have one or more public ECALLs, otherwise the Enclave functions cannot be called at all and `sgx_edger8r` will report an error in this case.

To grant an OCALL function access to an ECALL function, specify this access using the `allow` keyword. Both public and private ECALLs can be put into the allow list.

### Syntax

```
untrusted {
    <function prototype> allow (func_name, func2_name, ...);
};
```

### Example

```
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void clear_secret();
        public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
        void set_secret([in] secret_t* secret);
    };
    untrusted {
        void replace_secret(
            [in] secret_t* new_secret,
            [out] secret_t* old_secret)
            allow (set_secret, clear_secret);
    };
};
```

In the above example, the untrusted code is granted different access permission to the ECALLs.

ECALL	called as root ECALL	called from <code>replace_secret</code>
<code>clear_secret</code>	Y	Y
<code>get_secret</code>	Y	N
<code>set_secret</code>	N	Y

### Using Switchless Calls

ECALLs and OCALLs can use the **`transition_using_threads`** attribute as a postfix of the function declaration in the EDL file. When you use this attribute, the `sgx_edger8r` produces different edge-routines.

ECALLs and OCALLs with the **`transition_using_threads`** attribute use the Switchless mode of operation to serve the call.

(See: [Using Switchless Calls](#))



## Example

```
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void ecall_empty(void);
        public void ecall_empty_switchless(void) transition_using_
            threads;
    };
    untrusted {
        void ocall_empty(void);
        void ocall_empty_switchless(void) transition_using_threads;
    };
};
```

## Enclave Configuration File

The enclave configuration file is an XML file containing the user defined parameters of an enclave. This XML file is a part of the enclave project. A tool named `sgx_sign` uses this file as an input to create the signature and metadata for the enclave. Here is an example of the configuration file:

```
<EnclaveConfiguration>
    <ProdID>100</ProdID>
    <ISVSVN>1</ISVSVN>
    <StackMaxSize>0x50000</StackMaxSize>
    <StackMinSize>0x2000</StackMinSize>
    <HeapMaxSize>0x100000</HeapMaxSize>
    <HeapMinSize>0x40000</HeapMinSize>
    <HeapInitSize>0x80000</HeapInitSize>
    <TCSNum>3</TCSNum>
    <TCSMaxNum>4</TCSMaxNum>
    <TCSMinPool>2</TCSMinPool>
    <TCSPolicy>1</TCSPolicy>
    <DisableDebug>0</DisableDebug>
    <MiscSelect>0</MiscSelect>
    <MiscMask>0xFFFFFFFF</MiscMask>
    <EnableKSS>1</EnableKSS>
    <ISVEXTPRODID_H>1</ISVEXTPRODID_H>
    <ISVEXTPRODID_L>2</ISVEXTPRODID_L>
    <ISVFAMILYID_H>3</ISVFAMILYID_H>
    <ISVFAMILYID_L>4</ISVFAMILYID_L>
    <UserRegionSize>0x900000</UserRegionSize>
</EnclaveConfiguration>
```

The table below lists the elements defined in the configuration file. All of them are optional. Without a configuration file or if an element is not present in the configuration file, the default value is be used.

**Table 13 Enclave Configuration Default Values**

<b>Tag</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Default Value</b>
ProdID	ISV assigned Product ID.	0
ISVSVN	ISV assigned SVN.	0
TCSNum	The number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.	1
TCSMaxNum	The maximum number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.	1
TCSMinPool	The minimum number of available TCS at any time in the life cycle of an enclave	1
TCSPolicy	TCS management policy. 0 – TCS is bound to the untrusted thread. 1 – TCS is not bound to the untrusted thread.	1
StackMinSize	The minimum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x2000
StackMaxSize	The maximum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x40000
HeapInitSize	The initial heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x1000000
HeapMinSize	The minimum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x1000
HeapMaxSize	The maximum heap size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x1000000
ReservedMemMaxSize	The maximum reserved memory size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x0000000
ReservedMemMinSize	The minimum reserved memory size for the process. Must be	0x0000000

	4KB aligned.	
ReservedMemInitSize	The initial reserved memory size for the process. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x0000000
ReservedMemExecutable	The reserved memory is executable. <b>Note:</b> This value is only used for the Intel® SGX 1 platform.	0 - Reserved memory is not executable 1 - Reserved memory is executable
DisableDebug	Enclave cannot be debugged.	0 - Enclave can be debugged
MiscSelect	The desired Extended SSA frame feature.	0
MiscMask	The mask bits of MiscSelect to enforce.	0xFFFFFFFF
EnableKSS	Enable the Key Separation and Sharing feature	0
ISVEXTPRODID_H	ISV assigned Extended Product ID (High 8 bytes)	0
ISVEXTPRODID_L	ISV assigned Extended Product ID (Low 8 bytes)	0
ISVFAMILYID_H	ISV assigned Family ID (High 8 bytes)	0
ISVFAMILYID_L	ISV assigned Family ID (Low 8 bytes)	0
EnclaveImageAddress	The base address of the enclave image file.	0
ELRangeStartAddress	The base address of the enclave address range.	0
PKRU	Enable the Protection Keys	0
AMX	Enable the Advanced Matrix Extensions (AMX) feature	0
UserRegionSize	Allow the user to specify the size of the region	0

	where they can manage the memory using EDMM APIs	
<code>EnableAEXNotify</code>	Enable the AEX-Notify feature	0
<code>EnableIPPFIPS</code>	Enable enclave to operate in FIPS 140-3 certifiable mode. And <code>sgx_sign</code> signs the enclave with FIPS 140-3 certifiable signature.	0

`TCSMaxNum`, `TCSNum`, and `TCSMinPool` are used to determine how many threads will be created after the enclave initialization, and how many threads can be created dynamically when the enclave is running. These two kinds of threads are referred to as static threads and dynamic threads respectively.

`StackMaxSize` and `StackMinSize` have different meanings to a static thread and a dynamic thread.

For a static thread, only `StackMaxSize` is relevant, which determines the maximum amount of stack available.

For a dynamic thread, `StackMinSize` is the amount of stack available once the thread is created and initialized. The gap between `StackMinSize` and `StackMaxSize` is the amount of stack that is not available currently but can be expanded as necessary later. Therefore, `StackMaxSize` is the total amount of stack a thread can use. `StackMinSize` can be regarded as the lower limit and `StackMaxSize` is the upper limit.

When an enclave created with the Linux\* 2.0 SDK is executing on an Intel® SGX 2.0 platform that is running the Intel® SGX 2.0 PSW, `HeapMinSize` is the amount of heap available once the enclave completes initialization.

`HeapMaxSize` is the total amount of heap an enclave can use. The gap between `HeapMinSize` and `HeapMaxSize` is the amount of heap that is not available currently but can be expanded as necessary later.

When an enclave created with the Linux\* 2.0 SDK is executing on an older Intel SGX platform or a platform running a previous version of PSW, the values are interpreted differently. In this case `HeapInitSize` is the only relevant field and it indicates the total amount of heap available to an enclave.

MiscSelect bit 0, referred to as MiscSelect[0], and MiscMask bit 0, referred to as MiscMask[0] must be set to appropriate values with the rules described below depending on whether UserRegionSize is set. Other bits in MiscSelect and MiscMask are for future functional extensions.

If UserRegionSize is configured to a non-zero valid value, that is, the user wants to use the EDMM APIs to manage enclave memory, then:

- MiscSelect[0] and MiscMask[0] must be set to 1 and the enclave needs to be loaded on SGX 2.0 platform.

If UserRegionSize is not configured, but the heap, stack and thread related configurations have dynamic part, then:

- If MiscSelect[0] = 0, the enclave will be loaded as if it has no dynamic components.
- if MiscSelect[0] = 1 and MiscMask[0] = 1, the enclave can only be loaded on SGX 2.0 platform.
- if MiscSelect[0] = 1 and MiscMask[0] = 0, the enclave can be loaded on both SGX 1.0 and SGX 2.0 platforms. But it can utilize dynamic features only on SGX 2.0 platform.

If UserRegionSize is not configured and the heap, stack and thread configuration only has static components, then:

- If MiscSelect[0] = 1 and MiscMask[0] = 1, the enclave can only be loaded on SGX 2.0 platform.
- If MiscSelect[0] = 0, the enclave can be loaded on SGX 1.0 and SGX 2.0 platforms.

ReservedMemMinSize, ReservedMemMaxSize and ReservedMemInitSize can be used to configure a reserved memory area for an enclave. By default, an enclave has no reserved memory. You can add a reserved memory area by specifying these fields in the enclave's configuration file. The reserved memory area will be added at the end of the enclave at the loading time and can be used at the runtime.

`ReservedMemExecutable` can be used to configure whether the reserved memory has executable permission by setting `ReservedMemExecutable` to 1.

---

**NOTE:**

On the Intel® SGX 2.0 platform, the reserved memory is forcibly configured to RW permission although `ReservedMemExecutable` is set to 1.

With the introduction of SGX EDMM in this release, while enclaves previously built with reserved memory API can still work, new users on SGX 2.0 platform are recommended to uniformly use the EDMM API to achieve the goal.

---

Currently, the reserved memory is used to support Just in Time (JIT) usage in the [Intel® SGX DNNL Library](#).

Several sample configuration files are provided in `SampleEnclave` project in order to further clarify the effects of different combinations of the parameter settings.

Set `EnableKSS` to 1 to enable the Key Separation & Sharing (KSS) feature for the enclave. `ISVEXTPRODID_H` and `ISVEXTPRODID_L` are used to set the ISV assigned Extended Product ID, which is a 16-byte value. `ISVFAMILYID_H` and `ISVFAMILYID_L` are for the 16-bytes ISV assigned Family ID. Note that you need to enable KSS before setting the ISV assigned Extended Product ID and the ISV assigned Family ID.

The total amount of stack and heap actually used by an enclave can be measured by using the measurement tool `sgx_emmt`. See [Enclave Memory Measurement Tool](#) for details.

An Eclipse\* plug-in named **Intel® SGX Update Configuration** is provided to help you easily edit your configuration file. See the *Intel® SGX Eclipse\* Plug-in User's Guide* from the Eclipse's Help content for details.

If there is no enough stack for the enclave, `ECALL` returns the error code `SGX_ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN`. This error code gives the information to enclave writer that the `StackMaxSize` may need further adjustment.

`EnclaveImageAddress`, `ElRangeStartAddress` and `ElRangeSize` can be used to configure enclave elrange for an enclave. By default, these fields are set to 0. You can specify these fields in the enclave's configuration file.

`PKRU` can be used to enable or disable the Protection Keys inside enclave.

`AMX` can be used to enable or disable the Advanced Matrix Extensions (AMX) feature inside enclave.

Below lists the acceptable values and the corresponding meanings for the `PKRU` and `AMX` fields:

- 0 - The feature must be disabled
- 1 - The feature must be enabled
- 2 - Let the loader choose to enable the feature or not.

---

**NOTE:**

`AMX` feature enlarges the SSA frame size and may introduce some performance downgrade since SGX SW needs to save and restore the XSAVE area when entering or exiting the SGX enclave. Therefore, it is recommended to only enable the `AMX` feature when you really need this feature inside enclave.

---

`UserRegionSize` can be used to specify the size of the region where users can manage memory using [Enclave Memory Management APIs](#).

`EnableAEXNotify` can be used to enable or disable the `Asynchronous Enclave Exit Notify (AEX-Notify)` feature inside enclave. You can set `EnableAEXNotify` to 1 to allow the `AEX-Notify` feature to be enabled in an enclave. Refer to section [AEX-Notify Handling](#) for more information about the `AEX-Notify` feature.

---

**NOTE:**

To enable `AEX-Notify` feature in an enclave, the hardware must support it and the in-kernel driver must be v6.2 or later.

---

`EnableIPPFIPS` can be used to enable or disable the FIPS 140-3 certifiable mode inside enclave. You can set `ENABLEIPPFIPS` to 1 to enable FIPS 140-3 certifiable mode inside enclave and allow `sgx_sign` to sign the enclave with FIPS 1400-3 certifiable signature.

## Enclave Project Configurations

Depending on the development stage you are at, choose one of the following project configurations to build an enclave:

- Simulation: Under the *simulation* mode the enclave can be either built with debug or release compiler settings. However, in both cases the enclave is launched in the *enclave debug* mode. The Eclipse\* plugin provides the **Intel® SGX Simulation** and **Intel® SGX Simulation Debug** configuration options to enable compiling and launching the

- enclave in the simulation mode. From the command line, an enclave can be built in this mode by passing `SGX_DEBUG=1` for debug simulation and no parameters for release simulation. This is the default build mode. Single-step signing is the default method to sign a simulation enclave.
- **Debug:** When the **Intel® SGX Hardware Debug** configuration option is selected for an enclave project in Eclipse\* plugin, the enclave is compiled in the *debug* mode and the resulting enclave file will contain debug information and symbols. To use this configuration for an enclave, set `SGX_MODE=HW` and `SGX_DEBUG=1` as parameters to the Makefile during the build. Choosing this project configuration also allows the enclave to be launched in the *enclave debug* mode. This is facilitated by enabling the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` that is passed as one of the parameters to the `sgx_create_enclave` function. Single-step method is the default signing method for this project configuration. The signing key used in this mode cannot be added to the allowlist.
  - **Prerelease:** When you choose the **Intel® SGX Hardware Prerelease** configuration option for an enclave project, Eclipse\* plugin will build the enclave in *release* mode with compiler optimizations applied. An enclave is built in this mode by setting `SGX_MODE=HW` and `SGX_PRERELEASE=1` in the Makefile during build. Under this configuration, the enclave is launched in *enclave debug* mode. The Makefile of the sample application defines the `EDEBUG` flag when `SGX_PRERELEASE=1` is passed as a command line parameter to the Makefile during build. When the `EDEBUG` preprocessor flag is defined, it enables the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`, which in turn, launches the enclave in the *enclave debug* mode. Single-step method is also the default signing method for the *Prerelease* project configuration. Like in the *Debug* configuration, the signing key cannot be added to the allowlist either.
  - **Release:** The **Intel® SGX Hardware Release** configuration option for an Eclipse plugin enclave project compiles the enclave in the *release* mode and launches the enclave in the *enclave release* mode. This is done by disabling the `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`. This mode is enabled in enclave by passing `SGX_MODE=HW` to the Makefile while building the project. `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is only enabled when `NDEBUG` is not defined or `EDEBUG` is defined. In the debug configuration `NDEBUG` is undefined and hence `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is enabled. In the prerelease configuration `NDEBUG`



and `EDEBUG` are both defined, which enables `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`. In the release mode, configuration `NDEBUG` is defined and hence it disables `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` thereby launching the enclave in *enclave release* mode. Two-step method is the default signing method for the Release configuration. The enclave needs to be signed with a key that has been added to the allowlist.

For additional information on the different enclave signing methods, see [Enclave Signing Tool](#) and [Enclave Signer Usage Examples](#)

### Loading and Unloading an Enclave

Enclave source code is built as a shared object. To use an enclave, the `enclave.so` should be loaded into protected memory by calling the API `sgx_create_enclave()` or `sgx_create_enclave_ex()`. The `enclave.so` must be signed by `sgx_sign`. Before the Intel® SGX 2.4 release, when loading an enclave for the first time, the loader gets a launch token and saves it back to the in/out parameter `token`. You can save the launch token into a file, so that when loading an enclave for the second time, the application can get the launch token from the file. Providing a valid launch token can enhance the load performance. Starting the Intel® SGX 2.4 release, you do not need to pass and store the launch token anymore. To unload an enclave, call `sgx_destroy_enclave()` interface with parameter `sgx_enclave_id_t`.

The sample code to load and unload an Enclave is shown below.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include "sgx_urts.h"

#define ENCLAVE_FILE_T("Enclave.signed.so")

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    sgx_enclave_id_t    eid;
    sgx_status_t        ret    = SGX_SUCCESS;
    sgx_launch_token_t token = {0};
    int updated = 0;

    // Create the Enclave with above launch token.
```

```

ret = sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILE, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token,
&updated, &eid, NULL);
if (ret != SGX_SUCCESS) {
    printf("App: error %#x, failed to create enclave.\n", ret);
    return -1;
}

// A bunch of Enclave calls (ECALL) will happen here.

// Destroy the enclave when all Enclave calls finished.
if(SGX_SUCCESS != sgx_destroy_enclave(eid))
    return -1;

return 0;
}

```

## Handling Power Events

The protected memory encryption keys that are stored within an Intel SGX-enabled CPU are destroyed with every power event, including suspend and hibernation.

Thus, when a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all enclave data will not be accessible after that. As a result, when the system resumes, any subsequent ECALL will fail returning the error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST`. This specific error code indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel SGX application should have the capability to handle any power transition that might occur while the enclave is loaded in protected memory. To handle the power event and resume enclave execution with minimum impact, the application must be prepared to receive the error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST` when an ECALL fails. When this happens, one and only one thread from the application must destroy the enclave, `sgx_destroy_enclave()`, and reload it again, `sgx_create_enclave()`. In addition, to resume execution from where it was when the enclave was destroyed, the application should periodically seal and save enclave state information on the platform and use this information to restore the enclave to its original state after the enclave is reloaded.

The [Power Transition](#) sample code included in the SDK demonstrates this procedure.

## Using Switchless Calls

An enclave switch occurs whenever the execution of a CPU jumps in (EENTER) or out (EEXIT) of an enclave; for example, when making ECALLs/OCALLs. Enclave switches have a performance overhead. For workloads with short and frequent calls, the enclave switching overhead can be reduced using Switchless Calls. Switchless Calls introduce a new mode of operation to perform calls from/to Intel® SGX enclaves, using worker threads inside and outside the enclave.

---

### **PERFORMANCE NOTE:**

Switchless calls is an advanced feature. It requires additional worker threads and configuration, performance testing and tuning. It should be used for workloads that require fine performance tuning. Misconfiguration may result in under utilized worker threads, which consumes CPU time while not serving any tasks.

---

### **Usage**

To use Switchless calls, the EDL attribute `transition_using_threads` should be postfixed to the ECALLs and OCALLs where Switchless Calls are required. An EDL file can contain ECALLs/OCALLs with or without this attribute.

The application code must create an enclave using `sgx_create_enclave_ex`, set the Switchless flag in an extended options vector, and provide a switchless configuration structure. In addition, the enclave must be linked with the `libsgx_tswitchless.a` library (see [Switchless Calls Library](#)). If the application creates an enclave that supports Switchless Calls using `sgx_create_enclave`, the enclave is created, but the Switchless Calls mode of operation is disabled and all calls are using enclave switches. If **`transition_using_threads`** attribute is used, but the enclave is not linked with `libsgx_tswitchless.a` library, creating the enclave using `sgx_create_enclave_ex` will return `SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED`.

On enclave creation, the uRTS creates several trusted and untrusted worker threads according to the Switchless configuration provided via initialization structures and allocates the required data structures for Switchless Calls. Trusted worker threads use regular enclave TCSes. The `TCSNum` defined in the enclave XML configuration should be updated accordingly when building an enclave with switchless trusted worker threads.

---

### **NOTE:**

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---

You should not use Switchless Calls with TCS binding policy, namely TCSPolicy 0. Using this policy disables concurrent execution of E/OCALLS.

When a developer builds an enclave with the TCS binding policy, they expect the TLS data of the trusted thread to be preserved across calls to the same trusted function. However, this behavior cannot be provided if the enclave uses switchless calls for two main reasons:

- Worker threads handle different switchless ECALLs, despite the TCS binding policy. As a result, the TLS area assigned to any worker thread will be re-used by all the ECALL functions that the worker thread services.
  - When a switchless call request times out, it is serviced as a regular ECALL using a TCS reserved for regular ECALLs. Thus, the switchless ECALL will re-use the TLS area of a regular ECALL.
- 

Example usage of `sgx_create_enclave_ex`:

```
sgx_launch_token_t token = {0};
sgx_status_t ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
int updated = 0;

sgx_uswitchless_config_t us_config = { 0, 1, 1,
100000, 100000, { 0 } };

void* enclave_ex_p[32] = { 0 };

enclave_ex_p[SGX_CREATE_ENCLAVE_EX_SWITCHLESS_
BIT_IDX] = &us_config;

sgx_enclave_id_t eid;

const char* fname = "enclave.signed.so";

ret = sgx_create_enclave_ex ( fname,
    SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, &token, &updated, &eid,
    NULL,
    SGX_CREATE_ENCLAVE_EX_SWITCHLESS,
    enclave_ex_p );
```

## High Level Overview




Figure 1 Switchless Calls Architecture

**Major Highlights:**

- Two task pools, for ECALL and OCALL-tasks respectively.
- Several worker threads servicing ECALLs (running inside the enclave) and OCALLs (running outside the enclave) requests.
- Task objects describing an ECALL/OCALL request including all the required parameters.

**Task Pool**

The Task Pool contains task requests pending to be executed. It uses task objects to transfer data between trusted and untrusted sides without invoking

EENTER/EEXIT.

The application defines at runtime the task pool size, namely the number of concurrent task requests.

### Worker Threads

Worker threads wait for one or more pending tasks in the relevant task pool and start executing the tasks until the task pool gets empty.

The number of working threads is defined by the application at runtime and should be at least two to support nested Switchless Calls.

The depth of nested Switchless Calls (Switchless OCALL → Switchless ECALL → ... → Switchless OCALL) cannot be greater than the number of working threads.

### Fallback to regular ECALLs/OCALLs

When the Task Pool is full, or when all Worker Threads are busy, a Switchless Call falls back to a regular ECALL/OCALL.

### Nested Switchless ECALL

Switchless Calls do not support private nested ECALLs. Nested ECALLs using the `transition_using_threads` keywords must be public as well. Allowing a nested switchless ECALL is not sufficient. A non-public nested ECALL returns `SGX_ERROR_ECALL_NOT_ALLOWED` to the application.

### Switchless Calls Usage Configuration Tips

The Switchless Calls operation mode can improve performance of some workloads. However, this mode is complex and may cause a slowdown or/and a resource overloading by busy-wait worker threads.

It is highly recommended to introduce performance measurements and tuning to the development cycle when you use switchless calls. A simple example is shown in the Switchless sample code.

### Switchless Calls Operation Mode Callbacks

The application can register callbacks for worker thread events. Worker threads can send four types of events:

- worker threads starts
- worker thread exits
- worker thread enters idle state (sleep)
- worker thread misses switchless call (fallback)

Worker thread events contain statistics of processed and missed (fallback) switchless calls. The statistics is common for all worker threads of the same type (trusted/untrusted).

Application may use the Switchless mode callbacks (`sgx_uswitchless_worker_callback_t`) to gather additional performance data. Note that the worker thread MISS event (`SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_MISS`) may happen and cause additional overhead.

Applications that use Switchless Calls may find it useful to detect the HW capabilities of the CPU: the number of cores and threads to configure the switchless configuration structure.

The worker thread START event (`SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_START`) can be used to set thread affinity .

See the example of the worker thread exit callback below. For the callback prototype, refer to [sgx\\_uswitchless\\_worker\\_callback\\_t](#).

```
// global processed/missed calls counters
// 0,1 - untrusted; 2,3 - trusted
uint64_t g_stats[4] = { 0 };

/**
 * callback to log switchless calls stats
 */
void exit_callback (
    sgx_uswitchless_worker_type_t type,
    sgx_uswitchless_worker_event_t event,
    const sgx_uswitchless_worker_stats_t* stats )
{
    // last thread exiting will update the latest results
    g_stats[type*2] = stats->processed;
    g_stats[type*2+1] = stats->missed;
}
```

### Enabling Enclave Code Confidentiality

Intel® Software Guard Extensions Protected Code Loader (Intel® SGX PCL) is intended to protect Intellectual Property (IP) within the code for Intel® SGX enclave applications running on the Linux\* OS.

**Problem:** Intel® SGX provides integrity of code and confidentiality and integrity of data at run-time. However, it does NOT provide confidentiality of code offline as a binary file on disk. Adversaries can reverse engineer the binary enclave shared object.

**Solution:** Encrypt the enclave shared object (.so) at build time and decrypt it at enclave load time.

### Intel® SGX PCL Architectural Overview

#### Build Time:

Figure below shows the Intel® SGX PCL build flow.




Figure 2 Intel® SGX PCL Build Flow

1. The Intel® SGX PCL library is linked into the ISV Intel® SGX IP Enclave.
2. Before the ISV IP Enclave is signed, the linked shared object is modified so that ELF sections containing IP are encrypted. The green key designates the symmetric encryption/decryption key.

#### Notes:

- The Intel® SGX PCL encryption tool treats all sections as IP, except for sections that are required by either the signing tool, the Intel® SGX PSW Enclave Loader, or the Intel® SGX PCL decryption flow. For a detailed list, see 'Sections that are Not Encrypted' below.



- Encryption/decryption key management is the ISV responsibility, which is out of scope for this document.

## Run Time

### ISV Sealing Enclave

To load an IP Enclave, the ISV must first transport a decryption AES key to the user local machine, seal it on the user local machine, and use it as an input for the Intel® SGX PCL. For this, the ISV must devise the second enclave, the 'Sealing Enclave'. The figure below shows this flow:




Figure 3 ISV Sealing Enclave Flow

The ISV Sealing Enclave performs the following operation:

1. Uses the existing standard Intel® SGX SDK Remote Attestation to generate a secure session with the ISV server. (The light blue key illustrates session keys)

2. Receives the decryption key from the ISV server in a secured way.

See details at "Intel® SGX PCL Decryption key provisioning" below. (The green key illustrates a decryption key)

3. Uses the existing standard Intel® SGX SDK sealing mechanism to generate the sealed key and store it locally.

#### Notes:

- For the Sealing Enclave and the IP Enclave to be able to seal and unseal the decryption key, both enclaves must be signed with the same Intel® SGX ISV signing key and have the same ProdID.
- Once the sealed key is generated, it can be stored in nonvolatile memory on the platform. This decreases the number of remote attestations required to run.

## ISV IP Enclave

Figure below shows the enclave loading flow:




Figure 4 ISV IP Enclave Loading Flow

The ISV IP Enclave performs the following operations:

1. Receives the Sealed Key Blob as input.
2. Unseals the blob to receive the decryption key.
3. Uses the decryption key to decrypt the IP content.

### Comparison with Standard Flow

Table below summarizes the differences between the IP Enclave load flows [with](#) and without the Intel® SGX PCL.

Table 14 Comparison of flows with and without Intel® SGX PCL:

Step	Standard Flow (No Intel® SGX PCL)	Intel® SGX PCL Flow
Build Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Link:</b> ISV archives and objs are linked to Enclave.so</li> <li>• <b>Sign:</b> Enclave.so is signed to generate Enclave.signed.so</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Link:</b> ISV archives, objs, and <a href="#">libsgx_pcl.a</a> are linked to IPEnclave.so</li> <li>• <b>Encrypt</b> <a href="#">IPEnclave.so</a> to <a href="#">IPEnclave.so.enc</a></li> <li>• <b>Sign:</b> <a href="#">IPEnclave.so.enc</a> is signed to generate <a href="#">IPEnclave.signed.so</a></li> </ul>
Enclave Load	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enclave application loads the enclave using <code>sgx_create_enclave</code>.</li> <li>2. <code>sgx_create_enclave</code> performs an implicit</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <a href="#">Enclave application gets the sealed decryption key.</a></li> <li>2. Enclave application loads the enclave using <code>sgx_create_enclave_ex</code>, providing the sealed decryption key</li> <li>3. <code>sgx_create_enclave_ex</code> performs an</li> </ol>

ecall. 3. The implicit ecall initiates an enclave runtime initialization flow.	implicit ecall. 4. <a href="#">The Implicit ecall invokes the Intel® SGX PCL flow.</a> 5. <a href="#">Intel® SGX PCL unseals the sealed blob to get the decryption key.</a> 6. <a href="#">Intel® SGX PCL decrypts the encrypted IP sections and returns the enclave to its functional state.</a> 7. The process continues with the enclave runtime initialization flow.
---	--

**Note:** In the simulation mode, link `libsgx_pclsim.a` and not `libsgx_pcl.a`

## Security Considerations

### Not Encrypted Sections

The ISV must make sure the ELF sections in Table below do not contain the ISV IP. The encryption tool will **NOT** encrypt these sections.

Table 15 Not Encrypted Sections

Section name	Description
<code>.shstrtab</code>	Sections' names string table. Pointed by <code>e_shstrndx</code>
<code>.note.sgxmeta</code>	Used by the Intel® SGXSDK
<code>.bss</code> and <code>.tbss</code>	Zero initialized data
<code>.dynamic</code>	Section is required to construct <code>dyn_info</code> by function <code>parse_dyn</code> at <code>elfparser.cpp</code>
<code>.dysym</code> , <code>.dynstr</code> , <code>.rela.dyn</code> , <code>.rela.plt</code>	Sections hold the content pointed by entries with index <code>DT_SYMTAB</code> , <code>DT_STRTAB</code> , <code>DT_REL</code> and <code>DT_PLTREL</code> in <code>dyn_info</code>
<code>.plctbl</code> , <code>.nipx</code> , <code>.nipd</code> , <code>.niprod</code>	Sections which contain Intel® SGX PCL code and data ( <code>nip</code> stands for Non IP)
Debug only:	
<code>.comment</code> , <code>.debug_abbrev</code> , <code>.debug_aranges</code> , <code>.debug_info</code> , <code>.debug_line</code> , <code>.debug_loc</code> ,	These sections remain plain text to enable / ease debugging.

<code>.debug_ragnes, .debug_str, .symtab, .strtab, .gnu_version_d</code>	
--	--

### Writable Sections and Segments

The Intel® SGX PCL encryption tool sets the Writable bit in the section flags of the encrypted ELF sections and in the segment flags of ELF segments that include the encrypted ELF sections. As a result, all pages that belong to such ELF segments or sections, including portions of the enclave code and read-only data, are writable at enclave runtime.

### Intel® SGX PCL Cryptographic Standards

At build time, the encryption tool uses:

- SHA256 to compute the hash of the symmetric encryption/decryption key and embeds it into the IP enclave binary.
- AES-GCM-128 to encrypt-in-place the IP sections.
- RDRAND to generate the per-section random IVs.

At run time the Intel® SGX PCL uses:

- SHA256 to compute the hash of the unsealed symmetric encryption/decryption key. The Intel® SGX PCL verifies the integrity of the symmetric encryption/decryption key by comparing its hash with the one embedded in the IP enclave binary at build time.
- AES-GCM-128 to decrypt-in-place the IP sections.

### Intel® SGX PCL Crypto Code Snippets from OpenSSL

Intel® SGX PCL library includes code snippets from OpenSSL1.1.0g (with slight modifications to enable running with Intel® SGX PCL). Those snippets are now part of the ISV's IP enclave's TCB. If in the future, an identified vulnerability in OpenSSL1.1.0g requires modification to a file from which these snippets originate, ISV must update the snippets accordingly.

### Integrating Intel® SGX PCL with an existing Intel® SGX solution

Integrating an ISV enclave with the Intel® SGX PCL requires the ISV to apply modifications to the ISV solution:

1. Apply modifications to the IP enclave.
2. Apply modifications to the enclave application that loads the enclave(s).
3. Create an additional enclave, the Sealing Enclave.

**Note:** Steps above are already applied to SampleEnclavePCL. See README.md for instructions on building and running the sample code.

**Disclaimer:** This chapter presents a pseudo code, which is not secure, not complete, and it will not compile. For the complete code, see SampleEnclavePCL.

### Modifications to IP Enclave

- Add the following code to the IP Enclave link flags:
 

```
-Wl,--whole-archive -l<pcl_archive_name> -Wl,--no-
whole-archive
```

 where <pcl\_archive\_name> is sgx\_pcl and sgx\_pclsim for the HW and simulation modes, respectively.
- Add the following stage to the build flow:
 

```
ifneq ($(SGX_IPLDR),0)
PCL_ENCRYPTION_TOOL := sgx_encrypt
PCL_KEY := key.bin
ifeq ($(SGX_DEBUG),1)
ENCRYPTION_TOOL_FLAGS := -d
endif
$(ENCRYPTED_ENCLAVE_NAME) : $(ENCLAVE_NAME) $(PCL_ENCRYPTION_TOOL)
$(PCL_ENCRYPTION_TOOL) -i $< -o $@ -k $(PCL_KEY) $(ENCRYPTION_
TOOL_FLAGS)
endif
```

  - In the debug mode, add the '-d' option. It prevents the tool from encrypting or zeroing sections used for debugging.
- Modify the build flow so that the sealed enclave is generated from the encrypted enclave.
- No modifications are required for the IP Enclave source code.

### Modifications to Enclave Application

Required steps:

1. Get the sealed blob:
  - If a file containing the sealed blob exists (for example, it was generated during the previous runs), read it.

- If the file does not exist:
    - Create the Sealing Enclave.
    - Use the Sealing Enclave to provision the decryption key to the platform and seal it.
    - Save the sealed key to a file on the platform for future use.
2. Load the encrypted enclave using `sgx_create_enclave_ex` and provide it with the sealed blob.

#### Pseudo code:

```
#define SEALED_KEY_FILE_NAME "SealedKey.bin"
#define IP_ENCLAVE_FILE_NAME "IPEnclave.signed.so"
#define SEALING_ENCLAVE_FILE_NAME "SealingEnclave.signed.so"

uint8_t* sealed_key;
size_t sealed_key_size;

if(file_exists(SEALED_KEY_FILE_NAME))
{
    // Sealed key file exists, read it into buffer:
    ReadFromFile(SEALED_KEY_FILE_NAME, sealed_key);
}
else
{
    /*
    * Sealed key file does not exist. Create it:
    * 1. Create the Sealing Enclave
    * 2. Use the Sealing Enclave to provision the decryption key
    * onto the platform and seal it.
    * 3. Save the sealed key to a file for future uses
    */
    // 1. create the sealing enclave
    sgx_create_enclave(
        SEALING_ENCLAVE_FILE_NAME,
        debug,
        &token,
        &updated,
        &seal_enclave_id,
```

```

        NULL);

    /*
    * 2. Use the Sealing Enclave to provision the decryption key
    * onto the platform and seal it:
    */

    ecall_get_sealed_key_size(seal_enclave_id, &sealed_key_size);
    sealed_key = (uint8_t*)malloc(sealed_key_size);
    ecall_get_sealed_key(seal_enclave_id, sealed_key, sealed_key_size);

    // 3. Save the sealed key to a file for future uses
    WriteToFile(SEALED_KEY_FILE_NAME, sealed_key);
}

// Load the encrypted enclave, providing the sealed key:
const void* ex_features[32] = {};
ex_features[SGX_CREATE_ENCLAVE_EX_PCL_BIT_IDX] = sealed_key;
sgx_create_enclave_ex(
    IP_ENCLAVE_FILE_NAME,
    debug,
    &token,
    &updated,
    ip_enclave_id,
    NULL,
    ex_features,
    SGX_CREATE_ENCLAVE_EX_PCL);

```

## Sealing Enclave

### Intel® SGX PCL Decryption key provisioning

This section describes methods for creating and using the ISV Sealing Enclave. The ISV Sealing enclave provisions the decryption key to the user local machine and seals it.

To securely transport the decryption AES key to the user local machine, the ISV Sealing enclave needs to attest to the ISV server, generate a secure session, and use it to provision the decryption key.

### Sending the Intel® SGX PCL Decryption Key from ISV Server to Local Platform

The Remote Attestation sample in this document illustrates and describes in details how to initiate a remote attestation session with an ISV server.

Remote attestation enables the server and the client to share secret keys. Such keys can be used to generate a secure session (for example, using TLS) between the ISV server and the Sealing enclave. The secure session can then be used to securely provision the decryption key.

### **Sealing the Intel® SGX PCL Decryption Key**

The sealing sample code in this document illustrates how to seal a secret. By default, the Intel® SGX SDK seals the secret using MRSIGNER.

### **Interaction with the Enclave Application**

In the pseudo code above, the ISV Sealing Enclave provides the Enclave Application with the sealed decryption key by implementing the enclave calls `ecall_get_sealed_key_size` and `ecall_get_sealed_key`. This is not an architectural requirement and ISVs can use their own design.

## **Protection Keys in SGX**

The Protection Keys feature provides an additional mechanism by which 4-level paging and 5-level controls access to user-mode addresses. The protection key is located in bits 62:59 of the paging-structure entry that mapped the page containing the linear address. Software can set a mask in the `PKRU` (protection key rights for user pages) register, to either disable access or disable write to the linear address mapped by the PTE. The `PKRU` register is a 32-bit register with the following format:

For each  $i$  ( $0 \leq i \leq 15$ ), `PKRU[2i]` is the access-disable bit for protection key  $i$  (ADi) and `PKRU[2i+1]` is the write-disable bit for protection key  $i$  (WDi).

The Protection Keys feature offers an attacker an easy mechanism to trace data accesses at a page granularity inside SGX enclaves. To mitigate this potential attack inside SGX enclaves, the `sgx_sign` provides a field `PKRU` in the enclave configuration file, which could be used to enable or disable the Protection Keys inside enclave. If the enclave is signed and loaded as Protection Keys enabled, the tRTS will set the `PKRU` register to 0 on each root ecall. This would prevent an attacker from tracing the data accesses inside enclave. The tRTS also provides two APIs for users to read and write the `PKRU` register inside enclave. Refer to section [Enclave Configuration File](#) and section [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions](#) for details.



## SGX Enclave Memory Manager

An enclave's memory is backed by a special reserved region in RAM, called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). Enclave memory management tasks include allocating/reserving virtual address ranges, committing physical EPC pages, changing EPC page permissions or page types, and removing EPC pages. Those tasks require collaboration between the trusted runtime, the untrusted runtime, and the OS. The SGX enclave memory manager (EMM) serves as a central component in enclave trusted runtime that abstracts the interaction with the untrusted runtime for all memory management flows and provides APIs for its clients to perform the memory management tasks.

The header file `sgx_mm.h` includes EMM public APIs, [sgx\\_mm\\_alloc](#), [sgx\\_mm\\_dealloc](#), [sgx\\_mm\\_commit](#), [sgx\\_mm\\_uncommit](#), [sgx\\_mm\\_commit\\_data](#), [sgx\\_mm\\_modify\\_permissions](#) and [sgx\\_mm\\_modify\\_type](#), which are intended to encapsulate low level details of managing the basic EDMM flows.

### Allocate and Deallocate Enclave Memory

The EMM provides an API, [sgx\\_mm\\_alloc](#), for its clients to request enclave memory allocations. An enclave memory allocation represents both a reserved virtual address range and a commitment of EPC pages. EPC pages are committed for enclaves via special SGX instructions: loaded by EADD/EEXTEND before EINIT or dynamically added using EAUG followed by EACCEPT. The [sgx\\_mm\\_alloc](#) API allows clients to specify one of three committing modes for an allocation:

- `SGX_EMA_RESERVE`: only the virtual address range is reserved. No EPC pages will be committed in this mode.
- `SGX_EMA_COMMIT_NOW`: reserves and commits physical EPC upon allocation. EACCEPT will be done immediately on SGX2 platforms.
- `SGX_EMA_COMMIT_ON_DEMAND`: EACCEPT is done on demand, see below on committing and uncommitting.

An allocation, once created, will own its address range until the deallocation API, [sgx\\_mm\\_dealloc](#), is called upon. No two active allocations can have overlapping address ranges.

### **Commit and Uncommit Enclave Memory**

When a page in COMMIT\_ON\_DEMAND allocations is accessed, a page fault occurs if the page was not yet committed. The EMM will perform EACCEPT to commit the EPC page on page fault after OS doing EAUG. The clients can also call the EMM commit API, [sgx\\_mm\\_commit](#), to proactively commit specific sub-regions in a COMMIT\_ON\_DEMAND allocation to avoid future page fault. Some EMM clients, e.g., a dynamic code loader wishing to load code on page faults, can register a custom handler for page faults at the time of allocation request. In the custom page fault handler, it can invoke an API, [sgx\\_mm\\_commit\\_data](#), to commit and load data to newly committed EPC page at the same time as supported by EACCEPTCOPY.

Committed pages will stay committed regardless how they were committed until the clients calls the API, [sgx\\_mm\\_uncommit](#), on them or the allocation they belong to is deallocated by [sgx\\_mm\\_dealloc](#).

### **Modify Page Attributes**

The EMM clients may call [sgx\\_mm\\_modify\\_permissions](#) and [sgx\\_mm\\_modify\\_type](#) to request permissions or page type changes for pages in existing allocations.

### **Note**

The main-line kernel has built-in EDMM support since release v6.0. Steps to build and install kernel with EDMM support can be found [here](#).

The enclaves built with previously released SDK, if not requiring dynamic features, will still work as expected. If they depend on the dynamic features, i.e. expanding the heap/stack size on demand, changing page permissions, or creating dynamic threads within enclaves, then they need to be rebuilt with this new SDK release.

### **Limitations**

The EMM holds a global recursive mutex for the whole duration of each API invocation. There is no support for concurrent operations such as modifying type/permissions, committing pages on different regions.

The EMM internally uses a separate dynamic allocator (emalloc) to manage its internal memory allocation for bookkeeping. During initialization, the EMM emalloc will create an initial reserve region from the user range and it may add more reserves later from the user range if needed. SDK signing tool can estimate this overhead as  $(\text{total size of all RTS regions and user regions})/2^{14}$  and account for it when calculating the enclave size.

The EMM relies on vDSO interface to guarantee that fault handler is called on the same OS thread where fault happened. This is due to the use of the global recursive mutex. If fault handler comes in from different thread while the mutex is held, it will deadlock. A #PF could happen when more stack is needed inside EMM functions while the mutex is locked. vDSO user handler should ensure it re-enters enclave with the original TCS and on the same OS thread. To avoid potential deadlocks, no other mutex/lock should be used in this path from user handler to first phase exception handler inside enclave.

EMM has not been optimized for performance.

## Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK Sample Code

After installing the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK, you can find the sample code at `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode`.

- The *SampleEnclave* project shows how to create an enclave.
- The *Cxx11SGXDemo* project shows how to use C++11 library inside the enclave.
- The *LocalAttestation* project shows how to use the Intel Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange library to establish a trusted channel between two enclaves running on the same platform.
- The *RemoteAttestation* project shows how to use the Intel remote attestation and key exchange library in the remote attestation process.

### Sample Enclave

The project *SampleEnclave* shows you how to write an enclave from scratch. This topic demonstrates the following basic aspects of enclave features:

- Initialize and destroy an enclave
- Create ECALLs or OCALLs
- Call trusted libraries inside the enclave

The source code is shipped with an installation package of the Intel® SGX SDK in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/SampleEnclave`. A Makefile is provided to build the *SampleEnclave* on Linux.

---

#### **NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

### Initialize an Enclave

Before establishing any trusted transaction between an application and an enclave, the enclave itself needs to be correctly created and initialized by calling `sgx_create_enclave` provided by the uRTS library.

### Saving and Retrieving the Launch Token

Starting the Intel® SGX 2.4 release, you do not need to pass and store the launch token anymore.

Before the Intel® SGX 2.4 release, a launch token needs to be passed to `sgx_create_enclave` for enclave initialization. If the launch token was saved in a

previous transaction, it can be retrieved and used directly. Otherwise, you can provide an all-0 buffer. `sgx_create_enclave` will attempt to create a valid launch token if the input is not valid. After the enclave is correctly created and initialized, you may need to save the token if it has been updated. The fourth parameter of `sgx_create_enclave` indicates whether or not an update has been performed.

The launch token should be saved in a per-user directory or a registry entry in case it would be used in a multi-user environment.

### ECALL/OCALL Functions

This sample demonstrates basic EDL syntax used by ECALL/OCALL functions, as well as using trusted libraries inside the enclave. You may see [Enclave Definition Language Syntax](#) for syntax details and [Trusted Libraries](#) for C/C++ support.

### Destroy an Enclave

To release the enclave memory, you need to invoke `sgx_destroy_enclave` provided by the `sgx_urts` library. It will recycle the EPC memory and untrusted resources used by that enclave instance.

### Power Transition

If a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all the enclave data will be inaccessible. Consequently, when the system is resumed, each of the in-process ECALLS and the subsequent ECALLS will fail with the error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST` which indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel® Software Guard Extensions project should have the capability to handle the power transition which might impact its behavior. The project named *PowerTransition* describes one method of developing Intel® Software Guard Extensions projects that handle power transitions. See [ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry](#) for more info.

*PowerTransition* demonstrates the following scenario: an enclave instance is created and initialized by one main thread and shared with three other child threads; The three child threads repeatedly ECALL into the enclave, manipulate secret data within the enclave and backup the corresponding encrypted data outside the enclave; After all the child threads finish, the main thread destroys the enclave and frees the associated system resources. If a power transition happens, one and only one thread will reload the enclave and restore the

secret data inside the enclave with the encrypted data that was saved outside and then continues the execution.

The *PowerTransition* sample code is released with Intel® SGX SDK in [Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/PowerTransition. A Makefile is provided to build the sample code on Linux\* OS.

---

**NOTE:**

If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

### ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry

After a power transition, an Intel® SGX error code `SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST` will be returned for the current ECALL. To handle the power transition and continue the project without impact, you need to destroy the invalid enclave to free resources first and then retry with a newly created and initialized enclave instance, as depicted in the following figure.




Figure 5 Power Transition Handling Flow Chart

### ECALLs in Demonstration

*PowerTransition* demonstrates handling the power transition in two types of ECALLs:

1. Initialization ECALL after enclave creation.
2. Normal ECALL to manipulate secrets within the enclave.

#### Initialization ECALL after Enclave Creation

*PowerTransition* illustrates one initialization ECALL after enclave creation which is shown in the following figure:




Figure 6 Enclave Initialization ECall after Enclave Creation Flow Chart

`sgx_create_enclave` is a key API provided by the uRTS library for enclave creation. For `sgx_create_enclave`, a mechanism of power transition handling is already implemented in the uRTS library. Therefore, it is unnecessary to manually handle power transition for this API.

---

**NOTE:**

To concentrate on handling a power transition, `PowerTransition` assumes the enclave file and the launch token are located in the same directory as the application. See [Sample Enclave](#) for how to store the launch token properly.

---

**Normal ECALL to Process Secrets within the Enclave**

This is the most common ECALL type into an enclave. `PowerTransition` demonstrates the power transition handling for this type of ECALL in a child thread after the enclave creation and initialization by the main thread, as depicted in the figure below. Since the enclave instance is shared by the child threads, it is required to make sure one and only one child thread to re-creates and re-initializes the enclave instance after the power transition and the others utilize the re-created enclave instance directly. `PowerTransition` confirms this point by checking whether the Enclave ID is updated.




Figure 7 Regular ECALL Flow Chart

**NOTE:**

During the ECALL process, it is recommended to back up the confidential data as cipher text outside the enclave frequently. Then we can use the backup data to restore the enclave to reduce the power transition impacts.

**C++11 Demo**

The project `Cxx11SGXDemo` is designed to illustrate some of the C++11 library features supported inside the enclave provided by the Intel® SGX SDK and the compiler features supported by the GCC. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++11 features currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/Cxx11SGXDemo`. A Makefile is provided to build the `Cxx11SGXDemo` on Linux.

**NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted.



The sample covers a subset of C++11 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

**Table 16 Overview of C++11 features covered**

Headers	<pre>#include &lt;typeinfo&gt; #include &lt;functional&gt; #include &lt;algorithm&gt; #include &lt;unordered_set&gt; #include &lt;unordered_map&gt; #include &lt;initializer_list&gt; #include &lt;tuple&gt; #include &lt;memory&gt; #include &lt;atomic&gt; #include &lt;mutex&gt; #include &lt;condition_variable&gt; #include &lt;map&gt;</pre>
Classes	<pre>std::function, std::all_of, std::any_of, std::none_of, std::initializer_list, std::unordered_set, std::unordered_map, std::unordered_multiset, std::unordered_multimap, std::tuple, std::shared_ptr, std::unique_ptr, std::auto_ptr, std::mutex, std::condition_variable</pre>
Compiler features	<pre>lambda expressions, auto, decltype, strongly typed enum classes, range-based for statements, static_assert, new virtual function controls, delegating constructors, variadic templates, substitution failure is not an error (SFINAE), rvalue references and move semantics, nullptr type</pre>

## C++14 Demo

The project *Cxx14SGXDemo* is designed to illustrate some of the C++14 library features supported inside the enclave that is provided by the Intel® SGX SDK and the compiler features that are supported by the GCC. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++14 features that are currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/Cxx14SGXDemo`. A Makefile is provided to build the *Cxx14SGXDemo* on Linux.

---

### **NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

The sample covers a subset of C++14 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

**Table 17 Overview of C++14 features covered**

Classes	std::make_unique, std::integral_constant, std::integer_sequence, std::cbegin, std::cend, std::crbegin, std::crend, std::exchange, std::is_final, std::quoted, std::equal new overload, std::mismatch new overload, std::is_permutation new overload, standard user-defined literals
Compiler features	heterogeneous lookup, function return type deduction, variable template, binary literals, digit separators, generic lambdas, lambda capture expressions, attribute <code>[[deprecated]]</code> , aggregate member initialization, alternate type deduction on declaration, relaxed constexpr restrictions

## C++17\_Demo

The project *Cxx17SGXDemo* is designed to illustrate some of the C++17 library features supported inside the enclave that is provided by the Intel® SGX SDK and the compiler features that are supported by the GCC. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++17 features that are currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/Cxx17SGXDemo`. A Makefile is provided to build the *Cxx17SGXDemo* on Linux.

---

### **NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

The sample covers a subset of C++17 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

**Table 18 Overview of C++17 features covered**

Library features	<p>std::apply, std::make_from_tuple, std::any, std::optional, std::variant, searchers, std::as_const, std::not_fn,</p> <p>uninitialized memory algorithms, std::destroy_at, std::destroy, std::destroy_n, std::uninitialized_move, std::uninitialized_value_construct, weak_from_this, std::aligned_alloc, transparent std::owner_less, array support for std::shared_ptr, allocation functions with explicit alignment,</p> <p>std::byte, std::conjunction/std::disjunction/std::negation, type trait variable templates, std::is_swappable, is_invocable, is_aggregate, std::has_unique_object_representations,</p> <p>std::clamp, std::reduce, std::inclusive_scan, std::exclusive_scan, std::gcd, std::lcm,</p> <p>map/set extract and map/set merge, map/unordered_map try_emplace and insert_or_assign, contiguous iterators (LegacyContiguousIterator), non-member std::size/std::empty/std::data, std::launder, std::uncaught_exceptions</p>
Compiler features	<p>fold-expressions, class template argument deduction, non-type template parameters declared with auto, compile-time if con-</p>

<p>stexpr, inline variables, structured bindings, initializers for if and switch, u8 character literal, simplified nested namespaces, using-declaration declaring multiple names, made noexcept part of type system, new order of evaluation rules, guaranteed copy elision, temporary materialization, lambda capture of *this, constexpr lambda, attribute namespaces don't have to repeat, __has_include, new attributes <code>[[fallthrough]]</code> <code>[[maybe_unused]]</code> <code>[[nodiscard]]</code></p>
---

## Attestation

In the Intel® Software Guard Extensions architecture, attestation refers to the process of demonstrating that a specific enclave was established on the platform. The Intel® SGX Architecture provides two attestation mechanisms:

- One creates an authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform referred to as local attestation.
- The second mechanism extends local attestation to provide assertions to 3rd parties outside the platform referred to as remote attestation. The remote attestation process leverages a quoting service.

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides APIs used by applications to implement the attestation process.

### Local Attestation

Local attestation refers to two enclaves on the same platform authenticating to each other using the Intel SGX REPORT mechanism before exchanging information. In an Intel® SGX application, multiple enclaves might collaborate to perform certain functions. After the two enclaves verify the counterpart is trustworthy, they can exchange information on a protected channel, which typically provides confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. The local attestation and protected channel establishment uses the REPORT based Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange\* protocol.

You can find a sample solution shipped with the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK at `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/Local_Attestation` directory. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

When you build the sample code two different applications are generated. One application runs both local attestation initiator and responder enclaves within a single process. The second application, consisting of a pair of binaries,

runs the initiator and responder enclaves in two separate processes. See the [README](#) file for additional information.

---

**NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

The sample code shows an example implementation of local attestation, including protected channel establishment and secret message exchange using enclave to enclave function call as an example.

**Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation Flow**

The local attestation sample in the SDK uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library to establish a protected channel between two enclaves. The DH key exchange APIs are described in `sgx_dh.h`. The key exchange library is part of the Intel® SGX application SDK trusted libraries. It is statically linked with the enclave code and exposes APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. The library is combined with other libraries and is built into the final library called `libsgx_tservice.a` that is part of the SDK release.




Figure 8 Local Attestation Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

The figure above represents the usage of DH key exchange library. A local attestation flow consists of the following steps:

In the figure, ISV Enclave 1 is the initiator enclave and ISV Enclave 2 is the responder enclave.

1. Initiator enclave calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
2. The initiator enclave does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into the responder enclave.
4. Responder enclave in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
5. Responder enclave calls the key exchange library to generate the DH Message 1 `ga || TARGETINFO`.
6. DH Message 1 is sent back from the responder enclave to the initiator enclave through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into the initiator enclave.
7. Initiator enclave processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library API and generates the DH Message 2 `gb|[Report Enclave 1(h(ga || gb))]`SMK.
8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into the responder enclave giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting the DH Message 3.
10. Responder enclave calls the key exchange library API to process the DH Message 2 and generates the DH Message 3 `[ReportEnclave2(h(gb || ga)) || Optional Payload]`SMK.
11. DH Message 3 is sent back from the responder enclave to the initiator enclave through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into the initiator enclave.
12. Initiator enclave uses the key exchange library to process the DH Message 3 and establish the session.
13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

### Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation 2.0

the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library also exposes DH key exchange 2.0 APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. To use DH key exchange 2.0 APIs which are also described in `sgx_dh.h`, add `SGX_USE_LAv2_INITIATOR` to `Preprocessor Definitions` option.

A local attestation 2.0 flow consists of the steps in previous section except 7 and 10:

1. ISV initiator enclave calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
2. The initiator enclave does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into the responder enclave .
4. The responder enclave in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
5. The responder enclave calls the key exchange library to generate DH Message 1 `ga || TARGETINFO`.
6. DH Message 1 is sent back from the responder enclave to the initiator enclave through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into the initiator enclave.
7. The initiator enclave processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library 2.0 API and generates the DH Message 2 `gb || [Report Enclave 1(h(proto_spec || gb))]SMK` and `report_data` replaced with `proto_spec` which `proto_spec` is `'SGX LA' || Ver || Rev || TARGET_SPEC || padding`.
8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into the responder enclave giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting the DH Message 3.
10. The responder enclave calls the key exchange library 2.0 API to process the DH Message 2 and generates the DH Message 3 `[Report Enclave2(h(ga || proto_spec)) || Optional Payload || ga]SMK`.
11. DH Message 3 is sent back from the responder enclave to initiator enclave through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into the initiator enclave.
12. The initiator enclave uses the key exchange library to process the DH Message 3 and establish the session.
13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

#### Protected Channel Establishment

The following figure illustrates the interaction between two enclaves, namely the source enclave and the destination enclave, to establish a session. The application initiates a session between the source enclave and the destination enclave by doing an ECALL into the source enclave, passing in the enclave id of the destination enclave. Upon receiving the enclave id of the destination enclave, the source enclave does an OCALL into the core untrusted code



which then does an ECALL into the destination enclave to exchange the messages required to establish a session using ECDH Key Exchange\* protocol.




Figure 9 Secure Channel Establishment Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

### Secret Message Exchange and Enclave to Enclave Call

The following figure illustrates the message exchange between two enclaves. After the establishment of the protected channel, session keys are used to encrypt the payload in the message(s) being exchanged between the source and destination enclaves. The sample code implements interfaces to encrypt the payload of the message. The sample code also shows the implementation of an enclave calling a function from another enclave. Call type, target function ID, total input parameter length and input parameters are encapsulated in the payload of the secret message sent from the caller (source) Enclave and the callee (destination) enclave. As one enclave cannot access memory of another enclave, all input and output parameters, including data indirectly referenced by a parameter needs to be marshaled across the two enclaves. The sample code uses Intel® SGX SDK trusted cryptographic library to encrypt the payload of the message. Through such encryption, message exchange is just the secret and in case of the enclave to enclave call is the marshaled destination enclave's function id, total parameter length and all the parameters. The destination enclave decrypts the payload and calls the appropriate function. The results of the function call are encrypted using the session keys and sent back to the source enclave.




Figure 10 Secret Message Exchange Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

### Remote Attestation

Generally speaking, Remote Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a remote provider or producer of some sort. With Intel® SGX, Remote Attestation software includes the app's

enclave and the Intel-provided Quoting Enclave (QE) and Provisioning Enclave (PvE). The attestation HW is the Intel® SGX enabled CPU.

Remote Attestation alone is not enough for the remote party to be able to securely deliver their service (secrets or assets). Securely delivering services also requires a secure communication session. Remote Attestation is used during the establishment of such a session. This is analogous to how the familiar SSL handshake includes both authentication and session establishment.

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes sample code showing:

- How an application enclave can attest to a remote party.
- How an application enclave and the remote party can establish a secure session.

The SDK includes a remote session establishment or key exchange (KE) libraries that can be used to greatly simplify these processes.

You can find the sample code for remote attestation in the directory `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/RemoteAttestation`.

---

**NOTE:**

To run the sample code in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

---

**NOTE:**

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

---

Intel® SGX uses an anonymous signature scheme, Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel® EPID), for authentication (for example, attestation). The supplied key exchange libraries implement a Sigma-like protocol for session establishment. Sigma is a protocol that includes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but also addresses the weaknesses of DH. The protocol Intel® SGX uses differs from the Sigma protocol that's used in IKE v1 and v2 in that the Intel® SGX platform uses Intel® EPID to authenticate while the service provider uses PKI. (In Sigma, both parties use PKI.) Finally, the KE libraries require the service provider to use an ECDSA, not an RSA, key pair in the authentication portion of the protocol and the libraries use ECDH for the actual key exchange.

### Remote Key Exchange (KE) Libraries

The RemoteAttestation sample in the SDK uses the remote KE libraries as described above to create a remote attestation of an enclave, and uses that

attestation during establishment of a secure session (a key exchange).

There are both untrusted and trusted KE libraries. The untrusted KE library is provided as a static library, `libsgx_ukey_exchange.a`. The Intel® SGX application needs to link with this library and include the header file `sgx_ukey_exchange.h`, containing the prototypes for the APIs that the KE trusted library exposes.

---

**NOTE:**

If you are unable to use either of the two pre-built untrusted key exchange static libraries, the source code for a sample untrusted key exchange library is included in the `isv_app` subfolder of the Remote Attestation sample application that is shipped with this SDK.

---

The trusted KE library is also provided as a static library. As a trusted library, the process for using it is slightly different than that for the untrusted KE library. The main difference relates to the fact that the trusted KE library exposes ECALLs called by the untrusted KE library. This means that the library has a corresponding EDL file, `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`, which has to be imported in the EDL file for the application enclave that uses the library. We can see this in code snippet below, showing the complete contents of `app_enclave.edl`, the EDL file for the app enclave in the sample code.

```
enclave {
    from "sgx_tkey_exchange.edl" import *;
    include "sgx_key_exchange.h"
    include "sgx_trts.h"
    trusted {
        public sgx_status_t enclave_init_ra(
            int b_pse,
            [out] sgx_ra_context_t *p_context);
        public sgx_status_t enclave_ra_close(
            sgx_ra_context_t context);
    };
};
```

It's worth noting that `sgx_key_exchange.h` contains types specific to remote key exchange and must be included as shown above as well as in the untrusted code of the application that uses the enclave. Finally, `sgx_tkey_exchange.h` is a header file that includes prototypes for the APIs that the trusted library exposes, but that are not ECALLs, i.e., APIs called by ISV code in the application enclave.

### Remote Attestation and Protected Session Establishment

This topic describes the functionality of the remote attestation sample in detail.

---

**NOTE:**

In the sample code, the service provider is modeled as a Shared Object, `service_provider.so`. The sample service provider does not depend on Intel® SGX headers, type definitions, libraries, and so on. This was done to demonstrate that the Intel SGX is not required in any way when building a remote attestation service provider.

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


Figure 11 Remote Attestation and Trust Channel Establishment Flow

An Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) application would typically begin by requesting service (for example, media streaming) from a service provider (SP) and the SP would respond with a challenge. This is not shown in the figure. The figure begins with the app’s reaction to the challenge.

1. The flow starts with the app entering the enclave that will be the endpoint of the KE, passing in `b_pse`, a flag indicating whether the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
2. If `b_pse` is true, then the isv enclave shall call trusted AE support library with `sgx_create_pse_session()` to establish a session with PSE.
3. Code in the enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`, passing in the SP's ECDSA public key, `g_sp_pub_key`, and `b_pse`. The integrity of `g_sp_pub_key` is a public key is important so this value should just be built into isv\_enclave.
4. Close PSE session by `sgx_close_pse_session()` if a session is established before. The requirement is that, if the app enclave uses Platform Services, the session with the PSE must already be established before the app enclave calls `sgx_ra_init()`.
5. `sgx_ra_init()` returns the KE context to the app enclave and the app enclave returns the context to the app.
6. The application calls `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id()` and sends the value returned in `p_extended_epid_group_id` to the server in `msg0`.
7. The server checks whether the extended Intel® EPID group ID is supported. If the ID is not supported, the server aborts remote attestation.

---

**NOTE:**

Currently, the only valid extended Intel® EPID group ID is zero. The server should verify this value is zero. If the Intel® EPID group ID is not zero, the server aborts remote attestation.

---

8. The application calls `sgx_ra_get_msg1()`, passing in this KE's context. Figure 3 shows the app also passing in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, exposed by the TKE. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.
9. `sgx_ra_get_msg1()` builds an S1 message = (ga || GID) and returns it to the app.
10. The app sends S1 to the service provider (SP) by `ra_network_send_receive()`, it will call `sp_ra_proc_msg1_req()` to process S1 and generate S2.
11. Application eventually receives  $S2 = gb \parallel SPID \parallel 2\text{-byte TYPE} \parallel 2\text{-byte KDF-ID} \parallel \text{SigSP}(gb, ga) \parallel \text{CMAC}_{SMK}(gb$



```
|| SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb,
ga)) || SigRL.
```

12. The application calls `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()`, passing in `S2` and the context.
13. The code in `sgx_ra_proc_msg2()` builds  $S3 = \text{CMAC}_{\text{SMK}}(M) || M$  where  $M = \text{ga} || \text{PS\_SECURITY\_PROPERTY} || \text{QUOTE}$  and returns it. Platform Services Security Information is included only if the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
14. Application sends the `msg3` to the SP by `ra_network_send_receive()`, and the SP verifies the `msg3`.
15. SP returns the verification result to the application.

At this point, a session has been established and keys exchanged. Whether the service provider thinks the session is secure and uses it depends on the security properties of the platform as indicated by the `S3` message. If the platform's security properties meet the service provider's criteria, then the service provider can use the session keys to securely deliver a secret and the app enclave can consume the secret any time after it retrieves the session keys by calling `sgx_ra_get_keys()` on the trusted KE library. This is not shown in the figure, nor is the closing of the session. Closing the session requires entering the app enclave and calling `sgx_ra_close()` on the trusted KE library, among other app enclave-specific cleanup.

#### Remote Attestation with a Custom Key Derivation Function (KDF)

By default, the platform software uses the KDF described in the definition of the `sgx_ra_get_keys` API when the `sgx_ra_init` API is used to generate the remote attestation context. If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel® SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK, and VK). The decision to use a different KDF is a policy of the ISV, but it should be approved by the ISV's security process.

#### Debugging a Remote Attestation Service Provider

As an ISV writing the remote attestation service provider, you may want to debug the message flow. One way to do this would be to provide pre-generated messages that can be replayed and verified. However, not that `S1 message = (GID || ga)` includes the random component `ga` generated inside an enclave. Also, the remote attestation service provider generates a random public+private key pair as part of its `msg2` generation, but without

any interaction with Intel® SGX. Finally, each of these has state or context that is associated with cryptographic operations and is used to ensure that certain calls being made are in the correct order and that the state is consistent. These characteristics help protect the remote attestation flow against attacks, but also make it more difficult to replay pre-generated messages.

To overcome these, the cryptographic library is modified and used (only) by the sample service provider. Any time that key generation, signing, or other operation requests a random number, the number 9 is returned. This means that the crypto functions from `libsampl_crypto.so` are predictable and cryptographically weak. If we can replay `msg1` send from the `isv_app`, the sample `service_provider` will always generate the exact same `msg2`. We now have a sufficient system to replay messages sent by the `isv_app` and have it verify that the responses sent by the remote service are the expected ones.

To replay messages and exercise this verification flow, pass in 1 or 2 as a command-line argument when running the sample application `isv_app`. The `isv_app` will ignore errors generated by the built-in checks in the Intel SGX. Developers wishing to debug their remote attestation service provider should be able to temporarily modify their cryptographic subsystem to behave in a similar manner as the `libsampl_crypto.so` and replay the pre-computed messages stored in `sample_messages.h`. The responses from their own remote attestation service provider should match the ones generated by ours, which are also stored in `sample_messages.h`.

---

**NOTE**

Do not use the sample cryptographic library provided in this sample in production code.

---

**Using a Different Extended Intel® EPID Group for Remote Attestation**

The Intel® SGX platform software can generate Quotes signed by keys belonging to a more than one extended Intel® EPID Group. Before remote attestation starts, the ISV Service provider (SP) needs to know which extended Intel® EPID Group the PSW supports. The ISV SP will use this information to request Quote generation and verification in the correct extended Intel® EPID Group. The API `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id` returns the extended Intel® EPID Group ID. The ISV application should query the currently configured extended Intel® EPID Group ID from the platform software using this API and sending it to the ISV SP. The ISV SP then knows which extended Intel® EPID Group to use for remote attestation. If the ISV SP does not support the

provided extended Intel® EPID Group, it will terminate the remote attestation attempt.

### ECDSA Remote Attestation

The Intel® SGX platform software consume The Intel® SGX Data Center Attestation Primitives (Intel® SGX DCAP) in order to support ECDSA attestation. The platform which creates the ECDSA attestation must support Flexible Launch Control (FLC).

The ECDSA Attestation key is created and owned by the owner of the remote attestation infrastructure but is certified by an Intel rooted key whose certificate is distributed by Intel. The Intel rooted certificate proves that the platform running the Intel® SGX enclave is valid and in good standing.

The application calls `sgx_select_att_key_id` to select the ECDSA attestation key from a list provided by the off-platform Quote verifier.

### Switchless

The Switchless sample is designed to illustrate the usage and potential performance benefits of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Switchless Calls. It demonstrates the usage of `sgx_create_enclave_ex` and the Switchless Calls configuration. The Switchless sample EDL defines regular and switchless ECALLs and regular and switchless OCALLs. The sample application calls sample ECALLs/OCALLs in loops and compares the execution time of the regular and switchless calls.

### Protected Code Loader

Comparing the sample code in folder SampleEnclavePCL to the sample code in folder SampleEnclave demonstrates how to integrate the Intel® Software Guard Extensions Protected Code Loader (Intel® SGX PCL) into an ISV existing Intel® SGX project.

### Sample Enclave for GM SMx using Intel® IPP

The project SampleEnclaveGMIPP shows how to use the GM (Chinese National Commercial Password Algorithms) SM2, SM3, and SM4 functions inside an enclave. These functions are implemented in the Intel® IPP.

The source code is shipped with the installation package of the Intel® SGX SDK in `<install-dir>SampleCode/SampleEnclaveGMIPP`.

There are 3 parts of the sample project: initializing an enclave, creating an ECALL and calling GM SM2, or SM3, or SM4 functions in a specific sequence in

this ECALL, and destroying the enclave. For more details about GM SM2, SM3, and SM4 functions, refer to the Intel® IPP official page.

## GM SM2

SM2 is a public key cryptographic algorithm based on elliptic curves, it is used for key pair generation and digital signature verification. The procedure of using GM SM2 functions for signing and verifying is demonstrated below:

1. Create an ECC context for SM2
2. Generate a SM2 key pair including a private key and a public key
3. Do user message digest for SM2 signing and verifying
4. Sign the user message using SM2 ECC context by the private key
5. Verify the signature of the user message using SM2 ECC context by the public key
6. Remove secrets and release resources

SM2 is also used for encryption and decryption, take GM (GM/T 0003-2012) standard for example, the procedure of using GM SM2 functions for encrypting and decrypting is demonstrated below:

1. Create an ECC context for SM2
2. Generate a SM2 key pair including a private key and a public key
3. Encrypt the plaintext message using SM2 ECC context by the public key
4. Decrypt the encrypted message using SM2 ECC context by the private key
5. Compare decrypted message and original message
6. Remove secrets and release resources

SM2 key exchange protocol can be used in key management and key agreement, and the shared secret key is generally used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. The procedure of using GM SM2 functions for exchanging key is demonstrated below:

1. Create an ECC context for SM2
2. Generate requester and responder's regular/ephemeral private/public key
3. Initialize the SM2 key exchange ECC context
4. Compute requester's shared key
5. Compute responder's shared key

6. Confirm if requester and responder's shared key correct, and compare if equal
7. Remove secrets and release resources

### GM SM3

SM3 is a cryptographic hash function used in digital signatures, message authentication codes, and pseudorandom number generators. The procedure of using GM SM3 functions to compute a digest of a message:

1. Initialize: initialize SM3 context
2. Update: digest the message of specified length
3. Get tag: compute the current SM3 digest value of the processed part of the message
4. Finalize: complete computation of the SM3 digest value
5. Remove secrets and release resources

### GM SM4

SM4 is a block cipher algorithm used for data encryption and decryption. The procedure of using GM SM4 functions to encrypt plaintext and decrypt ciphertext by CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode and CTR (Counter) mode:

1. Initialize a SM4 context
2. Encrypt a plaintext to an encrypted text by CBC/CTR
3. Decrypt the encrypted text to a decrypted text by CBC/CTR
4. Compare plaintext and decrypted text
5. Remove secrets and release resources

### Sample Attested TLS

The project *SampleAttestedTLS* shows you how to establish attested TLS channel based on Intel® SGX ECDSA remote attestation. Refer to *AttestedTLSREADME* and *README* in *Sample* project to understand the basic concept of Attested TLS channel and prerequisites.

This sample demonstrates attested TLS in two different ways:

- between two enclaves
- between an enclave application and a non enclave application

---

**NOTE:**

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The sample based on Intel® SGX ECDSA remote attestation. Refer to [Intel® SGX DCAP](#) (Data Center Attestation Primitives) to set up environment and make sure DCAP `QuoteGenerationSample` and `QuoteVerificationSample` can be ran successfully.

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### Sample Enclave for SGX MbedCrypto Library

The project shows you how to use SGX Mbedtls Cryptography Library within an enclave. This sample demonstrates the typical SGX Cryptography APIs' usages.

### Sample Enclave for AEX-Notify

The project `SampleAEXNotify` is a sample application to demonstrate how to use the AEX-Notify feature in an SGX enclave.

The source code is shipped with an installation package of the Intel® SGX SDK in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]SampleCode/SampleAEXNotify`. A Makefile is provided to build the `SampleAEXNotify` on Linux.

---

#### **NOTE:**

The `SampleAEXNotify` sample requires to enable the AEX-Notify feature in an enclave. Executing the application requires the hardware must support it and the in-kernel driver must be v6.2 or later.

---

## Library Functions and Type Reference

This topic includes the following sub-topics to describe library functions and type reference for Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- [Untrusted Library Functions](#)
- [Trusted Libraries](#)
- [Function Descriptions](#)
- [Types and Enumerations](#)
- [Error Codes](#)

### Untrusted Library Functions

The untrusted library functions can only be called from application code - outside the enclave.

The untrusted libraries built for the hardware mode contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as the prefix, is defined when the library is built. The string version consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all untrusted libraries shipped in a given Intel® SGX PSW/SDK release have the same version number and allows quick identification of the untrusted libraries linked into an untrusted component.

For instance, `libsgx_urts.so` contains a string version `SGX_URTS_VERSION_1.0.0.0`. The last digit varies depending on the specific Intel SGX PSW/SDK release number.

### Enclave Creation and Destruction

These functions are used to create or destroy enclaves:

- [sgx\\_create\\_enclave](#)
- [sgx\\_create\\_enclave\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_create\\_enclave\\_from\\_buffer\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_create\\_encrypted\\_enclave](#)
- [sgx\\_destroy\\_enclave](#)

### Quoting Functions

These functions allow application enclaves to ensure that they are running on the Intel® Software Guard Extensions environment.

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**NOTE:**

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To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to the Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

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These functions perform Intel® EPID quoting.

- [sgx\\_init\\_quote](#)
- [sgx\\_calc\\_quote\\_size](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_quote\\_size](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_quote](#)
- [sgx\\_report\\_attestation\\_status](#)
- [sgx\\_check\\_update\\_status](#)

These functions perform Intel® EPID quoting and ECDSA quoting.

- [sgx\\_select\\_att\\_key\\_id](#)
- [sgx\\_init\\_quote\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_quote\\_size\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_quote\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_supported\\_att\\_key\\_id\\_num](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_supported\\_att\\_key\\_ids](#)

### Untrusted Key Exchange Functions

These functions allow exchanging of secrets between ISV's server and enclaves. They are used in concert with the trusted Key Exchange functions.

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#### **NOTE:**

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to the Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

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These functions perform Intel® EPID attestation.

- [sgx\\_ra\\_get\\_msg1](#)
- [sgx\\_ra\\_proc\\_msg2](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_extended\\_epid\\_group\\_id](#)

These functions perform Intel® EPID attestation and ECDSA attestation.

- [sgx\\_ra\\_get\\_msg1\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_ra\\_proc\\_msg2\\_ex](#)

### Untrusted Remote Attestation TLS library



This library provides two APIs that help users to verify the self-signed X.509 certificate and SGX quote in non-SGX enclave environment. It also provides support for Trusted Remote Attestation TLS library.

Note that the verification is not performed inside an SGX enclave. The APIs listed below call Intel® SGX QVL (Quote Verification Library) to verify quote, and QvE (Quote Verification Enclave) is not involved. Before using these APIs, make sure the verification environment is secure.

- [tee\\_verify\\_certificate\\_with\\_evidence\\_host](#)
- [tee\\_free\\_supplemental\\_data\\_host](#)

### Intel® SGX Enabling and Launch Control Functions

The enabling and launch control function helps you to enable the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) device and return appropriate status.

- [sgx\\_cap\\_enable\\_device](#)

This function provides an Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain, which contains the signing key(s) of the Intel® SGX application enclave(s) allowed to be launched. If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`. Use `sgx_get_whitelist_size` to get the size of the current Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain. Use `sgx_get_whitelist` to get the chain.

- [sgx\\_register\\_wl\\_cert\\_chain](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_whitelist\\_size](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_whitelist](#)

### Intel® SGX device capability Functions

The Intel® SGX device capability functions help you query the Intel SGX device status and the version of the PSW installed.

- [sgx\\_is\\_capable](#)
- [sgx\\_cap\\_get\\_status](#)

### Trusted Libraries

The trusted libraries are static libraries that linked with the enclave binary. The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK ships with several trusted libraries

that cover domains such as standard C/C++ libraries, synchronization, encryption and more.

These functions/objects can only be used from within the enclave.

Trusted libraries built for HW mode (for example, not for simulation) contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as prefix, is defined when the SDK is built and consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all trusted libraries shipped in a given SDK release will have the same version number and allows quick identification of the trusted libraries linked into an enclave.

For instance, `libsgx_tstdc.a` contains a string version like `SGX_TSTDC_VERSION_1.0.0.0`. Of course, the last digits vary depending on the SDK release.

---

**CAUTION:**

Do not link the enclave with any untrusted library including C/C++ standard libraries. This action will either fail the enclave signing process or cause a runtime failure due to the use of restricted instructions.

---

### Trusted Runtime System

The Intel® SGX trusted runtime system (tRTS) is a key component of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK. It provides the enclave entry point logic as well as other functions to be used by enclave developers.

- [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions](#)
- [Custom Exception Handling](#)
- [AEX-Notify Handling](#)

#### [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions](#)

The tRTS provides the following helper functions for you to determine whether a given address is within or outside enclave memory.

- [sgx\\_is\\_within\\_enclave](#)
- [sgx\\_is\\_outside\\_enclave](#)

The tRTS provides a wrapper to the RDRAND instruction to generate a true random number from hardware. The C/C++ standard library functions `rand` and `srand` functions are not supported within an enclave because they only provide pseudo random numbers. Instead, enclave developers should use the `sgx_read_rand` function to get true random numbers.

- [sgx\\_read\\_rand](#)

The tRTS also provides two functions to read or write the PKRU register if the enclave is configured as Protection Keys enabled:

- [sgx\\_rdpkru](#)
- [sgx\\_wrpkru](#)

### Custom Exception Handling

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. When one of the enclave supported hardware exceptions occurs within the enclave, the registered exception handlers will be called in a specific order until an exception handler reports that it has handled the exception. For example, issuing a CPUID instruction inside an Enclave will result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can call `sgx_register_exception_handler` to register a function of type `sgx_exception_handler_t` to respond to this exception. Any custom exception handlers should check the validity of the exception, as it may be coming from an untrusted source. To check a list of enclave supported exceptions, see [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference](#).

---

#### **NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in HW mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

---

#### **NOTE:**

OCALLs are not allowed in the exception handler.

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#### Note:

If the exception handlers can not handle the exceptions, `abort()` is called. `abort()` makes the enclave unusable and generates another exception.

---

The Custom Exception Handling APIs are listed below:

- [sgx\\_register\\_exception\\_handler](#)
- [sgx\\_unregister\\_exception\\_handler](#)

### Custom Exception Handler for CPUID Instruction

If an ISV requires using the CPUID information within an enclave, then the enclave code must make an OCALL to perform the CPUID instruction in the

untrusted application. The Intel® SGX SDK provides two functions in the library `sgx_tstdc` to obtain CPUID information through an OCALL:

- `sgx_cpuid`
- `sgx_cpuid_ex`

In addition, the Intel SGX SDK also provides the following intrinsics which call the above functions to obtain CPUID data:

- `__cpuid`
- `__cpuidex`

Both the functions and intrinsics result in an OCALL to the uRTS library to obtain CPUID data. The results are returned from an untrusted component in the system. It is recommended that threat evaluation be performed to ensure that CPUID return values are not problematic. Ideally, sanity checking of the return values should be performed.

If an ISV's enclave uses a third party library which executes the CPUID instruction, then the ISV would need to provide a custom exception handler to handle the exception generated from issuing the CPUID instruction (unless the third party library registers its own exception handler for CPUID support). The ISV is responsible for analyzing the usage of the specific CPUID result provided by the untrusted domain to ensure it does not compromise the enclave security properties. Recommended implementation of the CPUID exception handler involves:

1. ISV analyzes the third party library CPUID usages, identifying required CPUID results.
2. ISV enclave code initialization routine populates a *cache* of the required CPUID results inside the enclave. This *cache* might be maintained by the RTS or by ISV code.
3. ISV enclave code initialization routine registers a custom exception handler.
4. The custom exception handler, when invoked, examines the exception information and faulting instruction. If the exception is caused by a CPUID instruction:
  1. Retrieve the *cached* CPUID result and populate the CPUID instruction output registers.
  2. Advance the RIP to bypass the CPUID instruction and complete the exception handling.

### AEX-Notify Handling

AEX-Notify is a security feature used to mitigate the "SGX-Step" type attacks on an SGX enclave. The SGX-Step type attacks rely on frequent enclave preemptions (e.g. interrupts) to execute an enclave in small increments and strategically extract secret data from the enclave through one or more side channels. AEX-Notify feature allows an enclave developer to configure a handler to run after `ERESUME` from each Async Exit, so that the enclave may have the option of detecting single step attacks or mitigating the side-channel information exposed by the attacks. For more information on AEX-Notify, see <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/content-details/736463/white-paper-asynchronous-enclave-exit-notify-and-the-edeccssa-user-leaf-function.html>.

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides several APIs to allow you to register the AEX-Notify handlers to detect the single step attacks. The Intel® SGX SDK also provides a default AEX-Notify handler for mitigating SGX-Step type attacks. This default handler will always be executed if AEX-Notify is enabled for an AEX-Notify enabled enclave.

The AEX-Notify Handling APIs are listed below:

- [sgx\\_set\\_ssa\\_aexnotify](#)
- [sgx\\_register\\_aex\\_handler](#)
- [sgx\\_unregister\\_aex\\_handler](#)

To enable the AEX-Notify feature inside an enclave:

- The enclave should be signed with `EnableAEXNotify` set to 1.

Then the code inside the enclave will be protected against "SGX-Step" type attacks, until you disable it by calling `sgx_set_ssa_aexnotify(0)`, and you can re-enable it by calling `sgx_set_ssa_aexnotify(1)`.

---

#### **NOTE:**

To enable AEX-Notify feature in an enclave, the hardware must support it and the in-kernel driver must be v6.2 or later.

---

### Trusted Service Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library named `sgx_tservice` for secure data manipulation and protection. The `sgx_tservice` library provides the following trusted functionality and services:

- [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions](#)
- [Intel® Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions](#)
- [Diffie–Hellman \(DH\) Session Establishment Functions](#)
- [Custom Alignment Interfaces](#)

#### **Intel® Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions**

The `sgx_tservice` library provides functions for getting specific keys and creating and verifying an enclave report. The API functions are listed below:

- [sgx\\_get\\_key](#)
- [sgx\\_create\\_report](#)
- [sgx\\_verify\\_report](#)

The `sgx_tservice` library also provides two help functions:

- [sgx\\_self\\_report](#) for getting a self cryptographic report
- [sgx\\_self\\_target](#) for getting a self target info of an enclave.

#### **Intel® Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions**

The `sgx_tservice` library provides the following functions:

- Exposes APIs to create sealed data which is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
- Exposes an API to unseal sealed data inside the enclave.
- Provides APIs to authenticate and verify the input data with AES-GMAC.

See the following related topics for more information.

- [sgx\\_seal\\_data](#)
- [sgx\\_seal\\_data\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_unseal\\_data](#)
- [sgx\\_mac\\_aadata](#)
- [sgx\\_mac\\_aadata\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_unmac\\_aadata](#)

The library also provides APIs to help calculate the sealed data size, encrypt text length, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) text length.

- [sgx\\_calc\\_sealed\\_data\\_size](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_add\\_mac\\_txt\\_len](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_encrypt\\_txt\\_len](#)

## SealLibrary Introduction

When an enclave is instantiated, it provides protections (confidentiality and integrity) to the data by keeping it within the boundary of the enclave. Enclave developers should identify enclave data and/or state that is considered secret and potentially needs preservation across the following enclave destruction events:

- Application is done with the enclave and closes it.
- Application itself is closed.
- The platform is hibernated or shutdown.

In general, the secrets provisioned within an enclave are lost when the enclave is closed. However if the secret data needs to be preserved during one of these events for future use within an enclave, it must be stored outside the enclave boundary before closing the enclave. In order to protect and preserve the data, a mechanism is in place which allows enclave software to retrieve a key unique to that enclave. This key can only be generated by that enclave on that particular platform. Enclave software uses that key to encrypt data to the platform or to decrypt data already on the platform. Refer to these *encrypt* and *decrypt* operations as *sealing* and *unsealing* respectively as the data is cryptographically sealed to the enclave and platform.

To provide strong protection against potential key-wear-out attacks, a unique seal key is generated for each data blob encrypted with the `sgx_seal_data` API call. A key ID for each encrypted data blob is stored in clear alongside the encrypted data blob. The key ID is used to re-generate the seal key to decrypt the data blob.

AES-GCM (AES – Advanced Encryption Standard) is utilized to encrypt and MAC-protect the payload. To protect against software-based side channel attacks, the crypto implementation of AES-GCM utilizes Intel® Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (Intel® AES-NI), which is immune to software-based side channel attacks. The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. If the GCM input contains only data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code), is simply an authentication mode for the input data. The `sgx_mac_aadata` API call restricts the input to non-

confidential data to provide data origin authentication only. The single output of this function is the authentication tag.

### Example Use Cases

One example is that an application may start collecting secret state while executing that needs to be preserved and utilized on future invocations of that application. Another example is during application installation, a secret key may need to be preserved and verified upon starting the application.

For these cases the seal APIs can be utilized to seal the secret data (key or state) in the examples above, and then unseal the secret data when needed.

### Sealing

1. Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.
2. Allocate memory for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.
3. Call `sgx_seal_data` to perform sealing operation
4. Save the sealed data structure for future use.

### Unsealing

1. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` and `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the size of the buffers to allocate in terms of bytes.
2. Allocate memory for the decrypted text and additional text buffers.
3. Call `sgx_unseal_data` to perform the unsealing operation.

### Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

The `sgx_tservice` library provides the following functions to allow an ISV to establish secure session between two enclaves using the EC DH Key exchange protocol.

- `sgx_dh_init_session`
- `sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1`
- `sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1`
- `sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2`
- `sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3`

### Custom Alignment Interfaces

The `sgx_tservice` library provides a set of interfaces that facilitate custom alignment of secrets and structures that contain secrets. Different interfaces



are used for secrets that are statically-defined (stack, global, static) versus dynamically-defined (heap) and for secrets in C++ code versus C code.

See the following related topics for more information:

- class template [custom\\_alignment\\_aligned](#)
- [sgx\\_get\\_aligned\\_ptr](#)
- [sgx\\_aligned\\_malloc](#)
- [sgx\\_aligned\\_free](#)

### C Standard Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C standard library. The library is named `sgx_tstdc` (trusted standard C), and can only be used inside an enclave. Standard C headers are located under `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]include/tlibc`.

`sgx_tstdc` provides a subset of C99 functions that are ported from the OpenBSD\* project. Unsupported functions are not allowed inside an enclave for the following reasons:

- The definition implies usage of a restricted CPU instruction.
- The definition is known to be unsafe or insecure.
- The definition implementation is too large to fit inside an enclave or relies heavily on information from the untrusted domain.
- The definition is compiler specific, and not part of the standard.
- The definition is a part of the standard, but it is not supported by a specific compiler.

See [Unsupported C Standard Functions](#) for a list of unsupported C99 definitions within an enclave.

### Locale Functions

A trusted version of locale functions is not provided primarily due to the size restriction. Those functions rely heavily on the localization data (normally 1MB to 2MB), which should be preloaded into the enclave in advance to ensure that it will not be modified from the untrusted domain. This practice would increase the footprint of an enclave, especially for those enclaves not depending on the locale functionality. Moreover, since localization data is not available, wide character functions inquiring enclave locale settings are not supported either.

### Random Number Generation Functions

The random functions `srand` and `rand` are not supported in the Intel® SGX SDK C library. A true random function `sgx_read_rand` is provided in the tRTS library by using the RDRAND instruction. However, in the Intel® SGX simulation environment, this function still generates pseudo random numbers because RDRAND may not be available on the hardware platform.

### String Functions

The functions `strcpy` and `strcat` are not supported in the Intel® SGX SDK C library. You are recommended to use `strncpy` and `strncat` instead.

### Abort Function

The `abort()` function is supported within an enclave but has a different behavior. When a thread calls the abort function, it makes the enclave unusable by setting the enclave state to a specific value that allows the tRTS and application to detect and report this event. The aborting thread generates an exception and exits the enclave, while other enclave threads continue running normally until they exit the enclave. Once the enclave is in the unusable state, subsequent enclave calls and OCALL returns generate the same error indicating that the enclave is no longer usable. After all thread calls abort, the enclave is locked and cannot be recovered. You have to destroy, reload and reinitialize the enclave to use it again.

### atexit\_Function

The `atexit()` function is supported inside enclaves but only under specific circumstances. On platforms that support SGX2, the tRTS invokes the global destructors as well as function registered with the `atexit()` function when enclave is destroyed.

### Thread Synchronization Primitives

Multiple untrusted threads may enter an enclave simultaneously as long as more than one thread context is defined by the application and created by the untrusted loader. Once multiple threads execute concurrently within an enclave, they will need some forms of synchronization mechanism if they intend to operate on any global data structure. In some cases, threads may use the atomic operations provided by the processor's ISA. In the general case, however, they would use synchronization objects and mechanisms similar to those available outside the enclave.

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK already supports mutex and conditional variable synchronization mechanisms by means of the following API

and data types defined in the [Types and Enumerations](#) section. Some functions included in the trusted Thread Synchronization library may make calls outside the enclave (OCALLs). If you use any of the APIs below, you must first import the needed OCALL functions from `sgx_tstdc.ed1`. Otherwise, you will get a linker error when the enclave is being built; see [Calling Functions outside the Enclave](#) for additional details. The table below illustrates the primitives that the Intel® SGX Thread Synchronization library supports, as well as the OCALLs that each API function needs.

	Function API	OCall Function
Mutex Synchronization	<a href="#">sgx_thread_mutex_init</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_mutex_destroy</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_mutex_lock</a>	<code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code>
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_mutex_trylock</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_mutex_unlock</a>	<code>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</code>
Reader/Writer Lock Synchronization	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_init</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_destroy</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_rdlock</a>	<code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code>
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_wrlock</a>	<code>sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</code>
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_tryrdlock</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_trywrlock</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_rwlock_unlock</a>	<code>sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</code> <code>sgx_thread_set_multiple_untrusted_events_ocall</code>
Condition Variable Syn-	<a href="#">sgx_thread_cond_</a>	

chronization	<a href="#">init</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_cond_destroy</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_cond_wait</a>	<a href="#">sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall</a> <a href="#">sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_events_ocall</a>
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_cond_signal</a>	<a href="#">sgx_thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall</a>
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_cond_broadcast</a>	<a href="#">sgx_thread_set_multiple_untrusted_events_ocall</a>
Thread Management	<a href="#">sgx_thread_self</a>	
	<a href="#">sgx_thread_equal</a>	

**NOTE:**

Use [POSIX aligned pthread](#) functions when you need to synchronize threads execution.

**Query CPUID inside Enclave**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides two functions for enclave developers to query a subset of CPUID information inside the enclave:

- [sgx\\_cpuid](#)
- [sgx\\_cpuidex](#)

**Secure Functions**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides some secure functions. An enclave project can include `<mbusafecrt.h>` to use them.

See [Supported C Secure Functions](#) for a list of supported secure functions definitions within an enclave.

**GCC\* Built-in Functions**

GCC\* provides built-in functions with optimization purposes. When GCC recognizes a built-in function, it will generate the code more efficiently by leveraging its optimization algorithms. GCC always treats functions with `__builtin_` prefix as built-in functions, such as `__builtin_malloc`, `__builtin_strncpy`, and so on. In many cases, GCC tries to use the built-in

variant for standard C functions, such as `memcpy`, `strncpy`, and `abort`. A call to the C library function is generated unless the `-fno-builtin` compiler option is specified.

GCC optimizes built-in functions in certain cases. If GCC does not expand the built-in function directly, it will call the corresponding library function (without the `__builtin_` prefix). The trusted C library must supply a version of the functions to ensure the enclave is always built correctly.

The trusted C library does not contain any function considered insecure (for example, `strcpy`) or that may contain illegal instructions in Intel SGX (for example, `fprintf`). However, the ISV should be aware that GCC may introduce security risks into an enclave if the compiler inlines the code corresponding to an insecure built-in function. In this case, the ISV may use the `-fno-builtin` or `-fno-builtin-function` options to suppress any unwanted built-in code generation.

See [Unsupported GCC\\* Built-in Functions](#) within an enclave for a list of unsupported GCC built-ins.

### Non-Local Jumps

The C standard library provides a pair of functions, `setjmp` and `longjmp`, that can be used to perform non-local jumps. `setjmp` saves the current program state into a data structure. `longjmp` can later use this data structure to restore the execution context. This means that after `longjmp`, execution continues at the `setjmp` call site.

Since `setjmp/longjmp` may transfer execution from one function to a predetermined location in another function, normal stack unwinding does not occur. As a result, you must use this functionality carefully, ensuring that an enclave only calls `setjmp` in a valid context. You should also perform extensive security validation to ascertain that the enclave never uses these functions in such a way it could result in undefined behavior. Typical use of `setjmp/longjmp` is the implementation of an exception mechanism (error handling). However, you must never use these functions in C++ programs. You should use the standard CEH instead. You are recommended to review the information provided at [cert.org](http://cert.org) on how to use `setjmp/longjmp` securely.

### Reserved Memory Functions

Intel(R) SGX SDK allows users to configure a reserved memory area for special usage, such as JIT support. The memory is allowed to be configured or changed to executable. See [Enclave Configuration File](#) for details. To manage the reserved memory the `sgx_tstdc` library provides the following functions

to query the memory information, allocate and deallocate the memory, change the memory protection.

- [sgx\\_get\\_rsrv\\_mem\\_info](#)
- [sgx\\_alloc\\_rsrv\\_mem](#)
- [sgx\\_alloc\\_rsrv\\_mem\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_free\\_rsrv\\_mem](#)
- [sgx\\_tprotect\\_rsrv\\_mem](#)

### **C++ Language Support**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library for C++ support inside the enclave. C++ developers would utilize advanced C++ features that require C++ runtime libraries.

The ISO/IEC 14882: C++ standard is chosen as the baseline for the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK trusted library. Most of standard C++ features are fully supported inside the enclave, and including:

1. Dynamic memory management with new/delete;
2. Global initializers are supported (usually used in the construction of global objects);
3. Run-time Type Identification (RTTI);
4. C++ exception handling inside the enclave.

Currently, global destructors are not supported due to the reason that EPC memory will be recycled when destroying an enclave.

---

### **NOTE**

C++ objects are not supported in enclave interface definitions. If an application needs to pass a C++ object across the enclave boundary, you are recommended to store the C++ object's data in a C struct and marshal the data across the enclave interface. Then you need to instantiate the C++ object inside the enclave with the marshaled C struct passed in to the constructor (or you may update existing instantiated objects with appropriate operators).

---

### **C++ Standard Library**

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C++ standard library (including STL) that conforms to the C++17 standard. However, a different version of this library will be linked depending on the Makefile you use to develop enclaves. The newer Makefile version uses `sgx_tccxx.a` by default, which has been ported from `libc++` and supports most

C++17 features. On the other hand, previous Makefile versions use `sgx_tstdcxx.a`. This library was ported from STLport but provides limited C++11 support. If you update an enclave project and want access to all the supported C++17 features, you need to manually add the new C++ trusted library. If `sgx_tstdcxx.a` is present, replace it with `sgx_tcxx.a`. Otherwise, simply add `sgx_tcxx.a` to the linker dependency list of the Makefile.

As for the C++ standard library, most functions will work just as its untrusted counterpart, but here is a high level summary of features that are not supported inside the enclave:

1. Functions depending on a locale library;
2. Any other functions that require system calls.

However, only C functions can be used as the language for trusted and untrusted interfaces. While you can use C++ to develop your enclaves, you should not pass C++ objects across the enclave boundary.

### Cryptography Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Software Development Kit (Intel® SGX SDK) includes a trusted cryptography library named `sgx_tcrypto`. It contains cryptographic functions used by other trusted libraries included in the SDK, such as the `sgx_tservice` library. Thus, functionality of this library is limited.

- `sgx_sha256_msg`
- `sgx_sha256_init`
- `sgx_sha256_update`
- `sgx_sha256_get_hash`
- `sgx_sha256_close`
- `sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt`
- `sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt`
- `sgx_aes_gcm_encrypt`
- `sgx_aes_gcm_decrypt`
- `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_init`
- `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_update`
- `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_get_mac`
- `sgx_aes_gcm_close`
- `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg`
- `sgx_cmac128_init`
- `sgx_cmac128_update`

- `sgx_cmac128_final`
- `sgx_cmac128_close`
- `sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt`
- `sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt`
- `sgx_ecc256_open_context`
- `sgx_ecc256_close_context`
- `sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair`
- `sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey`
- `sgx_ecc256_check_point`
- `sgx_ecdsa_sign`
- `sgx_ecdsa_verify`
- `sgx_ecdsa_verify_hash`
- `sgx_rsa3072_sign`
- `sgx_rsa3072_sign_ex`
- `sgx_rsa3072_verify`
- `sgx_create_rsa_key_pair`
- `sgx_create_rsa_priv1_key`
- `sgx_create_rsa_priv2_key`
- `sgx_create_rsa_pub1_key`
- `sgx_free_rsa_key`
- `sgx_rsa_priv_decrypt_sha256`
- `sgx_rsa_pub_encrypt_sha256`
- `sgx_calculate_ecdsa_priv_key`
- `sgx_ecc256_calculate_pub_from_priv`
- `sgx_hmac_sha256_msg`
- `sgx_hmac256_init`
- `sgx_hmac256_update`
- `sgx_hmac256_final`
- `sgx_hmac256_close`
- `sgx_sha384_msg`
- `sgx_sha384_init`
- `sgx_sha384_update`
- `sgx_sha384_get_hash`
- `sgx_sha384_close`

The trusted cryptography library is based on an underlying general-purpose cryptographic library: Intel® Integrated Performance Primitives (Intel® IPP) Cryptography library or Intel® Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library (Intel® SGX SSL).



The default build uses precompiled, optimized libraries, which include Intel® IPP libraries. In addition, the Intel® IPP Cryptographic header files are located in `[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]include/ipp`. If your enclave is configured and signed as `EnableIPPFIPS` to 1, the trusted cryptography library will trigger FIPS self-tests in each provided function for FIPS 140-3 certifiable mode requirement.

If you want to use Intel® SGX SSL instead of Intel® IPP, you should use the non-optimized code implementation. Follow the `README.md` for detailed instructions.

If you need additional cryptographic functionality, you can use the general-purpose cryptographic library, and its corresponding header files. The underlying trusted libraries are linked into `libsgx_tcrypto.a`.

Directly accessing Intel® SGX SSL API is possible after updating the Enclave EDL and the Application project with the requirements described in [Intel® SGX SSL Developer Guide](#), section 2.2. Using Intel® SGX SSL Library.

---

#### **NOTE**

To get internal OpenSSL\* error codes, you need to build `sgx_tcrypto` in DEBUG mode and declare `extern unsigned long openssl_last_err`, which holds OpenSSL error code upon failure.

See more information at the [Intel® Software Guard Extensions SSL cryptographic library GitHub\\* repository](#).

Known limitations:

- Intel SGX SSL library registers a CPUID exception handler which handles CPUID exceptions on certain leaves:
  - leaf 0x0
  - leaf 0x1
  - leaf 0x4, sub leaf 0x0
  - leaf 0x7, sub leaf 0x0
- Enclaves using one of the mentioned leaves may have a different behavior upon moving from Intel IPP to Intel SGX SSL.
- When running `sgx-gdb` on an enclave built with Intel SGX SSL, several SIGILL signals might be raised (since OpenSSL code has some `cpuid` instruction calls), `gdb continue` will continue executing your program.

### Trusted Key Exchange Functions

These functions allow an ISV to exchange secrets between its server and its enclaves. They are used in concert with untrusted Key Exchange functions.

- [sgx\\_ra\\_init](#)
- [sgx\\_ra\\_init\\_ex](#)
- [sgx\\_ra\\_get\\_keys](#)
- [sgx\\_ra\\_close](#)

### Trusted Remote Attestation TLS library

These functions allow end user to create attested TLS channel that are based on Intel® SGX ECDSA remote attestation. You can call these APIs to generate a self-signed X.509 certificate with embedded SGX quote, verify the self-signed X.509 certificate and SGX quote.

Note that this library depends on Intel® SGX ECDSA remote attestation. Before using these APIs, make sure your system can run Intel® SGX DCAP.

- [tee\\_get\\_certificate\\_with\\_evidence](#)
- [tee\\_free\\_certificate](#)
- [tee\\_verify\\_certificate\\_with\\_evidence](#)
- [tee\\_free\\_supplemental\\_data](#)

### Intel® Protected File System Library

Intel® Protected File System Library provides protected files API for Intel® SGX enclaves. It supports a basic subset of the regular C file API and enables you to create files and work with them as you would normally do from a regular application.

With this API, the files are encrypted and saved on the untrusted disk during a write operation, and they are verified for confidentiality and integrity during a read operation.

To encrypt a file, you should provide a file encryption key. This key is a 128 bits key, and is used as a key derivation key, to generate multiple encryption keys. According to “NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions”: “The key that is input to a key derivation function is called a key derivation key. To comply with this Recommendation, a key derivation key shall be a cryptographic key (see Section 3.1).

The key derivation key used as an input to one of the key derivation functions specified in this Recommendation can be generated by an approved cryptographic random bit generator (e.g., by a deterministic random bit generator of the type specified in [5]), or by an approved automated key-establishment process (e.g., as defined in [1] and [2]). For more details, please refer to [NIST SP 800-108](#) document.

Another option is to use automatic keys derived from the enclave sealing key (see disadvantages of this approach in the topic Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API).

- [sgx\\_fopen](#)
- [sgx\\_fopen\\_auto\\_key](#)
- [sgx\\_fclose](#)
- [sgx\\_fread](#)
- [sgx\\_fwrite](#)
- [sgx\\_fflush](#)
- [sgx\\_ftell](#)
- [sgx\\_fseek](#)
- [sgx\\_feof](#)
- [sgx\\_ferror](#)
- [sgx\\_clearerr](#)
- [sgx\\_remove](#)
- [sgx\\_fexport\\_auto\\_key](#)
- [sgx\\_fimport\\_auto\\_key](#)
- [sgx\\_fclear\\_cache](#)

#### **Protected FS Usage Limitation**

Since the Protected Files have meta-data embedded in them, only one file handle can be opened for writing at a time, or many file handles for reading. OS protection mechanism is used for protecting against accidentally opening more than one 'write' file handle. If this protection is bypassed, the file will get corrupted. An open file handle can be used by many threads inside the same enclave, the APIs include internal locks for handling this and the operations will be executed by one.

#### **Protected FS Error Codes**

The Protected File System (FS) API tries to preserve the original C file API errors. A local `errno` (enclave internal) is also set for APIs that require this according to the original C file API documentation.

When the Protected FS API is accessing the OS file system, if an error is returned, that error will be provided back to the caller of the Protected FS API. In addition, when possible, it returns an `EXXX` error code for internal errors (for example, the `EACCES` error code is returned when trying to write a file that was opened as read-only, or `ENOMEM` is returned when an internal attempt to allocate memory fails). Several special error codes were added, like `SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH`, for the cases when the current file name does not match the internal file name. You can find these error codes and their explanations in `sgx_error.h`.

### Protected FS Application Layout

The following figure demonstrates how the Protected File System (FS) works inside an Intel® SGX application:




Figure 12 Protected File System Layout

To use the Intel SGX Protected File System libraries:

1. The enclave must be linked with `libsgx_tprotected_fs.a`
2. The application must be linked with `libsgx_uprotected_fs.a`
3. The enclave's EDL file must 'import' all the functions from `sgx_tprotected_fs.edl`
4. The source files should 'include' `sgx_tprotected_fs.h`

#### Protected FS S3/S4 Important Note

To enhance the performance of the Protected File System, cache is used to save the user's data inside the enclave, and only when the cache is full it is flushed to disk.

In case of S3/S4 transitions, data in the cache will be lost (the entire enclave is lost). Therefore, all file handles must be flushed or closed before entering S3/S4. If no action is taken, the file integrity is not harmed, only the latest written data that was not flushed will be lost.

#### Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API

Automatic keys are derived from the enclave sealing key (with MRSIGNER), so the files are bound to all the enclaves signed by the same signer on this particular machine. To transfer a file from one machine to another, you should follow the key export and import procedure below. There are several cases when using automatic keys is not recommended.

- Disaster recovery – trying to open files created on one machine on a different machine will fail (unless you follow the procedure described below). Therefore, automatic disaster recovery may not work properly.
- VM migrations – currently, Intel® SGX does not support automatic enclave keys transfer in VM migration. Therefore, enclaves running on servers that use VM migrations cannot use the auto key API.

#### File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API

For files that were created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`, to transfer a file from one enclave to another, or to another enclave on a different machine, follow this procedure:

1. Close all open handles to the file.
2. Call the `sgx_fexport_auto_key` API. This API returns the last encryption key that was used to encrypt the meta-data node of the file.
3. Transfer the file to the destination enclave, and provide the key in a safe method to that enclave.

4. Call the `sgx_fimport_auto_key` API. This API will re-encrypt the meta-data node with a new encryption key, derived from the local enclave seal key.
5. Open the file with `sgx_fopen_auto_key` as usual.

#### Protected FS Security Non-Objectives

In order to mitigate file swapping attacks (with two valid files), file names are checked during a file open operation (verifies that the current name is equal to the file name the file was created with). However, if two files are created with the same file name, there is no way to protect against such a swapping attack.

Since the files are saved in the regular FS, there is no protection against malicious file deletion or modification – this will only be detected when trying to read or write the modified section from the file (decryption will fail).

There are several things that are not protected when using the Protected FS API, and anyone who can access the OS can see them:

1. File name
2. File size (up to 4KB granularity)
3. File modification date
4. Key type (user or auto)
5. Usage patterns
6. Read/Write offsets

If any of those items might expose sensitive information, and help a potential attacker, the enclave developer should add defense mechanisms on their own to protect against this. For example, an implementation of a “secure browser” should not save the ‘cookies’ with the names of their related websites, because an attacker can learn from that the user’s browsing history.

#### TCMalloc Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the TCMalloc library. The library is named `sgx_tcmalloc`, and can only be used inside an enclave. `sgx_tcmalloc` provides high performance memory allocation and deallocation functions that are ported from gperftools-2.5:

- `malloc`
- `free`
- `realloc`

- calloc
- memalign

Do the following to enable TCMalloc in Intel® SGX:

1. Set the enclave `HeapMaxSize` equal or larger than `0x900000` in `Enclave.config.xml`.

For example:

```
<HeapMaxSize>0x900000</HeapMaxSize>
```

2. Add `"-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-archive"` into enclave linking options in the Makefile.

For example:

```
Enclave_Link_Flags := $(SGX_COMMON_CFLAGS) -Wl,--no-
undefined -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostartfiles -
L$(SGX_LIBRARY_PATH) \
-Wl,--whole-archive -l$(Trts_Library_Name) -Wl,--no-
whole-archive \
-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-
archive \
-Wl,--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tstdcxx -l$(Crypto_
Library_Name) -l$(Service_Library_Name) -Wl,--end-group
\
-Wl,-Bstatic -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--no-undefined \
-Wl,-pie,-eenclave_entry -Wl,--export-dynamic \
-Wl,--defsym,__ImageBase=0 \
-Wl,--version-script=Enclave/Enclave.lds
```

---

**NOTE:**

The flags `"-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-archive"` must be inserted before `"-Wl,--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tstdcxx -Wl,--end-group"`.

Otherwise, the enclave build will fail.

---

### Switchless Calls Library

The untrusted portion of the Switchless Calls is integrated into the uRTS library. The trusted part is provided by the `libsgx_tswitchless.a` library. The trusted library does not expose any API functions. It just enables the Switchless Calls feature inside the enclave.

Developers can enable Switchless Calls using the 'transition\_using\_threads' keyword in the enclave EDL file and linking it with the `libsgx_tswitchless.a` library.

At runtime, the enclave must be created using the `sgx_create_enclave_ex` API, providing a Switchless Calls configuration structure.

### Protected Code Loader Library

The untrusted portion of Intel® SGX PCL is integrated into the uRTS library. The trusted part is provided by `libsgx_pcl.a` and `libsgx_pclsim.a` libraries in HW and Simulation modes respectively. The trusted library does not expose any API to the ISV portion of the enclave. See 'Integrating Intel® SGX PCL with an existing Intel® SGX solution' above for a detailed description of how these libraries are used.

### pthread

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK includes a trusted version of the pthreads library. The library is named `sgx_pthread`, and can only be used inside an enclave.

With the trust pthreads library, a single Enclave process can contain multiple threads executing the same program.

These threads share the same global memory inside Enclave(data and heap segments) but each thread has its own stack and TCS. You need to configure enough `<TCSNum>` in [Enclave Configuration File](#); otherwise `pthread_create()` fails.

The list below contains APIs that the Intel® SGX pthread library supports. These API interfaces are aligned with the POSIX standard.

- `pthread_create(pthread_t *threadp, const pthread_attr_t *attr, void*(*start_routine)(void*), void*arg)`  
Description: start a new thread in the calling process.



---

**NOTE**

The `attr` is not supported inside the Enclave, so the new thread will be created with `PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE`.

---

- `pthread_exit(void *retval)`  
Description: terminate the calling thread.
  - `pthread_join(pthread_t thread, void **retval)`  
Description: join with a terminated thread.
- 

**NOTE**

This function returns directly when called inside Enclave's destructor process on the Intel® SGX 2.0 platform. URTS syncs and recycles running threads when destroying the Enclave.

---

- `pthread_self(void)`  
Description: obtain ID of the calling thread.
  - `pthread_mutex_init(pthread_mutex_t *mutexp, const pthread_mutexattr_t *attr)`  
Description: initialize the mutex referenced by `mutexp`.
- 

**NOTE**

The `attr` is not supported inside the Enclave.

---

- `pthread_mutex_destroy(pthread_mutex_t *mutexp)`  
Description: destroy the mutex.
- `pthread_mutex_lock(pthread_mutex_t *mutexp)`  
Description: lock the mutex.
- `pthread_mutex_trylock(pthread_mutex_t *mutexp)`  
Description: lock the mutex. If the mutex is currently locked by other thread, it returns immediately.
- `pthread_mutex_unlock(pthread_mutex_t *mutexp)`  
Description: unlock the mutex.
- `pthread_rwlock_init(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp, const pthread_rwlockattr_t *attr)`  
Description: initialize the read-write lock referenced by `rwlockp`.

---

**NOTE**

The `attr` is not supported inside the Enclave.

---

- `pthread_rwlock_destroy(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: destroy the read-write lock object.
- `pthread_rwlock_rdlock(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: acquire a reader lock.
- `pthread_rwlock_tryrdlock(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: attempt to acquire a reader lock. If the corresponding writer lock is currently held by another thread, it returns immediately.
- `pthread_rwlock_wrlock(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: acquire a writer lock.
- `pthread_rwlock_trywrlock(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: attempt to acquire a writer lock. If the corresponding reader or writer lock is currently held by another thread, it returns immediately.
- `pthread_rwlock_unlock(pthread_rwlock_t *rwlockp)`  
Description: release the reader or writer lock held by the thread.
- `pthread_cond_init(pthread_cond_t *condp, const pthread_condattr_t *attr)`  
Description: initialize a condition variable.

---

**NOTE**

The `attr` is not supported inside the Enclave.

---

- `pthread_cond_destory(pthread_cond_t *condp)`  
Description: destory a condition variable.
- `pthread_cond_wait(pthread_cond_t *condp, pthread_mutex_t *mutexp)`  
Description: wait for a condition.
- `pthread_cond_signal(pthread_cond_t *condp)`  
Description: signal a condition.
- `pthread_cond_broadcast(pthread_cond_t *condp)`  
Description: broadcast a condition.

- `pthread_key_create(pthread_key_t *key, void (*destructor)(void*))`  
Description: create a thread-specific data key.
- `pthread_key_delete(pthread_key_t key)`  
Description: delete a thread-specific data key.
- `pthread_get_specific(pthread_key_t key)`  
Description: manage thread-specific data.
- `pthread_set_specific(pthread_key_t key, const void *data)`  
Description: manage thread-specific data.
- `pthread_equal(pthread_t t1, pthread_t t2)`  
Description: compare thread IDs.
- `pthread_once(pthread_once_t *once_control, void (*init_routine)(void*))`  
Description: dynamic package initialization.

To enable trust pthreads in Intel® SGX, add "`-lsgx_pthread`" into enclave linking options in the Makefile.

### Intel® SGX OpenMP Library

OpenMP (Open Multi-Processing) API is a portable, scalable model that gives parallel programmers a simple and flexible interface for developing portable parallel applications in C/C++ and Fortran. The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Software Development Kit (Intel® SGX SDK) includes a trusted version of OpenMP library for C/C++, named `libsgx_omp.a`. The Intel® SGX OpenMP library is a customized version based on [LLVM\\* OpenMP\\*](#) API version 5.0.

The official OpenMP contains a set of directives and a set of runtime library routines. Not all the directives and runtime routines are supported by the Intel® SGX environment. The Intel® SGX OpenMP library provides a specific subset of the directives and runtime library routines compared to the official OpenMP. See [Supported OpenMP Directives and Runtime Routines](#) for the supported list inside enclave. You can also find a list for the features that are natively unsupported by the Intel® SGX environment at [Unsupported OpenMP Directives and Runtime Routines](#). Not listed features are not validated and are not recommended to be used.

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#### **NOTE**

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Intel® SGX OpenMP depends on the Intel® SGX [pthreads](#) library for thread management. As one Intel® SGX thread is designed to bind one TCS, the TCSNum in the enclave's configuration file should be enough. And it is also recommended to configure enough heap and stack for the OpenMP enabled enclaves. Otherwise, Intel® SGX OpenMP may throw exception because of resource shortage.

---

To enable Intel® SGX OpenMP library in an enclave, follow the steps below to update the Makefile and the enclave EDL file:

1. Add '-fopenmp' option to the enclave compiling options in the Makefile.
2. Add '-lsgx\_pthread -lsgx\_omp' to the enclave linking options in the Makefile.
3. Add 'from "sgx\_pthread.edl" import \*;' to the enclave EDL file.

#### Supported OpenMP Directives and Runtime Routines

The Intel® SGX OpenMP supports the following OpenMP directives:

Category	Syntax
Parallel construct	#pragma omp parallel
Work-sharing constructs	#pragma omp for/do #pragma omp sections #pragma omp single #pragma omp master
Data sharing attributes clauses	shared, private, default, firstprivate, lastprivate, reduction
Synchronization clauses	critical, atomic, ordered, collapse, barrier, nowait
initialization clauses	firstprivate, lastprivate, threadprivate,
Data copying clauses	copyin, copyprivate
If-control clause	if
Others	flush, master

Supported runtime routines:

- `omp_get_num_threads(void)`
- `omp_get_dynamic(void)`
- `omp_get_nested(void)`
- `omp_get_max_threads(void)`
- `omp_get_thread_num(void)`
- `omp_get_num_procs(void)`
- `omp_in_parallel(void)`
- `omp_in_final(void)`
- `omp_get_active_level(void)`
- `omp_get_level(void)`
- `omp_get_ancestor_thread_num(int)`
- `omp_get_team_size(int);`
- `omp_get_thread_limit(void)`
- `omp_get_max_active_levels(void)`
- `omp_get_max_task_priority(void)`
- `omp_get_num_teams(void)`
- `omp_get_team_num(void)`
- `omp_init_lock(omp_lock_t *)`
- `omp_set_lock(omp_lock_t *)`
- `omp_unset_lock(omp_lock_t *)`
- `omp_destroy_lock(omp_lock_t *)`
- `omp_test_lock(omp_lock_t *)`
- `omp_init_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_set_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_unset_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_destroy_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_test_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_test_nest_lock(omp_nest_lock_t *)`
- `omp_set_num_threads(int)`
- `omp_set_dynamic(int)`
- `omp_set_nested(int)`
- `omp_set_max_active_levels(int)`
- `omp_set_schedule(omp_sched_t, int)`

---

### **NOTE**

Certain syntax settings and runtime routines behavior may differ from the standard OpenMP behavior. For example, a thread number. You can use `#pragma omp parallel num_threads(N)` or `omp_set_num_threads`

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(N) to configure the working threads number. If the desired value N is too big, it may not be effective. Intel® SGX OpenMP will take a proper value instead to avoid the resource shortage exception.

---

### Unsupported OpenMP Directives and Runtime Routines

The Intel® SGX OpenMP does not support the OpenMP directives below:

Category	Syntax
Thread Affinity	proc_bind
Thread cancellation	cancel, cancellation point
Offloading support	target, target data, device, map, array ...

### Unsupported runtime routines:

- omp\_get\_wtime(void)
- omp\_get\_wtick(void)
- omp\_set\_default\_device(int)
- omp\_is\_initial\_device(void)
- omp\_get\_num\_devices(void)
- omp\_get\_initial\_device(void)
- omp\_target\_alloc(size\_t, int)
- omp\_target\_free(void \*, int)
- omp\_target\_is\_present(void \*, int)
- omp\_target\_memcpy(void \*, void \*, size\_t, size\_t, size\_t, int, int)
- omp\_target\_memcpy\_rect(void \*, void \*, size\_t, int, const size\_t \*, const size\_t \*, const size\_t \*, const size\_t \*, const size\_t \*, int, int)
- omp\_target\_associate\_ptr(void \*, void \*, size\_t, size\_t, int)
- omp\_target\_disassociate\_ptr(void \*, int)
- omp\_get\_device\_num(void)
- kmp\_set\_warnings\_on(void)
- kmp\_set\_warnings\_off(void)
- kmp\_set\_affinity(kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)
- kmp\_get\_affinity(kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)
- kmp\_get\_affinity\_max\_proc(void)
- kmp\_create\_affinity\_mask(kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)
- kmp\_destroy\_affinity\_mask(kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)
- kmp\_set\_affinity\_mask\_proc(int, kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)
- kmp\_unset\_affinity\_mask\_proc(int, kmp\_affinity\_mask\_t \*)

- `kmp_get_affinity_mask_proc(int, kmp_affinity_mask_t *)`
- `omp_get_proc_bind(void)`
- `omp_get_num_places(void)`
- `omp_get_place_num_procs(int)`
- `omp_get_place_proc_ids(int, int *)`
- `omp_get_place_num(void)`
- `omp_get_partition_num_places(void)`
- `omp_get_partition_place_nums(int *)`
- `omp_control_tool(int, int, void*)`
- `omp_set_affinity_format(char const *)`
- `omp_get_affinity_format(char *, size_t)`
- `omp_display_affinity(char const *)`
- `omp_capture_affinity(char *, size_t, char const *)`

### Deep Neural Network Library

The Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) SDK includes a trusted version of the Intel® Deep Neural Network Library (DNNL) library. The library is named `libsgx_dnnl.a`, and can only be used inside an enclave.

All the Intel® DNNL standard APIs are supported inside the Intel® SGX DNNL.

Intel® SGX DNNL is ported based on [Intel® DNNL V1.1.1](#). This library is built with following configurations:

- The library is built as an static library.
- The library is built with CPU engine, the CPU engine is configured to use OpenMP.

To build the Intel® SGX DNNL library, follow the steps below:

1. Download Intel® SGX source codes.
2. Enter `linux-trunk/external/dnnl/`
3. Execute `make` command. The Makefile will download [Intel® DNNL V1.1.1](#) source codes and patch the Intel® SGX specific patch automatically.

To install Intel® SGX DNNL library, follow the steps below:

1. Copy Intel® SGX DNNL lib to the Intel® SGX SDK installation directory.  

```
$cp "./sgx_dnnl/lib/libsgx_dnnl.a" "$(SGX_SDK)/lib64"
```
2. Copy Intel® SGX DNNL header file to the Intel® SGX SDK installation directory.  

```
$cp "./sgx_dnnl/include/*" "$(SGX_SDK)/include"
```

To enable Intel® SGX DNNL in Enclave, do the following:

1. On Intel® SGX1 platform, set `<ReservedMemExecutable>` to 1 in [the Enclave Configuration File](#).
2. Add `"-lsgx_pthread -lsgx_omp -lsgx_dnnl"` into enclave linking options in Makefile.
3. Add `'from "sgx_pthread.edl" import *;'` to the enclave EDL file.

### Intel® SGX Protobuf Library

Protocol Buffers (a.k.a., protobuf) are Google's language-neutral, platform-neutral, extensible mechanism for serializing structured data. You can find documentation on protobuf on the [Google Developers site](#). The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Software Development Kit (Intel® SGX SDK) includes a trusted version of protobuf library for C/C++, named `libsgx_protobuf.a`. The Intel® SGX Protobuf library is a customized version based on a specific release version of [Google's Protocol Buffers](#).

To enable Intel® SGX Protobuf library in an enclave

1. Follow the steps below to update the Makefile:
  1. Add `'-I$(SGX_SDK)/include/tprotobuf'` to the enclave header files options.
  2. Add `'-lsgx_protobuf'` to the enclave linking options.
2. Define `printf` in the enclave for the SGX Protobuf logging module.

### Unsupported protobuf Field types, Classes and Functions

Unsupported Field types:

- Duration
- Timestamp
- Service
- Api
- Method
- Empty
- FieldMask
- Value
- Mixin

Unsupported classes:



- GzipInputStream
- GzipOutputStream
- FileInputStream
- FileOutputStream
- IstreamInputStream
- OstreamOutputStream
- TimeUtil

#### Unsupported Functions:

- SerializeToFileDescriptor(int) const
- ParseFromFileDescriptor (int)
- bool SerializeToOstream(ostream\*) const
- bool ParseFromIstream(istream\*)
- operator<<(std::ostream&, const uint128&)
- operator<<(std::ostream&, const Status uint128&)
- operator<<(std::ostream&, StringPiece uint128&)

#### Intel® SGX Mbedtls Cryptography Library

The Intel® SGX Mbedtls Cryptography Library is a customized version of the Mbed TLS C library that provides cryptographic primitives, X.509 certificate manipulation and the support for SSL/TLS and DTLS protocols. Documentation for Mbed TLS can be found at [trustedfirmware.org](https://trustedfirmware.org). The Intel® Software Guard Extensions Software Development Kit (Intel® SGX SDK) includes a trusted version of Mbedtls cryptography library for C/C++, named libsgx\_mbedcrypto.a.

Most functions of the Mbedtls cryptography standard library work similarly to their untrusted counterpart. However, some features are not supported within the enclave, including I/O related functions, functions that rely on a locale library, and any other functions that require system calls.

To use Intel® SGX Mbedtls Cryptography Library within an enclave, update the Makefile with the following steps:

1. Include '-I\$(SGX\_SDK)/include/mbedtls' in the enclave header files options.
2. Add '-lsgx\_mbedcrypto' to the enclave linking options.

To enable logging for the SGX Mbedtls Cryptography Library within the enclave, please define printf.

## Function Descriptions

This topic describes various functions including their syntax, parameters, return values, and requirements.

---

### **NOTE**

When an API function lists an EDL in its requirements, users need to explicitly import such library EDL file in their enclave's EDL.

---

#### **sgx\_create\_enclave**

Loads the enclave using its file name

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave (
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **file\_name [in]**

Name or full path to the enclave image.

##### **debug [in]**

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is *not* under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 1 by default.

##### **launch\_token [deprecated]**

Pointer to an [sgx\\_launch\\_token\\_t](#) object used to initialize the enclave to be created (deprecated)

**launch\_token\_updated [deprecated]**

This parameter is deprecated.

**enclave\_id [out]**

Pointer to an [sgx\\_enclave\\_id\\_t](#) that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

**misc\_attr [out, optional]**

Pointer to an [sgx\\_misc\\_attribute\\_t](#) structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The enclave is loaded and initialized successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE**

The enclave file is corrupted.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The 'enclave\_id' parameter is NULL.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave()`.

**SGX\_ERROR\_ENCLAVE\_FILE\_ACCESS**

The enclave file cannot be opened. Possible reasons: the enclave file is not found or you have no privilege to access the enclave file.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_METADATA**

The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupted or missing.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_VERSION**

The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

The signature for the enclave is not valid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

The protected memory has run out. Possible reasons: you are creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or one of the Architecture Enclaves for this operation cannot be loaded.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_DEVICE**

The Intel® SGX device is not valid. This may be caused by the Intel® SGX driver being disabled or not installed.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_CONFLICT**

During the enclave creation, a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread occurred. The loader may fail to map virtual address. Create the enclave again.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_DEVICE\_BUSY**

The Intel® SGX driver or a low level system is busy when creating the enclave. Create the enclave again.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_MODE\_INCOMPATIBLE**

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. Possible reasons: a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_INVALID\_PRIVILEGE**

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but is not privileged.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NDEBUG\_ENCLAVE**

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNDEFINED\_SYMBOL**

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_MISC**

The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is encrypted. This function cannot be used to load an enclave that was encrypted by the encryption tool. Use `sgx_create_encrypted_enclave` or `sgx_create_enclave_ex`.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_FEATURE\_NOT\_SUPPORTED**

Requested feature is not supported. Possible features are KSS, EDMM.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_FAILURE**

Failed to reserve memory for the enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

#### **Description**

The `sgx_create_enclave` function loads and initializes the enclave using the enclave file name.

If the enclave is valid, the function returns a value of `SGX_SUCCESS`. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the `enclave_id` parameter.

The library `libsgx_urts.so` provides this function to load an enclave with the Intel® SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library `libsgx_urts_sim.so` exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation enclave. Running in simulation mode does not require Intel® SGX hardware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. A compromised loader or operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

**Notes on signal handling:** If the Linux\* kernel you use does not support the vDSO function to enter the enclave, URTS installs a signal handler for

SIGSEGV, SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGBUS, SIGTRAP during the first call, after the enclave is successfully loaded and initialized (EINIT is done) . Its purpose is to handle signals caused by exceptions inside enclaves or at EENTER, ERESUME instructions used to enter enclaves. The handler invokes previously installed signal handlers to handle those signals raised in other situations unrelated to enclaves. If an application installs signal handler(s) for these signals after `sgx_create_enclave` is called, the newly installed handler(s) should also forward those signals to previously installed handler in order for enclave related exceptions to be handled properly by the URTS handler. If the Linux\* kernel you use supports the vDSO function to enter the enclave, the vDSO function intercepts any exceptions that occur when running the enclave.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_create_enclave_ex`

Loads the enclave using its file name.

Enables extended features, Intel® SGX PCL, Switchless Calls initialization, and Key Separation & Sharing (KSS).

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave_ex(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr,
    const uint32_t ex_features,
    const void* ex_features_p[32]
);
```

### Parameters

#### **file\_name [in]**

Name or full path to the enclave image.

#### **debug [in]**

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates creating the enclave in a non-debug mode. An enclave created in a non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates creating the enclave in a debug mode. The code or data memory inside an enclave created in a debug mode is accessible by a debugger or another software outside the enclave. Thus, this enclave is *not* under the same memory access protections as a non-debug enclave.

You should create enclaves in the debug mode for debug purposes only. To create a debuggable enclave, you can use a helper macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`. In release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 1 by default.

### **launch\_token [deprecated]**

Pointer to an `sgx_launch_token_t` object used to initialize the enclave to be created (deprecated).

### **launch\_token\_updated [deprecated]**

This parameter is deprecated.

### **enclave\_id [out]**

Pointer to an `sgx_enclave_id_t` that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

### **misc\_attr [out, optional]**

Pointer to an `sgx_misc_attribute_t` structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer can be NULL if the information is not needed.

### **ex\_features [in]**

Bitmask defining the extended features to activate on the enclave creation.

Bit [0] – enable the Intel® SGX PCL.

Bit [1] – enable Switchless Calls.

Bit [2] - enable Key Separation & Sharing (KSS).

Bits [3:31] – reserved, must be 0.

### **ex\_features\_p [in]**

Array of pointers to extended feature control structures. The index of the extended feature control structure in the array is the same as the index of the feature enable bit in `ex_features`.

ex\_features\_p[0] – pointer to an Intel® SGX PCL sealed key.

ex\_features\_p[1] – pointer to the `sgx_uswitchless_config_t` structure.

ex\_features\_p[2] – pointer to the `sgx_kss_config_t` structure.

ex\_features\_p[3:31] – reserved, must be NULL.

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Enclave is loaded and initialized successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE**

Enclave file is corrupted.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

'enclave\_id' parameter is NULL.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave_ex()`.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_ENCLAVE\_FILE\_ACCESS**

Enclave file cannot be opened. Possible reasons: the file is not found or you have no privilege to access the file.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_METADATA**

Metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupted or missing.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_VERSION**

Enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

Signature for the enclave is not valid.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

Protected memory has run out. Possible reasons: you are creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or one of the Architecture Enclaves for this operation cannot be loaded.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_DEVICE**



Intel® SGX device is not valid. Possible reasons: the Intel® SGX driver is disabled or not installed.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_CONFLICT**

During enclave creation, a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread occurred. The loader may fail to map virtual address. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_DEVICE\_BUSY**

Intel®SGX driver or a low level system is busy when creating the enclave. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MODE\_INCOMPATIBLE**

Target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. Reason examples: a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to the AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_INVALID\_PRIVILEGE**

Request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but it does not privilege.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NDEBUG\_ENCLAVE**

Enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNDEFINED\_SYMBOL**

Enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically reports this type of error when the enclave is built.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_MISC**

The MiscSelct or MiscMask settings are not correct.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is encrypted but input parameters do not include the required content (e.g. sealed decryption key blob).

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_NOT\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is not encrypted but input parameters include content for enclave decryption.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_FEATURE\_NOT\_SUPPORTED**

Desired feature is not supported.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_FAILURE**

Failed to reserve memory for the enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

### Description

The `sgx_create_enclave_ex` function loads and initializes the enclave as described by `sgx_create_enclave`. In addition, `sgx_create_enclave_ex` activates extended features, based on the input provided in `ex_features` and `ex_features_p` parameters.

The following extended features are currently supported:

- Intel® SGX Protected Code Loader that enables loading encrypted enclaves.
- Switchless Calls. For more information, see the Switchless Calls section.
- Key Separation & Sharing (KSS). You can specify a different `sgx_kss_config_t` structure to load a KSS enabled enclave to have additional control options over the key derivation process. The KSS enabled enclave should be signed with `EnableKSS` set to 1 in the configuration file.

The described extended features are independent but can also work together.

**Notes on signal handling:** If the Linux\* kernel you use does not support the vDSO function to enter the enclave, URTS installs a signal handler for SIGSEGV, SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGBUS, SIGTRAP during the first call of the `sgx_create_enclave_ex` function, after the enclave is successfully loaded and initialized (EINIT is done). Its purpose is to handle signals caused by exceptions inside enclaves or at EENTER, ERESUME instructions used to enter enclaves. The handler invokes previously installed signal handlers to handle

those signals raised in other situations unrelated to enclaves. If an application installs signal handler(s) for these signals after the call of `sgx_create_enclave_ex`, the newly installed handler(s) should also forward those signals to the previously installed handler ifor enclave related exceptions to be handled properly by the URTS handler. If the Linux\* kernel you use supports the vDSO function to enter the enclave, the vDSO function intercepts any exceptions that occur when running the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

## `sgx_create_encrypted_enclave`

Loads the encrypted enclave using its file name. Enables Intel® SGX PCL.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_encrypted_enclave(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr,
    uint8_t* sealed_key
);
```

## Parameters

### **file\_name [in]**

Name or full path to the enclave image.

### **debug [in]**

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is *not* under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 1 by default.

**launch\_token [deprecated]**

Pointer to an `sgx_launch_token_t` object used to initialize the enclave to be created (deprecated).

**launch\_token\_updated [deprecated]**

This parameter is deprecated.

**enclave\_id [out]**

Pointer to an `sgx_enclave_id_t` that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

**misc\_attr [out, optional]**

Pointer to an `sgx_misc_attribute_t` structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

**sealed\_key [in]**

Pointer to a sealed Intel® SGX PCL decryption key.

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The enclave is loaded and initialized successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE**

The enclave file is corrupted.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The 'enclave\_id' parameter is NULL.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave()`.

**SGX\_ERROR\_ENCLAVE\_FILE\_ACCESS**

The enclave file cannot be opened. Possible reasons: the file is not found or you have no privilege to access the file.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_METADATA**

The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupted or missing.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_VERSION**

The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

The signature for the enclave is not valid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

The protected memory has run out. Possible reasons: you are creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed for this operation cannot be loaded.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_DEVICE**

The Intel® SGX device is not valid. Possible reasons: the Intel® SGX driver is disabled or not installed.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_CONFLICT**

During enclave creation, a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread occurred. The loader may fail to map virtual address. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_DEVICE\_BUSY**

The Intel® SGX driver or a low level system is busy when creating the enclave. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MODE\_INCOMPATIBLE**

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. Reason examples: a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_INVALID\_PRIVILEGE**

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but does not have privilege.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NDEBUG\_ENCLAVE**

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNDEFINED\_SYMBOL**

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_MISC**

The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_NOT\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is not encrypted. This function cannot be used to load an enclave that was not encrypted by the encryption tool. Use `sgx_create_encalve` or `sgx_create_enclave_ex`.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_FAILURE**

Failed to reserve memory for the enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

#### **Description**

The `sgx_create_encrypted_enclave` function loads and initializes an encrypted enclave using the enclave file name, the launch token, and the sealed decryption key blob. If the launch token is incorrect, the function gets a new one and save it back to the input parameter “token”. The parameter “updated” indicates that the launch token has been updated.

If the enclave launch token and the sealed decryption key blob are valid, the function returns `SGX_SUCCESS`. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the `enclave_id` parameter.

The library `libsgx_urts.so` provides this function to load an enclave with the Intel® SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library `libsgx_urts_sim.a` exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation

enclave. The simulation mode does not require the Intel® SGX hardware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. A compromised loader or an operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

**Notes on signal handling:** If the Linux\* kernel you use does not support the vDSO function to enter the enclave, URTS installs a signal handler for SIGSEGV, SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGBUS, SIGTRAP during the first call of the `sgx_create_encrypted_enclave` function, after the enclave is successfully loaded and initialized (EINIT is done). Its purpose is to handle signals caused by exceptions inside enclaves or at EENTER, ERESUME instructions used to enter enclaves. The handler invokes previously installed signal handlers to handle those signals raised in other situations unrelated to enclaves. If an application installs signal handler(s) for these signals after `sgx_create_encrypted_enclave` is called, the newly installed handler(s) should also forward those signals to the previously installed handler for enclave related exceptions to be handled properly by the URTS handler. If the Linux\* kernel you use supports the vDSO function to enter the enclave, the vDSO function intercepts any exceptions that occur when running the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### [sgx\\_create\\_enclave\\_from\\_buffer\\_ex](#)

Loads an enclave from memory.

Enables extended features, the Intel® SGX PCL, Switchless Calls initialization, and Key Separation & Sharing (KSS).

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave_from_buffer_ex(
    uint8_t *buffer,
    size_t buffer_size,
    const int debug,
```

```

    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr,
    const uint32_t ex_features,
    const void* ex_features_p[32]
);

```

## Parameters

### **buffer [in]**

Pointer to the enclave image buffer. Must not be NULL.

### **buffer\_size [in]**

Size of the enclave image buffer. Must be non-zero.

### **debug [in]**

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates creating the enclave in a non-debug mode. An enclave created in the non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates creating the enclave in a debug mode. The code or data memory inside an enclave created in the debug mode is accessible by a debugger or another software outside the enclave. Thus, this enclave is *not* under the same memory access protections as a non-debug enclave.

You should create enclaves in the debug mode for debug purposes only. To create an enclave in this mode, you can use a helper macro `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG`. In release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of `SGX_DEBUG_FLAG` is 1 by default.

### **enclave\_id [out]**

Pointer to an `sgx_enclave_id_t` that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

### **misc\_attr [out, optional]**

Pointer to an `sgx_misc_attribute_t` structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer can be NULL if the information is not needed.

### **ex\_features [in]**

Bitmask defining extended features to be activated during the enclave creation.

Bit [0] – enable the Intel® SGX PCL.



Bit [1] – enable Switchless Calls.

Bit [2] - enable Key Separation & Sharing (KSS).

Bits [3:31] – reserved, must be 0.

### **ex\_features\_p [in]**

Array of pointers to extended feature control structures. The index of the extended feature control structure in the array is the same as the index of the feature enable bit in `ex_features`.

`ex_features_p[0]` – pointer to an Intel® SGX PCL sealed key.

`ex_features_p[1]` – pointer to the `sgx_uswitchless_config_t` structure.

`ex_features_p[2]` - pointer to the `sgx_kss_config_t` structure.

`ex_features_p[3:31]` – reserved, must be NULL.

### **Return value**

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Enclave is loaded and initialized successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE**

Enclave file is corrupted.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

'enclave\_id' parameter is NULL.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete `sgx_create_enclave_ex()`.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_ENCLAVE\_FILE\_ACCESS**

Enclave file cannot be opened. Possible reasons: the file is not found or you do not have privilege to access the file.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_METADATA**

Metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupted or missing.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_VERSION**

Enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

Signature for the enclave is not valid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

Protected memory has run out. Possible reasons: you are creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or one of the Architecture Enclaves for this operation cannot be loaded.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_DEVICE**

Intel® SGX device is not valid. Possible reasons: the Intel® SGX driver is disabled or not installed.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_CONFLICT**

During enclave creation, a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread occurred. The loader may fail to map the virtual address. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_DEVICE\_BUSY**

Intel® SGX driver or low level system is busy when creating the enclave. Create the enclave again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MODE\_INCOMPATIBLE**

Target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. Reason examples: a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

`sgx_create_enclave()` needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to the AE service has timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_INVALID\_PRIVILEGE**

Request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but it is not privileged.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NDEBUG\_ENCLAVE**

Enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNDEFINED\_SYMBOL**

Enclave contains an undefined symbol.

This type of error typically occurs when the enclave is built.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_MISC**

The MiscSelct or MiscMask settings are not correct.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is encrypted but input parameters do not include the required content (for example, sealed decryption key blob).

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_PCL\_NOT\_ENCRYPTED**

Enclave is not encrypted but input parameters include content for enclave decryption.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_FEATURE\_NOT\_SUPPORTED**

Desired feature is not supported.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MEMORY\_MAP\_FAILURE**

Failed to reserve memory for the enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

#### **Description**

The `sgx_create_enclave_from_buffer_ex` function loads an enclave. This function supports extended features if the input is provided in `ex_features` and `ex_features_p` parameters. Unlike the `sgx_create_enclave_ex` function, the `sgx_create_enclave_from_buffer_ex` function allows you to load an enclave from memory without using its file name.

The following extended features are currently supported:

- Intel® SGX Protected Code Loader that enables loading encrypted enclaves.
- Switchless Calls. For more information, see the Switchless Calls section.
- Key Separation & Sharing (KSS). You can specify a different `sgx_kss_config_t` structure to load a KSS enabled enclave to have additional control options over the key derivation process. You should sign the KSS enabled enclave with `EnableKSS` set to 1 in the configuration file.

The described extended features are independent but can also work together.

**Notes on signal handling:** If the Linux\* kernel you use does not support the vDSO function to enter the enclave, URTS installs a signal handler for SIGSEGV, SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGBUS, SIGTRAP during the first call of the `sgx_create_enclave_ex` function, after the enclave is successfully loaded and initialized (EINIT is done). Its purpose is to handle signals caused by exceptions inside enclaves or at EENTER, ERESUME instructions used to enter enclaves. The handler invokes previously installed signal handlers to handle those signals raised in other situations unrelated to enclaves. If an application installs signal handler(s) for these signals after calling `sgx_create_enclave_ex`, the newly installed handler(s) should also forward those signals to the previously installed handler for enclave related exceptions to be handled properly by the URTS handler. If the Linux\* kernel you use supports the vDSO function to enter the enclave, the vDSO function intercepts any exceptions that occur when running the enclave.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_destroy_enclave`

The `sgx_destroy_enclave` function destroys an enclave and frees its associated resources.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_enclave(
    const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id
);
```

### Parameters

#### **enclave\_id [in]**

An enclave ID or handle that was generated by `sgx_create_enclave`.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The enclave was unloaded successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE\_ID**

The enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the enclave has already been destroyed.

### Description

The `sgx_destroy_enclave` function destroys an enclave and releases its associated resources and invalidates the enclave ID or handle.

The function will block until no other threads are executing inside the enclave.

It is highly recommended that the `sgx_destroy_enclave` function be called after the application has finished using the enclave to avoid possible deadlocks.

The library `libsgx_urts.so` exposes this function to destroy a previously created enclave in hardware mode, while `libsgx_urts_sim.so` provides a simulative counterpart.

See more details in [Loading and Unloading an Enclave](#).

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_get_target_info`

Gets the target info of an enclave.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_target_info(
    const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id;
    sgx_target_info_t* target_info)
;
```

### Parameters

#### **enclave\_id [in]**

Enclave ID or handle generated by `sgx_create_enclave`.

#### **target\_info [OUT]**

Pointer to the `sgx_target_info_t` object that receives the target info of the enclave. Must be a non-NULL pointer.

See `sgx_target_info_t` for structure details.

### Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ENCLAVE\_ID**

Enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the enclave has already been destroyed.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

**Description**

The `sgx_get_target_info` function gets the target info of an enclave. The enclave should have been loaded.

The library `libsgx_urts.so` exposes this function to get a previously created enclave in a hardware mode, while `libsgx_urts_sim.so` provides a simulative counterpart.

See more details in [Loading and Unloading an Enclave](#).

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_urts.so</code> or <code>libsgx_urts_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**`sgx_select_att_key_id`**

`sgx_select_att_key_id` used to select the attestation key.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_select_att_key_id(
    const uint8_t *p_att_key_id_list,
    uint32_t att_key_idlist_size,
    sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id
);
```

**Parameters****`p_att_key_id_list` [in]**

List of the supported attestation key IDs provided by the quote verifier.

### **att\_key\_id\_list\_size**

The size of `p_att_key_id_list`.

### **p\_att\_key\_id[out]**

Pointer to the selected attestation key. Cannot be NULL.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_att_key_id_list` is not correct, list header is incorrect, the number of key IDs in the list exceeds the maximum or `p_att_key_id` pointer is invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

### Description

You can select the attestation key id from the list provided by the off-platform Quote verifier. Calling `sgx_select_att_key_id` is the first thing an Intel® Software Guard Extensions application does when getting a quote of an enclave. Then call `sgx_init_quote_ext` to generate or obtain the attestation key. Calculate quote size by calling `sgx_get_quote_size_ex`. At last, call `sgx_get_quote_ext` to generate the quote.

The function will return a `sgx_att_key_id_t` of attestation keys supported both by the platform and the relying party. If the platform cannot support one in the list, the API will return error `SGX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ATT_KEY_ID`. If the caller doesn't supply a list (`p_att_key_id_list == NULL`), then the platform software deem the relying party support all kinds of attestation keys. If there are multiple attestation keys are supported by both the platform and the relying party, in such case, if the "default quoting type" in config file (`/etc/aes-md.conf`) is one of them, then the "default quoting type" will be returned; otherwise, the platform software will choose one of them according to its internal logic.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_quote_ex.h
Library	libsgx_quote_ex.so or libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so (simulation)

**sgx\_init\_quote**

`sgx_init_quote` returns information needed by an Intel® SGX application to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote(
    sgx_target_info_t *p_target_info,
    sgx_epid_group_id_t *p_gid
);
```

**Parameters****p\_target\_info [out]**

Allows an enclave for which the quote is being created, to create report that only QE can verify.

**p\_gid [out]**

ID of platform's current Intel® EPID group.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**



The AE service did not respond.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to the AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

#### Description

Calling `sgx_init_quote` is the first thing an Intel® Software Guard Extensions application does in the process of getting a quote of an enclave. The content of `p_target_info` changes when the QE changes. The content of `p_gid` changes when the platform SVN changes.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_epid_sim.so</code> (simulation)

#### **sgx\_init\_quote\_ex**

Returns information required by an Intel® SGX application to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote_ex(
    const sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id,
```

```

    sgx_target_info_t *p_target_info,
    size_t* p_pub_key_id_size,
    uint8_t* p_pub_key_id
);

```

## Parameters

### **p\_att\_key\_id[in]**

Selected attestation key ID returned by `sgx_select_att_key_id`. Cannot be NULL.

### **p\_target\_info [out]**

Allows an enclave for that the quote is being created to create the report that only QE can verify.

### **p\_pub\_key\_id\_size [out]**

This parameter can be used in two ways. If `p_pub_key_id` is NULL, the API returns the buffer size required to hold the attestation public key ID. If `p_pub_key_id` is not NULL, `p_pub_key_size` must be large enough to hold the return attestation public key ID. Must not be NULL.

### **p\_pub\_key\_id [out]**

This parameter can be used in two ways. If it is passed in as NULL and `p_pub_key_id_size` is not NULL, the API returns the buffer size required to hold the attestation public key ID. If the parameter is not NULL, it must point to the buffer that is at least as long as the value passed in by `p_pub_key_id`.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If `p_pub_key_id_size`, `p_att_key_id` is NULL, any of the other pointers are invalid. If `p_pub_key_size` is not NULL, any of the other pointers are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to the AE service timed out.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

Not enough EPC memory is available to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_ATT\_KEY\_CERTIFICATION\_FAILURE**

Failed to generate and certify the attestation key.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error was detected.

#### **Description**

The application calls this API to request the owner of the selected platform attestation key to generate or obtain the attestation key.

If **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned, you should wait (typically, several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API.

#### **Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_quote_ex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_quote_ex.so</code> or <code>libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**sgx\_calc\_quote\_size**

`sgx_calc_quote_size` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_calc_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

**Parameters****p\_sig\_rl [in]**

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

**sig\_rl\_size [in]**

Size of `p_sig_rl`, in bytes. If `p_sig_rl` is NULL, then `sig_rl_size` will be 0.

**p\_quote\_size [out]**

Indicate the size of quote buffer.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_quote_size` pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

**Description**

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_calc_quote`, call `sgx_calc_quote_size` first to calculate the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_epid_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_get\_quote\_size**

`sgx_get_quote_size` is deprecated. Use the `sgx_calc_quote_size` function instead.

`sgx_get_quote_size` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

### Syntax

```

sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);

```

### Parameters

#### **p\_sig\_rl [in]**

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

#### **p\_quote\_size [out]**

Indicate the size of quote buffer.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_quote_size` pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

### Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_get_quote`, call `sgx_get_quote_size` first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_epid_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_get\_quote\_size\_ex**

`sgx_get_quote_size_ex` returns the required buffer size for the quote.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size_ex(
    const sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_att\_key\_id[in]**

Selected attestation key ID returned by `sgx_select_att_key_id`. Cannot be NULL.

### **p\_quote\_size [out]**

Indicate the size of quote buffer. Cannot be NULL.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_quote_size` pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_ATT\_KEY\_UNINITIALIZED**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not have the attestation key available to generate quotes. Call `sgx_init_quote_ex` again.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

## Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_get_quote_ex`, call `sgx_get_quote_size_ex` first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_quote_ex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_quote_ex.so</code> or <code>libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**sgx\_get\_quote**

`sgx_get_quote` generates a linkable or un-linkable QUOTE.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote(
    const sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_sign_type_t quote_type,
    const sgx_spid_t *p_spid,
    const sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce,
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    sgx_report_t *p_qe_report,
    sgx_quote_t *p_quote,
    uint32_t quote_size
);
```

**Parameters****p\_report [in]**

Report of enclave for which quote is being calculated.

**quote\_type [in]**

`SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE` for unlinkable quote or `SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE` for linkable quote.

**p\_spid [in]**

ID of service provider.

**p\_nonce [in]**

Optional nonce, if `p_qe_report` is not NULL, then nonce should not be NULL as well.

**p\_sig\_rl [in]**

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

**sig\_rl\_size [in]**

Size of `p_sig_rl`, in bytes. If the `p_sig_rl` is NULL, then `sig_rl_size` shall be 0.

**p\_qe\_report [out]**

Optional output. If not NULL, report of QE target to the calling enclave will be copied to this buffer, and in this case, nonce should not be NULL as well.

### **p\_quote [out]**

The major output of `get_quote`, the quote itself, linkable or unlinkable depending on `quote_type` input. `quote` cannot be NULL.

### **quote\_size [in]**

Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call `sgx_calc_quote_size` first.

### **Return value**

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_EPID\_MEMBER\_REVOKED**

The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.



**SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

Both Intel® EPID Member and Verifier need to know the Group Public Key and the Intel® EPID Parameters used. These values not being returned by either `sgx_init_quote()` or `sgx_get_quote()` reflects the reliance on the Attestation Service for Intel® Software Guard Extensions. With the Attestation Service in place, simply sending the GID to the Attestation Service (through the Intel® SGX application and PS) is sufficient for the Attestation Service to know which public key and parameters to use.

The purpose of `p_qe_report` is for the ISV enclave to confirm the QUOTE it received is not modified by the untrusted SW stack, and not a replay. The implementation in QE is to generate a REPORT targeting the ISV enclave (target info from `p_report`), with the lower 32Bytes in `report.data = SHA256(p_nonce || p_quote)`. The ISV enclave can verify the `p_qe_report` and `report.data` to confirm the QUOTE has not be modified and is not a replay. It is optional.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_epid_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**sgx\_get\_quote\_ex**

`sgx_get_quote_ex` takes the application enclave REPORT and generates a QUOTE.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_ex(
    const sgx_report_t *p_app_report,
    const sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id,
```

```
    sgx_qe_report_info_t *p_qe_report_info,  
    sgx_quote_t *p_quote,  
    uint32_t quote_size  
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_app\_report [in]**

Report of the enclave for that the quote is being calculated. Cannot be NULL.

### **p\_att\_key\_id[in]**

Selected attestation key ID returned by `sgx_select_att_key_id`. Cannot be NULL.

### **p\_qe\_report\_info [in, out]**

Optional input and output contain the information required to generate a REPORT that can be verified by the application enclave.

### **p\_quote [out]**

The major output of `sgx_get_quote_ex`, the quote itself cannot be NULL.

### **quote\_size [in]**

Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call `sgx_get_quote_size_ex` first.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_ATT\_KEY\_UNINITIALIZED**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not have the attestation key available to generate quotes. Call `sgx_init_quote_ex` again.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error was detected.

#### **Description**

The function takes the application enclave REPORT that will be converted into a quote after the QE verifies the REPORT. After the verification, the QE signs the REPORT with the platform attestation key matching the selected attestation key ID. If the key is not available, this API may return an error `SGX_ATT_KEY_NOT_INITIALIZED` depending on the algorithm. In this case, call `sgx_init_quote_ex` to re-generate and certify the attestation key.

The purpose of `qe_report` in `p_qe_report_info` is for the ISV enclave to confirm the QUOTE it received is not modified by the untrusted SW stack, and not a replay. The implementation in QE is to generate a REPORT targeting the ISV enclave (**app\_enclave\_target\_info** from `p_app_report`), with the lower 32Bytes in `report.data = SHA256(nonce || p_quote)` (nonce from `p_app_report`). The ISV enclave can verify the `qe_report` and `report.data` to confirm the QUOTE has not been modified and is not a replay. It is optional.

If `SGX_ERROR_BUSY` is returned, you should wait (typically, several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_quote_ex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_quote_ex.so</code> or <code>libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_get_supported_att_key_id_num`

`sgx_get_supported_att_key_id_num` returns the number of supported attestation key IDs on the platform.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_supported_att_key_id_num(
    uint32_t *p_att_key_id_num
);
```

### Parameters

#### `p_att_key_id_num[out]`

Indicate the pointer to the location where the required number will be returned.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_att_key_id_num` pointer is invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

#### Description

You need to call this function before getting supported attestation key IDs. The number is variable depending on the platform. You can use the returned `p_att_key_id_num` to allocate the buffer whose size is `sizeof sgx_att_key_id_ext_t * att_key_id_num` to hold the supported attestation key IDs.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_quote_ex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_quote_ex.so</code> or <code>libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so</code> (simulation)

#### **sgx\_get\_supported\_att\_key\_ids**

`sgx_get_supported_att_key_ids` returns an array of all supported attestation key IDs.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_supported_att_key_ids(
    sgx_att_key_id_ext_t *p_att_key_id_list,
    uint32_t att_key_id_num
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **p\_att\_key\_id\_list [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that will contain supported attestation key IDs. The buffer size must be `sizeof sgx_att_key_id_ext_t * att_key_id_num`.

##### **att\_key\_id\_num [in]**

Indicate the the number of supported attestation key IDs. To get the number, call `sgx_get_supported_att_key_id_num` first.

#### Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_att_key_id_list` pointer is invalid or `att_key_id_num` is not correct.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

You can get all supported attestation key IDs on the platform used by `aesm_service`.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_quote_ex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_quote_ex.so</code> or <code>libsgx_quote_ex_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**`sgx_ra_get_msg1`**

`sgx_ra_get_msg1` is used to get the Intel® EPID remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave should use `sgx_ra_init` function to create the remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_msg1(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t p_get_ga,
    sgx_ra_msg1_t *p_msg1
);
```

## Parameters

### **context [in]**

Context returned by the `sgx_ra_init` function inside the application enclave.

### **eid [in]**

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

### **p\_get\_ga [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_ga` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_ga`.

### **p\_msg1 [out]**

Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_EPID\_MEMBER\_REVOKED**

The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ukey_exchange.a</code>

**sgx\_ra\_get\_msg1\_ex**

`sgx_ra_get_msg1_ex` is used to get the Intel® EPID or ECDSA remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave should use `sgx_ra_init_ex` function to create the remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.



## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_msg1_ex(
    const sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t p_get_ga,
    sgx_ra_msg1_t *p_msg1
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_att\_key\_id [in]**

Selected attestation key ID returned by `sgx_select_att_key_id`.

### **context [in]**

Context returned by the `sgx_ra_init_ex` function inside the application enclave.

### **eid [in]**

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

### **p\_get\_ga [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_ga` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_ga`.

### **p\_msg1 [out]**

Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_EPID\_MEMBER\_REVOKED**

The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in an incorrect order or state.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

**SGX\_ERROR\_ATT\_KEY\_CERTIFICATION\_FAILURE**

Failed to generate and certify the attestation key.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error was detected.

[Description](#)

The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to `sgx_ra_get_ga`, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

If **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned, you should wait (typically, several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ukey_exchange.a</code>

### `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`

`sgx_ra_proc_msg2` is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use `sgx_ra_get_keys` function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use `sgx_ra_close` function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it does not receive message 3.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_proc_msg2(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t p_proc_msg2,
    sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t p_get_msg3,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    uint32_t msg2_size,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t **pp_msg3,
    uint32_t *p_msg3_size
);
```

## Parameters

### **context [in]**

Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

### **eid [in]**

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

### **p\_proc\_msg2 [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

### **p\_get\_msg3 [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_msg3`.

### **p\_msg2 [in]**

`sgx_ra_msg2_t` message 2 from the service provider received by application.

### **msg2\_size [in]**

The length of `p_msg2` (in bytes).

### **pp\_msg3 [out]**

`sgx_ra_msg3_t` message 3 to be sent to the service provider. The message buffer is allocated by the `sgx_ukey_exchange` library. The caller should free the buffer after use.

### **p\_msg3\_size [out]**

The length of `pp_msg3` (in bytes).

### **Return value**

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_EPID\_MEMBER\_REVOKED**

The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

The signature is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

**SGX\_ERROR\_KDF\_MISMATCH**

Indicates key derivation function does not match.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

### Description

The `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ukey_exchange.a</code>

### `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_ex`

`sgx_ra_proc_msg2_ex` is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use `sgx_ra_get_keys` function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use `sgx_ra_close` function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it does not receive message 3.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_proc_msg2_ex(
    const sgx_att_key_id_t *p_att_key_id,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t p_proc_msg2,
    sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t p_get_msg3,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    uint32_t msg2_size,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t **pp_msg3,
    uint32_t *p_msg3_size
);
```

### Parameters

#### `p_att_key_id[in]`

Selected attestation key ID returned from `sgx_select_att_key_id`.

**context [in]**

Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

**eid [in]**

ID of the application enclave that is going to be attested.

**p\_proc\_msg2 [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**p\_get\_msg3 [in]**

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy `sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t` generated by `sgx_edger8r`. The application enclave should link with `sgx_tkey_exchange` library and import the `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl` in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for `sgx_ra_get_msg3`.

**p\_msg2 [in]**

`sgx_ra_msg2_t` message 2 from the service provider received by application.

**msg2\_size [in]**

The length of `p_msg2` (in bytes).

**pp\_msg3 [out]**

`sgx_ra_msg3_t` message 3 to be sent to the service provider. The message buffer is allocated by the `sgx_ukey_exchange` library. The caller should free the buffer after use.

**p\_msg3\_size [out]**

The length of `pp_msg3` (in bytes).

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

**SGX\_ERROR\_EPID\_MEMBER\_REVOKED**

The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

Request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in an incorrect order or state. Before calling this API, user should call `sgx_ra_get_msg1_ex` first.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE**

The signature is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

**SGX\_ERROR\_KDF\_MISMATCH**

Indicates key derivation function does not match.



**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_ATT\_KEY\_ID**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key described.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ATT\_KEY\_CERT\_DATA**

The data returned by the platform library's `sgx_get_quote_config` is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The `sgx_ra_proc_msg2_ex` processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

If **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY** is returned, you should wait (typically, several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ukey_exchange.a</code>

**`sgx_report_attestation_status`**

`sgx_report_attestation_status` reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to decide whether a TCB update is required. It is recommended to always call `sgx_report_attestation_status` after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB).

The `attestation_status` indicates whether the ISV server decided to trust the enclave or not.

- The value `pass:0` indicates that the ISV server trusts the enclave. If the ISV server trusts the enclave and platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will not take actions to correct the TCB that will cause negative user experience such as long latencies or requesting a TCB update.

- The value `fail:!=0` indicates that the ISV server does not trust the enclave. If the ISV server does not trust the enclave or platform services, `sgx_report_attestation_status` will take all actions to correct the TCB which may incur long latencies and/or request the application to update one of the Intel SGX's TCB components. It is the ISV's responsibility to provide the TCB component updates to the client platform.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_report_attestation_status (
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info
    int attestation_status,
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_platform\_info [in]**

Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server.

### **attestation\_status [in]**

The value indicates whether remote attestation succeeds or fails. If attestation succeeds, the value is 0. If it fails, the value will be others.

### **p\_update\_info [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of `sgx_report_attestation_status` is `SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED`.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

This service is temporarily unavailable.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The application calls `sgx_report_attestation_status` after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_uae_service_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**`sgx_check_update_status`**

`sgx_check_update_status` reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to learn whether a TCB update is available, and whether Intel® EPID provisioning or PSE provisioning/long-term pairing is or was needed or pending. It is recommended to always call `sgx_`

check\_update\_status after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB).

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_check_update_status (
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info,
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info,
    uint32_t config,
    uint32_t* p_status
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_platform\_info [in]**

Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server. Can be NULL when TCB is up to date. If it is, then p\_update\_info also needs to be NULL.

#### **p\_update\_info [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of sgx\_check\_update\_status is SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED. Can be NULL.

#### **config [in]**

The value indicates whether caller wants to address pending Intel® EPID or PSE provisioning using the combination of the following bits.

Value	Description
bit 0:	reserved and must be zero.
bit 1:	set if caller wants to trigger Intel® EPID provisioning if it is needed/pending.
bit 2:	set if caller wants to trigger PSE provisioning/long-term pairing if it is needed/pending.
bit 31..3:	reserved and must be zero.
if bit[2:1] == 0:	never trigger either Intel® EPID or PSE provisioning/long-term pairing.

#### **p\_status [out]**

The value will be filled as follows:

Value	Description
-------	-------------

bit 0:	set if any update is available. Caller can inspect <code>p_update_info</code> to learn details.
bit 1:	set if Intel® EPID provisioning is or was needed/pending. Set or cleared independent of config input.
bit 2:	set if PSE provisioning/long-term pairing is or was needed/pending. Set or cleared independent of config input.
bit 31..3:	reserved and must be zero.

Can be NULL. If all user wants is to know about updates, the API will return `SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE` and fill in `p_update_info` even if `p_status` is NULL.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the pointers are invalid.

For example: `p_platform_info` NULL and `p_update_info` non-NULL (can't determine update status w/o PIB). Or `p_platform_info` NULL and `config == 0` (nothing to do).

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNSUPPORTED\_CONFIG**

Any unsupported bits in config input are set.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_INVALID\_EPIDBLOB**

The Intel® EPID blob is corrupted.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UPDATE\_NEEDED**

Intel® SGX needs to be updated.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

This service is temporarily unavailable.

**SGX\_ERROR\_NETWORK\_FAILURE**

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNRECOGNIZED\_PLATFORM**

Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The application calls `sgx_check_update_status` after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB and learn whether Intel® EPID provisioning or PSE provisioning/long-term pairing is or was needed/pending.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_uae_service_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**`sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id`**

The function `sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id` reports which extended Intel® EPID Group the client uses by default. The key used to sign a Quote will be a member of the extended Intel® EPID Group reported in this API.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id(
    uint32_t *p_extended_epid_group_id
);
```

**Parameters**

**p\_extended\_epid\_group\_id [out]**

The extended Intel® EPID Group ID.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_extended_epid_group_id` pointer is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

**SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

**Description**

The application uses this value to tell the ISV Service Provider which extended Intel® EPID Group to use during remote attestation.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uae_epid.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_epid.so</code> or <code>libsgx_uae_service_sim.so</code> (simulation)

**sgx\_register\_wl\_cert\_chain**

`sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` helps you to provide an Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain. An Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain contains the signing key(s) of the Intel® SGX application enclave(s). If the system has not acquired an up-to-date Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain, you can provide the chain to the system by setting `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain`.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_register_wl_cert_chain(
```

```

    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);

```

### Parameters

#### **p\_whitelist [out]**

A pointer to the allowlist.

#### **whitelist\_size [in]**

Size of `p_whitelist`, in bytes.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The Allow List is invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

The request to the AE service timed out.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error is detected.

### Description

If you have an update-to-date Enclave Signing Key Allow List Certificate Chain, you need to call `sgx_register_wl_cert_chain` once first to launch enclaves.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_launch.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_launch.so</code> or <code>libsgx_launch_sim.so</code> (simulation)



## sgx\_is\_capable

`sgx_is_capable` helps ISV applications to check if the client platform is enabled for the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX). You must run the client application with the administrator privileges to get the status successfully.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_is_capable(  
    int *sgx_capable  
);
```

## Parameters

### **sgx\_capable [out]**

Capable status of the Intel SGX device.

**1**

Platform is enabled for the Intel SGX or the Software Control Interface is available to configure the Intel SGX device.

**0**

Intel SGX device is not available or may require manual configuration.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

`sgx_capable` pointer is invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_PRIVILEGE**

Application does not have the required privilege to read EFI variables. Run the application with administrator privileges to query the Intel SGX device status.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

## Description

ISV applications can call `sgx_is_capable` to detect if the Intel® SGX device is available. This API is intended to detect cases where software can configure the Intel SGX device. If 0 is returned, `sgx_cap_get_status` can be used to detect manual configuration changes that can be made to enable the Intel SGX device.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_capable.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_capable.so</code> and <code>libsgx_capable.a</code>

---

#### **NOTE:**

Administrative privileges are required to use this API.

---

### `sgx_cap_enable_device`

`sgx_cap_enable_device` helps ISV applications to enable the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) device and return the appropriate status. If a reboot is required, an ISV application can decide whether to notify users of the restart requirement or not.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_enable_device(
    sgx_device_status_t *sgx_device_status
);
```

### Parameters

#### **sgx\_device\_status [out]**

Intel® SGX status of the Intel® SGX device.

#### **SGX\_ENABLED**

Platform is enabled for the Intel® SGX.

#### **SGX\_DISABLED\_REBOOT\_REQUIRED**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX. Reboot required to enable the platform.

#### **SGX\_DISABLED\_MANUAL\_ENABLE**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX but can be enabled manually through the BIOS menu. The Software Control Interface is not available to enable the Intel® SGX on this platform.

### **SGX\_DISABLED\_HYPERV\_ENABLED**

Detected version of Windows\* OS10 is incompatible with the Hyper-V\*. The Intel® SGX cannot be enabled on the target system unless the Hyper-V\* is disabled.

### **SGX\_DISABLED\_LEGACY\_OS**

Operating system does not support UEFI enabling of the the Intel® SGX device. If the operating system supports UEFI in general, but support for enabling the Intel® SGX device does not exist, this function returns `SGX_DISABLED`.

### **SGX\_DISABLED\_UNSUPPORTED\_CPU**

Processor does not support the Intel SGX.

### **SGX\_DISABLED**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX. More details about enabling the Intel® SGX are unavailable. The Intel® SGX can be manually enabled in the BIOS.

#### [Return value](#)

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `sgx_device_status` pointer is invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_PRIVILEGE**

Application does not have the required privileges to read an UEFI variable. Run the application with the administrator privileges to enable the Intel® SGX device status.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

#### [Description](#)

ISV application can call `sgx_cap_enable_device` to enable the Intel SGX device dynamically.

#### [Requirements](#)

Header	<code>sgx_capable.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_capable.so</code> and <code>libsgx_capable.a</code>

---

**NOTE:**

Administrative privileges are required to use this API.

APIs that begin with `sgx_cap` are utility functions that operate independently of the Intel® SGX PSW. They do not require the PSW to be installed on the system. When the PSW is installed, they have the same behavior.

---

**sgx\_cap\_get\_status**

`sgx_cap_get_status` helps ISV applications check the status of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) on the client platform. You must run the client application with the administrator privileges to get the status successfully.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cap_get_status (  
    sgx_device_status_t *sgx_device_status  
);
```

**Parameters****sgx\_device\_status [out]**

Intel® SGX status of the Intel® SGX device.

**SGX\_ENABLED**

Platform is enabled for the Intel® SGX.

**SGX\_DISABLED\_REBOOT\_REQUIRED**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX. Reboot required for enabling the platform.

**SGX\_DISABLED\_SCI\_AVAILABLE**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX but can be enabled using the Software Control Interface.

**SGX\_DISABLED\_MANUAL\_ENABLE**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX but can be enabled manually through the BIOS menu. The Software Control Interface is not available to enable the Intel® SGX on this platform.

**SGX\_DISABLED\_LEGACY\_OS**

Operating system does not support UEFI enabling of the Intel SGX device. If the operating system supports the UEFI in general but cannot enable the Intel® SGX device, the function returns `SGX_DISABLED`.

### **SGX\_DISABLED\_UNSUPPORTED\_CPU**

Processor does not support the Intel® SGX.

### **SGX\_DISABLED**

Platform is disabled for the Intel® SGX. You can try to enable the Intel® SGX manually through the BIOS menu.

#### [Return value](#)

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `sgx_device_status` pointer is invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_NO\_PRIVILEGE**

Application does not have the required privileges to read EFI variables. Run the application with the administrator privileges to query the Intel® SGX device status.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error is detected.

#### [Description](#)

ISV applications can call `sgx_cap_get_status` to detect if the Intel® SGX is enabled or can be enabled on the device, using the software interface or by taking manual configuration steps.

#### [Requirements](#)

Header	<code>sgx_capable.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_capable.so</code> and <code>libsgx_capable.a</code>

#### **NOTE:**

Administrator privileges are required to use this API.

APIs that begin with `sgx_cap` are the utility functions that operate independently of the Intel® SGX Platform Software (Intel® SGX PSW). They do not

---

require the Intel® SGX PSW to be installed on the system. When the Intel® SGX PSW is installed, the functions behavior remains unchanged.

---

### **sgx\_get\_whitelist\_size**

`sgx_get_whitelist_size` returns the required buffer size for the allowlist.

#### **Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist_size(  
    uint32_t *p_whitelist_size  
);
```

#### **Parameters**

##### **p\_whitelist\_size [out]**

Indicate the size of the allowlist buffer.

#### **Return value**

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist_size` pointer is invalid.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

#### **Description**

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call `sgx_get_whitelist`, call `sgx_get_whitelist_size` first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_launch.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_launch.so</code> or <code>libsgx_launch_sim.so</code> (simulation)

## `sgx_get_whitelist`

`sgx_get_whitelist` returns the allowlist used by `aesm_service`.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist(
    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_whitelist [out]**

The allowlist.

### **whitelist\_size [in]**

Indicate the size of the allowlist buffer. To get the size, call `sgx_get_whitelist_size` first.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `p_whitelist` pointer is invalid or `whitelist_size` is not correct.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_BUSY**

The requested service is temporarily not available.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_UNAVAILABLE**

The AE service did not respond.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_SERVICE\_TIMEOUT**

A request to AE service timed out.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

#### Description

You can get current allowlist used by `aesm_service`.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_uae_launch.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_launch.so</code> or <code>libsgx_launch_sim.so</code> (simulation)

#### `sgx_is_within_enclave`

The `sgx_is_within_enclave` function checks that the buffer located at the pointer `addr` with its length of `size` is an address that is strictly within the calling enclave address space.

#### Syntax

```
int sgx_is_within_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **addr [in]**

The start address of the buffer.

##### **size [in]**

The size of the buffer.

#### Return value

**1**

The buffer is strictly within the enclave address space.

**0**



The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

### Description

`sgx_is_within_enclave` simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. Given a function pointer, you sometimes need to confirm whether such a function is within the enclave. In this case, it is recommended to use `sgx_is_within_enclave` with a size of 1. `sgx_is_within_enclave` returns 0 if the buffer is outside the enclave or overlaps with the enclave boundary. Thus `!sgx_is_within_enclave() ≠ sgx_is_outside_enclave()`.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_is_outside_enclave`

The `sgx_is_outside_enclave` function checks that the buffer located at the pointer `addr` with its length of `size` is an address that is strictly outside the calling enclave address space.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_is_outside_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

### Parameters

#### **addr [in]**

The start address of the buffer.

#### **size [in]**

The size of the buffer.

### Return value

**1**

The buffer is strictly outside the enclave address space.

**0**

The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

### Description

`sgx_is_outside_enclave` simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. `sgx_is_outside_enclave` returns 0 if the buffer is inside the enclave or overlaps with the enclave boundary. Thus `!sgx_is_outside_enclave() ≠ sgx_is_within_enclave()`.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_read_rand`

The `sgx_read_rand` function is used to generate a random number inside the enclave.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(
    unsigned char *rand,
    size_t length_in_bytes
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rand [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the random number. The pointer cannot be NULL. The rand buffer can be either within or outside the enclave, but it is not allowed to be across the enclave boundary or wrapped around.

#### **length\_in\_bytes [in]**

The length of the buffer (in bytes).

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Invalid input parameters detected.

## SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the valid random number generation process.

### Description

The `sgx_read_rand` function is provided to replace the C standard pseudo-random sequence generation functions inside the enclave, since these standard functions are not supported in the enclave, such as `rand`, `srand`, etc. For HW mode, the function generates a real-random sequence; while for simulation mode, the function generates a pseudo-random sequence.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_wrpkr`

The `sgx_wrpkr` function is used to modify the PKRU register inside an enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_wrpkr (
    uint32_t val
);
```

### Parameters

#### **val [in]**

The desired PKRU value.

### Return value

#### **1**

Write the PKRU register successfully.

#### **0**

Fail to write the PKRU register.

### Description

`sgx_wrpkr` is used to set the PKRU register with the specific input `val` using the `wrpkr` instruction inside an enclave. It works only if the enclave is loaded as Protection Keys enabled.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_rdpkr`

The `sgx_rdpkr` function can be used to read the PKRU register value inside an enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_rdpkr (
    uint32_t *val
);
```

### Parameters

#### **val [out]**

The output PKRU value.

### Return value

**1**

Read PKRU register successfully.

**0**

Fail to read the PKRU register.

### Description

`sgx_rdpkr` is used to read the PKRU register value inside an enclave using the `rdpkr` instruction. It works only if the enclave is loaded as Protection Keys enabled.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_register\_exception\_handler**

`sgx_register_exception_handler` allows developers to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is equal to 1) or append the handler to the handler chain.

#### **Syntax**

```
void* sgx_register_exception_handler(  
    int is_first_handler,  
    sgx_exception_handler_t exception_handler  
);
```

#### **Parameters**

##### **is\_first\_handler [in]**

Specify the order in which the handler should be called. If the parameter is nonzero, the handler is the first handler to be called. If the parameter is zero, the handler is the last handler to be called.

##### **exception\_handler [in]**

The exception handler to be called

#### **Return value**

##### **Non-zero**

Indicates the exception handler is registered successfully. The return value is an open handle to the custom exception handler.

##### **NULL**

The exception handler was not registered.

#### **Description**

The Intel® SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. You can write your own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. For example, a CPUID instruction inside an enclave will effectively result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can have an exception handler to prevent the enclave from being trapped into an exception condition. See [Custom Exception Handling](#) for more details.

Calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` allows you to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when `is_first_handler` is nonzero) or append the handler to the handler chain.

After calling `sgx_register_exception_handler` to prepend an exception handler, a subsequent call to this function may add another exception handler at the beginning of the handler chain. Therefore the order in which exception handlers are called does not only depend on the value of the `is_first_handler` parameter, but more importantly depends on the order in which exception handlers are registered.

---

**NOTE:**

Custom exception handling is only supported in hardware mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

---

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts_exception.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_unregister_exception_handler`

`sgx_unregister_exception_handler` is used to unregister a custom exception handler.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_unregister_exception_handler(
    void* handler
);
```

### Parameters

#### **handler [in]**

A handle to the custom exception handler previously registered using the `sgx_register_exception_handler` function.

### Return value

#### **Non-zero**

The custom exception handler is unregistered successfully.

#### **0**

The exception handler was not unregistered (not a valid pointer, handler not found).

### Description

The Intel® SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. An enclave developer can write their own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See [Custom Exception Handling](#) for more details.

Calling `sgx_unregister_exception_handler` allows developers to unregister an exception handler that was registered earlier.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts_exception.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code> or <code>libsgx_trts_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_set_ssa_aexnotify`

`sgx_set_ssa_aexnotify` allows developers to enable the `AEX-Notify` feature upon a piece of enclave code.

### Syntax

```
void* sgx_set_ssa_aexnotify(
    int flag
);
```

### Parameters

#### flag [in]

Flag to enable or disable the `AEX-Notify` upon a piece of enclave code. Set 0 to disable the `AEX-Notify` and non-zero to enable the `AEX-Notify`.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates the `AEX-Notify` handler is registered successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error.

### Description

You can enable or disable `AEX-Notify` in the enclave code using this function. To enable `AEX-Notify` for critical code that you want to mitigate for single-step attacks, call this function. The following execution will be executed with `AEX-Notify` enabled until you call this function to disable it.

Header	<code>sgx_trts_aex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code>

### sgx\_register\_aex\_handler

`sgx_register_aex_handler` allows developers to register an `AEX-Notify` handler.

#### Syntax

```
void* sgx_register_aex_handler(
    sgx_aex_mitigation_node_t *aex_node,
    sgx_aex_mitigation_fn_t handler,
    const void *args
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **aex\_node [in, out]**

A pointer to an `AEX` mitigation node. The mitigation node must exist and be valid until it is unregistered.

##### **handler [in]**

A function handler to call after being notified of an `AEX`.

##### **args [in]**

Arguments to pass to the handler

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates the `AEX-Notify` handler is registered successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `aex_node` or `handler` are `NULL`.

#### Description

The Intel® SGX SDK allows you to register custom `AEX-Notify` functions. You can write your own code to provide an `AEX-Notify` handler that detects single-step attacks. For instance, you can provide a handler that counts the Async Exit. If the count is abnormal which means single-step attacks occur, you can take proper actions.

Calling `sgx_register_aex_handler` allows you to register an `AEX-Notify` handler.

#### Requirements



Header	<code>sgx_trts_aex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code>

**sgx\_unregister\_aex\_handler**

`sgx_unregister_aex_handler` is used to unregister an AEX-Notify handler.

**Syntax**

```
void* sgx_unregister_aex_handler(
    sgx_aex_mitigation_fn_t handler
);
```

**Parameters****handler [in]**

A function handler that was previously registered.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates the AEX handler is registered successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The `handler` was NULL or has not been previously registered.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

There currently are no registered handlers.

**Description**

The Intel® SGX SDK allows you to register custom AEX-Notify functions. You can write your own code to provide an AEX-Notify handler that detects single-step attacks.

Calling `sgx_unregister_exception_handler` allows developers to unregister an AEX-Notify handler that was registered earlier.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_trts_aex.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code>

### sgx\_spin\_lock

The `sgx_spin_lock` function acquires a spin lock within the enclave.

#### Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_spin_lock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

#### Parameters

##### lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be acquired.

#### Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is acquired.

#### Description

`sgx_spin_lock` modifies the value of the spin lock by using compiler atomic operations. If the lock is not available to be acquired, the thread will always wait on the lock until it can be acquired successfully.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_spinlock.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### sgx\_spin\_unlock

The `sgx_spin_unlock` function releases a spin lock within the enclave.

#### Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_spin_unlock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

#### Parameters

##### lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be released.

## Return value

**0**

This function always returns zero after the lock is released.

## Description

`sgx_spin_unlock` resets the value of the spin lock, regardless of its current state. This function simply assigns a value of zero to the lock, which indicates the lock is released.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_spinlock.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

## `sgx_thread_mutex_init`

The `sgx_thread_mutex_init` function initializes a trusted mutex object within the enclave.

## Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_init(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex,
    const sgx_thread_mutexattr_t * unused
);
```

## Parameters

### **mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be initialized.

### **unused [in]**

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined mutex attributes. [NOT USED]

## Return value

**0**

The mutex is initialized successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

## Description

When a thread creates a mutex within an enclave, `sgx_thread_mutex_init` simply initializes the various fields of the mutex object to indicate that the mutex is available. `sgx_thread_mutex_init` creates a non-recursive mutex. The results of using a mutex in a lock or unlock operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_mutex_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a trusted mutex, it is recommended statically initializing the mutex with the macro `SGX_THREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER`, `SGX_THREAD_NON_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER`, or `SGX_THREAD_RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER` instead.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_thread_mutex_destroy`

The `sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` function destroys a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

## Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_destroy(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

## Parameters

### **mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be destroyed.

## Return value

**0**

The mutex is destroyed successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

### **EBUSY**

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

### Description

`sgx_thread_mutex_destroy` resets the mutex, which brings it to its initial status. In this process, certain fields are checked to prevent releasing a mutex that is still owned by a thread or on which threads are still waiting.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Locking or unlocking a mutex after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a mutex is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

---

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_thread_mutex_lock`

The `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` function locks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_lock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

### Parameters

#### **mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be locked.

### Return value

**0**

The mutex is locked successfully.

#### **EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

### Description

To acquire a mutex, a thread first needs to acquire the corresponding spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread checks whether the mutex is available. If the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue the thread will now become the owner of the mutex. To confirm its ownership, the thread updates the refcount and owner fields. If the mutex is not available, the thread searches the queue. If the thread is already in the queue, but not at the head, it means that the thread has previously tried to lock the mutex, but it did not succeed and had to wait outside the enclave and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. If the thread is trying to lock the mutex for the first time, it will update the waiting queue and make an OCALL to get suspended. Note that threads release the spin lock after acquiring the mutex or before leaving the enclave.

---

### **NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

---

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tsrdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### **`sgx_thread_mutex_trylock`**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_trylock` function tries to lock a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_trylock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

### Parameters

#### **mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be try-locked.

### Return value

**0**

The mutex is locked successfully.

**EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

**EBUSY**

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

**Description**

A thread may check the status of the mutex, which implies acquiring the spin lock and verifying that the mutex is available and that the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue. When this happens, the thread acquires the mutex, releases the spin lock and returns 0. Otherwise, the thread releases the spin lock and returns EINVAL/EBUSY. The thread is not suspended in this case.

**NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

**sgx\_thread\_mutex\_unlock**

The `sgx_thread_mutex_unlock` function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_unlock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

**Parameters****mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object to be unlocked.

**Return value**

**0**

The mutex is unlocked successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted mutex object is invalid or it is not locked by any thread.

### **EPERM**

The mutex is locked by another thread.

### Description

Before a thread releases a mutex, it has to verify it is the owner of the mutex. If that is the case, the thread decreases the refcount by 1 and then may either continue normal execution or wakeup the first thread in the queue. Note that to ensure the state of the mutex remains consistent, the thread that is awakened by the thread releasing the mutex will then try to acquire the mutex almost as in the initial call to the `sgx_thread_mutex_lock` routine.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgxtstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_thread_rwlock_init`

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_init` function initializes a trusted rwlock object within the enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_init(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t *rwlock,
    const sgx_thread_rwlockattr_t *unused
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be initialized.

#### **unused [in]**

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined rwlock attributes. [NOT USED]

### Return value

**0**



The rwlock is initialized successfully.

## **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

### Description

When a thread creates a rwlock within an enclave, `sgx_thread_rwlock_init` simply initializes the various fields of the rwlock object to indicate that the rwlock is available. The results of using a rwlock in a lock or unlock operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_rwlock_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a trusted rwlock, it is recommended statically initializing the rwlock with the macro `SGX_THREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER`.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_thread_rwlock_destroy`

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_destroy` function destroys a trusted rwlock object within an enclave.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_destroy(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be destroyed.

### Return value

**0**

The rwlock is destroyed successfully.

## **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

### **EBUSY**

The rwlock is locked (either a reader or a writer lock) by another thread or it is pending threads to acquire the rwlock.

### Description

`sgx_thread_rwlock_destroy` resets the rwlock, which brings it to the initial status. The function will fail if any thread holds either a reader or a writer lock or awaits the lock.

---

### **NOTE:**

Attempting to acquire either a reader or a writer lock after it has destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a rwlock is destroyed, it must be re-initialized before it can be used again.

---

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_thread_rwlock_rdlock`

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_rdlock` function acquires a reader lock on the provided rwlock object.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_rdlock(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be locked.

### Return value

**0**

The reader lock is acquired.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid.

## EDEADLK

This thread currently holds a writer lock on the rwlock object.

### Description

Used to acquire a reader lock on rwlock object. The function ensures that no other threads hold a writer lock on the rwlock object. If no other threads hold a writer lock, the reader lock is acquired and the function returns successfully. If another thread is currently holding a writer lock, the function will make an OCALL to put the thread to sleep until the writer lock is released. When the writer lock is released, the thread that releases the writer lock will make an OCALL to wake pending threads, the function will return from the OCALL and try to obtain the reader lock again.

---

### NOTE

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a reader lock. Do not split a critical section protected by a lock across root ECALLs.

---

### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tsrdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### sgx\_thread\_rwlock\_tryrdlock

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_tryrdlock` function tries to acquire a reader lock on the provided rwlock object.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_tryrdlock(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be locked.

### Return value

**0**

The reader lock is acquired.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid.

### **EDEADLK**

This thread currently holds a writer lock on the rwlock object.

### **EBUSY**

Another thread currently holds a writer lock on the rwlock object.

### Description

A thread may try to acquire a reader lock on rwlock object. If no other threads hold a writer lock on the rwlock object, the reader lock is acquired. If another thread is currently holding a writer lock, the function returns EBUSY.

---

### **NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a reader lock. Do not split a critical section protected by a lock across root ECALLs.

---

### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tsrdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### **sgx\_thread\_rwlock\_wrlock**

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_wrlock` function acquires a writer lock on the provided rwlock object.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_wrlock(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

### Parameters

#### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be locked.

### Return value

**0**

The writer lock is acquired.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid.

### **EDEADLK**

This thread currently holds a writer lock on the rwlock object.

### Description

To acquire a writer lock on rwlock object, the function ensures that no other threads hold either a reader or a writer lock on the rwlock object. If no other threads hold a either a reader or a writer lock, the writer lock is acquired and the function returned successfully. If another thread currently holds either lock, the function will make an OCALL to put the thread to sleep until the lock is released. When either the writer lock or all the reader locks are released, the thread, that releases the lock, will make an OCALL to wake pending threads. The function will return from the OCALL and try to obtain the writer lock again.

---

### **NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a writer lock. Do not split a critical section protected by a lock across root ECALLs.

If a thread currently holds a reader lock attempts to acquire a writer lock, the thread will deadlock.

---

### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tsrdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### **sgx\_thread\_rwlock\_trywrlock**

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_trywrlock` function tries to acquire a writer lock on the provided rwlock object.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_trywrlock(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

### Parameters

**rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be locked.

**Return value****0**

The writer lock is acquired.

**EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid.

**EDEADLK**

This thread currently holds a writer lock on the rwlock object.

**EBUSY**

Another thread currently holds a writer or a reader lock on the rwlock object.

**Description**

A thread may try to acquire a writer lock on rwlock object. If no other threads hold a writer lock or a reader lock on the rwlock object, the writer lock is acquired. If another thread holds a lock, the function returns EBUSY.

**NOTE**

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a reader lock. Do not split a critical section protected by a lock across root ECALLs.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tsrdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

**sgx\_thread\_rwlock\_unlock**

The `sgx_thread_rwlock_unlock` function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

**Syntax**

```
int sgx_thread_rwlock_unlock(
    sgx_thread_rwlock_t * rwlock
);
```

## Parameters

### **rwlock [in]**

The trusted rwlock object to be unlocked.

## Return value

### **0**

The rwlock is unlocked successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted rwlock object is invalid.

### **EPERM**

The rwlock is not locked by any thread.

## Description

If the thread owns the writer lock, it will release the lock. Otherwise, it will release a reader lock by decreasing the reader lock refcount by 1. If releasing a writer lock or the reference count for reader locks becomes zero, indicating all reader locks, which have been released, the function will attempt to wake threads, waiting first on reader locks, then on writer locks.

---

### **NOTE**

Releasing a rwlock when the thread does not hold a lock can return undefined results.

---

## Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgxtstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### **sgx\_thread\_cond\_init**

The `sgx_thread_cond_init` function initializes a trusted condition variable within the enclave.

## Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_init(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    const sgx_thread_condattr_t * unused
);
```

## Parameters

### **cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable.

### **attr [in]**

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined condition variable attributes. [NOT USED]

## Return value

### **0**

The condition variable is initialized successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

## Description:

When a thread creates a condition variable within an enclave, it simply initializes the various fields of the object to indicate that the condition variable is available. The results of using a condition variable in a wait, signal or broadcast operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to `sgx_thread_cond_init` returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a condition variable, it is recommended statically initializing the condition variable with the macro `SGX_THREAD_COND_INITIALIZER`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### **`sgx_thread_cond_destroy`**

The `sgx_thread_cond_destroy` function destroys a trusted condition variable within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_destroy(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```



## Parameters

### **cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable to be destroyed.

## Return value

### **0**

The condition variable is destroyed successfully.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

### **EBUSY**

The condition variable has pending threads waiting on it.

## Description

The procedure first confirms that there are no threads waiting on the condition variable before it is destroyed. The destroy operation acquires the spin lock at the beginning of the operation to prevent other threads from signaling to or waiting on the condition variable.

---

### **NOTE**

Acquiring or releasing a condition variable after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a condition variable is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

---

## Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### **sgx\_thread\_cond\_wait**

The `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function waits on a condition variable within an enclave.

## Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_wait(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

## Parameters

### **cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable to be waited on.

### **mutex [in]**

The trusted mutex object that will be unlocked when the thread is blocked in the condition variable.

## Return value

### **0**

The thread waiting on the condition variable is signaled by other thread (without errors).

### **EINVAL**

The trusted condition variable or mutex object is invalid or the mutex is not locked.

### **EPERM**

The trusted mutex is locked by another thread.

## Description:

A condition variable is always used in conjunction with a mutex. To wait on a condition variable, a thread first needs to acquire the condition variable spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread updates the condition variable waiting queue. To avoid the lost wake-up signal problem, the condition variable spin lock is released after the mutex. This order ensures the function atomically releases the mutex and causes the calling thread to block on the condition variable, with respect to other threads accessing the mutex and the condition variable. After releasing the condition variable spin lock, the thread makes an OCALL to get suspended. When the thread is awakened, it acquires the condition variable spin lock. The thread then searches the condition variable queue. If the thread is in the queue, it means that the thread was already waiting on the condition variable outside the enclave, and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock, makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. Otherwise, another thread has signaled or broadcasted the condition variable and this thread may proceed. Before returning, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock and acquires the mutex, ensuring that upon returning from the function call the thread still owns the mutex.

**NOTE**

Threads check whether they are in the queue to make the Intel SGX condition variable robust against attacks to the untrusted event.

A thread may have to do up to two OCALLs throughout the `sgx_thread_cond_wait` function call.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

**sgx\_thread\_cond\_signal**

The `sgx_thread_cond_signal` function wakes a pending thread waiting on the condition variable.

**Syntax**

```
int sgx_thread_cond_signal(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

**Parameters****cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable to be signaled.

**Return value**

**0**

One pending thread is signaled.

**EINVAL**

The trusted condition variable is invalid.

**Description**

To signal a condition variable, a thread starts acquiring the condition variable spin-lock. Then it inspects the status of the condition variable queue. If the queue is empty it means that there are not any threads waiting on the condition variable. When that happens, the thread releases the condition variable and returns. However, if the queue is not empty, the thread removes the first thread waiting in the queue. The thread then makes an OCALL to wake up the

thread that is suspended outside the enclave, but first the thread releases the condition variable spin-lock. Upon returning from the OCALL, the thread continues normal execution.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

## `sgx_thread_cond_broadcast`

The `sgx_thread_cond_broadcast` function wakes all pending threads waiting on the condition variable.

## Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_broadcast(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

## Parameters

### **cond [in]**

The trusted condition variable to be broadcasted.

## Return value

**0**

All pending threads have been broadcasted.

### **EINVAL**

The trusted condition variable is invalid.

### **ENOMEM**

Internal memory allocation failed.

## Description

Broadcast and signal operations on a condition variable are analogous. The only difference is that during a broadcast operation, the thread removes all the threads waiting on the condition variable queue and wakes up all the threads suspended outside the enclave in a single OCALL.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### sgx\_thread\_self

The `sgx_thread_self` function returns the unique thread identification.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_thread_t sgx_thread_self(
    void
);
```

#### Return value

The return value cannot be NULL and is always valid as long as it is invoked by a thread inside the enclave.

#### Description

The function is a simple wrap of `get_thread_data()` provided in the tRTS, which provides a trusted thread unique identifier.

---

**NOTE:**

This identifier does not change throughout the life of an enclave.

---

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

### sgx\_thread\_equal

The `sgx_thread_equal` function compares two thread identifiers.

#### Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_equal(sgx_thread_t
    sgx_thread_t t1,
    sgx_thread_t t2
);
```

#### Return value

A nonzero value if the two thread IDs are equal, 0 otherwise.

#### Description

The function compares two thread identifiers provided by `sgx_thread_self` to determine if the IDs refer to the same trusted thread.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_cpuid`

The `sgx_cpuid` function performs the equivalent of a `cpuid()` function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

---

#### **NOTE:**

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

---

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuid(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf
);
```

### Parameters

#### **cpuinfo [in, out]**

The information returned in an array of four integers. This array must be located within the enclave.

#### **leaf [in]**

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates the parameter `cpuinfo` is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

### Description

This function provides the equivalent of the `cpuid()` function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information that is returned in `cpuinfo`, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking `oc_cpuidex` to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see [Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual](#) for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leaves. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

---

### **NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
  2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.
- 

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_cpuid.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_cpuidex`

The `sgx_cpuidex` function performs the equivalent of a `cpuid_ex()` function call or intrinsic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

---

### **NOTE:**

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

---

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuidex(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf,
    int subleaf
);
```

## Parameters

### **cpuinfo [in, out]**

The information returned in an array of four integers. The array must be located within the enclave.

### **leaf[in]**

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

### **subleaf[in]**

The sub-leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates the parameter `cpuinfo` is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

## Description

This function provides the equivalent of the `cpuid()` function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information returned in `cpuinfo`, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. `sgx_cpuid` performs an OCALL by invoking `oc_cpuidex` to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see [Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual](#) for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leaves. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

---

### **NOTE**

1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
-



- 
- The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.
- 

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_cpuid.h</code> <code>sgx_tstdc.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

## `sgx_get_key`

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key using the input information. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EGETKEY instruction.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_key(
    const sgx_key_request_t *key_request,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

## Parameters

### **key\_request [in]**

A pointer to a `sgx_key_request_t` object used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within the enclave. See details on the `sgx_key_request_t` to understand initializing this structure before calling this function.

### **key [out]**

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic key output. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within enclave memory.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

`key_request` buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.

key buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.

`key_request` and `key_request->key_policy` should not have any reserved bits set.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Indicates an error that the enclave is out of memory.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ATTRIBUTE**

Indicates the `key_request` requests a key for a `KEYNAME` which the enclave is not authorized.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_CPUSVN**

Indicates `key_request->cpu_svn` is beyond platform CPUSVN value

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ISVSVN**

Indicates `key_request->isv_svn` is greater than the enclave's ISVSVN

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_KEYNAME**

Indicates `key_request->key_name` is an unsupported value

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the key generation process.

## Description

The `sgx_get_key` function generates a 128-bit secret key from the processor specific key hierarchy with the `key_request` information. If the function fails with an error code, the key buffer will be filled with random numbers. The `key_request` structure needs to be initialized properly to obtain the requested key type. See [sgx\\_key\\_request\\_t](#) for structure details.

---

### **NOTE:**

It is not recommended to use this API to obtain the sealing key. Use the `sgx_seal_data`, `sgx_seal_data_ex`, and `sgx_unseal_data` API instead. The sealing key can change after the platform firmware is updated. The sealing data API generates a data blob (`sgx_sealed_data_t`), which contains all the necessary information to unseal the blob even after updating the platform firmware. Without this information, unsealing may fail.

---

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_utils.h</code>
--------	--------------------------

Library	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)
---------	---

### **sgx\_create\_report**

Tries to use the information of the target enclave and other information to create a cryptographic report of the enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) `EREPORT` instruction.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_report(
    const sgx_target_info_t *target_info,
    const sgx_report_data_t *report_data,
    sgx_report_t *report
);
```

### Parameters

#### **target\_info [in]**

Pointer to the [sgx\\_target\\_info\\_t](#) object that contains the information of the target enclave, which will cryptographically verify the report by calling `sgx_verify_report`.

- If the pointer value is `NULL`, `sgx_create_report` retrieves information about the calling enclave, but the generated report cannot be verified by any enclave.
- If the pointer value is *not* `NULL`, the `target_info` buffer must be within the enclave.

See [sgx\\_target\\_info\\_t](#) for structure details.

#### **report\_data [in]**

Pointer to the [sgx\\_report\\_data\\_t](#) object that contains a set of data used for communication between the enclaves. This pointer is allowed to be `NULL`. If it is not `NULL`, the `report_data` buffer must be within the enclave. See [sgx\\_report\\_data\\_t](#) for structure details.

#### **report [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic report of the enclave. The pointer cannot be `NULL` and the report buffer must be within the enclave. See [sgx\\_report\\_t](#) for structure details.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

An error is reported if any of the parameters are non-NULL but the memory is not within the enclave or the reserved fields of the data structure are not set to zero.

## Description

Use the function `sgx_create_report` to create a cryptographic report that describes the contents of the calling enclave. The report can be used by other enclaves to verify that the enclave is running on the same platform. When an enclave calls `sgx_verify_report` to verify a report, it succeeds only if the report has been generated using the `target_info` for said enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel® SGX `EREPORT` instruction.

Before the source enclave calls `sgx_create_report` to generate a report, it needs to populate `target_info` with information about the target enclave that will verify the report. The target enclave may obtain this information by calling `sgx_create_report` with a `NULL` pointer or directly calling `sgx_self_target` for `target_info` and pass it to the source enclave at the beginning of the inter-enclave attestation process.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_utils.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_verify\_report**

The `sgx_verify_report` function provides software verification for the report which is expected to be generated by the `sgx_create_report` function.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_verify_report(
    const sgx_report_t * report
);
```

## Parameters

**report[in]**

A pointer to an `sgx_report_t` object that contains the cryptographic report to be verified. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

Verification success: The input report was generated using a `target_info` that matches the one for the enclave making this call.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The report object is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

Indicates report verification error.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the report verification process.

**Description**

The `sgx_verify_report` performs a cryptographic CMAC function of the input `sgx_report_data_t` object in the report using the report key. Then the function compares the input report MAC value with the calculated MAC value to determine whether the report is valid or not.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_utils.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

**sgx\_self\_report**

Generates a self cryptographic report of an enclave.

**Syntax**

```
const sgx_report_t *sgx_self_report(void);
```

**Return value**

The function returns a constant pointer to the generated self cryptographic report of an enclave. See [sgx\\_report\\_t](#) for structure details.

### Description

This function returns a self cryptographic report of an enclave. On the first call, the function calls `sgx_create_report` with a `NULL` pointer for `target_info` to generate a self cryptographic report of the enclave and saves it. For the subsequent calls, the function directly returns the generated report pointer.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_utils.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### [sgx\\_self\\_target](#)

Generates self target info from the self cryptographic report of an enclave.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_self_target(
    sgx_target_info_t *target_info
);
```

### Parameters

#### **target\_info [OUT]**

Pointer to the [sgx\\_target\\_info\\_t](#) object that receives the generated self target info from the self report of an enclave. The `target_info` must be a non-NULL pointer, and the buffer must be located within the enclave.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Invalid input parameters detected.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

## Description

The function `sgx_self_target` generates self target info with the self cryptographic report of the enclave. You can use it to get target info in the inter-enclave attestation process.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_utils.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

## `sgx_get_aligned_ptr`

The `sgx_get_aligned_ptr` function returns the address within the provided buffer. The returned address will be used as the starting address of the structure to be aligned.

## Syntax

```
void *sgx_get_aligned_ptr (
    void *raw,
    size_t raw_size,
    size_t allocate_size,
    size_t alignment,
    align_req_t *data,
    size_t count
);
```

## Parameters

### **raw [in]**

Pointer to the buffer allocated by the caller.

### **raw\_size [in]**

Size of the raw buffer.

### **allocate\_size [in]**

Size of the structure to be aligned.

### **alignment [in]**

Desired, traditional alignment of the structure. Must be power of 2.

### **data [in]**

(offset, length) pairs to define the fields in the structure that needs confidentiality protection. If data is NULL and count is 0, the whole structure is treated as needing confidentiality protection.

### count [in]

Number of `align_req_t` structures in the data.

### Return value

Address within the provided buffer where structure to be aligned must start or NULL, including the case when the structure cannot be aligned.

### Description

The `sgx_get_aligned_ptr` function facilitates alignment of the structure that contains secrets. The function returns the address within the provided raw buffer to be used as the start address of the structure on a specific boundary. If the structure cannot be aligned, the function returns NULL.

If the whole structure cannot be aligned, you can use `align_req_t` structure to define part of the secrets in the structure to be protected.

The raw buffer is defined/allocated by the caller. In general, its size (specified by the `raw_size` parameter) must be bigger than the structure being aligned. The delta between the raw buffer size and the structure size depends on value of the desired, traditional alignment.  $\text{Raw\_size} \geq \text{sizeof}(\text{structure}) + 64 + A$ , where  $A = \max((\text{desired, traditional alignment}), 8)$

.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_secure_align_api.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_aligned_malloc`

The `sgx_aligned_malloc` function allocates memory for a structure on a specified alignment boundary and returns the address where structure must start in order to be aligned.

### Syntax

```
void *sgx_aligned_malloc (
    size_t size,
```



```

    size_t alignment,
    align_req_t *data,
    size_t count
);

```

## Parameters

### size [in]

Size of the structure to be aligned.

### alignment [in]

Desired, traditional alignment of the structure. Must be power of 2.

### data [in]

(offset, length) pairs to define the fields in the structure that needs confidentiality protection. If the data is NULL and count is 0, the whole structure is treated as needing confidentiality protection.

### count [in]

Number of [align\\_req\\_t](#) structures in the data.

## Return value

Pointer to the memory block that is allocated or NULL if the operation failed, including the case when the structure cannot be aligned.

## Description

The `sgx_aligned_malloc` function allocates memory for the structure that contains secrets on a specified alignment boundary. If the structure cannot be aligned, the function returns NULL.

If the whole structure cannot be aligned, you can use the [align\\_req\\_t](#) structure to define part of the secrets in the structure to be protected.

The pointer allocated by `sgx_aligned_malloc` must be released by `sgx_aligned_free`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_secure_align_api.h</code>
--------	-------------------------------------

Library	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)
---------	---

### sgx\_aligned\_free

The `sgx_aligned_free` function frees a block of memory allocated by `sgx_aligned_malloc`.

### Syntax

```
void *sgx_aligned_free (
    void *size,
    size_t alignment,
    align_req_t *data,
    size_t count
);
```

### Parameters

#### **ptr [in]**

Pointer to the memory block that has been returned to `sgx_aligned_malloc`.

### Description

The `sgx_aligned_free` function frees the memory allocated by `sgx_aligned_malloc`. It does not check the input parameter. If the input pointer has not been previously allocated by `sgx_aligned_malloc`, the result is unpredictable.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_secure_align_api.h
Library	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)

### [sgx\\_calc\\_sealed\\_data\\_size](#)

The `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure.

### Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(
    const uint32_t add_mac_txt_size,
    const uint32_t txt_encrypt_size
);
```

### Parameters

#### **add\_mac\_txt\_size [in]**

Length of the optional additional data stream in bytes. The additional data will not be encrypted, but will be part of the MAC calculation.

#### **txt\_encrypt\_size [in]**

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. This data will also be part of the MAC calculation.

### Return value

If the function succeeds, the return value is the minimum number of bytes that need to be allocated for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. If the function fails, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

### Description

The function calculates the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The calculation includes the fixed portions of the structure as well as the two input data streams: encrypted text and optional additional MAC text.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### [sgx\\_get\\_add\\_mac\\_txt\\_len](#)

The `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the `additional_MAC_text` buffer output from the [sgx\\_unseal\\_data](#) function.

#### Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **p\_sealed\_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the `sgx_seal_data` function.

#### Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the optional additional MAC data buffer is returned. If this function fails, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

#### Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the output MAC data buffer returned by the [sgx\\_unseal\\_data](#) function.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### [sgx\\_get\\_encrypt\\_txt\\_len](#)

The `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the [sgx\\_unseal\\_data](#) function.

#### Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len(
```

```

    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);

```

## Parameters

### **p\_sealed\_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated during by the [sgx\\_seal\\_data](#) function.

### Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the encrypted data buffer is returned. Otherwise, the return value is `0xFFFFFFFF`. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

## Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the [sgx\\_unseal\\_data](#) function.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_seal\_data**

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted.

## Syntax

```

sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);

```

## Parameters

**additional\_MACtext\_length [in]**

Length of the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

**p\_additional\_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but `additional_MACtext_length` must be zero in this case).

---

**NOTE:**

This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

---

**text2encrypt\_length [in]**

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

**p\_text2encrypt [in]**

Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

**sealed\_data\_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p\_sealed\_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed data.

---

**NOTE:**

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

---

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

#### Description

The `sgx_seal_data` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to encrypt the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to preserve secret data after the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data blob can be unsealed on future instantiations of the enclave.

The additional data buffer will not be encrypted but will be part of the MAC calculation that covers the encrypted data as well. This data may include information about the application, version, data, etc which can be utilized to identify the sealed data blob since it will remain plain text

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer and `text2encrypt` buffers must be allocated within the enclave.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### [sgx\\_seal\\_data\\_ex](#)

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted. This is the expert mode version of function `sgx_seal_data`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

### Parameters

#### **key\_policy [in]**

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

Key policy name Value Description is detailed in [sgx\\_key\\_request\\_t](#).

#### **attribute\_mask [in]**

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of [sgx\\_attributes\\_t](#) to determine which attributes will be checked. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses `flags=0xFF0000000000000B`, `xfrm=0`.

#### **misc\_mask [in]**

Identifies the mask bits for the Misc feature to enforce. Function `sgx_seal_data` uses `0xF0000000`. The misc mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

#### **additional\_MACtext\_length [in]**

Length of the additional data to be MAC'ed in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.



**p\_additional\_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the additional data to be MAC'ed of variable length. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but `additional_MACtext_length` must be zero in this case).

---

**NOTE:**

This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

---

**text2encrypt\_length [in]**

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

**p\_text2encrypt [in]**

Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted of variable length. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

**sealed\_data\_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p\_sealed\_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

---

**NOTE:**

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

---

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_MACtext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_MACtext` cannot be NULL.

- `p_additional_MACtext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_text2encrypt` must be non-zero.
- `p_text2encrypt` buffer must be within the enclave.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

## SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

## SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

### Description

The `sgx_seal_data_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_seal_data`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and `attributes_mask`). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_seal_data` and the default values provided for `key_policy` (`MR_SIGNER`) and an attribute mask which includes the `RESERVED`, `INITED` and `DEBUG` bits. Users of this function should have a clear understanding of the impact on using a policy and/or `attribute_mask` that is different from that in `sgx_seal_data`.

### Requirement

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_unseal_data`

This function is used to AES-GCM decrypt the input sealed data structure. Two output data sets result: one is the decrypted data; the second is the optional additional data that was part of the GCM MAC calculation but was not encrypted. This function provides the converse of `sgx_seal_data` and `sgx_seal_data_ex`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_unseal_data(
```

```

    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
    uint8_t * p_decrypted_text,
    uint32_t * p_decrypted_text_length
);

```

## Parameters

### **p\_sealed\_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data buffer to be AES-GCM decrypted. Must be within the enclave.

### **p\_additional\_MACtext [out]**

Pointer to the additional data part of the MAC calculation. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the required buffer size to allocate. (NULL pointer can be passed, if `additional_MACtext_length` is zero).

### **p\_additional\_MACtext\_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the additional MAC data buffer in bytes. The calling code should call helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the minimum required buffer size. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream.

### **p\_decrypted\_text [out]**

Pointer to the decrypted data buffer which needs to be allocated by the calling code. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

### **p\_decrypted\_text\_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the decrypted data buffer in byte. The buffer length of `p_decrypted_text` must be specified in `p_decrypted_text_length` as input. The `sgx_unseal_data` function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream. Use `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `p_decrypted_text` buffer. Must be within the enclave.

## Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If `additional_mactext_length` is non-zero, `p_additional_mactext` cannot be NULL.
- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_decrypted_text` and `p_decrypted_text_length` must be within the enclave.
- `p_decrypted_text` and `p_additional_MACtext` buffer must be big enough to receive the decrypted data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the sealed data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the sealed data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

The tag verification failed during unsealing. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or sealed data blob corruption. This error is also reported if other corruption of the sealed data structure is detected.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

#### **Description**

The `sgx_unseal_data` function AES-GCM decrypts the sealed data so that the enclave data can be restored. This function can be utilized to restore

secret data that was preserved after an earlier instantiation of this enclave saved this data.

The calling code needs to allocate the additional data buffer and the decrypted data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for these buffers, helper functions `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` and `sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len` are provided. The decrypted text buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_mac_aadata`

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata (
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

### Parameters

#### **additional\_MACtext\_length [in]**

Length of the plain text to provide authentication for in bytes.

#### **p\_addtional\_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the plain text to provide authentication for.

---

#### **NOTE:**

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

---

#### **sealed\_data\_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for the `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

### **p\_sealed\_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer to store the `sealed_data_t` structure.

---

#### **NOTE:**

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

---

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a crypto library failure, or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

#### Description

The `sgx_mac_aadata` function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to generate the authentication tag based on the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The data origin authentication can be demonstrated on future instantiations of the enclave using the MAC stored into the data blob.

Use `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the `sgx_sealed_data_t` structure. The input sealed data buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

## `sgx_mac_aadata_ex`

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC. This is the expert mode version of the function `sgx_mac_aadata`.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

## Parameters

### **key\_policy [in]**

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Key policy name Value Description is detailed in `sgx_key_request_t`. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses the MRSIGNER policy.

### **attribute\_mask [in]**

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of `sgx_attributes_t` to determine which attributes will be checked. Function `sgx_mac_aadata` uses `flags=0xffffffffffff3`, `xfrm=0`.

### **misc\_mask [in]**

The `MISC_SELECT` mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

### **additional\_MACtext\_length [in]**

Length of the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed in bytes.

**p\_additional\_MACtext [in]**

Pointer to the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed of variable length.

---

**NOTE:**

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

---

**sealed\_data\_size [in]**

Number of bytes allocated for the `sealed_data_t` structure. The calling code should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` to determine the required buffer size.

**p\_sealed\_data [out]**

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

---

**NOTE:**

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size` with 0 as the `txt_encrypt_size` to determine the required buffer size. The `sealed_data_t` structure must be within the enclave.

---

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_mactext` buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `sealed_data_size` must be equal to the required buffer size, which is calculated by the function `sgx_calc_sealed_data_size`.
- `p_sealed_data` buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.



## SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

### Description

The `sgx_mac_aadata_ex` is an extended version of `sgx_mac_aadata`. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and `attributes_mask`). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use `sgx_mac_aadata` and the default values provided for `key_policy` (`MR_SIGNER`) and an attribute mask which includes the `RESERVED`, `INITED` and `DEBUG` bits. Before you use this function, you should have a clear understanding of the impact of using a policy and/or `attribute_mask` that is different from that in `sgx_mac_aadata`.

### Requirement

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### `sgx_unmac_aadata`

This function is used to verify the authenticity of the input sealed data structure using AES-GMAC. This function verifies the MAC generated with `sgx_mac_aadata` or `sgx_mac_aadata_ex`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_unmac_aadata(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_sealed\_data [in]**

Pointer to the sealed data structure to be authenticated with AES-GMAC. Must be within the enclave.

#### **p\_addtional\_MACtext [out]**

Pointer to the plain text data stream that was AES-GMAC protected. You should call the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len` to determine the required buffer size to allocate.

### **p\_additional\_MACtext\_length [in, out]**

Pointer to the length of the plain text data stream in bytes. Upon successful tag matching, `sgx_unmac_datasets` this parameter with the actual length of the plaintext stored in `p_additional_MACtext`.

### **Return value**

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The authentication tag in the `sealed_data_t` structure matches the expected value.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

This parameter indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- `p_additional_MACtext` buffers must be big enough to receive the plain text data.
- `p_sealed_data` buffers must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_CPUSVN**

The CPUSVN in the data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_ISVSVN**

The ISVSVN in the data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

The tag verification fails. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or corruption of the `sealed_data_t` structure.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

## Description

The `sgx_unmac_aadata` function verifies the tag with AES-GMAC. Use this function to demonstrate the authenticity of data that was preserved by an earlier instantiation of this enclave.

You need to allocate additional data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for additional data buffers, use the helper function `sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tseal.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

## `sgx_sha256_msg`

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

### **p\_hash [out]**

A pointer to the output 256bit hash resulting from the SHA256 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 hash function is performed successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Input pointers are invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA256 hash calculation failed.

### Description

The `sgx_sha256_msg` function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a SHA256 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **`sgx_sha256_init`**

`sgx_sha256_init` returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is `sgx_sha256_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_init(  
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle  
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_sha\_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 state is allocated and initialized properly.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The pointer `p_sha_handle` is invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA256 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

## Description

Calling `sgx_sha256_init` is the first step in performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA256 state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, `sgx_sha256_close` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_sha256\_update

sgx\_sha256\_update performs a SHA256 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the sha\_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_update (
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### p\_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

#### src\_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

#### sha\_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

### Return value

#### SGX\_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER

The input parameter(s) are NULL.

#### SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA256 hash calculation.

## Description

This function should be used as part of a SHA256 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA256 hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_sha256_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_sha256_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA256 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_sha256_get_hash` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_sha256_get_hash`

`sgx_sha256_get_hash` obtains the SHA256 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_sha256_update`).

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_get_hash(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t* p_hash
);
```

## Parameters

### **sha\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

### **p\_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 256-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

## Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The pointers are NULL.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA256 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function returns the hash after performing the SHA256 calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_sha256_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA256 state used in the `sgx_sha256_update` calls must be passed in as input.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

**sgx\_sha256\_close**

`sgx_sha256_close` cleans up and deallocates the SHA256 state that was allocated in function `sgx_sha256_init`.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

**Parameters****sha\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.



### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA256 state was deallocated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

### Description

Calling `sgx_sha256_close` is the last step after performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA256 calculation state.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **sgx\_sha384\_msg**

The `sgx_sha384_msg` function performs a standard SHA384 hash over the input data buffer.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha384_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha384_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

**p\_hash [out]**

A pointer to the output 384bit hash resulting from the SHA384 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA384 hash function is performed successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Input pointers are invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA384 hash calculation failed.

**Description**

The `sgx_sha384_msg` function performs a standard SHA384 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 384-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a SHA384 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### **sgx\_sha384\_init**

`sgx_sha384_init` returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is `sgx_sha384_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha384_init(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_sha\_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA384 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA384 state is allocated and initialized properly.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The pointer `p_sha_handle` is invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA384 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

### Description

Calling `sgx_sha384_init` is the first set in performing a SHA384 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA384 state

that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, `sgx_sha384_close` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_sha384_update`

`sgx_sha384_update` performs a SHA384 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the `sha_handle` contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha384_update (
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

#### **sha\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA384 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The input parameter(s) are NULL.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA384 hash calculation.

### Description

This function should be used as part of a SHA384 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA384 hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_sha384_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_sha384_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA384 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_sha384_get_hash` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **`sgx_sha384_get_hash`**

`sgx_sha384_get_hash` obtains the SHA384 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_sha384_update`).

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha384_get_hash(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle,
    sgx_sha384_hash_t* p_hash
);
```

#### Parameters

**sha\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA384 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

### **p\_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 384-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The pointers are NULL.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The SHA384 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

### Description

This function returns the hash after performing the SHA384 calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_sha384_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA384 state used in the `sgx_sha384_update` calls must be passed in as input.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **sgx\_sha384\_close**

`sgx_sha384_close` cleans up and deallocates the SHA384 state that was allocated in function `sgx_sha384_init`.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha384_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
```

```
) ;
```

## Parameters

### **sha\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA384 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The SHA384 state was deallocated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

## Description

Calling `sgx_sha384_close` is the last step after performing a SHA384 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA384 calculation state.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### **sgx\_rijndael128GCM\_encrypt**

`sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-GCM encryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel® SGX SDK cryptography library.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt (
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
```

```

    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
);

```

## Parameters

### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but `p_src` and `p_dst` should be NULL and `aad_len` must be greater than zero.

### **p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

### **p\_iv [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

### **iv\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

### **p\_aad [in]**

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

### **aad\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

### **p\_out\_mac [out]**



This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

### Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_rijndael128GCM\_decrypt

sgx\_rijndael128GCM\_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM decryption operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel® SGX SDK cryptography library.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but `p_src` and `p_dst` should be NULL and `aad_len` must be greater than zero.

#### **p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

#### **p\_iv [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

**iv\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

**p\_aad [in]**

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

**aad\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

**p\_in\_mac [in]**

This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to `sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt`).

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

**SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**

The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

## SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

### Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_aes\_gcm\_encrypt

`sgx_aes_gcm_encrypt` performs an AES-GCM encryption operation. It is a FIPS compatible version AES-GCM encryption function and creates a random initialization vector instead of requiring an input. This function supports both 128-bits key size and 256-bit key size.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm_encrypt(
    const uint8_t *p_key,
    uint32_t key_len,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
```

```

    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
);

```

## Parameters

### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits (16 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).

### **key\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the key. Must be 16 (bytes) or 32 (bytes)

### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but `p_src` and `p_dst` should be NULL and `aad_len` must be greater than zero.

### **p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

### **p\_iv [out]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

### **iv\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

### **p\_aad [in]**

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

### **aad\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

### **p\_out\_mac [out]**

This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

### Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_aes\_gcm\_decrypt

`sgx_aes_gcm_decrypt` performs an AES-GCM decryption operation. This function supports both 128-bits key size and 256-bit key size.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm_decrypt(
    const uint8_t *p_key,
    uint32_t key_len,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits (16 bytes) or 256 bits (32 bytes).

#### **key\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the key. Must be 16 (bytes) or 32 (bytes)

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but `p_src` and `p_dst` should be NULL and `aad_len` must be greater than zero.

#### **p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**p\_iv [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

**iv\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

**p\_aad [in]**

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

**aad\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

**p\_in\_mac [in]**

This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to `sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt`).

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

**SGX\_ERROR\_MAC\_MISMATCH**



The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

## Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### **sgx\_rijndael128\_cmac\_msg**

The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard 128bit CMAC hash over the input data buffer.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t *p_mac
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

### **p\_mac [out]**

A pointer to the output 128-bit hash resulting from the CMAC calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The CMAC hash function is performed successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The key, source or MAC pointer is NULL.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected internal cryptography library.

## Description

The `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` function performs a standard CMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 128-bit version of the CMAC hash is supported.

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a CMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_cmac128\_init

`sgx_cmac128_init` returns an allocated and initialized CMAC algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the CMAC hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommended call is `sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg` to perform the hash in a single call.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_init(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t* p_cmac_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

#### **p\_cmac\_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC 128-bit hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

### Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The CMAC hash state is successfully allocated and initialized.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The key or handle pointer is NULL.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

### Description

Calling `sgx_cmac128_init` is the first step in performing a CMAC 128-bit hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the CMAC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, `sgx_cmac128_close` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **`sgx_cmac128_update`**

`sgx_cmac128_update` performs a CMAC 128-bit hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the `cmac_handle` contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_update (
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

### **cmac\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The source pointer or cmac handle is NULL.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the CMAC hash calculation.

---

### **NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is *not* freed (CMAC handle). In this case, call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

---

## Description

This function should be used as part of a CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over multiple datasets. If a CMAC hash is needed over a single data set, function `sgx_rijndael128_cmac128_msg` should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the `sgx_cmac128_init` function must be called first to allocate and initialize the CMAC state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function `sgx_cmac128_`

`final` should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_cmac128_final`

`sgx_cmac128_final` obtains the CMAC 128-bit hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to `sgx_cmac128_update`).

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_final(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t* p_hash
);
```

### Parameters

#### **cmac\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

#### **p\_hash [out]**

This is a pointer to the 128-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The hash is obtained successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The hash pointer or CMAC handle is NULL.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The CMAC state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

---

**NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is freed (CMAC handle). In this case, please call `sgx_cmac128_close` to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

---

### Description

This function returns the hash after performing the CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over one or more datasets using the `sgx_cmac128_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to CMAC state used in the `sgx_cmac128_update` calls must be passed in as input.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_cmac128_close`

`sgx_cmac128_close` cleans up and deallocates the CMAC algorithm context state that was allocated in function `sgx_cmac128_init`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_close(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **cmac\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The CMAC state was deallocated successfully.

## SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER

The CMAC handle is NULL.

### Description

Calling `sgx_cmac128_close` is the last step after performing a CMAC hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used for storing the CMAC algorithm context state.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt`

`sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-CTR encryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel® SGX SDK cryptography library.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt (
    const sgx_aes_ctr_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

#### **p\_ctr [in]**



A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

**ctr\_inc\_bits [in]**

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

**p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

**Description**

This function encrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the encryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_aes\_ctr\_decrypt

`sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt` performs a Rijndael AES-CTR decryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel® SGX SDK cryptography library.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt (
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR decryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

#### **p\_src [in]**

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the input data stream to be decrypted.

#### **p\_ctr [in]**

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

#### **ctr\_inc\_bits [in]**

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

#### **p\_dst [out]**

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

## Description

This function decrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the decryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### **sgx\_ecc256\_open\_context**

`sgx_ecc256_open_context` returns an allocated and initialized context for the elliptic curve cryptosystem over a prime finite field, GF(p). This context must be created prior to calling `sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair` or `sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey`. When the calling code has completed its set of ECC operations, `sgx_ecc256_close_context` should be called to cleanup and deallocate the ECC context.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

---

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_open_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t *p_ecc_handle
```

```
) ;
```

## Parameters

### **p\_ecc\_handle [out]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

#### **NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The ECC256 GF(p) state is allocated and initialized properly.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle is NULL.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The ECC context state was not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

## Description

`sgx_ecc256_open_context` is utilized to allocate and initialize a 256-bit GF(p) cryptographic system. The caller does not allocate memory for the ECC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the ECC cryptographic function using this cryptographic system is completed or any error occurs, `sgx_ecc256_close_context` should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Public key cryptography successfully allows to solving problems of information safety by enabling trusted communication over insecure channels. Although elliptic curves are well studied as a branch of mathematics, an interest to the cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves is constantly rising due to the

advantages that the elliptic curve algorithms provide in the wireless communications: shorter processing time and key length.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) implement a different way of creating public keys. As elliptic curve calculation is based on the addition of the rational points in the (x,y) plane and it is difficult to solve a discrete logarithm from these points, a higher level of safety is achieved through the cryptographic schemes that use the elliptic curves. The cryptographic systems that encrypt messages by using the properties of elliptic curves are hard to attack due to the extreme complexity of deciphering the private key.

Using of elliptic curves allows shorter public key length and encourages cryptographers to create cryptosystems with the same or higher encryption strength as the RSA or DSA cryptosystems. Because of the relatively short key length, ECCs do encryption and decryption faster on the hardware that requires less computation processing volumes.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_ecc256_close_context`

`sgx_ecc256_close_context` cleans up and deallocates the ECC 256 GF (p) state that was allocated in function `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

---

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_close_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

## Parameters

### **ecc\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

**NOTE:**


---

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

The ECC 256 GF(p) state was deallocated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The input handle is NULL.

**Description**

`sgx_ecc256_close_context` is used by calling code to deallocate memory used for storing the ECC 256 GF(p) state used in ECC cryptographic calculations.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

**sgx\_ecc256\_create\_key\_pair**

`sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair` generates a private/public key pair on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. The calling code is responsible for allocating memory for the public and private keys. `sgx_ecc256_open_context` must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

**Parameters**

**p\_private [out]**

A pointer to the private key which is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**p\_public [out]**

A pointer to the public key which is an elliptic curve point such that:  
public key = private key \* G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**ecc\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, private key or public key is invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function populates private/public key pair. The calling code allocates memory for the private and public key pointers to be populated. The function generates a private key `p_private` and computes a public key `p_public` of the elliptic cryptosystem over a finite field GF(p).

The private key `p_private` is a number that lies in the range of  $[1, n-1]$  where  $n$  is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

The public key `p_public` is an elliptic curve point such that `p_public = p_private * G`, where  $G$  is the base point of the elliptic curve.

The context of the point `p_public` as an elliptic curve point must be created by using the function `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey`

`sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey` generates a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey(
    const sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_private\_b [in]**

A pointer to the local private key.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

#### **p\_public\_ga [in]**

A pointer to the remote public key.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

#### **p\_shared\_key [out]**



A pointer to the secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**ecc\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function computes the Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number sharedKey, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (sharedKey). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement

scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key `pubKeyA` by using her private key

`privKeyA`:  $\text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} * G$ , where `G` is the base point of the elliptic curve.

2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.

3. Bob calculates his own public key `pubKeyB` by using his private key

`privKeyB`:  $\text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} * G$ , where `G` is a base point of the elliptic curve.

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.

5. Alice gets Bob's public key and calculates the secret point `shareKeyA`. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob's public key and applies the following formula:

$\text{shareKeyA} = \text{privKeyA} * \text{pubKeyB} = \text{privKeyA} * \text{privKeyB} * G$ .

6. Bob gets Alice's public key and calculates the secret point `shareKeyB`. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice's public key and applies the following formula:

$\text{shareKeyB} = \text{privKeyB} * \text{pubKeyA} = \text{privKeyB} * \text{privKeyA} * G$ .

As the following equation is true  $\text{privKeyA} * \text{privKeyB} * G = \text{privKeyB} * \text{privKeyA} * G$ , the result of both calculations is the same, that is, the equation  $\text{shareKeyA} = \text{shareKeyB}$  is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

Shared secret `shareKey` is an x-coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### sgx\_ecc256\_check\_point

`sgx_ecc256_check_point` checks whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. `sgx_ecc256_open_context` must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_check_point(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_point,
    const sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle,
    int *p_valid
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **p\_point [in]**

A pointer to the point to perform validity check on.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

##### **ecc\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

##### **p\_valid [out]**

A pointer to the validation result.

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The validation process is performed successfully. Check `p_valid` to get the validation result.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If the input ecc handle, `p_point` or `p_valid` is NULL.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

#### Description

`sgx_ecc256_check_point` validates whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system.

The typical validation result is one of the two values:

- 1 - The input point is valid
- 0 - The input point is not valid

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **sgx\_ecdsa\_sign**

`sgx_ecdsa_sign` computes a digital signature with a given private key over an input dataset.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **p\_data [in]**

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

##### **data\_size [in]**

The size of the data to be signed.

##### **p\_private [in]**

A pointer to the private key.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**p\_signature [out]**

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**ecc\_handle [in]**

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

[Description](#)

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the input private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which the given function computes.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The keys can be generated and set up by the function: `sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair`.

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_ecdsa_verify`

`sgx_ecdsa_verify` verifies the input digital signature with a given public key over an input dataset.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    const sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_data [in]**

Pointer to the signed dataset to verify.

#### **data\_size [in]**

Size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

#### **p\_public [in]**

Pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**p\_signature [in]**

Pointer to the signature to be verified.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**p\_result [out]**

Pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

**ecc\_handle [in]**

Handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p\_result to get the verification result.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL, or the data size is 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

[Description](#)

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which could be created by function: `sgx_ecdsa_sign`. The scheme

used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

`SGX_EC_VALID` - Digital signature is valid

`SGX_EC_INVALID_SIGNATURE` - Digital signature is not valid

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: `sgx_ecc256_open_context`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_rsa3072_sign`

`sgx_rsa3072_sign` computes a digital signature for a given dataset based on RSA 3072 private key.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa3072_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_data [in]**

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

#### **data\_size [in]**

The size of the data to be signed.

#### **p\_key [in]**

A pointer to the RSA key.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---



**p\_signature [out]**

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

The digital signature is successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

**Description**

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the RSA 3072 key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 scheme.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

**sgx\_rsa3072\_sign\_ex**

`sgx_rsa3072_sign_ex` computes a digital signature for a given dataset based on the RSA 3072 private key and the optional corresponding RSA 3072 public key.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa3072_sign_ex(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_key_t *p_key,
    const sgx_rsa3072_public_key_t *p_public,
    sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
);
```

**Parameters****p\_data [in]**

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

**data\_size [in]**

The size of the data to be signed.

**p\_key [in]**

A pointer to the RSA private key.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p\_public [in]**

A pointer to the RSA public key. Can be NULL.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**p\_signature [out]**

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

The digital signature is successfully generated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0. Or the RSA private key and the public key do not match.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

#### Description

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the RSA 3072 private key and verifies the signature using the corresponding RSA 3072 public key if provided.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 scheme.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### **sgx\_rsa3072\_verify**

`sgx_rsa3072_verify` verifies the input digital signature for the given dataset based on the RSA 3072 public key.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa3072_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_public_key_t *p_public,
```

```
    const sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature,  
          sgx_rsa_result_t *p_result  
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_data [in]**

A pointer to the signed dataset to be verified.

### **data\_size [in]**

The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

### **p\_public [in]**

A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

### **p\_signature [in]**

A pointer to the signature to be verified.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

### **p\_result [out]**

A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p\_result to get the verification result.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

## Description

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input RSA 3072 public key.

A digital signature over a message is a buffer of 384-bytes, which could be created by function: `sgx_rsa3072_sign`. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

`SGX_RSA_VALID` - Digital signature is valid

`SGX_RSA_INVALID_SIGNATURE` - Digital signature is not valid

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_create_rsa_key_pair`

`sgx_create_rsa_key_pair` generates public and private key pairs for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with input key size and extracts each part of the key pair to the prepared buffers.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_rsa_key_pair(
    int n_byte_size,
    int e_byte_size,
    unsigned char *p_n,
    unsigned char *p_d,
    unsigned char *p_e,
    unsigned char *p_p,
    unsigned char *p_q,
    unsigned char *p_dmp1,
    unsigned char *p_dmq1,
    unsigned char *p_iqmp);
```

## Parameters

### **n\_byte\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA key modulus.

### **e\_byte\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA public exponent.

### **p\_n [out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA modulus.

**p\_d [out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA private exponent.

**p\_e [in, out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA private exponent.

**p\_p [out]**

Pointer to the RSA key factor  $p$ .

**p\_q [out]**

Pointer to the RSA key factor  $q$ .

**p\_dmp1 [out]**

Pointer to the RSA key factor  $dmp1$ .

**p\_dmqr1 [out]**

Pointer to the RSA key factor  $dmqr1$ .

**p\_iqmp [out]**

Pointer to the RSA key factor  $iqmp$ .

**Return value**

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

RSA key pair is successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input size is less than 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the RSA key pair generation.

**Description**

This function generates public and private key pairs for the RSA cryptographic algorithm and extracts each part of the key pair to the prepared buffers. If the RSA public exponent is specified, this function utilizes the specified RSA public exponent to the generated RSA key pair.

Before calling the function, you need to allocate memory for all the RSA key components (n, d, e, p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp).

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### sgx\_create\_rsa\_priv1\_key

`sgx_create_rsa_priv1_key` generates a private key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components (n, e, d).

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_rsa_priv1_key(
    int n_byte_size,
    int e_byte_size,
    int d_byte_size,
    const unsigned char *le_n,
    const unsigned char *le_e,
    const unsigned char *le_d,
    void **new_pri_key1
);
```

### Parameters

#### **n\_byte\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA key modulus.

#### **e\_byte\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA public exponent.

#### **d\_byte\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA private exponent.

#### **le\_n [in]**

Pointer to the RSA key modulus buffer.

#### **le\_e [in]**

Pointer to the RSA public exponent buffer. e.

#### **le\_d [in]**

Pointer to the RSA private exponent buffer d.

**new\_pri\_key1 [out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA private key.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

RSA private key is successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input size is less than 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the RSA private key generation.

**Description**

This function generates a private key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components (n, e, d).

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

**sgx\_create\_rsa\_priv2\_key**

`sgx_create_rsa_priv2_key` generates a private key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_rsa_priv2_key(
    int mod_size,
    int exp_size,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_e,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_p,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_q,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_dmp1,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_dmq1,
    const unsigned char *p_rsa_key_iqmp,
    void **new_pri_key2
);
```



## Parameters

### **mod\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA key modulus.

### **exp\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA public exponent.

### **p\_rsa\_key\_e [in]**

Pointer to the RSA public exponent buffer.

### **p\_rsa\_key\_p [in]**

Pointer to the prime number  $p$ .

### **p\_rsa\_key\_q [in]**

Pointer to the prime number  $q$ .

### **p\_rsa\_key\_dmp1 [in]**

Pointer to the RSA factor  $dmp1$ .  $dmp1 = q \bmod (p-1)$

### **p\_rsa\_key\_dmqq1 [in]**

Pointer to the RSA factor  $dmqq1$ .  $dmqq1 = p \bmod (q-1)$

### **p\_rsa\_key\_iqmp [in]**

Pointer to the RSA factor  $iqmp$ .  $iqmp = q^{-1} \bmod p$

### **new\_pri\_key2 [out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA private key.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

RSA private key is successfully generated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input size is less than 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the RSA private key generation.

## Description

This function generates a private key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components ( *p*, *q*, *dmp1*, *dmq1*, *iqmp*).

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### **sgx\_create\_rsa\_pub1\_key**

`sgx_create_rsa_pub1_key` generates a public key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_rsa_pub1_key(
    int mod_size,
    int exp_size,
    const unsigned char *le_n,
    const unsigned char *le_e,
    void **new_pub_key1
);
```

## Parameters

### **mod\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA key modulus.

### **exp\_size [in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA public exponent.

### **le\_n [in]**

Pointer to the RSA modulus buffer.

### **le\_e [in]**

Pointer to the RSA public exponent buffer.

### **new\_pub\_key1 [out]**

Pointer to the generated RSA public key.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

RSA public key is successfully generated.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input size is less than 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the RSA public key generation.

## Description

This function generates a public key for the RSA cryptographic algorithm with the input RSA key components (n, e).

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### **sgx\_free\_rsa\_key**

`sgx_free_rsa_key` cleans up and deallocates the input RSA key.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_free_rsa_key(
    void *p_rsa_key,
    sgx_rsa_key_type_t key_type,
    int mod_size,
    int exp_size
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_rsa\_key [in]**

Pointer to the RSA key.

### **key\_type [in]**

RSA key type .

### **mod\_size[in]**

Size in bytes for the RSA key modules.

**exp\_size[in]**

Size in bytes of the RSA public exponent.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

RSA key is successfully cleaned up.

**Description**

This function clears the RSA key generated by one of the following APIs:

[sgx\\_create\\_rsa\\_priv1\\_key](#)

[sgx\\_create\\_rsa\\_priv2\\_key](#)

[sgx\\_create\\_rsa\\_pub1\\_key](#)

You can use this function to deallocate the memory used for storing the RSA key.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

**sgx\_rsa\_pub\_encrypt\_sha256**

`sgx_rsa_pub_encrypt_sha256` performs the RSA-OAEP encryption operation with the SHA-256 algorithm.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa_pub_encrypt_sha256(
    const void* rsa_key,
    unsigned char* pout_data,
    size_t* pout_len,
    const unsigned char* pin_data,
    const size_t pin_len
);
```

**Parameters****rsa\_key [in]**

Pointer to the RSA public key.

**pout\_data [out]**

Pointer to the output cipher text buffer.

**pout\_len [out]**

Length of the output cipher text buffer.

**pin\_data [in]**

Pointer to the input data buffer.

**pin\_len [in]**

Length of the input data buffer.

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input data size is 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the encryption operation.

[Description](#)

This function carries out the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme with the SHA256 algorithm to encrypt the input data stream of a variable length.

You should allocate the source, destination, and counter data buffers within the enclave.

[Requirements](#)

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

[sgx\\_rsa\\_priv\\_decrypt\\_sha256](#)

`sgx_rsa_priv_decrypt_sha256` performs the RSA-OAEP decryption operation with the SHA-256 algorithm.

[Syntax](#)

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa_priv_decrypt_sha256(  
    const void* rsa_key,  
    unsigned char* pout_data,  
    size_t* pout_len,  
    const unsigned char* pin_data,  
    const size_t pin_len  
);
```

## Parameters

### **rsa\_key [in]**

Pointer to the RSA private key.

### **pout\_data [out]**

Pointer to the output decrypted data buffer.

### **pout\_len [out]**

Length of the output decrypted data buffer.

### **pin\_data [in]**

Pointer to the input data buffer to be decrypted.

### **pin\_len [in]**

Length of the input data buffer to be decrypted.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input data size is 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the encryption operation.

## Description

This function carries out the RSA-OAEP decryption scheme with the SHA256 algorithm to decrypt the input data stream of a variable length.

You should allocate the source, destination, and counter data buffers within the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### **sgx\_calculate\_ecdsa\_priv\_key**

`sgx_calculate_ecdsa_priv_key` generates an ECDSA private key based on an input random seed.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_calculate_ecdsa_priv_key(
    const unsigned char* hash_drg,
    int hash_drg_len,
    const unsigned char* sgx_nistp256_r_m1,
    int sgx_nistp256_r_m1_len,
    unsigned char* out_key,
    int out_key_len
);
```

### Parameters

#### **hash\_drg [in]**

Pointer to the input random seed.

#### **hash\_drg\_len [in]**

Length of the input random seed.

#### **sgx\_nistp256\_r\_m1 [in]**

Pointer to the buffer for n-1 where n is order of the ECC group used.

#### **sgx\_nistp256\_r\_m1\_len [in]**

Length for the buffer for nistp256.

#### **out\_key [out]**

Pointer to the generated ECDSA private key.

#### **out\_key\_len [in]**

Length of the prepared buffer for ECDSA private key.

### Return value

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

ECDSA private key is successfully generated.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Some of the pointers are NULL, or the input size is less than 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred during the ECDSA private key generation.

**Description**

This function generates an ECDSA private key based on an input random seed.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

**sgx\_ra\_init**

The `sgx_ra_init` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

**Parameters****p\_pub\_key [in] (Little Endian)**

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

**b\_pse [in]**

Reserved for backward compatibility.



**p\_context [out]**

The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_SESSION\_INVALID**

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

**Description**

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tkey_exchange.h</code> <code>sgx_tkey_exchange.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tkey_exchange.a</code>

**sgx\_ra\_init\_ex**

The `sgx_ra_init_ex` function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process while it allows the use of a custom defined Key Derivation Function (KDF).

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init_ex(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t derive_key_cb,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
```

```
) ;
```

## Parameters

### **p\_pub\_key [in] (Little Endian)**

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

### **b\_pse [in]**

Reserved for backward compatibility.

### **derive\_key\_cb [in]**

This a pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype of `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t`. This function takes the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK).

### **p\_context [out]**

The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in `sgx_ra_get_msg1` and `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_AE\_SESSION\_INVALID**

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

## Description

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_tkey_exchange.h sgx_tkey_exchange.edl
Library	libsgx_tkey_exchange.a

### sgx\_ra\_get\_keys

The `sgx_ra_get_keys` function is used to get the negotiated keys of a remote attestation and key exchange session. This function should only be called after the service provider accepts the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 3 produced by `sgx_ra_proc_msg2`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_keys (
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ra_key_type_t type,
    sgx_ra_key_128_t *p_key
);
```

### Parameters

#### context [in]

Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

#### type [in]

The type of the keys, which can be `SGX_RA_KEY_MK` or `SGX_RA_KEY_SK`.

If the RA context was generated by `sgx_ra_init`, the returned `SGX_RA_KEY_MK` or `SGX_RA_KEY_SK` is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave using the following Key Derivation Function (KDF):

$$KDK = \text{AES-CMAC}(\text{key0}, \text{gab x-coordinate})$$

$$\text{SGX\_RA\_KEY\_MK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01 || 'MK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)$$

$$\text{SGX\_RA\_KEY\_SK} = \text{AES-CMAC}(KDK, 0x01 || 'SK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)$$

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the Key derivation calculation is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format. The plain text used in each key calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of one of the strings 'MK' or 'SK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

If the RA context was generated by the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API, the KDF used to generate `SGX_RA_KEY_MK` and `SGX_RA_KEY_SK` is defined in the implementation of the call back function provided to the `sgx_ra_init_ex` function.

### **p\_key [out]**

The key returned.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

Indicates this API is invoked in incorrect order, it can be called only after a success session has been established. In other words, `sgx_ra_proc_msg2` should have been called and no error returned.

### Description

After a successful key exchange process, this API can be used in the enclave to get specific key associated with this remote attestation and key exchange session.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tkey_exchange.h</code> <code>sgx_tkey_exchange.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tkey_exchange.a</code>

### sgx\_ra\_close

Call the `sgx_ra_close` function to release the remote attestation and key exchange context after the process is done and the context isn't needed anymore.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_close(
    sgx_ra_context_t context
);
```

### Parameters

#### context [in]

Context returned by `sgx_ra_init`.

### Return value

#### SGX\_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

#### SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER

Indicates the context is invalid.

### Description

At the end of a key exchange process, the caller needs to use this API in an enclave to clear and free memory associated with this remote attestation session.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tkey_exchange.h</code> <code>sgx_key_exchange.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tkey_exchange.a</code>

### sgx\_dh\_init\_session

Initialize DH secure session according to the caller's role in the establishment.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_init_session(
    sgx_dh_session_role_t role,
    sgx_dh_session_t * session
);
```

## Parameters

### **role [in]**

Indicates which role the caller plays in the secure session establishment.

The value of role of the initiator of the session establishment must be `SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR`.

The value of role of the responder of the session establishment must be `SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER`.

### **session [out]**

A pointer to the instance of the DH session which contains entire information about session establishment.

---

### **NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

Session is initialized successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### **sgx\_dh\_responder\_gen\_msg1**

Generates MSG1 for the responder of DH secure session establishment and records ECC key pair in session structure.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1(
    sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
```

```
) ;
```

## Parameters

### **msg1 [out]**

A pointer to an `sgx_dh_msg1_t` `msg1` buffer. The buffer holding the `msg1` message, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

The DH `msg1` contains the responder's public key and report based target info.

### **dh\_session [in/out]**

A pointer that points to the instance of `sgx_dh_session_t`. The buffer holding the DH session information, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

---

### **NOTE**

As output, the DH session structure contains the responder's public key and private key for the current session.

---

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

MSG1 is generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error occurred.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### sgx\_dh\_initiator\_proc\_msg1

The initiator of the DH secure session establishment handles msg1 sent by a responder, generates msg2, and records the ECC key pair of the initiator in the DH session structure.

---

**NOTE**

To use DH key exchange 2.0 APIs, define SGX\_USE\_LAv2\_INITIATOR.

---

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1 (
    const sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

### Parameters

**msg1 [in]**

Pointer to the dh message 1 buffer generated by a session responder. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**msg2 [out]**

Pointer to the dh message 2 buffer. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**dh\_session [in/out]**

Pointer to the dh session structure used during establishment. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---



## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

msg1 is processed and msg2 is generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in an incorrect order or state.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Enclave is out of memory.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
Library	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (simulation)

### **sgx\_dh\_responder\_proc\_msg2**

Handles msg2 sent by an initiator, derives AEK, updates the session information, and generates msg3.

---

#### **NOTE**

To use DH key exchange 2.0 APIs, define SGX\_USE\_LAv2\_INITIATOR.

---

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2 (
    const sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * initiator_identity
);
```

## Parameters

**msg2 [in]**

Pointer to the dh message 2 buffer generated by a session initiator. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**msg3 [out]**

Pointer to the dh message 3 buffer generated by a session responder in this function. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**dh\_session [in/out]**

Pointer to the dh session structure used during establishment. The buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

**aek [out]**

Pointer to instance of `sgx_key_128bit_t`. The aek is derived as follows:

```
KDK := CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

```
AEK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'AEK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (`0x80`)

---

**NOTE**

---

---

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

### **initiator\_identity [out]**

Pointer to instance of `sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t`. Identity information of initiator includes `isv_svn`, `isv_product_id`, the enclave attributes, `MRSIGNER`, and `MRENCLAVE`. The buffer must be located in the enclave address space. Check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the `aek`.

---

### **NOTE**

The pointer value must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

`msg2` is processed and `msg3` is generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in an incorrect order or state.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_KDF\_MISMATCH**

Key derivation function does not match.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Enclave is out of memory.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected error occurred.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

### sgx\_dh\_initiator\_proc\_msg3

The initiator handles msg3 sent by responder and then derives AEK, updates session information and gets responder's identity information.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3(
    const sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * responder_identity
);
```

#### Parameters

##### msg3 [in]

Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

##### dh\_session [in]

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

---

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

---

##### aek [out]

A pointer that points to instance of `sgx_key_128bit_t`. The aek is derived as follows:

```
KDK:= CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
AEK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK' ||0x00||0x80||0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**responder\_identity [out]**

Identity information of responder including isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek or the `msg3_body.additional_prop` field of `msg3`.

**NOTE**

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

The function is done successfully.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_STATE**

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

The enclave is out of memory.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error occurred.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tservice.a</code> or <code>libsgx_tservice_sim.a</code> (simulation)

## sgx\_fopen

The `sgx_fopen` function creates or opens a protected file.

### Syntax

```

SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen (
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);

```

### Parameters

#### filename [in]

The name of the file to be created or opened.

#### mode [in]

The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of 'r', 'w' or 'a', with possible '+' and possible 'b' (since string functions are currently not supported, 'b' is meaningless).

#### key [in]

The encryption key of the file. This key is used as a key derivation key, used for deriving encryption keys for the file. If the file is created with `sgx_fopen`, you should protect this key and provide it as input every time the file is opened.

### Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, `NULL` is returned and `errno` is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

### Description

`sgx_fopen` is similar to the C file API `fopen`. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to `sgx_fopen`. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fopen` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### sgx\_fopen\_auto\_key

The `sgx_fopen_auto_key` function creates or opens a protected file.

#### Syntax

```

SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode
);

```

#### Parameters

##### filename [in]

The name of the file to be created or opened.

##### mode [in]

The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of 'r', 'w' or 'a', with possible '+' and possible 'b' (since string functions are currently not supported, 'b' is meaningless).

#### Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, `NULL` is returned and `errno` is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

#### Description

`sgx_fopen_auto_key` is similar to the C file API `fopen`. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to `sgx_fopen_auto_key`. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fopen` documentation.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### sgx\_fclose

The `sgx_fclose` function closes a protected file handle.

#### Syntax

```

int32_t sgx_fclose(

```

```

    SGX_FILE* stream
);

```

## Parameters

### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

## Return value

0

The file was closed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation.

## Description

`sgx_fclose` is similar to the C file API `fclose`. It closes an open Protected File handle created with a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`. After a call to this function, the handle is invalid even if an error is returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fclose` documentation.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### **sgx\_fread**

The `sgx_fread` function reads the requested amount of data from the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

## Syntax

```

size_t sgx_fread(
    void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);

```

## Parameters



**ptr[out]**

A pointer to a buffer of at least `size*count` bytes, to receive the data read from the file.

**size [in]**

The size of each block to be read.

**count [in]**

The number of blocks to be read.

**stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

**Return value**

The number of blocks of size `size` that were read from the file.

**Description**

`sgx_fread` is similar to the C file API `fread`. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fread` documentation.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

**sgx\_fwrite**

The `sgx_fwrite` function writes the given amount of data to the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

**Syntax**

```
size_t sgx_fwrite(
    const void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

**Parameters****ptr [in]**

A pointer to a buffer of at least `size*count` bytes, that contains the data to write to the file

#### **size [in]**

The size of each block to be written.

#### **count [in]**

The number of blocks to be written.

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

#### Return value

The number of blocks of size `size` that were written to the file.

#### Description

`sgx_fwrite` is similar to the C file API `fwrite`. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fwrite` documentation.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

#### **sgx\_fflush**

The `sgx_fflush` function forces a cache flush, and if it returns successfully, it is guaranteed that your changes are committed to a file on the disk.

#### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fflush(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

#### Parameters

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

#### Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation. `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

### Description

`sgx_fflush` is similar to the C file API `fflush`. This function flushes all the modified data from the cache and writes it to a file on the disk. In case of an error, `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code. Note that this function does not clear the cache, but only flushes the changes to the actual file on the disk. Flushing also happens automatically when the cache is full and page eviction is required.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fflush` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_ftell`

The `sgx_ftell` function creates or opens a protected file.

### Syntax

```
int64_t sgx_ftell(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

### Parameters

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

### Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns the current value of the position indicator of the file, otherwise, -1 is returned and `errno` is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

### Description

`sgx_ftell` is similar to the C file API `ftell`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `ftell` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_fseek`

The `sgx_fseek` function sets the current value of the position indicator of the file.

### Syntax

```
int64_t sgx_fseek(
    SGX_FILE* stream,
    int64_t offset,
    int origin
);
```

### Parameters

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

#### **offset [in]**

The new required value, relative to the origin parameter.

#### **origin [in]**

The origin from which to calculate the offset (`SEEK_SET`, `SEEK_CUR` or `SEEK_END`).

### Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

-1

There were errors during the operation. `sgx_ferror` can be called to get the error code.

### Description

`sgx_fseek` is similar to the C file API `fseek`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `fseek` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_feof`

The `sgx_feof` function tells the caller if the file's position indicator hit the end of the file in a previous read operation.

### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_feof(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

### Parameters

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

### Return value

0

End of file was not reached.

1

End of file was reached.

### Description

`sgx_feof` is similar to the C file API `feof`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `feof` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### sgx\_ferror

The `sgx_ferror` function returns the latest operation error code.

#### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_ferror(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

#### Return value

The latest operation error code is returned. 0 indicates that no errors occurred.

#### Description

`sgx_ferror` is similar to the C file API `ferror`. In case the latest operation failed because the file is in a bad state, `SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS` will be returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `ferror` documentation.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### sgx\_clearerr

The `sgx_clearerr` function attempts to repair a bad file status, and also clears the end-of-file flag.

#### Syntax

```
void sgx_clearerr(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

### Return value

None

### Description

`sgx_clearerr` is similar to the C file API `clearerr`. This function attempts to repair errors resulted from the underlying file system, like write errors to the disk (resulting in a full cache that cannot be emptied). Call `sgx_ferror` or `sgx_feof` after a call to this function to learn if it was successful or not.

`sgx_clearerr` does not repair errors resulting from a corrupted file, like decryption errors, or from memory corruption, etc.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `clearerr` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_remove`

The `sgx_remove` function deletes a file from the file system.

### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_remove(
    const char* filename,
);
```

### Parameters

#### **filename [in]**

The name of the file to delete.

### Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check `errno` for the error code.

### Description

`sgx_remove` is similar to the C file API `remove`.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the `remove` documentation.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_fexport_auto_key`

The `sgx_fexport_auto_key` function is used for exporting the latest key used for the file encryption. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fexport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

### Parameters

#### **filename [in]**

The name of the file to be exported. This should be the name of a file created with the `sgx_fopen_auto_key` API.

#### **key [out]**

The latest encryption key.

### Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check `errno` for the error code.

### Description

`sgx_fexport_auto_key` is used to export the last key that was used in the encryption of the file. With this key you can import the file in a different enclave or system.

---

### **NOTE:**

---



- 
1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
  2. This function only works with files created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.
- 

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

## `sgx_fimport_auto_key`

The `sgx_fimport_auto_key` function is used for importing a Protected FS auto key file created on a different enclave or platform. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

## Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fimport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

## Parameters

### **filename [in]**

The name of the file to be imported. This should be the name of a file created with the `sgx_fopen_auto_key` API, on a different enclave or system.

### **key [in]**

The encryption key, exported with a call to `sgx_fexport_auto_key` in the source enclave or system.

## Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check `errno` for the error code.

## Description

`sgx_fimport_auto_key` is used for importing a Protected FS file. After this call returns successfully, the file can be opened normally with `sgx_fexport_auto_key`.

---

**NOTE:**

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
  2. This function only works with files created with `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.
- 

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_fclear_cache`

The `sgx_fclear_cache` function is used for clearing the internal file cache. The function scrubs all the data from the cache, and releases all the allocated cache memory.

### Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fclear_cache(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

### Parameters

#### **stream [in]**

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to `sgx_fopen` or `sgx_fopen_auto_key`.

### Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, call `sgx_ferror` to get the error code.

### Description

`sgx_fclear_cache` is used to scrub all the data from the cache and release all the allocated cache memory. If modified data is found in the cache, it will be written to the file on disk before being scrubbed.

This function is especially useful if you do not trust parts of your own enclave (for example, external libraries you linked against, etc.) and want to make sure there is as little sensitive data in the memory as possible before transferring control to the code they do not trust. Note, however, that the `SGX_FILE` structure itself still holds sensitive data. To remove all such data related to the file from memory completely, you should close the file handle.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tprotected_fs.h</code> <code>sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tprotected_fs.a</code>

### `sgx_ecc256_calculate_pub_from_priv`

Generates an ECC public key based on a given ECC private key.

### Syntax

```
sgx_ecc256_calculate_pub_from_priv(
    const sgx_ec256_private_t *p_att_priv_key,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_att_pub_key
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_att\_priv\_key [in]**

Pointer to the input ECC private key.

#### **p\_att\_pub\_key [out]**

Pointer to output public key - LITTLE ENDIAN.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

One or more of input parameters is invalid.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

### Description

This function retrieves an ECC public key from a given private key on curve NID\_X9\_62\_prime256v1. (pub = priv \* curve\_group).

### Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### **sgx\_ecdsa\_verify\_hash**

Directly verifies the signature for the given data of size SGX\_SHA256\_HASH\_SIZE based on the public key.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify_hash(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    const sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_data [in]**

Pointer to the signed dataset of size SGX\_SHA256\_HASH\_SIZE to be verified.

#### **p\_public [in]**

Pointer to the public key to be used for the signature calculation.

---

#### **NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

#### **p\_signature [in]**

Pointer to the signature to be verified.

---

**NOTE:**

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

---

**p\_result [out]**

Pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

**ecc\_handle [in]**

Handle of the allocated and initialized ECC GF(p) context state used to call standard functions of the elliptic curve cryptosystem. The algorithm stores intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

---

**NOTE:**

The ECC set of APIs only supports a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

---

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Digital signature verification is performed successfully. Check p\_result to get the verification result.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The ECC context handle, public key, data, result, or signature pointer is NULL, or the data size is 0.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library error.

[Description](#)

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key. The function performs verification without calculating the data hash.

A digital signature of the message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256 bits each, which could be created by `sgx_ecdsa_sign`. The ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme, is used for computing a digital signature.

The digital signature verification results in one of the following values:

`SGX_EC_VALID` - Digital signature is valid.

SGX\_EC\_INVALID\_SIGNATURE - Digital signature is not valid.

To create elliptic curve domain parameters, use the `sgx_ecc256_open_context` function.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_hmac_sha256_msg`

Computes a message authentication code of `p_src` using the hash function SHA256 and `p_key`.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_hmac_sha256_msg(
    const unsigned char *p_src,
    int src_len,
    const unsigned char *p_key,
    int key_len,
    unsigned char *p_mac,
    int mac_len
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_src [in]**

Pointer to the input stream to be hashed.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Length in bytes of the input stream to be hashed.

#### **p\_key [in]**

Pointer to the key to be used in MAC operation.

#### **key\_len [in]**

Key length, in bytes.

#### **p\_mac [out]**

Pointer to the result MAC, must be allocated by the caller.

#### **mac\_len [in]**

Expected output MAC length, in bytes.

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

p\_src, p\_key, or p\_mac pointer is NULL.

src\_len, key\_len, or mac\_len size is less than or equal to 0.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

#### Description

The function performs a standard HMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the HMAC hash is supported.

Use this function if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, use the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure to compute the HMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

##### **sgx\_hmac256\_init**

Allocates and initializes the HMAC state to use p\_key.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_hmac256_init(
    const unsigned char *p_key,
    int key_len,
    sgx_hmac_state_handle_t *p_hmac_handle
);
```

## Parameters

### **p\_key [in]**

Pointer to the key used in the message authentication operation.

### **key\_len [in]**

Key length, in bytes.

### **p\_hmac\_handle [out]**

Pointer to the output HMAC state handle.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

p\_key or p\_hmac\_handle is NULL, or key\_len is less than or equal to 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

## Description

Calling `sgx_hmac256_init` is the first step in performing the HMAC 256-bit hash over multiple data sets. Do not allocate memory for the HMAC state returned by this function. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library, so the library performs the allocation itself. If the hash over the desired data sets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, call `sgx_hmac256_close` to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>



### `sgx_hmac256_update`

Authenticates chunks of a message during repetitive calls.

#### Syntax

```

sgx_status_t sgx_hmac256_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    int src_len,
    sgx_hmac_state_handle_t hmac_handle
);

```

#### Parameters

##### **p\_src [in]**

Pointer to the input stream to be hashed.

##### **src\_len [in]**

Length in bytes of the input stream to be hashed.

##### **p\_hmac\_handle [in]**

Pointer to the HMAC state handle.

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

`p_src` or `p_hmac_handle` is NULL, or `src_len` is less than or equal to 0.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

#### Description

Use this functions as a part of an HMAC 256-bit hash calculation over multiple data sets. For the HMAC hash calculation over a single data set, use the `sgx_hmac_sha256_msg` function instead. Before calling this function on the first data set, allocate and initialize the HMAC state structure, which will hold intermediate hash results, using the `sgx_hmac256_init` function. To obtain the

hash after processing the final data set, call the `sgx_hmac256_final` function.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

## `sgx_hmac256_final`

Places the message authentication code in `p_hash`.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_hmac256_final(
    unsigned char *p_hash,
    int hash_len,
    sgx_hmac_state_handle_t hmac_handle
);
```

## Parameters

### **hash\_len [in]**

Expected MAC length, in bytes.

### **hmac\_handle [in]**

Pointer to the HMAC state handle.

### **p\_hash [out]**

Pointer to the resultant hash from the HMAC operation. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All outputs are generated successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

`p_hash` or `hmac_handle` is NULL, or `hash_len` is less than or equal to 0.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

## Description

This function returns the hash after performing the HMAC 256-bit hash calculation over one or more data sets using the `sgx_hmac256_update` function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to the HMAC state used in the `sgx_hmac256_update` calls must be passed as input.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_hmac256_close`

Cleans up the HMAC state.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_hmac256_close(
    sgx_hmac_state_handle_t hmac_handle
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_hmac\_handle [in]**

Pointer to the HMAC state handle.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

HMAC state is cleaned up successful.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failed.

## Description

Calling `sgx_hmac256_close` is the last step after performing the HMAC hash over multiple data sets. Use this function to clean and deallocate memory used for storing the HMAC algorithm context state.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_init`

Returns an allocated and initialized AES-GCM encrypt algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the AES-GCM encryption is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, you should call `sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt` to perform the encryption in a single call.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_init(
    const uint8_t *key,
    const uint8_t *iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_state_handle_t* aes_gcm_state
);
```

## Parameters

### **key [in]**

Pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

### **iv [in]**

Pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

### **iv\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

### **aad [in]**

Pointer to the additional authentication data buffer used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

#### **aad\_len [in]**

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and the size can be zero.

#### **aes\_gcm\_state [out]**

Handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative AES-GCM 128-bit encryption. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the encryption over data sets.

#### **Return value**

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The AES-GCM encryption state is successfully allocated and initialized.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

The key or handle pointer is NULL.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failure occurred.

#### **Description**

Call `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_init` as the first step in performing the AES-GCM encrypt over multiple datasets. Do not allocate memory for the AES-GCM state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the encryption over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the encryption process, call `sgx_aes_gcm_close` to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

#### **Requirements**

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

### **sgx\_aes\_gcm128\_enc\_update**

Performs AES-GCM 128-bit encryption over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative encryption over multiple datasets where `aes_gcm_handle` contains the intermediate results of the encryption over previous datasets.

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_update (
    uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    sgx_aes_state_handle_t aes_gcm_state
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_src [in]**

Pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

#### **src\_len [in]**

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

#### **p\_dst [out]**

Pointer to the output cipher-text buffer.

#### **aes\_gcm\_state [in]**

Handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform AES-GCM encryption.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

All the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The source pointer, destination pointer, or AES handle is NULL.

The source length is 0 or greater than `INT_MAX`.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the AES-GCM encryption.

**NOTE:**

Unexpected errors indicate that the AES-GCM state is *not* freed. Call `sgx_aes_gcm_close` to free the AES-GCM state and avoid memory leak.

**Description**

This function encrypts data in the source input and puts it in `p_dst`. You should use it after initializing the AES-GCM state with `sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_init`.

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

**sgx\_aes\_gcm128\_enc\_get\_mac**

Obtains the authentication MAC from the given AES-GCM state.

**Syntax**

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm128_enc_get_mac(
    uint8_t *mac,
    sgx_aes_state_handle_t aes_gcm_state
);
```

**Parameters****aes\_gcm\_state [in]**

Handle to the context state used by the cryptography library performing an iterative AES-GCM encryption.

**mac [out]**

Pointer to `SGX_AESGCM_MAC_SIZE` buffer to store MAC. The memory for the MAC should be allocated by the calling code.

**Return value****SGX\_SUCCESS**

The MAC is obtained successfully.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

The MAC pointer or AES-GCM handle is NULL.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the AES-GCM encryption.

---

#### **NOTE:**

If an unexpected error occurs, call `sgx_aes_gcm_close` to free the AES-GCM state to avoid memory leak.

---

#### Description

Writes `SGX_AESGCM_MAC_SIZE` bytes of the tag value to the buffer indicated by MAC.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

#### `sgx_aes_gcm_close`

Cleans up and frees the AES-GCM state.

#### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_gcm_close(
    sgx_aes_state_handle_t aes_gcm_state
);
```

#### Parameters

##### **aes\_gcm\_state [in]**

Pointer to the AES-GCM state handle.

#### Return value

##### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The AES-GCM state was deallocated successfully.

##### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**



Internal cryptography library failure occurred.

### Description

Call `sgx_aes_gcm_close` as the last step after performing AES-GCM over multiple datasets. Use this function to clean and deallocate the memory used for storing the AES-GCM algorithm context state.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_tcrypto.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tcrypto.a</code>

### `sgx_get_rsrv_mem_info`

Get the start address and/or the max size info for the reserved memory area

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_rsrv_mem_info(
    void **addr, size_t* max_size
);
```

### Parameters

#### **addr [out]**

The starting address of the reserved memory.

#### **max\_size [out]**

The maximum size of the reserved memory.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The reserved memory information is returned.

#### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

One of the input parameters is invalid.

## Description

`sgx_get_rsrv_mem_info` can be used to query the reserved memory area information, such as the starting address and the maximum size. The `addr` and `max_size` are not allowed to be NULL at the same time.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_rsrv_mem_mgr.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem_ex`

Allocate a range of EPC memory with a fixed address from the reserved memory area

### Syntax

```
void* sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem_ex(
    void *desired_addr, size_t length
);
```

### Parameters

#### **desired\_addr [in]**

The desired starting address to allocate the reserved memory. Should be page aligned.

#### **length [in]**

The length of region to be allocated in bytes. Should be page aligned.

### Return value

On success, `sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem_ex` returns a pointer with the desired starting address to the reserved memory region. Otherwise, returns NULL to indicate allocation failure.

## Description

`sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem_ex` allocates a block of `length` bytes of EPC memory with a desired starting address from reserved memory area. The

`desired_addr` and `length` should be page aligned. Used when it needs to allocate a memory from a specific address from reserved memory area. If the starting address doesn't matter, please use `sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem` instead.

On success, a pointer to the memory is returned. On Intel(R) SGX 2.0 the initial permission for the allocated memory is `RW`, while on Intel(R) SGX 1.0 it depends on the `ReservedMemExecutable` flag in the [Enclave Configuration File](#). If this flag is set, the allocated memory would be granted with `RWX` permission. Otherwise, the granted permission is `RW`.

After completion of the reserved memory operation, it needs to call `sgx_free_rsrv_mem` function to deallocate the memory resource.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_rsrv_mem_mngr.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem`

Allocate a range of EPC memory from the reserved memory area

### Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem(
    size_t length
);
```

### Parameters

#### **length [in]**

The memory length to be manipulated in bytes. Should be page aligned.

### Return value

On success, `sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem` returns a pointer to the reserved memory region. Otherwise, returns `NULL` to indicate allocation failure.

### Description

`sgx_alloc_rsrv_mem` allocates a block of `length` bytes of EPC memory from reserved memory area. The `length` should be page aligned. Used when the starting address doesn't matter.

On success, a memory pointer is returned. On Intel(R) SGX 2.0 the initial permission for the allocated memory is `RW`, while on Intel(R) SGX 1.0 it depends on the `ReservedMemExecutable` flag in the [Enclave Configuration File](#). If this flag is set, the allocated memory would be granted with `RWX` permission. Otherwise, the granted permission is `RW`.

After completion of the reserved memory operation, it needs to call `sgx_free_rsrv_mem` function to deallocate the memory resource.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_rsrv_mem_mngr.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

### `sgx_free_rsrv_mem`

Deallocate a range of EPC memory from the reserved memory area

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_free_rsrv_mem(
    void *addr, size_t length
);
```

## Parameters

### **addr [in]**

The starting address of region that would be freed. Should be page aligned.

### **length [in]**

The length of the memory to be manipulated in bytes. Should be page aligned.

## Return value

**0**

The EPC memory is freed successfully.

**-1**

The operation is failed.

## Description

`sgx_free_rsrv_mem` is used to deallocate the memory from the reserved memory area allocated by the following functions:

[sgx\\_alloc\\_rsrv\\_mem](#)

[sgx\\_alloc\\_rsrv\\_mem\\_ex](#)

The input `addr` and `length` should be page aligned.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_rsrv_mem_mngr.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

## [sgx\\_tprotect\\_rsrv\\_mem](#)

Modify the access permissions of the pages in the reserved memory area.

## Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_tprotect_rsrv_mem(
    void *addr, size_t length, int prot
);
```

## Parameters

### **addr [in]**

The starting address of region which needs to change access permission. Should be page aligned.

### **length [in]**

The length of the memory to be manipulated in bytes. Should be page aligned.

### **prot [in]**

The target memory protection.

## Return value

### **SGX\_SUCCESS**

The permission is set to the target memory protection.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the input parameters is invalid.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory to complete this operation.

### **SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Unexpected failure occurred.

## Description

`sgx_tprotect_rsrv_mem` function sets the protection `prot` for the target reserved memory `[addr, addr+length-1]` similar to the system API `mprotect`. The `addr` and `length` should be page aligned.

`prot` is a combination of the following access flags: `SGX_PROT_NONE` or a bit-wise-or of the other values of the following list.

<code>SGX_PROT_NONE</code>	The memory cannot be accessed at all.
<code>SGX_PROT_READ</code>	The memory can be read.
<code>SGX_PROT_WRITE</code>	The memory can be modified.
<code>SGX_PROT_EXEC</code>	The memory can be executed.

---

### **NOTE:**

This function is workable only on the Intel(R) SGX 2.0 enabled platform. For Intel(R) SGX 1.0 this function doesn't actually change any permission but perform a sanity check.

---

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_rsrv_mem_mngr.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code>

**tee\_get\_certificate\_with\_evidence**

`tee_get_certificate_with_evidence` generates a self-signed X.509 certificate with embedded Intel® SGX ECDSA quote.

**Syntax**

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_get_certificate_with_evidence(
    const unsigned char *p_subject_name,
    const uint8_t *p_prv_key,
    size_t private_key_size,
    const uint8_t *p_pub_key,
    size_t public_key_size,
    uint8_t **pp_output_cert,
    size_t *p_output_cert_size
);
```

**Parameters****p\_subject\_name [in]**

A string containing an X.509 distinguished name (DN) for customizing the generated certificate. This name is also used as the issuer name for this self-signed certificate See RFC5280 (<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>) for details.

Example value "CN=Intel SGX Enclave,O=Intel Corporation,C=US"

**p\_prv\_key [in]**

A private key used to sign this certificate in PEM format

**private\_key\_size [in]**

The size of the `private_key` in bytes

**p\_pub\_key [in]**

A public key used as the certificate's subject key in PEM format

**public\_key\_size [in]**

The size of the public key in bytes

**pp\_output\_cert [out]**

A pointer to output certificate pointer

**p\_output\_cert\_size [out]**

A pointer to the size of the output certificate above

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS**

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the parameters are invalid

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

**SGX\_QL\_ATT\_KEY\_NOT\_INITIALIZED**

The platform quoting infrastructure does not have the attestation key available to generate quotes. `sgx_qe_get_target_info()` must be called again

**SGX\_QL\_ATT\_KEY\_CERT\_DATA\_INVALID**

The data returned by the platform library's `sgx_ql_get_quote_config()` is invalid

**SGX\_QL\_OUT\_OF\_EPC**

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation

**SGX\_QL\_ENCLAVE\_LOST**

Enclave lost after power transition or used in child process created by `linux:-fork()`

**SGX\_QL\_ENCLAVE\_LOAD\_ERROR**

Unable to load the enclaves required to initialize the attestation key. Could be due to file I/O error, loading infrastructure error or insufficient enclave memory

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected

[Description](#)



Calling `tee_get_certificate_with_evidence` generates a self-signed X.509 certificate with embedded Intel® SGX ECDSA quote. This API depends on Intel® SGX DCAP remote attestation. Review DCAP requirement before using this API.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_ttls.h, sgx_ttls.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ttls.a</code>

### `tee_free_certificate`

`tee_free_evidence` frees the output X.509 certificate buffer which generate by API `tee_get_certificate_with_evidence_in_enclave`

### Syntax

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_free_evidence(
    uint8_t* p_certificate
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_certificate [in]**

A pointer to output certificate buffer after called API `tee_get_certificate_with_evidence`

### Return value

#### **SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS**

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the parameters are invalid.

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected

## Requirements

Header	sgx_ttls.h, sgx_ttls.edl
Library	libsgx_ttls.a

### tee\_verify\_certificate\_with\_evidence

`tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence` performs Intel® SGX quote and X.509 certificate verification inside an SGX enclave. The validation includes extracting quote extension from the certificate before validating the quote.

### Syntax

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence(
    const uint8_t *p_cert_in_der,
    size_t cert_in_der_len,
    const time_t expiration_check_date,
    sgx_q1_qv_result_t *p_qv_result,
    uint8_t **pp_supplemental_data,
    uint32_t *p_supplemental_data_size
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_cert\_in\_der [in]**

A pointer to buffer holding certificate contents in DER format

#### **in\_der\_len [in]**

The size of certificate buffer above

#### **expiration\_check\_date [in]**

The date that verifier will use to determine if any of the verification collateral have expired

#### **p\_qv\_result [in]**

Quote verification result

**pp\_supplemental\_data [out]**

Optional input, a pointer to SGX quote verification supplemental data pointer

**p\_supplemental\_data\_size [out]**

Optional input, the size of supplemental data above, only valid when you provide 'pp\_supplemental\_data'

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS**

Both X.509 certificate and quote verification passed,

But you can still refer to output parameters 'p\_qv\_result' for some non-critical errors, you can refer to 'p\_qv\_result' and supplemental data to define your own quote verification policy

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the parameters are invalid

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

**SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

[Description](#)

`tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence` extracts the quote from self-signed X.509 certificate, then calls Intel® ECDSA quote verification library and enclave to verify the quote. In addition, this API calls SgxSSL to verify the X.509 certificate.

Note that if this API returns success, it only means there was no critical error during quote verification. You should still refer to output 'p\_qv\_result' and 'p\_supplemental\_data' to check for warnings such as verification collateral out of date warning. It is suggested to define your verification policy based the output or pass the output to relying party for further verification.

[Requirements](#)

Header	<code>sgx_ttls.h, sgx_ttls.edl</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_ttls.a</code>

### tee\_free\_supplemental\_data

tee\_free\_supplemental\_data frees the quote verification supplemental data buffer, which is an output of the tee\_verify\_certificate\_with\_evidenceAPI.

Note that this API should be called only when you askquote verification supplemental data in the tee\_verify\_certificate\_with\_evidenceAPI.

### Syntax

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_free_supplemental_data(
    uint8_t* p_supplemental_data
);
```

### Parameters

#### p\_supplemental\_data [in]

A pointer to quote verification supplemental data, which is an output of the tee\_verify\_certificate\_with\_evidenceAPI.

### Return value

#### SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

#### SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER

Any of the parameters are invalid.

#### SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

#### SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected

### Requirements

Header	sgx_ttls.h, sgx_ttls.edl
Library	libsgx_ttls.a

### tee\_verify\_certificate\_with\_evidence\_host

`tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host` performs Intel® SGX quote and X.509 certificate verification in host side. The validation includes extracting quote extension from the certificate before validating the quote.

Note that the verification is not performed inside an SGX enclave. This API calls Intel® SGX QVL (Quote Verification Library) to verify quote, QvE (Quote Verification Enclave) is not involved. Before using this API, make sure the verification environment is secure.

### Syntax

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host(
    const uint8_t *p_cert_in_der,
    size_t cert_in_der_len,
    const time_t expiration_check_date,
    sgx_q1_qv_result_t *p_qv_result,
    uint8_t **pp_supplemental_data,
    uint32_t *p_supplemental_data_size
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_cert\_in\_der [in]**

A pointer to buffer holding certificate contents in DER format

#### **in\_der\_len [in]**

The size of certificate buffer above

#### **expiration\_check\_date [in]**

The date that verifier will use to determine if any of the verification collateral have expired

#### **p\_qv\_result [in]**

Quote verification result

#### **pp\_supplemental\_data [out]**

Optional input, a pointer to SGX quote verification supplemental data pointer

#### **p\_supplemental\_data\_size [out]**

Optional input, the size of supplemental data above, only valid when you provide 'pp\_supplemental\_data'

#### **Return value**

#### **SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS**

Both X.509 certificate and quote verification passed,

But you can still refer to output parameters 'p\_qv\_result' for some non-critical errors, you can refer to 'p\_qv\_result' and supplemental data to define your own quote verification policy

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the parameters are invalid

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected.

#### **Description**

`tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host` extracts the quote from a self-signed X.509 certificate, then calls Intel® ECDSA quote verification library to verify the quote. In addition, this API calls OpenSSL to verify the X.509 certificate.

Note that if this API returns success, it only means there was no critical error during quote verification. You should still refer to output 'p\_qv\_result' and 'p\_supplemental\_data' to check for warnings such as verification collateral out of date warning. It is suggested to define your verification policy based the output or pass the output to relying party for further verification.

#### **Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_utls.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_utls.a</code>

### **tee\_free\_supplemental\_data\_host**

`tee_free_supplemental_data_host` frees the quote verification supplemental data buffer, which is an output of the `tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host` API.

Note that this API should be called only when you asked quote verification supplemental data in the `tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host` API.

### Syntax

```
quote3_error_t SGXAPI tee_free_supplemental_data_host(  
    uint8_t* p_supplemental_data  
);
```

### Parameters

#### **p\_supplemental\_data [in]**

A pointer to quote verification supplemental data, which is output of the `tee_verify_certificate_with_evidence_host` API.

### Return value

#### **SGX\_QL\_SUCCESS**

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Any of the parameters are invalid.

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

#### **SGX\_QL\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

An unexpected error was detected

### Requirements

Header	sgx_utls.h
Library	libsgx_utls.a

### sgx\_mm\_alloc

sgx\_mm\_alloc allows EMM clients to request enclave memory allocations. No two active allocations can have overlapping address ranges. Permissions of newly allocated regions are always SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_READ|SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_WRITE and of page type SGX\_EMA\_PAGE\_TYPE\_REG, except for SGX\_EMA\_RESERVE mode regions which will have SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_NONE. Once allocated by sgx\_mm\_alloc, a region will stay in the allocated state and become deallocated once sgx\_mm\_dealloc is called. If sgx\_mm\_dealloc on a partial range of a previously allocated region, then the region is split, and the freed range is deallocated. The remainder of the region stays allocated. If all pages in the region are freed by sgx\_mm\_dealloc, then the whole region is released, and the memory manager no longer tracks the region.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_mm_alloc(
    void *addr,
    size_t length,
    int flags,
    sgx_enclave_fault_handler_t handler,
    void *handler_private,
    void **out_addr
);
```

### Parameters

#### addr [in]

Starting address of the region, page aligned. If NULL is provided, then the function will select the starting address.



### **length [in]**

Size of the region in bytes of multiples of page size.

### **flags [in]**

A bitwise OR of flags describing committing mode, committing order, address preference, and page type.

Flags should include exactly one of following for committing mode:

**SGX\_EMA\_RESERVE:** Just reserve an address range, no EPC committed. To allocate memory on a reserved range, call this function again with **SGX\_EMA\_COMMIT\_ON\_DEMAND** or **SGX\_EMA\_COMMIT\_NOW**.

**SGX\_EMA\_COMMIT\_NOW:** Reserves memory range and commit EPC pages. EAUG and EACCEPT are done on SGX2 platforms.

**SGX\_EMA\_COMMIT\_ON\_DEMAND:** Reserves memory range, EPC pages are committed (EACCEPT) on demand upon #PF on SGX2 platforms.

Commit mode can be ORed with zero or one of the committing order flags for SGX2 platforms:

**SGX\_EMA\_GROWSDOWN:** Always commit pages from higher to lower addresses, no gaps in addresses above the last committed.

**SGX\_EMA\_GROWSUP:** Always commit pages from lower to higher addresses, no gaps in addresses below the last committed.

Optionally ORed with

**SGX\_EMA\_FIXED:** Allocate at fixed address, will return error if the requested address is in use.

**SGX\_EMA\_ALIGNED(n):** Align the region on a requested boundary. Fail if a suitable region cannot be found. The argument *n* specifies the binary logarithm of the desired alignment and must be at least 12.

Optionally ORed with one of following page types:

**SGX\_EMA\_PAGE\_TYPE\_REG:** Regular page type. This is the default if not specified.

### **handler [in]**

A custom handler for page faults in this region, NULL if no custom handling needed.

### **handler\_private [in]**

Private data for the @handler, which will be passed back when the handler is called.

**out\_addr [out]**

Pointer to store the start address of allocated range. Set to valid address by the function on success, NULL otherwise.

**Return value**

**0**

The operation was successful.

.

**EACCESS**

Region is outside enclave address space.

**EEXIST**

Any page in range requested is in use and SGX\_EMA\_FIXED is set.

**EINVAL**

Invalid alignment boundary, i.e.,  $n < 12$  in SGX\_EMA\_ALIGNED(n).

**ENOMEM**

Out of memory, or no free space to satisfy alignment boundary.

**EFAULT**

All other errors.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

**sgx\_mm\_dealloc**

sgx\_mm\_dealloc deallocates the address range. The pages in the allocation

are freed and the address range is released for future allocation.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_mm_dealloc(  
    void *addr,  
    size_t length  
);
```

### Parameters

#### **addr [in]**

Page aligned start address of the region to be freed and released.

#### **length [in]**

Size in bytes of multiples of page size.

### Return value

#### **0**

The operation was successful.

#### **EINVAL**

The address range is not allocated or outside enclave.

#### **EFAULT**

All other errors.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

## sgx\_mm\_commit

sgx\_mm\_commit commits a partial or full range of memory. Calling this API on pages already committed has no effect.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_mm_commit(  
    void *addr,  
    size_t length  
);
```

### Parameters

#### **addr [in]**

Page aligned start address.

#### **length [in]**

Size in bytes of multiples of page size.

### Return value

#### **0**

The operation was successful.

#### **EINVAL**

Any requested page is not in any previously allocated regions, or outside the enclave address range.

#### **EFAULT**

All other errors.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

**sgx\_mm\_uncommit**

sgx\_mm\_uncommit uncommits or trims physical EPC pages in a previously committed range. The pages in the allocation are freed, but the address range is still reserved.

**Syntax**

```
int sgx_mm_uncommit(
    void *addr,
    size_t length
);
```

**Parameters****addr [in]**

Page aligned start address of the region to be trimmed.

**length [in]**

Size in bytes of multiples of page size.

**Return value**

**0**

The operation was successful.

**EINVAL**

The address range is not allocated or outside enclave.

**EFAULT**

All other errors.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

### sgx\_mm\_commit\_data

sgx\_mm\_commit\_data loads data into target pages within a region previously allocated by sgx\_mm\_alloc. This can be called to load data and set target permissions at the same time, e.g., dynamic code loading. The caller has verified data to be trusted and expected to be loaded to the target address range. Calling this API on pages already committed will fail.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_mm_commit_data(
    void *addr,
    size_t length,
    uint8_t *data,
    int prot
);
```

### Parameters

#### **addr [in]**

Page aligned target start address.

#### **length [in]**

Length of data, in bytes of multiples of page size.

#### **data [in]**

Data of length bytes long.

#### **prot [in]**

Target permissions.

### Return value

**0**

The operation was successful.

### **EINVAL**

Any page in requested address range is not previously allocated, or outside the enclave address range.

### **EACCES**

Any page in requested range is previously committed.

### **EFAULT**

All other errors.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

### **sgx\_mm\_modify\_permissions**

sgx\_mm\_modify\_permissions changes permissions of an allocated region.

### Syntax

```
int sgx_mm_modify_permissions(  
    void *addr,  
    size_t length,  
    int prot  
);
```

### Parameters

**addr [in]**

Start address of the region, must be page aligned.

**length [in]**

Size in bytes of multiples of page size.

**prot [in]**

Permissions which can be bitwise OR of:

SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_READ: Pages may be read.

SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_WRITE: Pages may be written.

SGX\_EMA\_PROT\_EXEC: Pages may be executed.

**Return value**

**0**

The operation was successful.

**EINVAL**

The memory region was not allocated or outside enclave or other invalid parameters that are not supported.

**EACCES**

The page type does not allow the change.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_mm.h
Library	libsgx_trts.a

**sgx\_mm\_modify\_type**

sgx\_mm\_modify\_type changes the page type of an allocated region.

**Syntax**



```
int sgx_mm_modify_type(  
    void *addr,  
    size_t length,  
    int type  
);
```

## Parameters

### **addr [in]**

Start address of the region, must be page aligned.

### **length [in]**

Size in bytes of multiples of page size.

### **type [in]**

Page type, only SGX\_EMA\_PAGE\_TYPE\_TCS is supported.

## Return value

### **0**

The operation was successful.

### **EINVAL**

The memory region was not allocated or outside enclave or other invalid parameters that are not supported.

### **EPERM**

Target page type is not allowed by this API, e.g., PT\_TRIM, PT\_SS\_FIRST, PT\_SS\_REST.

### **EACCES**

Original page type or permissions do not allow the change.

### **EFAULT**

All other errors.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_mm.h</code>
Library	<code>libsgx_trts.a</code>

## Types and Enumerations

This topic introduces the types and error codes in the following topics:

- [Type Descriptions](#)
- [Error Codes](#)

### Type Descriptions

This topic section describes the following data types provided by the Intel® SGX:

- [sgx\\_enclave\\_id\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_status\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_launch\\_token\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_exception\\_vector\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_exception\\_type\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_cpu\\_context\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_exception\\_info\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_exception\\_handler\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_spinlock\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_mutex\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_mutexattr\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_rwlock\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_rwlockattr\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_cond\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_thread\\_condattr\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_misc\\_select\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_attributes\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_misc\\_attribute\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_isv\\_svn\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_cpu\\_svn\\_t](#)

- `sgx_key_id_t`
- `sgx_key_128bit_t`
- `sgx_key_request_t`
- `sgx_measurement_t`
- `sgx_mac_t`
- `sgx_report_data_t`
- `sgx_prod_id_t`
- `sgx_target_info_t`
- `sgx_report_body_t`
- `sgx_report_t`
- `sgx_aes_gcm_data_t`
- `sgx_sealed_data_t`
- `sgx_epid_group_id_t`
- `sgx_basename_t`
- `sgx_quote_t`
- `sgx_quote_sign_type_t`
- `sgx_spid_t`
- `sgx_quote_nonce_t`
- `sgx_att_key_id_t`
- `sgx_ql_att_key_id_t`
- `sgx_att_key_id_ext_t`
- `sgx_qe_report_info_t`
- `sgx_ra_context_t`
- `sgx_ra_key_128_t`
- `sgx_ra_key_type_t`
- `sgx_ra_msg1_t`
- `sgx_ra_msg2_t`
- `sgx_ra_msg3_t`
- `sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t`
- `sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t`
- `sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t`
- `sgx_platform_info_t`
- `sgx_update_info_bit_t`
- `sgx_dh_msg1_t`
- `sgx_dh_msg2_t`
- `sgx_dh_msg3_t`
- `sgx_dh_msg3_body_t`

- [sgx\\_dh\\_session\\_enclave\\_identity\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_dh\\_session\\_role\\_t](#)
- [sgx\\_dh\\_session\\_t](#)
- class template [custom\\_alignment\\_aligned](#)

### [sgx\\_enclave\\_id\\_t](#)

An enclave ID, also referred to as an enclave handle. Used as a handle to an enclave by various functions.

Enclave IDs are locally unique, i.e. within the platform, and the uniqueness is guaranteed until the next machine restart.

### Syntax

```
typedef uint64_t sgx_enclave_id_t;
```

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_eid.h</code>
--------	------------------------

### [sgx\\_status\\_t](#)

Specifies the return status from an Intel SGX function call. For a list containing all possible values of this data type, see Error Codes.

### Syntax

```
typedef enum _status_t { ... } sgx_status_t;
```

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_error.h</code>
--------	--------------------------

### [sgx\\_launch\\_token\\_t](#)

An opaque type used to hold enclave launch information. Used by [sgx\\_create\\_enclave](#) to initialize an enclave. The license is generated by the Launch Enclave.

See more details in [Loading and Unloading an Enclave](#).

### Syntax

```
typedef uint8_t sgx_launch_token_t[1024];
```

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_urts.h</code>
--------	-------------------------

### **sgx\_uswitchless\_worker\_type\_t**

Defines Switchless Calls worker thread type, trusted or untrusted. A worker can be either trusted (executed inside enclave) or untrusted (executed outside enclave).

#### **Syntax**

```
typedef enum {
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_TYPE_UNTRUSTED,
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_TYPE_TRUSTED
} sgx_uswitchless_worker_type_t;
```

#### **Requirements**

Header	sgx_uswitchless.h
--------	-------------------

### **sgx\_uswitchless\_worker\_event\_t**

An application may register a callback to receive Switchless Calls events. The most useful information is presented by 4 worker events: a worker thread starts, a worker thread is idle, a worker thread missed some tasks, a worker thread exits.

#### **Syntax**

```
typedef enum {
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_START,
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_IDLE,
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_MISS,
    SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_EXIT,
    _SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_NUM,
} sgx_uswitchless_worker_event_t;
```

#### **Requirements**

Header	sgx_uswitchless.h
--------	-------------------

### **sgx\_uswitchless\_worker\_stats\_t**

Switchless Calls gather statistics of calls processed by worker threads, and calls missed by worker threads and handled using fallback to regular ECALLs/OCALLs. An application can access the statistics values if it is registered to callbacks.

#### **Syntax**

```
typedef struct {
```

```

    uint64_t processed;
    uint64_t missed;
} sgx_uswitchless_worker_stats_t;

```

## Members

### **processed**

64-bit counter that counts the number of tasks that all workers have processed.

### **missed**

64-bit counter that counts the number of tasks that all workers have missed.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_uswitchless.h
--------	-------------------

### **sgx\_uswitchless\_worker\_callback\_t**

Callback function that is called upon worker threads events and can be used to collect feature statistics and detect feature behavior for configuration tuning or other needs.

## Syntax

```

typedef void (*sgx_uswitchless_worker_callback_t) (
    sgx_uswitchless_worker_type_t type,
    sgx_uswitchless_worker_event_t event,
    const sgx_uswitchless_worker_stats_t* stats);

```

## Parameters

### **type**

Worker thread type .

### **event**

Type of the event occurred.

### **stats**

Pointer to statistics data.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_uswitchless.h
--------	-------------------

**sgx\_uswitchless\_config\_t**

Switchless Calls configuration structure passed to `sgx_create_enclave_ex` to select feature configuration.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct
{
    uint32_t switchless_calls_pool_size_qwords;
    uint32_t num_uworkers;
    uint32_t num_tworkers;
    uint32_t retries_before_fallback;
    uint32_t retries_before_sleep;
    sgx_uswitchless_worker_callback_t
    callback_func[_SGX_USWITCHLESS_WORKER_EVENT_NUM];
} sgx_uswitchless_config_t;
```

**Members****switchless\_calls\_pool\_size\_qwords**

Size of the Switchless Calls task pool (1 indicates a task pool of 64 tasks).

Default value: 1 (64 tasks)

Max value: 8 (512 tasks)

```
#define SL_DEFAULT_MAX_TASKS_QWORDS 1 //64
#define SL_MAX_TASKS_MAX_QWORDS 8 //512
```

**num\_uworkers**

Number of untrusted worker threads that serve Switchless OCALLs.

**num\_tworkers**

Number of trusted worker threads that serve Switchless ECALLs. This number is limited by TCSNum defined in an enclave configuration file. Exceeding the number of available TCS prevents several trusted worker threads from entering the enclave.

**retries\_before\_fallback**

Number of retries client threads wait (assembly pause) for a worker thread to start executing a Switchless Call before falling back to a regular ECALL/OCALL.

Default value: 20000

```
#define SL_DEFAULT_FALLBACK_RETRIES 20000
```

**retries\_before\_sleep**

Number of retries worker threads wait (assembly pause) on the Task Pool for an incoming Switchless Call request before the worker thread goes to sleep .

Default value: 20000

```
#define SL_DEFAULT_SLEEP_RETRIES 20000
```

**Callback\_func**

Array of 4 callback functions for all event types. Optional, default value: NULL.

**Default Initialization**

At least one of `num_uworkers` or `num_tworkers` must not be 0. If both are 0, `sgx_create_enclave_ex` will return an error.

Other fields passed as 0 are replaced with the default field value.

A macro with default values provided.

```
#define SGX_USWITCHLESS_CONFIG_INITIALIZER {0, 1, 1, 0, 0, { 0 } }
```

It will be translated to `{1, 1, 1, 20000, 20000, { 0 } }`

**Requirements**

Header	<code>sgx_uswitchless.h</code>
--------	--------------------------------

**sgx\_exception\_vector\_t**

The `sgx_exception_vector_t` enumeration contains the enclave supported exception vectors. If the exception vector is `#BP`, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

**Syntax**

```
typedef enum _sgx_exception_vector_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DE = 0, /* DIV and DIV instructions */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DB = 1, /* For Intel use only */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BP = 3, /* INT 3 instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BR = 5, /* BOUND instruction */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_UD = 6, /* UD2 instruction or reserved
opcode */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_MF = 16, /* x87 FPU floating-point or
WAIT/FWAI instruction. */
    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_AC = 17, /* Any data reference in memory */

```



```

    SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_XM = 19, /* SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction */
} sgx_exception_vector_t;

```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

### sgx\_exception\_type\_t

The `sgx_exception_type_t` enumeration contains values that specify the exception type. If the exception vector is #BP (BreakPoint), the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE`; otherwise, the exception type is `SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE`.

### Syntax

```

typedef enum _sgx_exception_type_t
{
    SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE = 3,
    SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE = 6,
} sgx_exception_type_t;

```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

### sgx\_cpu\_context\_t

The `sgx_cpu_content_t` structure contains processor-specific register data. Custom exception handling uses `sgx_cpu_context_t` structure to record the CPU context at exception time.

### Syntax

```

#if defined (_M_X64) || defined (__x86_64__)
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t
    {
        uint64_t rax;
        uint64_t rcx;
        uint64_t rdx;
        uint64_t rbx;
        uint64_t rsp;
        uint64_t rbp;
        uint64_t rsi;
        uint64_t rdi;
        uint64_t r8;
    }
#endif

```

```

        uint64_t r9;
        uint64_t r10;
        uint64_t r11;
        uint64_t r12;
        uint64_t r13;
        uint64_t r14;
        uint64_t r15;
        uint64_t rflags;
        uint64_t rip;
    } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#else
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t
    {
        uint32_t eax;
        uint32_t ecx;
        uint32_t edx;
        uint32_t ebx;
        uint32_t esp;
        uint32_t ebp;
        uint32_t esi;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t eflags;
        uint32_t eip;
    } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#endif

```

## Members

**rax, rcx, rdx, rbx, rsp, rbp, rsi, rdi, r8 – r15**

64-bit general purpose registers

**rflags**

64-bit program status and control register

**rip**

64-bit instruction pointer

**eax, ecx, edx, ebx, esp, ebp, esi, edi**

32-bit general purpose registers

**eflags**

32-bit program status and control register

**eip**

32-bit instruction pointer

## Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

### **sgx\_misc\_exinfo\_t**

A structure of this type contains #PF exception information.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _exinfo_t
{
    uint64_t faulting_address;
    uint32_t error_code;
    uint32_t reserved;
} sgx_misc_exinfo_t;
```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

### **sgx\_exception\_info\_t**

A structure of this type contains an exception record with a description of the exception and processor context record at the time of exception.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _exception_info_t
{
    sgx_cpu_context_t cpu_context;
    sgx_exception_vector_t exception_vector;
    sgx_exception_type_t exception_type;
    sgx_misc_exinfo_t exinfo;
    uint64_t xsave_size;
    uint64_t reserved[2];
    uint8_t xsave_area[0];
} sgx_exception_info_t;
```

## Members

### **cpu\_context**

The context record that contains the processor context at the exception time.

### **exception\_vector**

The reason the exception occurs. This is the code generated by a hardware exception.

### **exception\_type**

The exception type.

`SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE (3)` indicates a HW exception.

`SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE (6)` indicates a SW exception.

### **exinfo**

Used for #PF info.

### **xsave\_size**

Number of bytes allocated for `xsave_area`.

### **reserved**

Padding to allow the data to be 64 byte aligned.

### **xsave\_area**

Extended feature registers state saved when exception occurs. The data is saved in XSAVE structure.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts_exception.h</code>
--------	-----------------------------------

## `sgx_exception_handler_t`

Callback function that serves as a custom exception handler.

## Syntax

```
typedef int (* sgx_exception_handler_t) (sgx_exception_info_t *info);
```

## Members

### **info**

A pointer to `sgx_exception_info_t` structure that receives the exception information.

## Return value

**EXCEPTION\_CONTINUE\_SEARCH (0)**

The exception handler did not handle the exception and the RTS should call the next exception handler in the chain.

### EXCEPTION\_CONTINUE\_EXECUTION (-1)

The exception handler handled the exception and the RTS should continue the execution of the enclave.

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

#### sgx\_aex\_mitigation\_node\_t

A structure of this type contains the information for AEX-Notify handling.

#### Syntax

```
typedef struct _aex_mitigation_node_t
{
    sgx_aex_mitigation_fn_t handler;
    const void * args;
    struct _aex_mitigation_node_t *next;
} sgx_aex_mitigation_node_t;
```

#### Members

##### handler

The customized AEX-Notify handler that to be registered.

##### args

Arguments to pass to the handler.

##### next

Pointer to next node.

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_aex.h
--------	----------------

#### sgx\_aex\_mitigation\_fn\_t

Callback function that serves as an AEX-Notify handler.

#### Syntax

```
typedef void (*sgx_aex_mitigation_fn_t)(const sgx_exception_info_t *info, const void * args);
```

## Members

### info

A pointer to `sgx_exception_info_t` structure that contains the exception information.

### args

A pointer to `sgx_exception_info_t` structure that receives the exception information.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_trts_aex.h</code>
--------	-----------------------------

### `sgx_spinlock_t`

Data type for a trusted spin lock.

### Syntax

```
typedef volatile uint32_t sgx_spinlock_t;
```

## Members

`sgx_spinlock_t` defines a spin lock object inside the enclave.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_spinlock.h</code>
--------	-----------------------------

### `sgx_thread_t`

Data type to uniquely identify a trusted thread.

### Syntax

```
typedef uintptr * sgx_thread_t;
```

## Members

`sgx_thread_t` is an opaque data type with no member fields visible to users. This data type is subject to change. Thus, enclave code should not rely on the contents of this data object.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_thread.h</code>
--------	---------------------------

## `sgx_thread_mutex_t`

Data type for a trusted mutex object.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex
{
    size_t m_refcount;
    uint32_t m_control;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_mutex_t;
```

## Members

### **m\_control**

Flags to define whether a mutex is recursive or not.

### **m\_refcount**

Reference counter of the mutex object. It will be increased by 1 if the mutex is successfully acquired, and be decreased by 1 if the mutex is released.

---

### **NOTE**

The counter will be greater than one only if the mutex is recursive.

---

### **m\_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the mutex object.

### **m\_owner**

The thread that currently owns the mutex writes its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a mutex releases it.

### **m\_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the ownership of the mutex. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

### **sgx\_thread\_mutexattr\_t**

Attribute for the trusted mutex object.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_mutexattr_t;
```

### Members

#### **m\_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

### **sgx\_thread\_rwlock\_t**

Data type for a trusted mutex object.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_thread_rwlock_t
{
    uint32_t m_reader_count;
    uint32_t m_writers_waiting;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_reader_queue;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_writer_queue;
} sgx_thread_rwlock_t;
```

### Members



**m\_reader\_count**

The number of readers currently holding the lock. It is increased by 1 whenever a reader lock is successfully acquired, and is decreased by 1 when a reader lock is released.

**m\_writers\_waiting**

The number of threads waiting on a writer lock.

**m\_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the rwlock object.

**m\_owner**

The thread that currently owns the writer lock, writing its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a writer lock releases it.

**m\_reader\_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the reader lock. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**m\_writer\_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the writer lock. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_thread\_rwlockattr\_t**

Attribute for the trusted rwlock object.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _sgx_thread_rwlock_attr_t
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_rwlockattr_t;
```

**Members**

**m\_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_thread\_cond\_t**

Data type for a trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond
{
    sgx_spinlock_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_cond_t;
```

**Members****m\_lock**

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the condition variable.

**m\_queue**

Ordered list of threads waiting on the condition variable. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_thread\_condattr\_t**

Attribute for the trusted condition variable.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_condattr_t;
```

## Members

### **m\_dummy**

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

### **sgx\_misc\_select\_t**

Enclave misc select bits. The value is 4 byte in length. Currently all the bits are reserved for future extension.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_attributes.h
--------	------------------

### **sgx\_attributes\_t**

Enclave attributes definition structure.

---

### **NOTE**

When specifying an attributes mask used in key derivation, at a minimum the flags that should be set are INITED, DEBUG and RESERVED bits.

---

### **NOTE**

The XGETBV instruction can be executed to determine the register sets, which are parts of the XSAVE state, which corresponds to the xfrm value of attributes. Since the save state depends on the host system and the operating system, an attributes mask generally does not include these bits (XFRM is set to 0).

---

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_attributes_t
{
    uint64_t flags;
    uint64_t xfrm;
} sgx_attributes_t;
```

## Members

### **flags**

Flags is a combination of the following values:

Value	Description
SGX_FLAGS_INITTED 0x0000000000000001ULL	The enclave is initialized
SGX_FLAGS_DEBUG 0x0000000000000002ULL	The enclave is a debug enclave
SGX_FLAGS_MODE64BIT 0x0000000000000004ULL	The enclave runs in 64 bit mode
SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY 0x0000000000000010ULL	The enclave has access to a provision key
SGX_FLAGS_EINITTOKEN_KEY 0x0000000000000020ULL	The enclave has access to a launch key
SGX_FLAGS_KSS 0x0000000000000080ULL	The enclave requires the KSS feature.

**xfrm**

xfrm is a combination of the following values:

Value	Description
SGX_XFRM_LEGACY 0x0000000000000003ULL	FPU and Intel® Streaming SIMD Extensions states are saved
SGX_XFRM_AVX 0x0000000000000006ULL	Intel® Advanced Vector Extensions state is saved

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_attributes.h
--------	------------------

**sgx\_misc\_attribute\_t**

Enclave `misc_select` and attributes definition structure.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _sgx_misc_attributes_t
{
    sgx_attributes_t secs_attr;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
} sgx_misc_attribute_t;
```

**Members****secs\_attr**

The Enclave attributes.

**misc\_select**

The Enclave misc select configuration.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_attributes.h
--------	------------------

### sgx\_isv\_svn\_t

ISV security version. The value is 2 bytes in length. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

### Requirements

Header	sgx_key.h
--------	-----------

### sgx\_cpu\_svn\_t

`sgx_cpu_svn_t` is a 128-bit value representing the CPU security version. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (`sgx_create_report`).

### Syntax

```
#define SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE 16
typedef struct _sgx_cpu_svn_t {
    uint8_t svn[SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE];
} sgx_cpu_svn_t;
```

### Requirements

Header	sgx_key.h
--------	-----------

### sgx\_key\_id\_t

`sgx_key_id_t` is a 256 bit value used in the key request structure. The value is generally populated with a random value to provide key wear-out protection.

### Syntax

```
#define SGX_KEYID_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_key_id_t {
    uint8_t id[SGX_KEYID_SIZE];
} sgx_key_id_t;
```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_key.h
--------	-----------

### sgx\_key\_128bit\_t

A 128 bit value that is used to store a derived key from for example the `sgx_get_key` function.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_key.h
--------	-----------

### sgx\_key\_request\_t

Data structure of a key request used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of the key. This is an input parameter for the `sgx_get_key` function.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _key_request_t {
    uint16_t key_name;
    uint16_t key_policy;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint16_t reserved1;
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask;
    sgx_config_svn_t config_svn
    uint8_t reserved2[434]
} sgx_key_request_t;
```

## Members

### key\_name

The key name requested. Possible values are below:

Key Name	Value	Description
SGX_KEYSELECT_EINITTOKEN	0x0000	Launch key
SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION	0x0001	Provisioning key
SGX_KEYSELECT_PROVISION_SEAL	0x0002	Provisioning seal key

SGX_KEYSELECT_REPORT	0x0003	Report key
SGX_KEYSELECT_SEAL	0x0004	Seal key

### key\_policy

Identify which inputs are required for the key derivation. Possible values are below:

Key policy name	Value	Description
SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRENCLAVE	0x0001	Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE measurement register
SGX_KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER	0x0002	Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER measurement register
SGX_KEYPOLICY_NOISVPRODID	0x0004	Derive key without the enclave's ISVPRODID
SGX_KEYPOLICY_CONFIGID	0x0008	Derive key with the enclave's CONFIGID
SGX_KEYPOLICY_ISVFAMILYID	0x0010	Derive key with the enclave's ISVFAMILYID
SGX_KEYPOLICY_ISVEXTPRODID	0x0020	Derive key with the enclave's ISVEXTPRODID

#### **NOTE**

If MRENCLAVE is used, that key can only be rederived by that particular enclave.

#### **NOTE**

If MRSIGNER is used, another enclave with the same ISV\_SVN could derive the key as well. This option is useful for applications that instantiate more than one enclave and want to pass data. The derived key could be used in the encryption process for the data passed between the enclaves.

### isv\_svn

The ISV security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

### reserved1

Reserved for future use. Must be zero.

### cpu\_svn

The TCB security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

### **attribute\_mask**

Attributes mask used to determine which enclave attributes must be included in the key. It only impacts the derivation of a seal key, a provisioning key, and a provisioning seal key. See the definition of [sgx\\_attributes\\_t](#).

### **key\_id**

Value for key wear-out protection. Generally initialized with a random number.

### **misc\_mask**

The misc mask used to determine which enclave misc select must be included in the key. Reserved for future function extension.

### **config\_svn**

The enclave CONFIGSVN field.

### **reserved2**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_key.h</code>
--------	------------------------

### **sgx\_measurement\_t**

`sgx_measurement_t` is a 256-bit value representing the enclave measurement.

## Syntax

```
#define SGX_HASH_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_measurement_t {
    uint8_t m[SGX_HASH_SIZE];
} sgx_measurement_t;
```

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_report.h</code>
--------	---------------------------

### **sgx\_mac\_t**

This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

## Requirements



Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_report\_data\_t**

`sgx_report_data_t` is a 512-bit value used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave. This is one of the inputs to the `sgx_create_report` function.

**Syntax**

```
#define SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE 64

typedef struct _sgx_report_data_t {
    uint8_t d[SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_report_data_t;
```

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_prod\_id\_t**

A 16-bit value representing the ISV enclave product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_target\_info\_t**

Data structure of report target information. This is an input to functions `sgx_create_report` and `sgx_init_quote`, which are used to identify the enclave (its measurement and attributes), which will be able to verify the generated REPORT.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _target_info_t
{
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    uint8_t reserved1[2];
    sgx_config_svn_t config_svn;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved2[8];
    sgx_config_id_t config_id;
    uint8_t reserved3[384];
};
```

```
} sgx_target_info_t;
```

## Members

### **mr\_enclave**

Enclave hash of the target enclave

### **attributes**

Attributes of the target enclave

### **reserved1**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **config\_svn**

Enclave CONFIGSVN.

### **misc\_select**

Misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

### **reserved2**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **config\_id**

Enclave CONFIGID

### **reserved3**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

### **sgx\_report\_body\_t**

Data structure that contains information about the enclave. This data structure is a part of the `sgx_report_t` structure.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _report_body_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved1[12];
    sgx_isvext_prod_id_t isv_ext_prod_id;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
}
```

```

    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved3[32];
    sgx_config_id_t config_id;
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    sgx_config_svn_t config_svn;
    uint8_t reserved4[42];
    sgx_isvfamily_id_t isv_family_id;
    sgx_report_data_t report_data;
} sgx_report_body_t;

```

## Members

### **cpu\_svn**

Security version number of the host system TCB (CPU).

### **misc\_select**

Misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

### **reserved1**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **isv\_ext\_prod\_id**

ISV assigned Extended Product ID.

### **attributes**

Attributes for the enclave. See [sgx\\_attributes\\_t](#) for the definitions of these flags.

### **mr\_enclave**

Measurement value of the enclave.

### **reserved2**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **mr\_signer**

Measurement value of the public key that verified the enclave.

### **reserved3**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **config\_id**

The enclave CONFIGID.

### **isv\_prod\_id**

SV Product ID of the enclave.

### **isv\_svn**

ISV security version number of the enclave.

### **config\_svn**

CONFIGSVN field.

### **reserved4**

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

### **isv\_family\_id**

ISV assigned Family ID.

### **report\_data**

Set of data used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

### **sgx\_report\_t**

Data structure that contains the report information for the enclave. This is the output parameter from the `sgx_create_report` function. This is the input parameter for the `sgx_init_quote` function.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _report_t
{
    sgx_report_body_t body;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
} sgx_report_t;
```

## Members

### **body**

The data structure containing information about the enclave.

**key\_id**

Value for key wear-out protection.

**mac**

The CMAC value of the report data using report key.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_aes\_gcm\_data\_t**

The structure contains the AES GCM\* data, payload size, MAC\* and payload.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _aes_gcm_data_t
{
    uint32_t payload_size;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    uint8_t payload_tag[SGX_SEAL_TAG_SIZE];
    uint8_t payload[];
} sgx_aes_gcm_data_t;
```

**Members****payload\_size**

Size of the payload data which includes both the encrypted data followed by the additional authenticated data (plain text). The full payload array is part of the AES GCM MAC calculation.

**reserved**

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

**payload\_tag**

AES-GMAC of the plain text, payload, and the sizes

**payload**

The payload data buffer includes the encrypted data followed by the optional additional authenticated data (plain text), which is not encrypted.

---

**NOTE**

---

---

The optional additional authenticated data (MAC or plain text) could be data which identifies the seal data blob and when it was created.

---

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
--------	-------------

## sgx\_sealed\_data\_t

Sealed data blob structure containing the key request structure used in the key derivation. The data structure has been laid out to achieve 16 byte alignment. This structure should be allocated within the enclave when the seal operation is performed. After the seal operation, the structure can be copied outside the enclave for preservation before the enclave is destroyed. The `sealed_data` structure needs to be copied back within the enclave before unsealing.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sealed_data_t
{
    sgx_key_request_t key_request;
    uint32_t plain_text_offset;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    sgx_aes_gcm_data_t aes_data;
} sgx_sealed_data_t;
```

## Members

### key\_request

The key request used to derive the seal key.

### plain\_text\_offset

The offset within the `aes_data` structure payload to the start of the optional additional MAC text.

### reserved

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

### aes\_data

Structure contains the AES GCM data (payload size, MAC, and payload).

## Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
--------	-------------

**sgx\_epid\_group\_id\_t**

Type for Intel® EPID group id

**Syntax**

```
typedef uint8_t sgx_epid_group_id_t[4];
```

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

**sgx\_basename\_t**

Type for base name used in `sgx_quote`.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _basename_t
{
    uint8_t name[32];
} sgx_basename_t;
```

**Members****name**

The base name used in `sgx_quote`.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

**sgx\_quote\_t**

Type for quote used in remote attestation.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _quote_t
{
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t sign_type;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t qe_svn;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pce_svn;
    uint32_t xeid;
    sgx_basename_t basename;
```

```

    sgx_report_body_t report_body;
    uint32_t signature_len;
    uint8_t signature[];
} sgx_quote_t;

```

## Members

### **version**

The version of the quote structure.

### **sign\_type**

The indicator of the Intel® EPID signature type.

### **epid\_group\_id**

The Intel® EPID group id of the platform belongs to.

### **qe\_svn**

The svn of the QE.

### **pce\_svn**

The svn of the PCE.

### **xeid**

The extended Intel® EPID group ID.

### **basename**

The base name used in `sgx_quote`.

### **report\_body**

The report body of the application enclave.

### **signature\_len**

The size in byte of the following signature.

### **signature**

The place holder of the variable length signature.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_quote.h</code>
--------	--------------------------

### **[sgx\\_quote\\_sign\\_type\\_t](#)**

Enum indicates the quote type, linkable or un-linkable



## Syntax

```
typedef enum {
    SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE,
    SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE
} sgx_quote_sign_type_t;
```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

## sgx\_spid\_t

Type for a service provider ID.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _spid_t
{
    uint8_t id[16];
} sgx_spid_t;
```

## Members

### id

The ID of the service provider.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

## sgx\_quote\_nonce\_t

This data structure indicates the quote nonce.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_quote_nonce
{
    uint8_t rand[16];
} sgx_quote_nonce_t;
```

## Members

### rand

The 16 bytes random number used as nonce.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

### sgx\_att\_key\_id\_t

An opaque type which identifies the attestation key to use when generating a quote.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _att_key_id_t {
    uint8_t att_key_id[256];
} sgx_att_key_id_t;
```

### Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

### sgx\_qi\_att\_key\_id\_t

A single attestation key. Contains both QE identity and the attestation algorithm ID.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_qi_att_key_id_t
{
    uint16_t id;
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t mrsigner_length;
    uint8_t mrsigner[48];
    uint32_t prod_id;
    uint8_t extended_prod_id[16];
    uint8_t config_id[64];
    uint8_t family_id[16];
    uint32_t algorithm_id;
}sgx_qi_att_key_id_t;
```

### Members

#### id

Structure ID.

**version**

Structure version.

**mrsigner\_length**

Number of valid bytes in MRSIGNER.

**mrsigner**

SHA256 or SHA384 hash of the Public key that signed the QE. The lower bytes contain MRSIGNER. Bytes beyond `mrsigner_length` are '0's.

**prod\_id**

Legacy Product ID of the QE.

**extended\_prod\_id**

Extended Product ID of the QE. All 0's for legacy format enclaves.

**config\_id**

Config ID of the QE.

**family\_id**

Family ID of the QE.

**algorithm\_id**

Identity of the attestation key algorithm.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_quote.h</code>
--------	--------------------------

**`sgx_att_key_id_ext_t`**

An extended attestation key to use when generating a quote.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_att_key_id_ext_t
{
    sgx_q1_att_key_id_t base;
    uint8_t spid[16];
    uint16_t att_key_type;
    uint8_t reserved[80];
}
```

```
}sgx_att_key_id_ext_t;
```

## Members

### base

The base structure of `sgx_ql_att_key_id_t`.

### spid

Service provider ID for EPID quote. Should be 0s for ECDSA quote.

### att\_key\_type

For non-EPID quote, it should be 0. For EPID quote, it equals to `sgx_quote_sign_type_t`.

### reserved

The structure should have the same size as `sgx_att_key_id_t`.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_quote.h</code>
--------	--------------------------

## `sgx_qe_report_info_t`

Data structure that contains the information from app enclave and report generated by Quoting Enclave. This is the input and output parameter from the `sgx_get_quote_ex` function.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _qe_report_info_t
{
    sgx_quote_nonce_t nonce;
    sgx_target_info_t app_enclave_target_info;
    sgx_report_t qe_report;
} sgx_qe_report_info_t;
```

## Members

### nonce

The quote nonce from app enclave used to generate quote.

### app\_enclave\_target\_info

The target info of the app enclave used to generate quote.

## qe\_report

The report generated by Quote Enclave.

### Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

## sgx\_ra\_context\_t

Type for a context returned by the key exchange library.

### Syntax

```
typedef uint32_t sgx_ra_context_t;
```

### Requirements

Header	sgx_key_exchange.h
--------	--------------------

## sgx\_ra\_key\_128\_t

Type for 128 bit key used in remote attestation.

### Syntax

```
typedef uint8_t sgx_ra_key_128_t[16];
```

### Requirements

Header	sgx_key_exchange.h
--------	--------------------

## sgx\_ra\_derive\_secret\_keys\_t

The `sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t` function should take the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK). Implementation of the function should return the appropriate return value.

### Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (*sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t) (
    const sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t* p_shared_key,
    uint16_t kdf_id,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_smk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_sk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_mk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_vk_key
);
```

### Parameters

**p\_shared\_key [in]**

The the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

**kdf\_id [in]**

Key Derivation Function ID.

**p\_smk\_key [out]**

The output SMK.

**p\_sk\_key [out]**

The output SK.

**p\_mk\_key [out]**

The output MK.

**p\_vk\_key [out]**

The output VK.

[Return value](#)

**SGX\_SUCCESS**

Indicates success.

**SGX\_ERROR\_INVALID\_PARAMETER**

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

**SGX\_ERROR\_KDF\_MISMATCH**

Indicates key derivation function does not match.

**SGX\_ERROR\_OUT\_OF\_MEMORY**

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

**SGX\_ERROR\_UNEXPECTED**

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

[Description](#)

A pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype.

[Requirements](#)

Header	sgx_tkey_exchange.h
--------	---------------------

### sgx\_ra\_key\_type\_t

Enum of the key types used in remote attestation.

#### Syntax

```
typedef enum _sgx_ra_key_type_t
{
    SGX_RA_KEY_SK = 1,
    SGX_RA_KEY_MK,
    SGX_RA_KEY_VK,
} sgx_ra_key_type_t;
```

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_key_exchange.h
--------	--------------------

### sgx\_ra\_msg1\_t

This data structure describes the message 1 that is used in remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

#### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg1_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t gid;
} sgx_ra_msg1_t;
```

#### Members

##### **g\_a (Little Endian)**

The public EC key of an application enclave, based on NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

##### **gid (Little Endian)**

ID of the Intel® EPID group of the platform belongs to.

#### Requirements

Header	sgx_key_exchange.h
--------	--------------------

## sgx\_ra\_msg2\_t

This data structure describes the message 2 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_spid_t spid;
    uint16_t quote_type;
    uint16_t kdf_id;
    sgx_ec256_signature_t sign_gb_ga;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    uint32_t sig_rl_size;
    uint8_t sig_rl[];
} sgx_ra_msg2_t;
```

### Members

#### **g\_b (Little Endian)**

Public EC key of service provider, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

#### **spid**

ID of the service provider

#### **quote\_type (Little Endian)**

Indicates the quote type, linkable (1) or un-linkable (0).

#### **kdf\_id (Little Endian)**

Key derivation function id.

#### **sign\_gb\_ga (Little Endian)**

ECDSA Signature of (g\_b || g\_a), using the service provider's ECDSA private key corresponding to the public key specified in `sgx_ra_init` or `sgx_ra_init_ex` function, where g\_b is the public EC key of the service provider and g\_a is the public key of application enclave, provided by the application enclave, in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

#### **mac**

AES-CMAC of g\_b, spid 2-byte TYPE, 2-byte KDF-ID, and sign\_gb\_ga using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:



```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

```
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'SMK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel® SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK), verification (VK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK).

### **sig\_rl\_size**

Size of the `sig_rl`, in bytes.

### **sig\_rl**

Pointer to the Intel® EPID Signature Revocation List Certificate of the Intel® EPID group identified by the `gid` in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_key_exchange.h</code>
--------	---------------------------------

### **sgx\_ra\_msg3\_t**

This data structure describes message 3 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg3_t
{
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop;
    uint8_t quote[];
} sgx_ra_msg3_t;
```

## Members

### mac

AES-CMAC of `g_a`, `ps_sec_prop`, `GID`, and `quote[]`, using `SMK`. `SMK` is derived follows:

```
KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'SMK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the `KDK` is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the `SMK` calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (`0x80`)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel® SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (`SMK`), verification (`VK`) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (`SK`, `MK`).

### `g_a` (Little Endian)

Public EC key of application enclave

### `ps_sec_prop`

Security property of the Intel® SGX Platform Service. If the Intel® SGX Platform Service security property information is not required in the remote attestation and key exchange process, this field will be all 0s.

### `quote`

Quote returned from `sgx_get_quote`. The first 32-byte `report_body.report_data` field in `Quote` is set to SHA256 hash of `ga`, `gb` and `VK`, and the second 32-byte is set to all 0s. `VK` is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

VK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'VK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the VK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'VK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80).

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel® SGX PSW, the ISV can use the `sgx_ra_init_ex` API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK), verification (VK) and returned by the API `sgx_ra_get_keys` (SK, MK).

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_key_exchange.h</code>
--------	---------------------------------

#### `sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t`

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

#### Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t) (
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *g_a // Little Endian
);
```

Note that the 4th parameter this function takes should be in little endian format.

### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_ukey_exchange.h</code>
--------	----------------------------------

#### `sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t`

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

#### Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t) (
```

```

    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
    const sgx_target_info_t *p_qe_target,
    sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce
);

```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_ukey_exchange.h
--------	---------------------

### sgx\_ecall\_get\_msg3\_trusted\_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from `sgx_tkey_exchange.edl`.

### Syntax

```

typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t) (
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint32_t quote_size,
    sgx_report_t* qe_report,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t *p_msg3,
    uint32_t msg3_size
);

```

## Requirements

Header	sgx_ukey_exchange.h
--------	---------------------

### sgx\_platform\_info\_t

This opaque data structure indicates the platform information received from Intel Attestation Server.

### Syntax

```

#define SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE 101
typedef struct _platform_info
{
    uint8_t platform_info[SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE];
} sgx_platform_info_t;

```

## Members

### **platform\_info**

The platform information.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

### **sgx\_update\_info\_bit\_t**

Type for information of what components of Intel SGX need to be updated and how to update them.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _update_info_bit
{
    int ucodeUpdate;
    int csmeFwUpdate;
    int pswUpdate;
} sgx_update_info_bit_t;
```

## Members

### **ucodeUpdate**

Whether the ucode needs to be updated.

### **csmeFwUpdate**

Whether the csme firmware needs to be updated.

### **pswUpdate**

Whether the platform software needs to be updated.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_quote.h
--------	-------------

### **sgx\_dh\_msg1\_t**

Type for MSG1 used in DH secure session establishment.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg1_t
{
```

```

    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_target_info_t target;
} sgx_dh_msg1_t;

```

## Members

### **g\_a (Little Endian)**

Public EC key of responder enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

### **target**

Report target info to be used by the peer enclave to generate the Intel® SGX report in the message 2 of the DH secure session protocol.

## Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
--------	----------

### **sgx\_dh\_msg2\_t**

Type for MSG2 used in DH secure session establishment.

## Syntax

```

typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_msg2_t;

```

## Members

### **g\_b (Little Endian)**

Public EC key of initiator enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

### **report**

Intel® SGX report of initiator enclave of DH session establishment. The first 32-byte of the report\_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g\_a and g\_b, where g\_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g\_b is the EC

public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the `report_data` field is set to all 0s.

### **cmac[SGX\_DH\_MAC\_SIZE]**

AES-CMAC value of `g_b,report`, 2-byte KDF-ID, and 0x00s using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

```
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01 || 'SMK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0x00. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
--------	-----------------------

### **sgx\_dh\_msg3\_t**

Type for MSG3 used in DH secure session establishment.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_t
{
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
    sgx_dh_msg3_body_t msg3_body;
} sgx_dh_msg3_t;
```

## Members

### **cmac[SGX\_DH\_MAC\_SIZE]**

CMAC value of message body of MSG3, using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

```
SMK = AES-CMAC (KDK, 0x01 || 'SMK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)
```

The `key0` used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of `0x00`. The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (`0x01`)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (`0x80`)

### msg3\_body

Variable length message body of MSG3.

#### Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
--------	-----------------------

#### sgx\_dh\_msg3\_body\_t

Type for message body of the MSG3 structure used in DH secure session establishment.

#### Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
{
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint32_t additional_prop_length;
    uint8_t additional_prop[0];
} sgx_dh_msg3_body_t;
```

#### Members

##### report

Intel® SGX report of responder enclave. The first 32-byte of the `report_data` field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of `g_b` and `g_a`, where `g_a` is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and `g_b` is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the `report_data` field is set to all 0s.

##### additional\_prop\_length

Length of additional property field in bytes.



**additional\_prop[0]**

Variable length buffer holding additional data that the responder enclave may provide.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_dh.h
--------	----------

**sgx\_dh\_session\_enclave\_identity\_t**

Type for enclave identity of initiator or responder used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    uint8_t reserved_1[32];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved_2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved_3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
} sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t;
```

**Members****cpu\_svn**

Security version number of CPU.

**reserved\_1[32]**

Reserved 32 bytes.

**attributes**

Intel SGX attributes of enclave.

**mr\_enclave**

Measurement of enclave.

**reserved\_2[32]**

Reserved 32 bytes.

**mr\_signer**

Measurement of enclave signer.

**reserved\_3[96]**

Reserved 96 bytes.

**isv\_prod\_id (Little Endian)**

Product ID of ISV enclave.

**isv\_svn (Little Endian)**

Security version number of ISV enclave.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_dh.h
--------	----------

**sgx\_dh\_session\_role\_t**

Type for role of establishing a DH secure session used in DH secure session establishment.

**Syntax**

```
typedef enum _sgx_dh_session_role_t
{
    SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR,
    SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
} sgx_dh_session_role_t;
```

**Members****SGX\_DH\_SESSION\_INITIATOR**

Initiator of a DH session establishment.

**SGX\_DH\_SESSION\_RESPONDER**

Responder of a DH session establishment.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_dh.h
--------	----------

**sgx\_dh\_session\_t**

Type for session used in DH secure session establishment.

## Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_t
{
    uint8_t sgx_dh_session[SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_session_t;
```

## Members

### **sgx\_dh\_session**

Data of DH session.

The array size of `sgx_dh_session` `SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE` is defined as 200 bytes.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_dh.h</code>
--------	-----------------------

### **sgx\_config\_svn\_t**

16-bits value representing the enclave CONFIGSVN. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_key.h</code>
--------	------------------------

### **sgx\_config\_id\_t**

64-bytes value representing the enclave CONFIGID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_key.h</code>
--------	------------------------

### **sgx\_isvext\_prod\_id\_t**

16-bytes value representing the enclave Extended Product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_report.h</code>
--------	---------------------------

**sgx\_isvfamily\_id\_t**

16-bytes value representing the enclave product Family ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

**sgx\_kss\_config\_t**

Structure of this type contains CONFIGSVN and CONFIGID values for a KSS enabled enclave. You can specify different CONFIGSVN and CONFIGID values for the enclave to have additional control options over the key derivation process.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _sgx_kss_config_t {
    sgx_config_id_t config_id;
    sgx_config_svn_t config_svn;
} sgx_kss_config_t;
```

**Members****config\_id**

64-bytes value representing the enclave CONFIGID.

**config\_svn**

16-bits value representing the enclave CONFIGSVN.

**Requirements**

Header	sgx_urts.h
--------	------------

**align\_req\_t**

`align_req_t` is an offset-length pair used to describe the secrets within a structure.

**Syntax**

```
typedef struct _req_data_t {
    size_t offset;
    size_t len;
} req_data_t;
```

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_secure_align_api.h</code>
--------	-------------------------------------

### **custom\_alignment\_aligned**

`custom_alignment_aligned` is a class template used to align secrets that are statically-defined, for example, on the stack.

## Syntax

```
template<class T, std::size_t A, std::size_t... Ols>
```

```
class custom_alignment_aligned;
```

**T** is the class, structure, or type that needs alignment, for example, a structure representing or containing a cryptographic key.

**A** is the desired, traditional alignment of T. Do not confuse it with the alignment needed to mitigate the vulnerability - the two are related, but different.

**OLs** is a variable-length list of offset-length pairs. Each pair describes a secret within T. If T represents a single secret, there is only one pair, (0, sizeof(T)).

## Requirements

Header	<code>sgx_secure_align.h</code>
--------	---------------------------------

## Error Codes

Table 19 Error code

Value	Error Name	Description
0x0000	SGX_SUCCESS	
0x0001	SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED	An unexpected error.
0x0002	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER	The parameter is incorrect.
0x0003	SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY	There is not enough memory available to complete this operation.
0x0004	SGX_ERROR_	The enclave is lost after power transition or used

	ENCLAVE_LOST	in child process created by fork().
0x0005	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE	The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.
0x0008	SGX_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED	The feature is not supported.
0x000a	SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_FAILURE	Failed to reserve memory for the enclave.
0x1001	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION	The ECALL or OCALL function index is incorrect.
0x1003	SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_TCS	The enclave is out of TCS.
0x1006	SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_CRASHED	The enclave has crashed.
0x1007	SGX_ERROR_ECALL_NOT_ALLOWED	ECALL is not allowed at this time. Possible reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ECALL is not public.</li> <li>• ECALL is blocked by the dynamic entry table.</li> <li>• A nested ECALL is not allowed during global initialization.</li> </ul>
0x1008	SGX_ERROR_OCALL_NOT_ALLOWED	OCALL is not allowed during exception handling.
0x1009	SGX_ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN	Stack overrun occurs within the enclave.
0x2000	SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL	The enclave contains an undefined symbol.
0x2001	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE	The enclave image is incorrect.
0x2002	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID	The enclave ID is invalid.

0x2003	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE	The signature is invalid.
0x2004	SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE	The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.
0x2005	SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC	There is not enough EPC available to load the enclave or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete the operation requested.
0x2006	SGX_ERROR_NO_DEVICE	Cannot open the device.
0x2007	SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT	Page mapping failed in the driver.
0x2009	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA	The metadata is incorrect.
0x200C	SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY	Device is busy.
0x200D	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION	Metadata version is inconsistent between uRTS and <code>sgx_sign</code> or the uRTS is incompatible with the current platform.
0x200E	SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE	The target enclave (32/64 bit or HS/Sim) mode is incompatible with the uRTS mode.
0x200F	SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS	Cannot open the enclave file.
0x2010	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC	The MiscSelect or MiscMask settings are incorrect.
0x2011	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_LAUNCH_TOKEN	The launch token is incorrect.
0x3001	SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH	Report verification error.
0x3002	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE	The enclave is not authorized.
0x3003	SGX_ERROR_	The CPU SVN is beyond the CPU SVN value of

	INVALID_CPUSVN	the platform.
0x3004	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN	The ISV SVN is greater than the ISV SVN value of the enclave.
0x3005	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME	Unsupported key name value.
0x4001	SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE	AE service does not respond or the requested service is not supported.
0x4002	SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT	The request to AE service timed out.
0x4003	SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB	Intel® EPID blob verification error.
0x4004	SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE	Enclave has no privilege to get a launch token.
0x4005	SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED	The Intel® EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and repeating the operation will not remedy the revocation.
0x4006	SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED	Intel® SGX requires update.
0x4007	SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE	Network connecting or proxy setting issue is encountered.
0x4008	SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID	The session is invalid or ended by the server.
0x400a	SGX_ERROR_BUSY	The requested service is temporarily not available.
0x400c	SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND	The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.
0x400d	SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT	The caller does not have the access right to the specified VMC.
0x400e	SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP	No monotonic counter is available.
0x400f	SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA	Monotonic counters reached quota limit.
0x4011	SGX_ERROR_KDF_	Key derivation function does not match during



	MISMATCH	key exchange.
0x4012	SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM	Intel® EPID Provisioning failed because the platform is not recognized by the back-end server.
0x6001	SGX_ERROR_PCL_ENCRYPTED	(Intel® SGX PCL) Trying to load an encrypted enclave using the wrong API or with wrong parameters
0x6002	SGX_ERROR_PCL_NOT_ENCRYPTED	(Intel® SGX PCL) Trying to load an enclave that is not encrypted using API or parameters for encrypted enclaves
0x6003	SGX_ERROR_PCL_MAC_MISMATCH	(Intel® SGX PCL) The runtime AES-GCM-128 MAC result of an encrypted section does not match the one at build time.
0x6004	SGX_ERROR_PCL_SHA_MISMATCH	(Intel® SGX PCL) The runtime SHA256 of the decryption key does not match the one at build time.
0x6005	SGX_ERROR_PCL_GUID_MISMATCH	(Intel® SGX PCL) The GUID in the decryption key sealed blob does not match the one at build time.
0x7001	SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS	The file is in a bad status. Run <code>sgx_clearerr</code> to try and fix it.
0x7002	SGX_ERROR_FILE_NO_KEY_ID	The Key ID field is all zeros, cannot re-generate the encryption key.
0x7003	SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH	The current file name is different than the original file name (not allowed, substitution attack).
0x7004	SGX_ERROR_FILE_NOT_SGX_FILE	The file is not an Intel® SGX file.
0x7005	SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_OPEN_RECOVERY_FILE	A recovery file cannot be opened, so the flush operation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).
0x7006	SGX_ERROR_FILE_CANT_WRITE_RECOVERY_FILE	A recovery file cannot be written, so the flush operation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).
0x7007	SGX_ERROR_FILE_RECOVERY_NEEDED	When opening the file, recovery is needed, but the recovery process failed.
0x7008	SGX_ERROR_FILE_	fflush operation (to the disk) failed (only used

	FLUSH_FAILED	when no EXXX is returned).
0x7009	SGX_ERROR_FILE_CLOSE_FAILED	fclose operation (to the disk) failed (only used when no EXXX is returned).
0x8001	SGX_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ATT_KEY_ID	Platform quoting infrastructure does not support the key.
0x8002	SGX_ERROR_ATT_KEY_CERTIFICATION_FAILURE	Failed to generate and certify the attestation key.
0x8003	SGX_ERROR_ATT_KEY_UNINITIALIZED	The platform quoting infrastructure does not have the attestation key available to generate a quote.
0x8004	SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATT_KEY_CERT_DATA	The data returned by the <code>sgx_get_quote_config()</code> of the platform library is invalid.
0x8005	SGX_ERROR_PLATFORM_CERT_UNAVAILABLE	The PCK Cert for the platform is not available.

## Security Issues Which May Require More Than Using the Latest Intel SGX SDK

This section lists security issues where mitigation may require more than using the latest Intel SGX SDK. The issues are listed in reverse chronological order.

Some of the issues are associated with the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### **INTEL-SA-00657, INTEL-SA-00767 (Addressing Stale Data Read from Legacy xAPIC)**

This section describes changes introduced in version 2.17.101.1 of the Intel SGX SDK for Linux.

[INTEL-SA-00657](#) describes an issue, named Stale Data Read from Legacy xAPIC, that affects SGX. As explained here in the associated technical paper, [the associated technical paper](#), Intel has provided a microcode update (MCU) to help mitigate the issue. However and as the paper explains, the best security for some enclaves may also require enclave SW changes. In the future, Intel expects to provide an additional MCU that will mitigate the issue such that enclave SW changes to help mitigate the issue will no longer be needed. This section describes:

1. changes in the Intel SGX SDK related to helping mitigate the issue.
2. changes that SGX developers may need to make to their enclaves, beyond rebuilding their enclaves with the new SDK, to achieve better security.

The SDK changes help ensure that enclave reads of memory outside the enclave are 8-byte-aligned and a multiple of 8 bytes in size (henceforth, safe reads). The new code does this through simple double-buffering where the destination of a safe read is a temporary buffer (the double-buffer). Then, this temporary buffer serves as the source of the original read. For example, suppose an enclave needs to read 100 bytes of memory outside the enclave, starting at address 0x10000001. One safe way to do this is for the enclave to read 104 (=8\*13) bytes in multiples of 8 bytes, starting at address 0x10000000, to a temporary buffer inside the enclave. Then, copy 100 bytes starting at the second byte (offset 1) of the temporary buffer to the original, non-temporary destination buffer. (Another safe way would recognize that the 88 bytes starting at 0x10000008 do not need to pass through a temporary buffer.)

The new SDK includes an updated Edger8r tool that generates code that does safe reads of memory outside the enclave. The updated SDK also has updated `memcpy` and `memcpy_s` functions. The updated versions check whether the source and/or destination buffers are outside the enclave and operate appropriately based on the results of these checks. (Checking the destination buffer is associated with the mitigation for [INTEL-SA-00615](#).) The updated SDK also introduces a `memcpy_nochecks` function that doesn't check where the buffers are. `memcpy_nochecks` can be used in cases where it's known that source and destination buffers are both inside the enclave.

For enclaves that read memory outside the enclave using code that isn't associated with ECALLs or OCALLs and for enclaves that use the EDL `[user_check]` attribute or that use nested pointers, the fact that the new Edger8r generates code with mitigations doesn't help. In these cases, SGX developers will still get [INTEL-SA-00657](#) mitigations if they use `memcpy` or `memcpy_s` to do the reads. Otherwise, developers of code like this may need to change their code to either mimic the behavior in the updated `memcpy` functions or convert assignment statements that cause reads of memory outside the enclave to `memcpy` or `memcpy_s` calls.

On affected processors, mitigation of these issues requires either

1. Intel microcode released February 2023
2. Disabling Hyper-Threading (if applicable)

Or

1. Intel microcode released August 2022
2. Disabling Hyper-Threading (if applicable)
3. SW mitigations described above

### SW Hardening

If the August 2022 microcode is used, then affected processors will get the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### [INTEL-SA-00615 \(Mitigations for Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities\)](#)

[INTEL-SA-00615](#) describes four vulnerabilities, each with their own CVE. These four vulnerabilities are collectively known as Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. The four CVEs are [CVE-2022-21123](#), [CVE-2022-21125](#), [CVE-2022-21127](#) and [CVE-2022-21166](#). [CVE-2022-21127](#) does not require SW

mitigations for SGX; the latest processor microcode alone is sufficient. The other CVEs require both processor microcode and SW to mitigate.

Because the Intel SGX security model does not trust the OS, a malicious OS could map MMIO memory into the untrusted memory space of an application that uses one or more Intel SGX enclaves. This could include the region of untrusted memory used for parameter passing to/from ECALLs and OCALLs, or any external buffers that an enclave might use to communicate with its application. If the malicious OS did such a mapping, then when the enclave wrote to this memory, it could propagate the stale data in its fill buffers into the uncore, where it could later be extracted by malicious software.

The mitigations below assume that Intel HT Technology is disabled to ensure that once the fill buffers are overwritten, a sibling thread cannot repopulate them. The necessary mitigation depends on how the enclave is accessing the non-enclave memory regions. See the [Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities technical paper](#) for more information.

Beginning with version 2.17.0.3, Intel has updated the Intel SGX SDK for Linux and the Edger8r tool included in the SDK to help prevent fill buffer data exposure through the code generated by the Edger8r tool. Similarly, the Intel SGX SDK now includes updates that will help prevent fill buffer data exposure through the code used by enclaves that use the switchless mode supported by the Intel SDK.

For enclaves that write to memory outside the enclave using code that isn't associated with ECALLs or OCALLs and for enclaves that use the EDL `[user_check]` attribute or that use nested pointers, SGX developers must add mitigations to their enclave source code to help prevent fill buffer data exposure. In order to mitigate, all writes to untrusted memory (that is, memory outside the enclave) must

1. either be preceded by the `VERW` instruction (with memory, not register, operand) and followed by the `MFENCE; LFENCE` instruction sequence or
2. must be in multiples of 8 bytes, aligned to an 8-byte boundary.

Specifically, for narrow (not a multiple of 8 bytes) or unaligned enclave writes to untrusted memory, the recommended mitigation is, for the narrow, one-byte case:

```
; rdi contains the write address outside the
enclave
```

```
SUBQ $8, %rsp ; assume stack exists and at least
8 bytes of stack available

MOVW %ds, (%rsp)

VERW (%rsp)

MOVB %al, (%rdi) ; narrow write to memory out-
side the enclave

MFENCE

LFENCE

ADDQ $8, %rsp
```

Note that the VERW instruction updates the ZF bit in the EFLAGS register, so exercise caution when using the above sequence in-line in existing code. Note also that the latest processor microcode has additions to VERW that are necessary for VERW to clear the fill buffers in the above sequence.

Mitigating a narrow or unaligned write to memory outside the enclave requires the instruction that does the write to be a single memory operand instruction; `MOVS` or `REP MOVS`, for example, cannot be used (unless the associated writes are all multiples of eight bytes and aligned). Read-modify-write instructions like `ADD` or even `CMPXCHG` can be treated like single memory operand write instructions, that is, add the mitigation sequence if the memory operand is narrow or unaligned. For example, for `CMPXCHG` with a 32-bit memory operand:

```
; rdi contains the address outside the enclave
; ecx contains the "new" value
; eax contains the "compare" value

SUBQ $8, %rsp ; assume stack exists and at least
8 bytes of stack available

MOVW %ds, (%rsp)

VERW (%rsp)

LOCK CMPXCHGL %ecx, (%rdi)

MFENCE

LFENCE
```

```
ADDQ $8, %rsp
```

The latest Intel SGX SDK includes new utility functions to facilitate SGX developers mitigating their code: `memcpy_verw`, `memcpy_verw_s`, `memmove_verw`, `memmove_verw_s`, `memset_verw` and `memset_verw_s`. These functions include width and alignment checks and will use the mitigation sequence as needed based on the results of these checks. They do not check whether the destination (write) address is outside the enclave; this is the responsibility of the calling code.

SGX developers should increment the ISVSVN values of their enclaves with the mitigations for Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities ([INTEL-SA-00615](#)).

### SW Hardening

Affected processors will get the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### Addressing MXCSR Configuration Dependent Timing

[Data Operand Independent Timing ISA Guidance](#) describes MXCSR Configuration Dependent Timing (MCDT) where SW is needed to help ensure instruction timing that is independent of the values of the instruction's data operands.

If the intended operation of an Intel SGX enclave, for the lifetime of the enclave, is achievable with `MXCSR=0x1FBF`, then any loads of `MXCSR` (via `LDMXCSR`, `XRSTOR`, etc.) should be of `0x1FBF`. Enclaves that don't use SSE\* floating point instructions fall into this category. There should be an `LFENCE` between any load of `MXCSR` (even of `0x1FBF`) and subsequent use of any affected instruction (see [Data Operand Independent Timing ISA Guidance](#)).

If an enclave is compatible with `MXCSR=0x1FBF` and uses any of the affected instructions, then the beginning of each enclave `ECALL` should set `MXCSR` to `0x1FBF` and then execute an `LFENCE` instruction. The Intel SGX SDK has been changed to do this alleviating the need for SGX developers using the Intel SGX SDK to do so.

If the intended operation of an Intel SGX enclave is not achievable with `MXCSR=0x1FBF`, then the following mitigation sequence should be used:

```
; at this point, MXCSR != 0x1FBF
STMXCSR save_val
LDMXCSR value_0x1fbf
```

```

LFENCE
; Constant-time code using instructions affected
by MCDT
LFENCE
LDMXCSR save_val

```

### SW Hardening

This issue is not associated with the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### INTEL-SA-00334 (Enable CVE-2020-0551 Mitigation)

The Intel® SGX SDK facilitates mitigation of CVE-2020-0551, aka LVI (Load Value Injection). The Intel® SGX SDK supports two mitigation levels. One level addresses all instructions vulnerable to LVI. This level is called CVE-2020-0551-Load (Load, for short). The second mitigation level addresses vulnerable control flow instructions only and is called CVE-2020-0551-CF (CF, for short).

For more information on LVI, see [CVE-2020-0551](#) and [Intel's LVI tech paper](#).

### Mitigation enabled Trust Libraries

The Intel® SGX SDK includes three sets of trusted libraries: Unmitigated, Load and CF.

Mitigation Level	Path
Unmitigated	[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]/lib64/
Load	[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]/lib64/cve_2020_0551_load
CF	[Intel SGX SDK Install Path]/lib64/cve_2020_0551_cf

The MITIGATION-CVE-2020-0551 make variable is used to select the desired set of libraries.

MITIGATION-CVE-2020-0551 make variable value	Which set of trusted libraries?
Not set	Unmitigated
LOAD	Load
CF	CF

See the Intel® SGX SDK SampleEnclave sample ([Intel SGX SDK Install Path]/SampleCode/SampleEnclave) for an example.



Note that the MITIGATION-CVE-2020-0551 make variable affects how your code is built by adding the same mitigations to this code. This is generally what is desired. However, it is possible to use a mitigation level for the code that is different from the mitigation level of the Intel® SGX SDK trusted libraries. Before describing how you can do this, the necessary tools and their options must be described.

Required tools:

- GCC 7.3 or higher.
- GNU Binutils 2.36 or higher that include the mitigation support. Until a critical mass of Linux\* distributions include 2.36 or higher, Intel will post the required Binutils tools here: [01.org distribution](#). The latest GNU Binutils can be found here: [Binutils-GNU Project - Free Software Foundation](#).

Required options:

	Load mitigation level	CF mitigation level
<b>GCC</b>	<code>-mindirect-branch-register</code> <code>-mfunction-return=thunk-extern</code>	
<b>GNU assembler, as</b>	<code>-mfence-after-load=yes</code> <code>-mfence-before-ret=not</code>	<code>-mfence-before-indirect-branch=register</code> <code>-mfence-before-ret=not</code>

If you use a mitigation level that is different from the mitigation level of the Intel® SGX SDK trusted libraries, you must do the following:

- Do not use the MITIGATION-CVE-2020-0551 make variable.
- Specify exactly which Intel® SGX SDK trusted libraries to use.
- Use the options in the table above as appropriate.

#### Create CVE-2020-0551 Mitigation enabled trusted (enclave) project

Users can refer to [Intel SGX SDK Install Path] `SampleCode/SampleEnclave` to create CVE-2020-0551 mitigation enabled new projects.

There are mainly three changes in the Makefile compared with the previous version of `SampleEnclave`:

- Include `buildenv.mk`.
- Append `MITIGATION_CFLAGS` to `Enclave_C_Flags` and `Enclave_Cpp_Flags`
- Append `MITIGATION_LDFLAGS` to `Enclave_Link_Flags`
- Replace `SGX_LIBRARY_PATH` to `SGX_TRUSTED_LIBRARY_PATH`.

Users can follow the same way to create CVE-2020-0551 mitigation enabled trust projects.

### Enable Mitigation for existing trusted project

Users can refer to [Intel SGX SDK Install Path] `SampleCode/SampleEnclave` to create CVE-2020-0551 mitigation enabled new projects.

There are mainly three changes in the Makefile compared with the previous version of `SampleEnclave`:

- Include `buildenv.mk`.
- Append `MITIGATION_CFLAGS` to `Enclave_C_Flags` and `Enclave_Cpp_Flags`.
- Append `MITIGATION_LDFLAGS` to `Enclave_Link_Flags`
- Replace `SGX_LIBRARY_PATH` to `SGX_TRUSTED_LIBRARY_PATH`.

Users can follow the same way to enable the CVE-2020-0551 mitigation for the existing trust projects.

### SW Hardening

Affected processors will get the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### [INTEL-SA-00219](#)

On some processors, mitigation of this issue requires disabling Intel integrated graphics. As an alternative, Intel SGX developers can follow the guidance in [INTEL-SA-00219 SGX SW Guidance](#)

### SW Hardening

This issue is not associated with the SW hardening needed attestation response.

### [INTEL-SA-00088 \(includes Spectre v1\)](#)

One approach for mitigating Spectre v1 in SGX enclaves is described in

[INTEL-SA-00088 \(Spectre v1\) SGX SW Guidance.](#)

**SW Hardening**

This issue is not associated with the SW hardening needed attestation response.

## Appendix

This topic provides the following reference information:

- [Unsupported GCC\\* Compiler Options for Enclaves](#)
- [Unsupported GCC\\* Built-in Functions](#)
- [Unsupported C Standard Functions](#)
- [Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions](#)
- [Unsupported C and C++ Keywords](#)
- [C++11 Support on Linux\\* OS](#)

### Unsupported GCC\* Compiler Options for Enclaves

The following GCC\* options are not supported to build enclaves.

Table 20 Unsupported GCC Compiler Options

Option	Category	Remark
-fgnu-tm	Options controlling C dialect.	Depends on libitm (transactional memory).
-fhosted		OS functions not supported within enclaves.
-fuse-cxa-atexit	Options controlling C++ dialect.	Depends on atexit(), which is not supported within an enclave.
All options	Options controlling objective-C and objective-C++.	Objective C/C++ not supported.
All options	Options for debugging a program.	All options because of runtime support required. Separate Intel® SGX debugger support provided.
-fmudflap, -fmudflapth, -fmudflapir	Optimization options.	Dependent on libmudflap.
-fexec-charset=charset, -fwide-exec-charset=charset	Options controlling the pre-processor.	Only providing partial support for UTF-8.
-x objective-c		Objective-C is not supported within an enclave.

-lobjc	Linker options.	Objective C not supported.
-pie, -s		Used for executables.
-shared-libgcc, -static-libgcc		Enclaves cannot depend on libgcc.
-static-libstdc++		Intel® SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX version of the C++ standard library.
-T script		Need to control the format of enclave code.
-mglibc	Hardware models and configurations for GNU*/Linux* options.	Intel SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX compatible C standard library.
-muclibc, -mbionic, -mandroid, -tno-android-cc, -tno-android-ld		Not applicable.
-msoft-float	Hardware models and configurations for Intel & AMD* x86-x64 options.	Run-time emulation of floating point is not supported.
-m96bit-long-double		96-bit not supported.
-mthreads		Depends on mingwthrd.
-mcmmodel=small, -mcmmodel=kernel, -mcmmodel=medium, -mcmmodel=large		Linker will fail.
All options	Hardware models and configurations for Intel & AMD* x86-x64 Windows* options	All options because these are only used with Cygwin* or MinGW*.
-fbounds-check	Options for code generation conventions	Currently for Java* and Fortran* front-ends, not C/C++.
-fpie, -fPIE		Only pertains to executable files.
-fpie, -pie		compilation option -fpie and linking option -pie cannot be used at the same time under simulation mode if TLS support is required.
-fpie, -shared -fpic		compilation option -fpie and linking option -shared -fpic cannot be used at the same time under both simulation mode and 64-bit hardware mode if TLS support is required.
-finstrument-functions		ISV would need to provide support for functions _

		__cyg_profile_func_enter and __cyg_profile_func_exit if this option is needed.
-fsplit-stack		Requires libgcc runtime support.

## Unsupported GCC\* Built-in Functions

The following table illustrates unsupported GCC\* built-in functions inside the enclave. Using any of these built-in functions will result in a linker error during the compilation of the enclave.

The complete list of GCC built-in functions is available at [http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.7.2/gcc/X86-Built\\_002din-Functions.html#X86-Built\\_002din-Functions](http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.7.2/gcc/X86-Built_002din-Functions.html#X86-Built_002din-Functions).

Table 21 Unsupported GCC Compiler Built-in Functions

<b>Non supported: Math built-ins</b>		
__builtin_signbitd32	__builtin_signbitd64	__builtin_signbitd128
__builtin_finitd32	__builtin_finitd64	__builtin_finitd128
__builtin_isinfd32	__builtin_isinfd64	__builtin_isinfd128
__builtin_isnand32	__builtin_isnand64	__builtin_isnand64
<b>Not Supported: String/memory built-ins</b>		
__builtin_strcat	__builtin_strcpy	__builtin_strdup
__builtin_stpcpy		
<b>Not Supported: I/O related built-ins</b>		
__builtin_fprintf	__builtin_fprintf_unlocked	__builtin_putc
__builtin_putc_unlocked	__builtin_fputc	__builtin_fputc_unlocked
__builtin_fputs	__builtin_fputs_unlocked	__builtin_fscanf
__builtin_fwrite	__builtin_fwrite_unlocked	__builtin_printf
__builtin_printf_unlocked	__builtin_putchar	__builtin_putchar_unlocked
__builtin_puts	__builtin_puts_unlocked	__builtin_scanf
__builtin_sprintf	__builtin_sscanf	__builtin_vfprintf
__builtin_vfscanf	__builtin_vprintf	__builtin_vscanf
__builtin_vsprintf	__builtin_vsscanf	
<b>Not Supported: wctype built-in</b>		
__builtin_iswalnum	__builtin_iswalpha	__builtin_iswblank
__builtin_iswcntrl	__builtin_iswdigit	__builtin_iswgraph
__builtin_iswlower	__builtin_iswprint	__builtin_iswpunct
__builtin_iswspace	__builtin_iswupper	__builtin_iswxdigit

__builtin_towlower	__builtin_toupper	
<b>Not Supported: Process control built-ins</b>		
__builtin_execl	__builtin_execlp	__builtin_execl_e
__builtin_execv	__builtin_execvp	__builtin_execve
__builtin_exit	__builtin_fork	__builtin__exit
__builtin__Exit		
<b>Non Supported: Object size checking built-ins</b>		
__builtin___fprintf_chk	__builtin___printf_chk	__builtin___vfprintf_chk
__builtin___vprintf_chk		
<b>Non Supported: Miscellaneous built-ins</b>		
__builtin_dcgettext	__builtin_dgettext	__builtin_gettext
__builtin_strfmon		
<b>Non Supported: Profiling Hooks</b>		
__cyg_profile_func_enter	__cyg_profile_func_exit	
<b>Non Supported: TLS Emulation</b>		
target.emutls.get_address	target.emutls.register_common	
<b>Non supported: Ring 0 built-ins</b>		
_writefsbase_u32	_writefsbase_u64	_writegsbase_u32
_writegsbase_u64	__rdpmc	__rdtsc
__rdtscp		
<b>Non Supported: OpenMP* built-ins</b>		
__builtin_omp_get_thread_num	__builtin_omp_get_num_threads	
__builtin_GOMP_atomic_start	__builtin_GOMP_atomic_end	
__builtin_GOMP_barrier	__builtin_GOMP_taskwait	
__builtin_GOMP_taskyield	__builtin_GOMP_critical_start	
__builtin_GOMP_critical_end	__builtin_GOMP_critical_name_start	
__builtin_GOMP_critical_name_end	__builtin_GOMP_loop_static_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_guided_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_static_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_guided_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_static_next	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_next	__builtin_GOMP_loop_guided_next	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_next	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_static_next	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_next	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_guided_next	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_next	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_start	
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_	

	start
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_next
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_next
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_next
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_next	__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_next
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_next	__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_static_start
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_next	__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_dynamic_start
__builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_next	__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_guided_start
__builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_runtime_start	__builtin_GOMP_loop_end
__builtin_GOMP_loop_end_nowait	__builtin_GOMP_ordered_start
__builtin_GOMP_ordered_end	__builtin_GOMP_parallel_start
__builtin_GOMP_parallel_end	__builtin_GOMP_task
__builtin_GOMP_sections_start	__builtin_GOMP_sections_next
__builtin_GOMP_parallel_sections_start	__builtin_GOMP_sections_end
__builtin_GOMP_sections_end_nowait	__builtin_GOMP_single_start
__builtin_GOMP_single_copy_start	__builtin_GOMP_single_copy_end

## Unsupported C Standard Functions

You cannot use the following Standard C functions within the enclave; otherwise, the compilation would fail.

Table 22 Unsupported C Standard Functions

Header file	Header file in Intel SGX?	Unsupported Definition	
		Macros/Types	Functions
complex.h	No	complex, _complex_I, imaginary, _imaginary_I, I,	cacos(), cacosf(), cacosl(), casin(), casinf(), casinl(), catan(), catanf(), catanl(), ccos(), ccosf(), ccosl(), csin(), csinf(), csinl(), ctan(), ctanf(), ctanl(), cacosh(), cacoshf(), cacoshl(), casinh(), casinhf(), casinhl(), catanh(),



Header file	Header file in Intel SGX?	Unsupported Definition	
		Macros/Types	Functions
		#pragma STDC CX_LIMITED_RANGE on-off-switch	catanhf(), catanhl(), ccosh(), ccoshf(), ccoshl(), csinh(), csinhf(), csinhl(), ctanh(), ctanhf(), ctanhl(), cexp(), cexpf(), cexpl(), clog(), clogf(), clogl(), cabs(), cabsf(), cabsl(), cpow(), cpowf(), cpowl(), csqrt(), csqrtf(), csqrtl(), carg(), cargf(), cargl(), cimag(), cimagf(), cimagl(), conj(), conjf(), conjl(), cproj(), cprojf(), cprojl(), creal(), crealf(), creall()
fenv.h	No	fenv_t, fexcept_t, FE_DIVBYZERO, FE_INEXACT, FE_INVALID, FE_OVERFLOW, FE_UNDERFLOW, FE_ALL_EXCEPT, FE_DOWNWARD, FE_TONEAREST, FE_TOWARDZERO, FE_UPWARD, FE_DFL_ENV, #pragma STDC FENV_ACCESS on-off-switch	feclearexcept(), fegetexceptflag(), feraiseexcept(), fesetexceptflag(), fetestexcept(), fegetround(), fesetround(), fegetenv(), feholdexcept(), fesetenv(), feupdateenv()
inttypes.h	Yes	SCNdN, SCNiN, SCNoN, SCNuN, SCNxN, SCNdLEASTN, SCNiLEASTN, SCNoLEASTN, SCNuLEASTN, SCNxLEASTN,	wcstoimax(), wcstoumax()

Header file	Header file in Intel SGX?	Unsupported Definition	
		Macros/Types	Functions
		SCNdFASTN, SCNiFASTN, SCNoFASTN, SCNuFASTN, SCNxFASTN,SCNdMAX, SCNiMAX, SCNoMAX, SCNuMAX, SCNxMAX, SCNdPTR, SCNiPTR, SCNoPTR, SCNuPTR, SCNxPTR	
locale.h	No	LC_ALL, LC_COLLATE, LC_CTYPE, LC_MONETARY, LC_NUMERIC, LC_TIME, struct lconv	setlocale(), localeconv()
signal.h	No	sig_atomic_t, SIG_DFL, SIG_ERR, SIG_IGN, SIGABRT, SIGFPE, SIGILL, SIGINT, SIGSEGV, SIGTERM	signal(), raise()
stdio.h	Yes	fpos_t, _IOFBF, _IOLBF, _IONBF, FILENAME_MAX, FOPEN_MAX, L_tmpnam, SEEK_CUR, SEEK_END,	remove(), rename(), tmpfile(), tmpnam(), fclose(), fflush(), fopen(), freopen(), setbuf(), setvbuf(), fprintf(), fscanf(), printf(), scanf(), sprintf(), sscanf(), vfprintf(), vfscanf(), vprintf() (), vscanf(), vsprintf(), vsscanf(), fgetc(), fgets (), fputc(), fputs(), getc(), getchar(), gets(), putc(), putchar(), puts(), ungetc(), fread(), fwrite(), fgetpos(), fseek(), fsetpos(), ftell(), rewind(), clearerr(), feof(), ferror(), perror()

Header file	Header file in Intel SGX?	Unsupported Definition	
		Macros/Types	Functions
		SEEK_SET, TMP_MAX, stderr, stdin, stdout	
stdlib.h	Yes		rand(), srand(), exit(), _Exit(), getenv(), system()
string.h	Yes		strcpy(), strcat(), strstr()*
tgmath.h	No		
time.h	Yes		clock(), time(), ctime(), gmtime(), localtime()
wchar.h	Yes		fwprintf(), fwscanf(), swscanf(), vfwprintf(), vfwscanf(), vswscanf(), vwprintf(), vwscanf(), wprintf(), wscanf(), fgetwc(), fgetws(), fputwc(), fputws(), fwide(), getwc(), getwchar(), putwc(), putwchar(), ungetwc(), wcstod(), wcstof(), wcstold(), wcstol(), wcstoll(), wcstoul(), wcstoull(), wcscopy(), wcscat(), wcsftime()
wctype.h	Yes		iswalnum(), iswalpha(), iswblank(), iswcntrl(), iswdigit(), iswgraph(), iswlower(), iswprint(), iswpunct(), iswspace(), iswupper(), iswxdigit(), wctype(), towlower(), towupper(), towctrans(), wctrans()

(\*) The trusted standard C library does not support `char strstr(const char*, const char*)`. However, it does support the variant `const char* strstr(const char*, const char*)` is supported.

---

### **NOTE**

Trusted C library is enhanced to avoid format string attacks. Any attempts to use `%n` in `printf`-family functions such as `snprintf` will result in a run-time error.

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### **Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions**

The following table lists unsupported C++11 classes and functions inside the enclave.

Table 23 Utilities library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cstdlib	Partial	
csignal	No	
csetjmp	No	
cstdarg	Yes	
typeinfo	Partial	
typeid	Yes	
type_traits	Yes	
bitset	Yes	
functional	Yes	
utility	Yes	
ctime	Partial	
chrono	No	
cstddef	Yes	
initializer_list	Yes	
tuple	Yes	

Table 24 Dynamic memory management

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
memory	Yes	
new	Partial	
scoped_allocator	Yes	

Table 25 Numeric limits

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cfloat	Yes	
cinttypes	Partial	
climits	Yes	
cstdint	Partial	
limits	Yes	

Table 26 Error handling

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cassert	Yes	
cerrno	Yes	
exception	Partial	nested_exception

stdexcept	Yes	
system_error	Yes	

Table 27 Strings library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cctype	Partial	
cstring	Partial	
cuchar	No	
cwchar	Partial	
cwctype	Partial	
string	Yes	

Table 28 Containers library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
array	Yes	
dequeue	Yes	
forward_list	Yes	
list	Yes	
map	Yes	
queue	Yes	
set	Yes	
stack	Yes	
unordered_map	Yes	
unordered_set	Yes	
vector	Yes	

Table 29 Algorithms library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
algorithm	Partial	

Table 30 Iterators library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
iterator	Yes	

Table 31 Numerics library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cfenv	No	

cmath	Partial	
complex	Yes	
numeric	Yes	
random	Yes	
ratio	Yes	
valarray	Yes	

Table 32 Input/Output library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cstdio	Partial	
fstream	No	
iomanip	Partial	Functions <code>get_money</code> , <code>put_money</code> , <code>get_time</code> , <code>put_time</code> are not supported.
ios	Yes	
iosfwd	Yes	
iostream	No	
istream	Partial	Formatted input is not supported.
ostream	Partial	Formatted output is not supported.
sstream	Partial	
streambuf	Yes	
stringstream	Yes	

Table 33 Localization library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
locale	No	
codecvt	No	
locale	Partial	<code>std::ctype&lt;char&gt;</code> and <code>std::ctype&lt;wchar_t&gt;</code> are the only supported facets.

Table 34 Regular expressions library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
regex	No	

Table 35 Atomic operations library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
atomic	Yes	

Table 36 Thread library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
condition_variable	Partial	
future	No	
mutex	Partial	timed_mutex, recursive_timed_mutex
thread	No	

Table 37 C compatibility headers

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
ccomplex	Yes	
ciso646	Yes	This header file is empty in a conforming implementation
cstdalign	Yes	
cstdbool	Yes	
ctgmath	Yes	

### Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

The following keywords are not supported in an enclave.

Table 38 Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

__transaction_atomic	__transaction_relaxed	__transaction_cancel
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The following GCC\* specific attributes are not supported in an enclave.

Table 39 Unsupported GCC\* Compiler Attributes

destructor	transaction_callable	transaction_unsafe
transaction_safe	transaction_may_cancel_outer	transaction_pure
transaction_wrap	disinterrupt	

### C++11 Support on Linux\* OS

Although C++11 is considered the baseline, the availability of certain C++11 features depends on the GCC\* compiler version and/or a specific compiler option. The table below summarizes the C++11 features available when you use the GCC compiler option `-std=c++11` and link the enclave with `sgx_tcxx` as the standard C++ library.

Table 40 Supported C++11 Language Features

<b>C++11 Language Feature</b>
Alignment support
Allowing move constructors to throw [noexcept]
Bidirectional fences
C99 preprocessor
Data-dependency ordering: atomics and memory model
Declared type of an expression
Default template arguments for function templates
Defaulted and deleted functions
Delegating constructors
Dynamic initialization and destruction with concurrency
Explicit conversion operators
Explicit virtual overrides
Expression SFINAE
Extended friend declarations
Extending sizeof
Extern templates
Forward declarations for enums
Generalized attributes
Generalized constant expressions
Inheriting constructors
Initialization of class objects by rvalues
Initializer lists
Inline namespaces
Lambdas: New wording for C++0x lambdas
Local and unnamed types as template arguments
Memory model
Minimal support for garbage collection
New character types
Non-static data member initializers
Null pointer constant
R-value references
Range-based for
Raw string literals
Right angle brackets
Sequence points



<b>C++11 Language Feature</b>
Solving the SFINAE problem for expressions
Standard layout types
Static assertions
Strong compare and exchange
Strongly-typed enums
Template aliases
Thread-local storage
Unicode strings literals
Universal character name literals
Unrestricted unions
User-defined literals
Variadic templates
__func__ predefined identifier
auto-typed variables
long long

### C++14 Support on Linux\* OS

Although C++14 is considered to be the baseline, the availability of certain C++14 features depends on the GCC\* compiler version and/or the compiler option. The table below summarizes the C++14 features that are available when you use the GCC compiler option `std=c++14` and link the enclave with `sgx_tcxx` as the standard C++ library.

**Table 41 Supported C++14 Language Features**

<b>C++14 Language Feature</b>
heterogeneous lookup
function return type deduction
variable template
binary literals
digit separators
generic lambdas
lambda capture expressions
attribute <code>[[deprecated]]</code>
aggregate member initialization
relaxed constexpr restrictions
alternate type deduction on declaration

**Table 42 Supported C++14 Library Features**

<b>C++14 Library Feature</b>
std::make_unique
std::integral_constant
std::integer_sequence
std::cbegin
std::cend
std::crbegin
std::crend
std::exchange
std::is_final
std::quoted
std::equal new overload
std::mismatch new overload
std::is_permutation new overload
standard user-defined literals

### **C++17\_Support\_on\_Linux**

Although C++17 is considered to be the baseline, the availability of certain C++17 features depends on the GCC\* compiler version and/or the compiler option. The table below summarizes the C++17 features that are available when you use the GCC compiler option `std=c++17` and link the enclave with `sgx_tccxx` as the standard C++ library.

**Table 43 Supported C++17 Language Features**

<b>C++17 Language Feature</b>
fold-expressions
class template argument deduction
non-type template parameters declared with auto
compile-time if constexpr
inline variables
structured bindings
initializers for if and switch
u8 character literal
simplified nested namespaces
using-declaration declaring multiple names
made noexcept part of type system
new order of evaluation rules

<b>C++17 Language Feature</b>
guaranteed copy elision
temporary materialization
lambda capture of *this
constexpr lambda
attribute namespaces don't have to repeat
__has_include
new attributes <code>[[fallthrough]]</code> <code>[[maybe_unused]]</code> <code>[[nodiscard]]</code>

Table 44 Supported C++17 Library Features

<b>C++17 Library Feature</b>
std::apply
std::make_from_tuple
std::any
std::optional
std::variant
searchers
std::as_const
std::not_fn
uninitialized memory algorithms
std::destroy_at
std::destroy
std::destroy_n
std::uninitialized_move
std::uninitialized_value_construct
weak_from_this
std::aligned_alloc
transparent std::owner_less
array support for std::shared_ptr
allocation functions with explicit alignment
std::byte
std::conjunction/std::disjunction/std::negation
type trait variable templates
std::is_swappable/std::is_invocable/std::is_aggregate
std::has_unique_object_representations
std::clamp/std::reduce/std::inclusive_scan/std::exclusive_scan/std::gcd/std::lcm
map/set extract and merge, map/unordered_map try_emplace and insert_or_assign

<b>C++17 Library Feature</b>
contiguous iterators (LegacyContiguousIterator)
non-member std::size/std::empty/std::data
std::launder
std::uncaught_exceptions

## Supported C Secure Functions

The following table lists supported C secure functions inside the enclave.

Table 1 Supported C Secure Functions

Header file	Supported C Secure Functions
mbusafecrt.h	strcat_s(), wcscat_s(), strncat_s(), wcsncat_s(), strcpy_s(), wcsncpy_s(), strncpy_s(), wcsncpy_s(), strtok_s(), wcstok_s(), wcsnlen(), _itoa_s(), _itow_s(), _ltoa_s(), _ltow_s(), _ultoa_s(), _ultow_s(), _i64toa_s(), _i64tow_s(), _ui64toa_s(), _ui64tow_s(), sprintf_s(), swprintf_s(), _snprintf_s(), _snwprintf_s(), _vsprintf_s(), _vsnprintf_s(), _vswprintf_s(), _vsnwprintf_s(), memcpy_s(), memmove_s()