

Intel[®] Software Guard Extensions SDK for Linux* OS

Developer Reference

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Revision History

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Introduction

Intel provides the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) SDK Developer Reference for software developers who wish to harden their application's security using Intel Software Guard Extensions technology.

This document covers an overview of the technology, tutorials, tools, sample code as well as API reference.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK from Intel is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries and tools that enables the software developer to write and debug Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions applications in C/C++.

NOTE

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions(Intel(R) SGX) technology is only available on 6th Generation Intel(R) Core(TM) Processor or newer.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Technology Overview

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is an Intel technology whose objective is to enable a high-level protection of secrets. It operates by allocating hardwareprotected memory where code and data reside. The protected memory area is called an enclave. Data within the enclave memory can only be accessed by the code that also resides within the enclave memory space. Enclave code can be invoked via special instructions. An enclave can be built and loaded as a shared object on Linux* OS.

NOTE:

The enclave file can be disassembled, so the algorithms used by the enclave developer will not remain secret.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions technology has a hard limit on the protected memory size, typically 64 MB or 128 MB. As a result, the number of active enclaves (in memory) is limited. Depending on the memory footprint of each enclave, use cases suggest that 5-20 enclaves can reside in memory simultaneously.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Security Properties

- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against software attacks:
 - The enclave memory cannot be read or written from outside the enclave regardless of current privilege level and CPU mode

(ring3/user-mode, ring0/kernel-mode, SMM, VMM, or another enclave). The abort page is returned in such conditions.

- An enclave can be created with a debug attribute that allows a special debugger (Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions debugger) to view its content like a standard debugger. Production enclaves (non-debug) cannot be debugged by software or hardware debuggers.
- The enclave environment cannot be entered via classic function calls, jumps, register manipulation or stack manipulation. The only way to call an enclave function is via a new instruction that performs several protect checks. Classic function calls initiated by enclave code to functions inside the enclave are allowed.
- CPU mode can only be 32 or 64 bit when executing enclave code.
 Other CPU modes are not supported. An exception is raised in such conditions.
- Intel designs the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions to protect against known hardware attacks:
 - The enclave memory is encrypted using industry-standard encryption algorithms with replay protection.
 - Tapping the memory or connecting the DRAM modules to another system will only give access to encrypted data.
 - The memory encryption key changes every power cycle randomly (for example, boot/sleep/hibernate). The key is stored within the CPU and it is not accessible.
 - Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions is not designed to handle side channel attacks or reverse engineering. It is up to the Intel(R) SGX developers to build enclaves that are protected against these types of attack.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions uses strong industry-standard algorithms for signing enclaves. The signature of an enclave characterizes the content and the layout of the enclave at build time. If the enclave's content and layout are not correct per the signature, then the enclave will fail to be initialized and, hence, will not be executed. If an enclave is initialized, it should be identical to the original enclave and will not be modified at runtime.

Application Design Considerations

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application design is different from non- Intel(R) SGX application as it requires dividing the application into two logical components:

- Trusted component. The code that accesses the secret resides here. This component is also called an enclave. More than one enclave can exist in an application.
- Untrusted component. The rest of the application including all its modules.¹

The application writer should make the trusted part as small as possible. It is suggested that enclave functionality should be limited to operate on the secret data. A large enclave statistically has more bugs and (user created) security holes than a small enclave.

The enclave code can leave the protected memory region and call functions in the untrusted zone (by a special instruction). Reducing the enclave dependency on untrusted code will also strengthen its protection against possible attacks.

Embracing the above design considerations will improve protection as the attack surface is minimized.

The application designer, as the first step to harnessing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in the application, must redesign or refactor the application to fit these guidelines. This is accomplished by isolating the code module(s) that access any secrets and then moving these modules to a separate package/library. The details of how to create such an enclave are detailed in the tutorials section. You can also see the demonstrations on creating an enclave in the sample code that are shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

Terminology and Acronyms

AE	Architectural enclaves. Enclaves that are part of the Intel(R) Soft-
	ware Guard Extensions framework. They include the quoting

¹From an enclave standpoint, the operating system and VMM are not trusted components, either.

	enclave (QE), provisioning enclave (PvE), launch enclave (LE)).	
Attestation	Prove authenticity. In case of platform attestation, prove the identity of the platform.	
CA	Certificate Authority.	
ECALL	Enclave call. A function call that enters the enclave.	
ECDH	Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman.	
EDL	Enclave Definition Language.	
Intel(R) EPID	Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID.	
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards developed by NIST for use in computer systems government-wide.	
FIPS 140-2	Standard that defines security requirements for cryptographic modules and is required for sales to the Federal Governments.	
HSM	Hardware Security Module.	
Attestation Service	Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.	
ISV	Independent Software Vendor.	
KE	Key Exchange.	
LE	Launch enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the licensing service.	
Nonce	An arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic com- munication.	
OCALL	Outside call. A function call that calls an untrusted function from an enclave.	
Intel(R) SGX PSW	Platform Software for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.	
PvE	Provisioning enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID) Provision ser- vice to handle the provisioning protocol.	
QE	Quoting enclave, an architectural enclave from Intel, involved in the quoting service.	
Intel(R) SGX	Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions.	
SigRL	Signature revocation list	
SMK	Session MAC key.	
SP	Service Provider.	
SVN	Security version number. Used to version security levels of both hardware and software components of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions framework.	

ТСВ	Trusted computing base. Portions of hardware and software that are considered safe and uncompromised. A system protection is improved if the TCB is as small as possible, making an attack harder.
TCS	Thread Control Structure.
TLS	Thread Local Storage.
TLS	Transport Layer Security.

Setting up an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Project

This topic introduces how to use the features of Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK to create and manage Intel(R) SGX application projects.

Creating Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Projects

To create an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project on Linux* OS, you are recommended to start using the directory structure and Makefiles from a sample application in the Intel(R) SGX SDK. In an Intel SGX project, you should normally prepare the following files:

- Enclave Definition Language (EDL) file describes enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototype. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for details.
- 2. Enclave configuration file contains the information of the enclave metadata. See Enclave Configuration File for details.
- 3. Signing key files used to sign an enclave to produce a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as enclave measurement. See Signing Key Files for details.
- 4. Application and enclave source code the implementation of application and enclave functions.
- 5. makefile it performs the following steps:
 - 1. Generates edger routines (see Edger8r Tool for details).
 - 2. Builds the application and enclave.
 - 3. Signs the enclave (see Enclave Signing Tool for details).
- 6. Linker script file it is recommended to use the linker script to hide all unnecessary symbols, and only export enclave_entry, g_global_data, and g_global_data_sim.

Once you understand how an Intel SGX application is built, you may customize the project setup according to your needs.

To develop an Intel SGX application, Intel(R) SGX SDK supports a few nonstandard configurations, not present in other SDKs. Enclave Project Configurations explains the various enclave project configurations as well as the corresponding Makefile options.

Enclave Image Generation

An enclave image is a statically linked shared object under Linux* OS, without any external dependencies. You are expected to follow the guidelines below to generate a proper enclave image:

1. Link the tRTS with the --whole-archive option, so that the whole content of the trusted runtime library is included in the enclave;

2. From other libraries, you just need to pull the required symbols. For example, if an enclave requires routines in the trusted standard C and seal libraries:

HW mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice -lsgx_tcrypto -
-end-group
```

Simulation mode:

```
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tservice_sim -lsgx_
tcrypto --end-group
```

In addition, a linker script is also recommended to hide all unnecessary symbols.

```
// file: enclave.lds
enclave.so
{
    global:
    enclave_entry;
    g_global_data_sim;
    g_peak_heap_used;
    local:
    *;
};
```

Assuming that you have a few object files to be linked into a target enclave, use the command line similar to the following:

```
$ ld -o enclave.so file1.o file2.o \
-pie -eenclave_entry -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostart-
files --no-undefined \
--whole-archive -lsgx_trts --no-whole-archive \
--start-group -lsgx_tstdc --lsgx_tservice -lsgx_crypto -
end-group \
-Bstatic -Bsymbolic --defsym=_ImageBase=0 --export-
dynamic \
--version-script=enclave.lds
```

You are also encouraged to hardening your enclaves, by passing one of the following options to the linker, to put read-only non-executable sections in your own segment:

```
ld.gold --rosegment
or,
-Wl,-fuse-ld=gold -Wl,--rosegment
```

Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in helps the enclave developer to maintain enclaves and untrusted related code inside Eclipse* C/C++ projects.

To get more information on Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plugin, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Eclipse* Plug-in Developer Guide from the Eclipse Help content: **Help > Help Contents > Intel(R) SGX Eclipse Plug-in Developer Guide**.

Using Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK Tools

This topic introduces how to use the following tools that the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides:

• Edger8r Tool

Generates interfaces between the untrusted components and enclaves.

• Enclave Signing Tool

Generates the enclave metadata, which includes the enclave signature, and adds such metadata to the enclave image.

• Enclave Debugger

Helps to debug an enclave.

• Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier

Helps to measure the performance of the enclave code.

Enclave Memory Measurement Tool

Helps to measure the usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

CPUSVN Configuration Tool

Helps to simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade scenario without modifying the hardware.

Edger8r Tool

The Edger8r tool ships as part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It generates edge routines by reading a user-provided EDL file. These edge routines provide the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave. Normally, the tool will run automatically as part of the enclave build process. However, an advanced enclave writer may invoke the Edger8r manually.

When given an EDL file, for example, demo.edl, the Edger8r will by default generate four files:

- demo_t.h It contains prototype declarations for trusted proxies and bridges.
- demo_t.c It contains function definitions for trusted proxies and bridges.

- demo_u.h It contains prototype declarations for untrusted proxies and bridges.
- demo_u.c It contains function definitions for untrusted proxies and bridges.

Here is the usage description for the Edger8r tool:

Syntax:

sgx_edger8r [options] <.edl file> [another .edl file ...]

Arguments:

[Options]	Descriptions
use-prefix	Prefix the untrusted proxy with the enclave
	name.
header-only	Generate header files only.
search-path	Specify the search path of EDL files.
<path></path>	
untrusted	Generate untrusted proxy and bridge routines
	only.
trusted	Generate trusted proxy and bridge routines
	only.
untrusted-dir	Specify the directory for saving the untrusted
<dir></dir>	code.
trusted-dir <dir></dir>	Specify the directory for saving the trusted
	code.
help	Print this help message.

If neither --untrusted nor --trusted is specified, the Edger8r will generate both.

Here, the path parameter has the same format as the PATH environment variable, and the enclave name is the base file name of the EDL file (demo in this case).

CAUTION:

The ISV must run the Edger8r tool in a protected malware-free environment to ensure the integrity of the tool so that the generated code is not compromised. The ISV is ultimately responsible for the code contained in the enclave and should review the code that the Edger8r tool generates.

Enclave Signing Tool

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool named *sgx_sign* for you to sign enclaves. In general, signing an enclave is a process that involves producing a signature structure that contains enclave properties such as the enclave measurement. Once an enclave is signed in such structure, the modifications to the enclave file (such as code, data, signature, and so on.) can be detected. The signing tool also evaluates the enclave image for potential errors and warns users about potential security hazards. *sgx_sign* is typically set up by one of the configuration tools included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK and runs automatically at the end of the build process. During the loading process, the signature is checked to confirm that the enclave has not been tampered with and has been loaded correctly. In addition, the signing tool can also be used to report metadata information for a signed enclave.

Command-Line Syntax

To run *sgx_sign*, use the following command syntax:

sgx_sign <command> [args]

All valid commands are listed in the table below. See Enclave Signer Usage Examples for more information.

Command	Description	Arguments
sign	Sign the enclave using the private key in one step.	Required: -enclave, -key, -out Optional: -config, -dumpfile
gendata	The first step of the 2-step signing process. Gen- erate the enclave signing material to be signed by an external tool. This step dumps the signing material, which consists of the header and body sections of the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic), into a file (256 bytes in total).	Required: -enclave, -out Optional: -config
catsig	The second step of the 2-step signing process. Generate the signed enclave with the input sig-	Required: -enclave, -key,

Table 1 Signing Tool Commands

	nature and public key. The input signature is gen- erated by an external tool based on the data gen- erated by the gendata command. At this step, the signature and buffer sections are generated. The signature and buffer sections together with the header and body sections complete the enclave signature structure (see the Table Enclave Signature Structure in this topic).	-out, -sig, -unisgned Optional: -config, -dumpfile
dump	Get the metadata information for a signed enclave file and dump it to a file specified by -dumpfile option	Required: -enclave, -dumpfile

All the valid command options are listed below:

Table 2 Signing Tool Arguments

Arguments	Descriptions	
-enclave <file></file>	Specify the enclave file to be signed or already signed.	
	It is a required argument for the four commands.	
-config <file></file>	Specify the enclave configuration file	
	It is an invalid argument for	dump command and an
	optional argument for the other three commands.	
-out <file></file>	Specify the output file.	
	It is required for the followi	ngthree commands.
	Command	Description
	sign	The signed enclave file.
	gendata	The file with the enclave
		signing material.
	catsig	The signed enclave file.
-key <file></file>	Specify the signing key file. See File Formats for	
	detailed description.	
	Command	Description
	sign	Private key.
	gendata	Not applicable.
	catsig	Public key.
-sig <file></file>	Specify the file containing the signature corresponding	
	to the enclave signing mate	erial.

	Only valid for catsig command.	
-unsigned	Specify the file containing the enclave signing material	
<file></file>	generated by gendata.	
	Only valid for the catsig command.	
-dumpfile	Specify a file to dump metadata information.	
	It is a required argument for the dump command and an optional argument for sign and catsig	
-ignore-rel-	By default, sgx_sign provides an error for enclaves with	
error	text relocations. You can ignore the error and continue	
	signing by providing this option. But it is recommended	
	that you eliminate the text relocations instead of	
	bypassing the error with this option.	

The arguments, including options and filenames, can be specified in any order. Options are processed first, then filenames. Use one or more spaces or tabs to separate arguments. Each option consists of an option identifier, a dash (-), followed by the name of the option. The < file> parameter specifies the absolute or relative path of a file.

sgx_sign generates the output file and returns 0 for success. Otherwise, it generates an error message and returns -1.

Section	Name
	HEADERTYPE
	HEADERLEN
	HEADERVERSION
	TYPE
	MODVENDOR
Header	DATE
neauer	SIZE
	KEYSIZE
	MODULUSSIZE
	ENPONENTSIZE
	SWDEFINED
	RESERVED

Table 3 Enclave Signature Structure

Section	Name
	MODULUS
Signature	EXPONENT
	SIGNATURE
	MISCSELECT
	MISCMASK
	RESERVED
	ATTRIBUTES
Body	ATTRIBUTEMASK
	ENCLAVEHASH
	RESERVED
	ISVPRODID
	ISVSVN
	RESERVED
Buffer	Q1
	Q2

Enclave Signing Key Management

An enclave project supports different signing methods needed by ISVs during the enclave development life cycle.

• Single-step method using the ISV's test private key:

The signing tool supports a single-step signing process, which requires the access to the signing key pair on the local build system. However, there is a requirement that any white-listed enclave signing key must be managed in a hardware security module. Thus, the ISV's test private key stored in the build platform will not be white-listed and enclaves signed with this key can only be launched in *debug* or *prerelease* mode. In this scenario, the ISV manages the signing key pair, which could be generated by the ISV using his own means. Single-step method is the default signing method for non-production enclave applications, which are created with the Intel SGX project *debug* and *prerelease* profiles.

- 2-step method using an external signing tool:
 - 1. First step: At the end of the enclave build process, the signing tool generates the enclave signing material.

The ISV takes the enclave signing material file to an external signing platform/facility where the private key is stored, signs the signing material file, and takes the resulting signature file back to the build platform.

2. Second step: The ISV runs the signing tool with the catsigcommand providing the necessary information at the command line to add the hash of the public key and signature to the enclave's metadata section.

The 2-step signing process protects the signing key in a separate facility. Thus it is the default signing method for the Intel SGX project *release* profile. This means it is the only method for signing production enclave applications.

File Formats

There are several files with various formats followed by the different options. The file format details are listed below.

File	Format	Description
Enclave file	Shared	It is a standard Shared Object.
	Object	
Signed	Shared	sgx_sign generates the signed enclave file , which
enclave file	Object	includes the signature, to the enclave file.
Configuration file	XML	See Enclave Configuration File.
Key file	PEM	Key file should follow the PEM format which contains an unencrypted RSA 3072-bit key. The public exponent must be 3.
Enclave hex file	RAW	It is a dump file of the enclave signing material data to be signed with the private RSA key.
Signature file	RAW	It is a dump file of the signature generated at the ISV's signing facility. The signature should follow the RSA- PKCS1.5 padding scheme. The signature should be gen- erated using the v1.5 version of the RSA scheme with an SHA-256 message digest.

Table 4 Signing Tool File Formats

Signing Key Files

The enclave signing tool only accepts key files in the PEM format and unencrypted. When an enclave project is created for the first time, you have to choose either using an already existing signing key or automatically generating one key for you. When you choose to import a pre-existing key, ensure that such key is in PEM format and unencrypted. If that is not the case, convert the signing key to the format accepted by the Signing Tool first. For instance, the following command converts an encrypted private key in PKCS#8/DER format to unencrypted PEM format:

openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -in private_pkcs8.der -outform PEM -out private pkcs1.pem

Depending on the platform OS, the openssl* utility might be installed already or it may be shipped with the Intel(R) SGX SDK.

Enclave Signer Usage Examples

The following are typical examples for signing an enclave using the one-step or the two-step method. When the private signing key is available at the build platform, you may follow the one-step signing process to sign your enclave. However, when the private key is only accessible in an isolated signing facility, you must follow the two-step signing process described below.

One-step signing process:

Signing an enclave using a private key available on the build system:

```
sgx_sign sign -enclave enclave.so -config config.xml
-out enclave_signed.so -key private.pem
```

• Two-step signing process:

Signing an enclave using a private key stored in an HSM, for instance:

1. Generate the enclave signing material.

```
sgx_sign gendata -enclave enclave.so -config con-
fig.xml -out enclave hash.hex
```

- At the signing facility, sign the file containing the enclave signing material (enclave_hash.hex) and take the resulting signature file (signature.hex) back to the build platform.
- 3. Sign the enclave using the signature file and public key.

```
sgx_sign catsig -enclave enclave.so -config con-
fig.xml -out enclave_signed.so -key public.pem
-sig signature.hex -unsigned enclave_hash.hex
```

The configuration file config.xml is optional. If you do not provide a configuration file, the signing tool uses the default configuration values. The following example is for generating a report of metadata information for a signed enclave:

```
sgx_sign dump -enclave enclave_signed.so -dumpfile
metadata info.txt
```

A single enclave signing tool is provided, which allows for operating 32-bit and 64-bit enclaves.

OpenSSL* Examples

The following command lines are typical examples using OpenSSL*.

1. Generate a 3072-bit RSA private key. Use 3 as the public exponent value.

openssl genrsa -out private key.pem -3 3072

2. Produce the public part of a private RSA key.

```
openssl rsa -in private_key.pem -pubout -out public_
key.pem
```

3. Sign the file containing the enclave signing material.

openssl dgst -sha256 -out signature.hex -sign private_ key.pem -keyform PEM enclave_hash.hex

Enclave Debugger

You can leverage the helper script sgx-gdb to debug your enclave applications. To debug an enclave on a hardware platform, the <DisableDebug> configuration parameter should be set to 0 in the enclave configuration file config.xml, and you should set the Debug parameter to 1 in the sgx_create_enclave(...) that creates the enclave. Debugging an enclave is similar to debugging a shared library. However not all the standard features are available to debug enclaves. The following table lists some unsupported GDB commands for enclave. sgx-gdb also supports measuring the enclave stack/heap usage by the Enclave Memory Measurement Tool. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for additional information.

Table 5 GDB Unsupported Commands

GDB Command	Description
info sharedlibrary	Does not show the status of the loaded enclave.
next/step	Does not allows to execute the next/step outside the enclave from inside the enclave. To go outside the enclave use the finish command.
call/print	Does not support calling outside the enclave from within an enclave func- tion, or calling inside the enclave from a function in the untrusted domain.
charset	Only supports GDB's default charset.
gcore	Does not support debug enclave with the application dump file

Performance Measurement using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier

You can use Intel[®] VTune[™] Amplifier Application 2016 Update 2 to measure the performance of Intel SGX applications including the enclave. Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application supports a new analysis type called SGX Hotspots that can be used to profile the Intel SGX Enclave Applications. You can use the default settings of SGX Hotspots to profile the application and the enclave code. Precise event based sampling (PEBS) helps to profile the Intel SGX enclave code. The _PS events represent precise events. You can add _PS events to the collection to profile enclave code. Non precise events would not help with profiling Intel SGX enclave code.

You can use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance of enclave code only when the enclave has been launched as a debug enclave. To launch the enclave as a debug enclave, pass a value of 1 as the second parameter to the sgx_create_enclave function which loads and initializes the enclave as shown below. Use the pre-defined macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG as the parameter, which equals 1 in the DEBUG and the PRE-RELEASE mode.

```
sgx_create_enclave(ENCLAVE_FILENAME, SGX_DEBUG_FLAG,
&token, &updated, &global_eid, NULL);
```

NOTE:

Only use Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier to measure the performance in the DEBUG and PRE-RELEASE mode because a DEBUG FLAG value of 1 cannot be passed in to create an enclave in RELEASE configuration.

Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier provides two options to profile applications:

- Run the applications using Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier. If you use this approach, you do not have to do anything special.
- Attach to an already running process or enclave application. If you use this approach, define the environment variable as follows:
 - 32bit:

INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY32 = <VTune Installation
Dir>/lib32/runtime/ittnotify collector.so

• 64bit:

```
INTEL_LIBITTNOTIFY64 = <VTune Installation
Dir>/lib64/runtime/ittnotify collector.so
```

Once an enclave is loaded, the invoked ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier in the uRTS passes information about the enclave to Intel® VTune™ Amplifier and profiles Intel SGX enclave applications. When you attach Intel(R) VTune (TM) Amplifier to the application after invoking ITT API of Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier, the module information about the enclave is cached in the ITT dynamic library and is used by the Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier application during attach to process. The following table describes the different scenarios of how Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is used to profile the enclave application.

Intel(R) VTune(TM)	Additional Con-	ITT API Res	uRTS Action
Amplifier Invocation	figuration	ult	
Launch the application with Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier	N/A	. ,	Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.
Late attach before invok- ing ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier pro filing check in sgx_ cereate enclave	variable is set.	VTune(TM)	Set Debug OPTIN bit and invoke Module mapping API.
	ITT environment variable is not set.	VTune(TM)	Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module map- ping API.
			Even though Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is running, it cannot

			profile enclaves. You need to set the envir- onment variable.
Late attach <i>after</i> invok- ing ITT API for Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier pro filing check in sgx_ cereate_enclave	ITT environment variable is set. -	Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is profiling	Set Debug OPTIN bit and Invoke Module mapping API. The ITT dynamic lib- rary caches the mod- ule information and provides it to the Intel (R) VTune(TM) Ampli- fier during attach to process.
	ITT environment variable is not set.	VTune(TM)	Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not Invoke Module map- ping API.
			Even though Intel(R) VTune(TM) Amplifier is running here it can- not profile enclaves. You need to set the environment variable.
Launch the application without Intel(R) VTune (TM) Amplifier	N/A	· · ·	Do not set Debug OPTIN bit and do not invoke Module map- ping API.

Enclave Memory Measurement Tool

An enclave is an isolated environment. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a tool called sgx_emmt to measure the real usage of protected memory by the enclave at runtime.

Currently the enclave memory measurement tool provides the following two functions:

- 1. Get the stack peak usage value for the enclave.
- 2. Get the heap peak usage value for the enclave.

The tool reports the size of both stack and heap in KB. When you get the accurate stack and heap usage information for your enclaves, you can rework the enclave configuration file based on this information to make full use of the protected memory. See Enclave Configuration File for details.

On Linux* OS, the enclave memory measurement capability is provided by the helper script sgx-gdb. The sgx-gdb is a GDB extension for you to debug your enclave applications. See Enclave Debugger for details.

To measure how much protected memory an enclave uses, you should leverage sgx-gdb to launch GDB with sgx_emmt enabled and load the test application which is using the enclave. You may also attach the debugger to a running an Intel SGX application in order to measure the heap and stack sizes of th enclave.

The sgx-gdb provides three commands pertaining the sgx emmt tool:

Table 6 Enclave Memory Measurement Tool Commands

Command	Description
enable sgx_emmt	Enable the enclave memory measurement tool.
disable sgx_emmt	Disable the enclave memory measurement tool.
show sgx_emmt	Show whether the enclave memory measurement tool is enabled or not.

Here are the typical steps necessary to collect an enclave's memory usage information:

1. Leverage sgx-gdb to start a GDB session.

2. Enable the enclave memory measurement function with ${\tt enable sgx_}$ emmt.

3. Load and run the test application which is using the enclave.

NOTE:

To collect peak stack/heap usage for an enclave on a hardware platform correctly, you need to make sure the enclave meets the following requirements:

- 1. The enclave is debuggable. This means that the <DisableDebug> configuration parameter in the enclave configuration file should be set to 0.
- 2. The enclave is launched in the debug mode. To launch the enclave in the debug mode, set the debug flag to 1 when calling sgx_create_enclave to load the enclave.

- 3. You need to export g_peak_heap_used in the version script of the enclave.
- 4. You need to destroy the enclave by using thesgx_destroy_enclave API.

CPUSVN Configuration Tool

CPUSVN stands for Security Version Number of the CPU, which affects the key derivation and report generation process. CPUSVN is not a numeric concept and will be upgraded/downgraded along with the hardware upgrade/- downgrade. To simulate the CPUSVN upgrade/downgrade without modifying the hardware, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a CPUSVN configuration tool for you to configure the CPUSVN. The CPUSVN configuration tool is for Intel(R) SGX simulation mode only.

Command-Line Syntax

To run the Intel(R) SGX CPUSVN configuration tool, use the following syntax:

sgx config cpusvn [Command]

The valid commands are listed in the table below:

Table 7 CPUSVN Configuration Tool Commands

Command	Description
-upgrade	Simulate a CPUSVN upgrade.
-downgrade	Simulate a CPUSVN downgrade.
-reset	Restore the CPUSVN to its default value.

Enclave Development Basics

This topic introduces the following enclave development basics:

- Writing Enclave Functions
- Calling Functions inside the Enclave
- Calling Functions outside the Enclave
- Linking Enclave with Libraries
- Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries
- Enclave Definition Language Syntax
- Loading and Unloading an Enclave

The typical enclave development process includes the following steps:

- 1. Define the interface between the untrusted application and the enclave in the EDL file.
- 2. Implement the application and enclave functions.
- 3. Build the application and enclave. In the build process, Edger8r Tool generates trusted and untrusted proxy/bridge functions. Enclave Signing Tool generates the metadata and signature for the enclave.
- 4. Run and debug the application in simulation and hardware modes. See Enclave Debugger for more details.
- 5. Prepare the application and enclave for release.

Writing Enclave Functions

From an application perspective, making an enclave call (ECALL) appears as any other function call when using the untrusted proxy function. Enclave functions are plain C/C++ functions with several limitations.

The user can write enclave functions in C and C++ (native only). Other languages are not supported.

Enclave functions can rely on special versions of the C/C++ runtime libraries, STL, synchronization and several other trusted libraries that are part of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. These trusted libraries are specifically designed to be used inside enclaves.

The user can write or use other trusted libraries, making sure the libraries follow the same rules as the internal enclave functions:

- 1. Enclave functions can't use all the available 32-bit or 64-bit instructions. To check a list of illegal instructions inside an enclave, see Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference.
- 2. Enclave functions will only run in user mode (ring 3). Using instructions requiring other CPU privileges will cause the enclave to fault.
- 3. Function calls within an enclave are possible if the called function is statically linked to the enclave (the function needs to be in the enclave image file).Linux* Shared Objects are not supported.

CAUTION:

The enclave signing process will fail if the enclave image contains any unresolved dependencies at build time.

Calling functions outside the enclave is possible using what are called OCALLs. OCALLs are explained in detail in the Calling Functions outside the Enclave section.

Feature	Supported	Comment
Languages	Partially	Native C/C++. Enclave interface functions are lim- ited to C (no C++).
C/C++ calls to other Shared Objects	No	Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).
C/C++ calls to System provided C/C++/STL standard lib- raries	No	A trusted version of these libraries is supplied with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK and they can be used instead.
OS API calls	No	Can be done by explicit external calls (OCALLs).
C++ frame- works	No	Including MFC*, QT*, Boost* (partially – as long as Boost runtime is not used).
Call C++ class methods	Yes	Including C++ classes, static and inline functions.
Intrinsic func- tions	Partially	Supported only if they use supported instruc- tions.
		The allowed functions are included in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK.

Table 8 Summary of Intel(R) SGX Rules and Limitations

Inline assembly	Partially	Same as the intrinsic functions.
Template func- tions	,	Only supported in enclave internal functions
Ellipse ()	Partially	Only supported in enclave internal functions
Varargs(va_ list)	Partially	Only supported in enclave internal functions.
Synchronization	Partially	The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a collection of functions/objects for synchronization: spin-lock, mutex, and condition variable.
Threading sup- port	Partially	Creating threads inside the enclave is not sup- ported. Threads that run inside the enclave are created within the (untrusted) application. Spin- locks, trusted mutex and condition variables API can be used for thread synchronization inside the enclave.
Thread Local Storage (TLS)	Partially	Only implicitly viathread.
Dynamic memory alloc- ation	Yes	Enclave memory is a limited resource. Maximum heap size is set at enclave creation.
C++ Exceptions	Yes	Although they have an impact on performance.
SEH Exceptions	No	The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides an API to allow you to register functions, or exception handlers, to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.
Signals	No	Signals are not supported inside an enclave.

Calling Functions inside the Enclave

After an enclave is loaded successfully, you get an enclave ID which is provided as a parameter when the ECALLs are performed. Optionally, OCALLs can be performed within an ECALL. For example, assume that you need to compute some secret inside an enclave, the EDL file might look like the following:

// demo.edl
enclave {

```
// Add your definition of "secret_t" here
trusted {
    public void get_secret([out] secret_t* secret);
};
untrusted {
    // This OCALL is for illustration purposes only.
    // It should not be used in a real enclave,
    // unless it is during the development phase
    // for debugging purposes.
    void dump_secret([in] const secret_t* secret);
};
```

With the above EDL, the sgx_edger8r will generate an untrusted proxy function for the ECALL and a trusted proxy function for the OCALL:

Untrusted proxy function (called by the application):

```
sgx_status_t get_secret(sgx_enclave_id_t eid, secret_t*
secret);
```

Trusted proxy function (called by the enclave):

```
sgx_status_t dump_secret(const secret_t* secret);
```

The generated untrusted proxy function will automatically call into the enclave with the parameters to be passed to the real trusted function get_secret inside the enclave. To initiate an ECALL in the application:

```
// An enclave call (ECALL) will happen here
secret_t secret;
sgx_status_t status = get_secret(eid, &secret);
```

The trusted functions inside the enclave can optionally do an OCALL to dump the secret with the trusted proxy dump_secret. It will automatically call out of the enclave with the given parameters to be received by the real untrusted function dump_secret. The real untrusted function needs to be implemented by the developer and linked with the application.

Checking the Return Value

The trusted and untrusted proxy functions return a value of type <code>sgx_status_t</code>. If the proxy function runs successfully, it will return <code>SGX_SUCCESS</code>. Otherwise, it indicates a specific error described in Error Codes section. You can refer to the sample code shipped with the SDK for examples of proper error handling.

Calling Functions outside the Enclave

In some cases, the code within the enclave needs to call external functions which reside in untrusted (unprotected) memory to use operating system capabilities outside the enclave such as system calls, I/O operations, and so on. This type of function call is named OCALL.

These functions need to be declared in the EDL file in the untrusted section. See Enclave Definition Language Syntax for more details.

The enclave image is loaded very similarly to how Linux* OS loads shared objects. The function address space of the application is shared with the enclave so the enclave code can indirectly call functions linked with the application that created the enclave. Calling functions from the application directly is not permitted and will raise an exception at runtime.

CAUTION:

The wrapper functions copy the parameters from protected (enclave) memory to unprotected memory as the external function cannot access protected memory regions. In particular, the OCALL parameters are copied into the untrusted stack. Depending on the number of parameters, the OCALL may cause a stack overrun in the untrusted domain. The exception that this event will trigger will appear to come from the code that the sgx_eder8r generates based on the enclave EDL file. However, the exception can be easily detected using the Intel(R) SGX debugger.

CAUTION:

The wrapper functions will copy buffers (memory referenced by pointers) only if these pointers are assigned special attributes in the EDL file.

CAUTION:

Certain trusted libraries distributed with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provide an API that internally makes OCALLs. Currently, the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions mutex, condition variable, and CPUID APIs from libsgx_tstdc.a make OCALLs. Similarly, the trusted support library libsgx_ tservice.a, which provides services from the Platform Services Enclave (PSE-Op), also makes OCALLs. Developers who use these APIs must first import the needed OCALL functions from their corresponding EDL files. Otherwise, developers will get a linker error when the enclave is built. See the Importing EDL Libraries for details on how to import OCALL functions from a trusted library EDL file.

CAUTION:

To help identify problems caused by missing imports, all OCALL functions used in the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK have the suffix ocall. For instance, the linker error below indicates that the enclave needs to import the OCALLs sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_event_ocall() and sgx_ thread_set_untrusted_event_ocall() that are needed in sethread_mutex.obj, which is part of libsgx_tstdc.a.

```
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_
thread mutex lock':
```

```
sethread_mutex.cpp:109: undefined reference to `sgx_
thread wait untrusted event ocall'
```

```
libsgx_tstdc.a(sethread_mutex.o): In function `sgx_
thread_mutex_unlock':
```

sethread_mutex.cpp:213: undefined reference to `sgx_ thread set untrusted event ocall'

CAUTION:

Accessing protected memory from unprotected memory will result in abort page semantics. This applies to all parts of the protected memory including heap, stack, code and data.

Abort page semantics:

An attempt to read from a non-existent or disallowed resource returns all ones for data (abort page). An attempt to write to a non-existent or disallowed physical resource is dropped. This behavior is unrelated to exception type abort (the others being Fault and Trap).

OCALL functions have the following limitations/rules:

- OCALL functions must be C functions, or C++ functions with C linkage.
- Pointers that reference data within the enclave must be annotated with pointer direction attributes in the EDL file. The wrapper function will

perform shallow copy on these pointers. See Pointers for more information.

- Exceptions will not be caught within the enclave. The user must handle them in the untrusted wrapper function.
- OCALLs cannot have an ellipse (...) or a va list in their prototype.

Example 1: The definition of a simple OCALL function

Step 1 – Add a declaration for foo in the EDL file

```
// foo.edl
enclave {
    untrusted {
        [cdecl] void foo(int param);
    };
};
```

Step 2 (optional but highly recommended) – write a trusted, user-friendly wrapper. This function is part of the enclave's trusted code.

The wrapper function <code>ocall_foo</code> function will look like:

```
// enclave's trusted code
#include "foo_t.h"
void ocall_foo(int param)
{
    // it is necessary to check the return value of foo()
    if (foo(param) != SGX_SUCCESS)
        abort();
}
Step 3 - write an untrusted foo function.
// untrusted code
```

```
void foo(int param)
{
    // the implementation of foo
}
```

The $sgx_edger8r$ will generate an untrusted bridge function which will call the untrusted function foo automatically. This untrusted bridge and the target untrusted function are part of the application, not the enclave.

Library Development for Enclaves

Trusted library is the term used to refer to a static library designed to be linked with an enclave. The following list describes the features of trusted libraries:

- Trusted libraries are components of an Intel(R) SGX-based solution. They typically undergo a more rigorous threat evaluation and review process than a regular static library.
- A trusted library is developed (or ported) with the specific purpose of being used within an enclave. Therefore, it should not contain instructions that are not supported by the Intel(R) SGX architecture.
- A subset of the trusted library API may also be part of the enclave interface. The trusted library interface that could be exposed to the untrusted domain is defined in an EDL file. If present, this EDL file is a key component of the trusted library.
- A trusted library may have to be shipped with an untrusted library. Functions within the trusted library may make OCALLs outside the enclave. If an external function that the trusted library uses is not provided by the libraries available on the platform, the trusted library will require an untrusted support library.

In summary, a trusted library, in addition to the .a file containing the trusted code and data, may also include an .edl file as well as an untrusted .a file.

This topic describes the process of developing a trusted library and provides an overview of the main steps necessary to build an enclave that uses such a trusted library.

- The ISV provides a trusted library including the trusted functions (without any edge-routines) and, when necessary, an EDL file and an untrusted support library. To develop a trusted library, an ISV should create an enclave project and choose the library option in the Eclipse plugin. This ensures the library is built with the appropriate settings. The ISV might delete the EDL file from the project if the trusted library only provides an interface to be invoked within an enclave. The ISV should create a standard static library project for the untrusted support library, if required.
- 2. Add a "from/import" statement with the library EDL file path and name to the enclave EDL file. The import statement indicates which trusted

functions (ECALLs) from the library may be called from outside the enclave and which untrusted functions (OCALLs) are called from within the trusted library. You may import all ECALLs and OCALLs from the trusted library or select a specific subset of them.

A library EDL file may import additional library EDL files building a hierarchical structure. For additional details, See Importing EDL Libraries.

- 3. During the enclave build process, the sgx_edger8r generates proxy/bridge code for all the trusted and untrusted functions. The generated code accounts for the functions declared in the enclave EDL file as well as any imported trusted library EDL file.
- 4. The trusted library and trusted proxy/bridge functions are linked to the enclave code.

NOTE:

If you use the wildcard option to import a trusted library, the resulting enclave contains the trusted bridge functions for all ECALLs and their corresponding implementations. The linker will not be able to optimize this code out.

5. The Intel(R) SGX application is linked to the untrusted proxy/bridge code. Similarly, when the wildcard import option is used, the untrusted bridge functions for all the OCALLs will be linked in.

Avoiding Name Collisions

An application may be designed to work with multiple enclaves. In this scenario, each enclave would still be an independent compilation unit resulting in a separate SO file.

Enclaves, like regular SO files, should provide a unique interface to avoid name collisions when an untrusted application is linked with the edge-routines of several enclaves. The sgx_edger8r prevents name collisions among OCALL functions because it automatically prepends the enclave name to the names of the untrusted bridge functions. However, ISVs must ensure the uniqueness of the ECALL function names across enclaves to prevent collisions among ECALL functions.

Despite having unique ECALL function names, name collision may also occur as the result of developing an Intel(R) SGX application. This happens because an enclave cannot import another SO file. When two enclaves import the same ECALL function from a trusted library, the set of edge-routines for each enclave will contain identical untrusted proxy functions and marshaling data structures for the imported ECALL. Thus, the linker will emit an error when the application is linked with these two sets of edge-routines. To build an application with more than one enclave when these enclaves import the same ECALL from a trusted library, ISVs have to:

- Provide the --use-prefix option to sgx_edger8r, which will prepend the enclave name to the untrusted proxy function names. For instance, when an enclave uses the local attestation trusted library sample code included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK, the enclave EDL file must be parsed with the --use-prefix option to sgx_edger8r. See Local Attestation for additional details.
- 2. Prefix all ECALLs in their untrusted code with the enclave name, matching the new proxy function names.

Linking Enclave with Libraries

This topic introduces how to link an enclave with the following types of libraries:

- Dynamic libraries
- Static Libraries
- Simulation Libraries

Dynamic Libraries

An enclave shared object must *not* depend on any dynamically linked library in any way. The enclave loader has been intentionally designed to prohibit dynamic linking of libraries within an enclave. The protection of an enclave is dependent upon obtaining an accurate measurement of all code and data that is placed into the enclave at load time; thus, dynamic linking would add complexity without providing any benefit over static linking.

CAUTION:

The enclave image signing process will fail if the enclave file has any unresolved dependencies.

Static Libraries

You can link with static libraries as long as they do not have any dependencies.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of trusted libraries.

Name	Description	Comment
libsgx_	Intel(R) SGX internals	Must link when
trts.a		running in HW
		mode
libsgx_	Intel(R) SGX internals (simulation mode)	Must link when
trts_sim.a		running in sim-
		ulation mode
libsgx_	Standard C library (math, string, and so on.)	Must link
tstdc.a		
libsgx_tsetjm-	Provides setjmp and longjmp functions to	Optional
p.a	be used to perform non-local jumps.	
libsgx_	Standard C++ libraries, STL	Optional
tcxx.a,		
libsgx_		
tstdcxx.a		
libsgx_tser	Data seal/unseal (encryption), trusted Archi-	Must link when
vice.a	tectural Enclaves support, Elliptic Curve Dif-	using HW
	fie-Hellman (EC DH) library, and so on.	mode
libsgx_tser	The counterpart of libsgx_tservice.a for sim-	Must link when
vice_sim.a	ulation mode	using sim-
		ulation mode
libsgx_	Cryptographic library	Must link
tcrypto.a		
libsgx_	Trusted key exchange library	Optional
tkey_		
exchange.a		

Table 9 Trusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK

Simulation Libraries

The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides simulation libraries to run application enclaves in simulation mode (Intel(R) SGX hardware is not required). There are an untrusted simulation library and a trusted simulation library. The untrusted simulation library provides the functionality that the untrusted runtime library requires to manage an enclave linked with the trusted simulation library, including the simulation of the Intel(R) SGX instructions executed outside the enclave: ECREATE, EADD, EEXTEND, EINIT, EREMOVE, and EENTER. The trusted simulation library is primarily responsible for simulating the Intel(R) SGX instructions that can execute inside an enclave: EEXIT, EGETKEY, and EREPORT.

NOTE

Simulation mode does not require the Intel SGX support in the CPU. However, the processor must support the Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions 4.1 instructions at least.

Linking Application with Untrusted Libraries

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides the following collection of untrusted libraries.

Name	Description	Comment
libsgx_urts.so	Provides functionality for applic-	Must link when running
	ations to manage enclaves	in HW mode.
		libsgx urts.so is
		included in Intel(R)
		SGX PSW
libsgx_urts_	uRTS library used in simulation	Dynamically linked
sim.so	mode	
libsgx_uae_ser	Provides both enclaves and	Must link when running
vice.so	untrusted applications access to	in HW mode.
	services provided by the AEs	libsgx_uae_ser-
		vice.so is included
		in Intel(R) SGX PSW
libsgx_uae_ser	Untrusted AE support library used	Dynamically linked
vice_sim.so	in simulation mode	
libsgx_ukey_	Untrusted key exchange library	Optional
exchange.a		

Table 10 Untrusted Libraries included in the Intel(R) SGX SDK

Enclave Definition Language Syntax

Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files are meant to describe enclave trusted and untrusted functions and types used in the function prototypes. Edger8r Tool uses this file to create C wrapper functions for both enclave exports (used by ECALLs) and imports (used by OCALLs).

EDL Template

```
enclave {
    //Include files
    //Import other edl files
    //Data structure declarations to be used as parameters of the
    //function prototypes in edl
    trusted {
         //Include header files if any
         //Will be includedd in enclave t.h
         //Trusted function prototypes
    };
    untrusted {
         //Include header files if any
         //Will be included in enclave u.hhead
         //Untrusted function prototypes
    };
};
```

The trusted block is optional only if it is used as a library EDL, and this EDL would be imported by other EDL files. However the untrusted block is always optional.

Every EDL file follows this generic format:

```
enclave {
    // An EDL file can optionally import functions from
    // other EDL files
    from "other/file.edl" import foo, bar; // selective importing
    from ``another/file.edl" import *;
                                            // import all functions
    // Include C headers, these headers will be included in the
    // generated files for both trusted and untrusted routines
    include "string.h"
    include "mytypes.h"
    // Type definitions (struct, union, enum), optional
    struct mysecret {
         int key;
         const char* text;
    };
    enum boolean { FALSE = 0, TRUE = 1 };
    // Export functions (ECALLs), optional for library EDLs
```

```
trusted {
         //Include header files if any
         //Will be included in enclave t.h
         //Trusted function prototypes
         public void set secret([in] struct mysecret* psecret);
         void some private func (enum boolean b); // private ECALL
         (non-root ECALL).
    };
    // Import functions (OCALLs), optional
    untrusted {
         //Include header files if any
         //Will be included in enclave u.h
         //Will be inserted in untrusted header file
         "untrusted.h"
         //Untrusted function prototypes
         // This OCALL is not allowed to make another ECALL.
         void ocall print();
         // This OCALL can make an ECALL to function
         // "some private func".
         int another ocall([in] struct mysecret* psecret)
              allow(some private func);
    };
};
```

Comments

Both types of C/C++ comments are valid.

Example

```
enclave {
    include "stdio.h" // include stdio header
    include "../../util.h" /* this header defines some custom public
    types */
};
```

Include Headers

Include C headers which define types (C structs, unions, typedefs, etc.); otherwise auto generated code cannot be compiled if these types are referenced in EDL. The included header file can be global or belong to trusted functions or untrusted functions only. A global included header file doesn't mean that the same header file is included in the enclave and untrusted application code. In this case, the enclave will use the stdio.h from the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. While the application code will use the stdio.h shipped with the host compiler.

Using the include directive is convenient when developers are migrating existing code to the Intel SGX technology, since data types are defined already in this case. Similar to other IDL languages like Microsoft* interface definition language (MIDL*) and CORBA* interface definition language (OMG-IDL), a user can define data types inside the EDL file and sgx_edger8r will generate a C header file with the data type definitions. For a list of supported data types with in EDL, see Basic Types.

Syntax

include "filename.h"

Example

```
enclave {
    include "stdio.h" // global headers
    include "../../util.h"
    trusted {
        include "foo.h" // for trusted functions only
    };
    untrusted {
        include "bar.h" // for untrusted functions only
    };
};
```

Keywords

The identifiers listed in the following table are reserved for use as keywords of the Enclave Definition Language.

Data Types					
char	short	int	float	double	void
int8_t	int16_t	int32_t	int64_t	size_t	wchar_t
uint8_t	uint16_t	uint32_t	uint64_t	unsigned	struct

Table 11 EDL Reserved Keywords

union	enum	long			
Pointer	Pointer Parameter Handling				
in	out	user_check	count	size	readonly
isptr	sizefunc	string	wstring		
Others					
enclave	from	import	trusted	untrusted	include
public	allow	isary	const	propagate_errno	
Function Calling Convention					
cdecl	stdcall	fastcall	dllimport		

Basic Types

EDL supports the following basic types:

```
char, short, long, int, float, double, void, int8_t,
int16_t, int32_t, int64_t, size_t, wchar_t, uint8_t,
uint16_t, uint32_t, uint64_t, unsigned, struct, enum,
union.
```

It also supports long long and 64-bit long double.

Basic data types can be modified using the C modifiers:

const, *, [].

Additional types can be defined by including a C header file.

Structures, Enums and Unions

Basic types and user defined data types can be used inside the structure/union except it differs from the standard in the following ways:

Unsupported Syntax:

```
short i : 3;
short j : 6;
short k : 7;
};
//3. Nested structure definition is not allowed
struct my_struct_t{
    int out_val;
    float out_fval;
    struct inner_struct_t{
        int in_val;
        float in_fval;
    };
};
```

Valid Syntax:

```
enclave{
```

```
include "user types.h" //for ufloat: typedef float ufloat
struct struct_foo_t {
    uint32_t struct_foo_0;
    uint64 t struct foo 1;
};
enum enum foo t {
   ENUM FOO 0 = 0,
    ENUM FOO 1 = 1
};
union union_foo_t {
    uint32 t union foo 0;
    uint32 t union foo 1;
    uint64 t union foo 3;
};
trusted {
    public void test char(char val);
    public void test int(int val);
    public void test long(long long val);
    public void test float(float val);
    public void test_ufloat(ufloat val);
    public void test_double(double val);
    public void test_long_double(long double val);
    public void test_size_t(size_t val);
    public void test_wchar_t(wchar_t val);
    public void test struct(struct struct foo t val);
    public void test struct2(struct foo t val);
```

```
public void test_enum(enum enum_foo_t val);
public void test_enum2(enum_foo_t val);
public void test_union(union union_foot_t val);
public void test_union2(union_foo_t val);
};
```

};

Pointers

EDL defines several attributes that can be used with pointers:

```
in, out, user_check, string, wstring, size, count, size-
func, isptr, readonly.
```

Each of them is explained in the following topics.

CAUTION:

The pointer attributes explained in this topic apply to ECALL and OCALL function parameters exclusively, not to the pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function. Thus, pointers returned by an ECALL or OCALL function are not checked by the edge-routines and must be verified by the enclave and application code.

Pointer Handling

Pointers should be decorated with either a pointer direction attribute in, out or a user_check attribute explicitly. The [in] and [out] serve as direction attributes.

- [in] when [in] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is passed from the calling procedure to the called procedure. For an ECALL the in parameter is passed from the application to the enclave, for an OCALL the parameter is passed from the enclave to the application.
- [out] when [out] is specified for a pointer argument, the parameter is returned from the called procedure to the calling procedure. In an ECALL function an out parameter is passed from the enclave to the application and an OCALL function passes it from the application to the enclave.
- [in] and [out] attributes may be combined. In this case the parameter is passed in both directions.

The direction attribute instructs the trusted edge-routines (trusted bridge and trusted proxy) to copy the buffer pointed by the pointer. In order to copy the buffer contents, the trusted edge-routines have to know how much data needs to be copied. For this reason, the direction attribute is usually followed by a size, count or sizefunc modifier. If neither of these is provided nor the pointer is NULL, the trusted edge-routine assumes a count of one. When a buffer is being copied, the trusted bridge must avoid overwriting enclave memory in an ECALL and the trusted proxy must avoid leaking secrets in an OCALL. To accomplish this goal, pointers passed as ECALL parameters must point to untrusted memory and pointers passed as OCALL parameters must point to trusted memory. If these conditions are not satisfied, the trusted bridge and the trusted proxy will report an error at runtime, respectively, and the ECALL and OCALL functions will not be executed.

You may use the direction attribute to trade protection for performance. Otherwise, you must use the user_check attribute described below and validate the data obtained from untrusted memory via pointers before using it, since the memory a pointer points to could change unexpectedly because it is stored in untrusted memory. However, the direction attribute does not help with structures that contain pointers. In this scenario, you have to validate and copy the buffer contents, recursively if needed, yourself.

Example

```
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_ecall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in([in] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_out([out] int * ptr);
        public void test_ecall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    };
    untrusted {
        void test_ocall_user_check([user_check] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in([in] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_out([out] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_out([in, out] int * ptr);
        void test_ocall_in_out([in, out] int * ptr);
    };
```

};

Unsupported Syntax:

```
enclave {
   trusted {
      // Pointers without a direction attribute
      // or 'user_check' are not allowed
      public void test_ecall_not(int * ptr);
      // Function pointers are not allowed
      public void test_ecall_func([in]int (*func_ptr)());
   };
};
```

In the example shown above:

For ECALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ecall_user_check, the pointer ptr will not be verified; you should verify the pointer passed to the trusted function. The buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to inside buffer either.
- [in]: In the function test_ecall_in, a buffer with the same size as the data type of 'ptr'(int) will be allocated inside the enclave. Content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied into the new allocated memory inside. Any changes performed inside the enclave will not be visible to the untrusted application.
- [out]: In the function test_ecall_out, a buffer with the same size as the data type of 'ptr'(int) will be allocated inside the enclave, but the content pointed to by ptr, one integer value will not be copied. Instead, it will be initialized to zero. After the trusted function returns, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer pointed to by ptr.
- [in, out]: In the function test_ecall_in_out, a buffer with the same size will be allocated inside the enclave, the content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer inside the enclave will be copied to the outside buffer.

For OCALL:

- [user_check]: In the function test_ocall_user_check, the pointer ptr will not be verified; the buffer pointed to by ptr is not copied to an outside buffer. Besides, the application cannot read/modify the memory pointed to by ptr, if ptr points to enclave memory.
- [in]: In the function test_ocall_in, a buffer with the same size as the data type of ptr(int) will be allocated in the 'application' side (untrusted side). Content pointed to by ptr, one integer value, will be copied into the newly allocated memory outside. Any changes performed by the application will not be visible inside the enclave.
- [out]: In the function test_ocall_out, a buffer with the same size as the data type of ptr(int) will be allocated on the application side (untrusted side) and its content will be initialized to zero. After the untrusted function returns, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied to the enclave buffer pointed to by ptr.
- [in, out]: In the function test_ocall_in_out, a buffer with the same size will be allocated in the application side, the content pointed to by ptr,one integer value, will be copied to this buffer. After returning, the buffer outside the enclave will be copied into the inside enclave buffer.

The following table summarizes behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes:

	ECALL	OCALL
	Pointer is not checked. Users must per- form the check and/or copy.	Pointer is not checked. Users must perform the check and/or copy
in	Buffer copied from the application into the enclave. Afterwards, changes will only affect the buffer inside enclave. Safe but slow.	Buffer copied from the enclave to the application. Must be used if pointer points to enclave data.
out	Trusted wrapper function will allocate a buffer to be used by the enclave. Upon return, this buffer will be copied to the original buffer.	The untrusted buffer will be copied into the enclave by the trusted wrapper function. Safe but slow.
in, out	Combines in and out behavior. Data is copied back and forth.	Same as ECALLs.

Table 12 Behavior of wrapper functions when using the in/out attributes

EDL cannot analyze C typedefs and macros found in C headers. If a pointer type is aliased to a type/macro that does not have an asterisk (*), the EDL parser may report an error or not properly copy the pointer's data.

In such cases, declare the function prototype to use types that have an asterisk.

Example:

// Error, PVOID is not a pointer in EDL void foo([in, size=4] PVOID buffer); // OK void foo([in, size=4] void* buffer); // OK, "isptr" indicates "PVOID" is pointer type void foo([in, isptr, size=4] PVOID buffer); // OK, opaque type, copy by value // Actual address must be in untrusted memory void foo(HWND hWnd);

Pointer Handling in ECALLs

In ECALLs, the trusted bridge checks that the marshaling structure does not overlap with the enclave memory, and automatically allocates space on the trusted stack to hold a copy of the structure. Then it checks that pointer parameters with their full range do not overlap with the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the in attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave and copies the memory pointed to by the pointer from outside to the enclave memory. When a pointer to the untrusted memory with the out attribute is passed to the enclave, the trusted bridge allocates a buffer in the trusted memory, zeroes the buffer contents to clear any previous data and passes a pointer to this buffer to the trusted function. After the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to untrusted memory. When the in and out attributes are combined, the trusted bridge allocates memory inside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the trusted memory before calling the trusted function, and once the trusted function returns, the trusted bridge copies the contents of the trusted buffer to the untrusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

NOTE:

When an ECALL with a pointer parameter with out attribute returns, the trusted bridge always copies data from the buffer in enclave memory to the buffer outside. You must clear all sensitive data from that buffer on failure.

Before the trusted bridge returns, it frees all the trusted heap memory allocated at the beginning of the ECALL function for pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted bridge after it returns results in undefined behavior.

Pointer Handling in OCALLs

For OCALLs, the trusted proxy allocates memory on the outside stack to pass the marshaling structure and checks that the pointer parameters with their full range are within enclave. When a pointer to trusted memory with the in attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave and copies the memory pointed by the pointer from inside the enclave to the untrusted memory. When a pointer to the trusted memory with the out attribute is passed from an enclave (an OCALL), the trusted proxy allocates a buffer on the untrusted stack, and passes a pointer to this buffer to the untrusted function. After the untrusted function returns, the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. When the in and out attributes are combined, the trusted proxy allocates memory outside the enclave, makes a copy of the buffer in the untrusted memory before calling the untrusted function, and after the untrusted function returns the trusted proxy copies the contents of the untrusted buffer to the trusted memory. The amount of data copied out is the same as the amount of data copied in.

When the trusted proxy function returns, it frees all the untrusted stack memory allocated at the beginning of the OCALL function for the pointer parameters with a direction attribute. Attempting to use a buffer allocated by the trusted proxy after it returns results in undefined behavior.

Attribute: user_check

In certain situations, the restrictions imposed by the direction attribute may not support the application needs for data communication across the enclave boundary. For instance, a buffer might be too large to fit in enclave memory and needs to be fragmented into smaller blocks that are then processed in a series of ECALLs, or an application might require passing a pointer to trusted memory (enclave context) as an ECALL parameter.

To support these specific scenarios, the EDL language provides the <code>user_check</code> attribute. Parameters declared with the <code>user_check</code> attribute do not

undergo any of the checks described for [in] and [out] attributes. However, you must understand the risks associated with passing pointers in and out the enclave, in general, and the user_check attribute, in particular. You must ensure that all the pointer checking and data copying are done correctly or risk compromising enclave secrets.

Buffer Size Calculation

The generalized formula for calculating the buffer size using these attributes:

Total number of bytes = count * size

- The above formula holds when both count and size/sizefunc are specified.
- size can be specified by either size or sizefunc attribute.
- If count is not specified for the pointer parameter, then it is assumed to be equal to 1, i.e., count=1. Then total number of bytes equals to size/sizefunc.
- If size is not specified, then the buffer size is calculated using the above formula where size is size of (element pointed by the pointer).

Attribute: size

The size attribute is used to indicate the buffer size in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute ([in]/[out]) (when there is no count attribute specified). This attribute is needed because the trusted bridge needs to know the whole range of the buffer passed as a pointer to ensure it does not overlap with the enclave memory, and to copy the contents of the buffer from untrusted memory to trusted memory and/or vice versa depending on the direction attribute. The size may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function. size attribute is generally used for void pointers.

Example

```
enclave{
   trusted {
      // Copies '100' bytes
      public void test_size1([in, size=100] void* ptr, size_t len);
      // Copies 'len' bytes
      public void test_size2([in, size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
```

```
};
};
Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    trusted {
        // size/count/sizefunc attributes must be used with
        // pointer direction ([in, out])
        void test_attribute_cant([size=len] void* ptr, size_t len);
    };
};
```

Attribute: sizefunc

The sizefunc attribute modifier depends on a user defined trusted function which is called by the edge-routines to get the number of bytes to be copied. The sizefunc has similar functionality as the sizeof () operator. An example of where sizefunc can be used is for marshaling variable-length structures, which are buffers whose total size is specified by a combination of values stored at well-defined locations inside the buffer (although typically it is at a single location). To prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, sizefunc is called twice. In the first call, sizefunc operates in untrusted memory. The second time, sizefunc operates in the data copied into trusted memory. If the sizes returned by the two sizefunc calls do not match, the trusted bridge will cancel the ECALL and will report an error to the untrusted application. Note that sizefunc must not be combined with the size attribute. sizefunc cannot be used with out alone, however sizefunc with both in and out is accepted. Additionally, users cannot define sizefunc as strlen or wcslen. In all these scenarios, the sgx edger8r will throw an error. Strings should not be passed with the sizefunc modifier, but with the string or wstring keyword. sizefunc can be used with the count attribute which gives the total length to be equal to sizefunc * count. The following is the prototype of the trusted sizefunc that you need to define inside the enclave:

size_t sizefunc_function_name(const parameter_type * p);

Where parameter_type is the data type of the parameter annotated with the sizefunc attribute. If you do not provide the definition of the sizefunc function, the linker will report an error.

NOTE

The function implementing a sizefunc should validate the input pointer carefully, before using it. Since the function is called before the pointer is checked by the generated code.

Example

```
enclave{
    trusted {
         // Copies get_packet_size bytes
         // User must provide a function definition that matches
         // size t get packet size(const void* ptr);
         void test sizefunc([in, sizefunc=get packet size] void* ptr);
         // Copies (get packet size * cnt) bytes
         void test sizefunc2(
                       [in, sizefunc=get packet size, count=cnt] void*
                       ptr,
                       unsigned cnt);
    };
};
Unsupported Syntax:
enclave{
    include "user types.h"
    trusted {
         // Cannot use sizefunc and size together
         void test sizefunc size(
                       [in, size=100, sizefunc=packet len] header* h);
         // Cannot use strlen or wcslen as sizefunc
         void test sizefunc strlen([in, sizefunc=strlen] header* h);
         void test sizefunc wcslen([in, sizefunc=wcslen] header* h);
    };
};
```

Attribute: count

The count attribute is used to indicate a block of sizeof element pointed by the pointer in bytes used for copy depending on the direction attribute. The count and size attribute modifiers serve the same purpose. The number of bytes copied by the trusted bridge or trusted proxy is the product of the count and the size of the data type to which the parameter points. The count may be either an integer constant or one of the parameters to the function.

The size and count attribute modifiers may also be combined. In this case, the trusted edge-routine will copy a number of bytes that is the product of

the count and size parameters (size*count) specified in the function declaration in the EDL file.

Example

```
enclave{
    trusted {
        // Copies cnt * sizeof(int) bytes
        public void test_count([in, count=cnt] int* ptr, unsigned
        cnt);
        // Copies cnt * len bytes
        public void test_count_size([in, count=cnt, size=len] int*
        ptr, unsigned cnt, size_t len);
    };
};
```

Strings

The attributes string and wstring indicate that the parameter is a NULL terminated C string or a NULL terminated wchar_t string, respectively. To prevent "check first, use later" type of attacks, the trusted edge-routine first operates in untrusted memory to determine the length of the string. Once the string has been copied into the enclave, the trusted bridge explicitly NULL terminates the string. The size of the buffer allocated in trusted memory accounts for the length determined in the first step as well as the size of the string termination character.

NOTE

The string and wstring attributes must not be combined with any other modifier such as size, count or sizefunc.string and wstring cannot be used with out alone. In all these cases, the sgx_edger8r will report an error. However, string and wstring with both in and out are accepted.

Example

```
enclave {
```

trusted {

```
// Cannot use [out] with "string/wstring" alone
// Using [in] , or [in, out] is acceptable
public void test_string([in, out, string] char* str);
public void test_wstring([in, out, wstring] char* wstr);
public void test_const_string([in, string] const char* str);
```

```
};
};
Unsupported Syntax:
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
    trusted {
         // string/wstring attributes must be used
         // with pointer direction
         void test_string_cant([string] char* ptr);
         // string/wstring attributes cannot be used
         // with [out] attribute
         void test string out([out, string] char* str);
         // sizefunc can't be used for strings, use [string/wstring]
         void test string sizefunc cant(
                       [in, string, sizefunc=packet len] header* h);
    };
};
```

In the first example, when the string attribute is used for function test_ string, strlen(str)+1 is used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave. The extra byte is for null termination.

In the function test_wstring, wcslen(str)+1 (two-byte units) will be used as the size for copying the string in and out of the enclave.

User Defined Data Types

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports user defined data types, but should be defined in a header file. Any basic datatype which is typedef'ed into another becomes a user defined data type.

Some user data types need to be annotated with special EDL attributes, such as *isptr*, *isary* and *readonly*. If one of these attributes is missing when a user-defined type parameter requires it so, the compiler will emit a compilation error in the code that *sgx_edger8r* generates.

• When there is a user defined data type for a pointer, isptr is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is a pointer. See Pointers for more information.

- When there is a user defined data type for arrays, *isary* is used to indicate that the user defined parameter is an array. See Arrays for more information.
- When an ECALL or OCALL parameter is a user defined type of a pointer to a const data type, the parameter should be annotated with the readonly attribute.

Example

```
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" // for typedef void * pBuf;
                         // and typedef void const * pBuf2;
                         // and typedef int uArray[10];
    trusted {
         public void test isptr(
                        [in, isptr, size=len] pBuf pBufptr,
                       size t len);
         public void test_isptr_readonly(
                       [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
                       pBuf2ptr,
                       size t len);
         public void test_isary([in, isary, size=len] uArray arr,
                       size t len);
    };
};
Unsupported Syntax:
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for typedef void const * pBuf2;
                         // and typedef int uArray[10];
    trusted {
         // Cannot use [out] when using [readonly] attribute
         void test isptr readonly cant(
                       [in, out, isptr, readonly, size=len] pBuf2
                       pBuf2ptr,
                       size t len);
         // User-defined array types need "isary"
         public void test_miss_isary([in, size=len] uArray arr,
                       size t len);
    };
};
```

In the function test_isptr_readonly, pBuf2 (typedef void const * pBuf2) is a user defined pointer type, so isptr is used to indicate that it is a user defined type. Also, the pBuff2ptr is readonly, so you cannot use the out attribute. The size attribute indicates the number of bytes to be copied to the enclave memory.

const Keyword

The EDL language accepts the const keyword with the same meaning as the const keyword in the C standard. However, the support for this keyword is limited in the EDL language. It may only be used with pointers and as the outermost qualifier. This satisfies the most important usage in Intel(R) SGX, which is to detect conflicts between const pointers (pointers to const data) with the out attribute. Other forms of the const keyword supported in the C standard are not supported in the EDL language.

Arrays

The Enclave Definition Language (EDL) supports multidimensional, fixed-size arrays to be used in data structure definition and parameter declaration. Zero-length array and flexible array member, however, are *not* supported. The special attribute <code>isary</code> is used to designate function parameters that are of a user defined type array.

Example

Unsupported Syntax:

```
enclave {
    include "user_types.h" //for uArray - typedef int uArray[10];
    trusted {
        // Flexible array is not supported
```

Support for arrays also includes attributes [in], [out] and [user_check], which are similar in usage to the pointers.

Preprocessor Capability

The EDL language supports macro definition and conditional compilation directives. To provide this capability, the sgx_edger8r first uses the compiler preprocessor to parse the EDL file. Once all preprocessor tokens have been translated, the sgx_edger8r then parses the resulting file as regular EDL language. This means that developers may define simple macros and use conditional compilation directives to easily remove debug and test capabilities from production enclaves, reducing the attack surface of an enclave. See the following EDL example.

```
#define SGX_DEBUG
enclave {
    trusted {
        // ECALL definitions
    }
     untrusted {
        // OCALL definitions
#ifdef SGX_DEBUG
        void print([in, string] const char * str);
#endif
    }
}
```

The current sgx_edger8r does not propagate macro definitions from the EDL file into the generated edge-routines. As a result, you need to duplicate macro definitions in both the EDL file as well as in the compiler arguments or other source files.

We recommend you only use simple macro definitions and conditional compilation directives in your EDL files. The sgx_edger8r uses gcc to parse macros and conditional compilation directives that might be in the EDL file. You may override the default search behavior or even specify a different preprocessor with the --preprocessor option.

Propagating errno in OCALLs

OCALLs may use the propagate_errno attribute. When you use this attribute, the sgx_edger8r produces slightly different edge-routines. The errno variable inside the enclave, which is provided by the trusted Standard C library, is overwritten with the value of errno in the untrusted domain before the OCALL returns. The trusted errno is updated upon OCALL completion regardless whether the OCALL was successful or not. This does not change the fundamental behavior of errno. A function that fails must set errno to indicate what went wrong. A function that succeeds, in this case the OCALL, is allowed to change the value of errno.

Example

```
enclave {
    include "sgx stdio stubs.h" //for FILE and other definitions
    trusted {
         public void test_file_io(void);
    };
    untrusted {
         FILE * fopen(
                        [in, string] const char * filename,
                        [in, string] const char * mode) propagate errno;
         int fclose([user_check] FILE * stream) propagate errno;
         size t fwrite(
                        [in, size=size, count=count] const void * buf-
                        fer,
                        size t size,
                        size t count,
                        [user check]FILE * stream) propagate errno;
    };
};
```

Importing EDL Libraries

You can implement export and import functions in external trusted libraries, akin to static libraries in the untrusted domain. To add these functions to an enclave, use the enclave definition language (EDL) library import mechanism.

Use the EDL keywords ${\tt from}~{\tt and}~{\tt import}~{\tt to}~{\tt add}~{\tt a}~{\tt library}~{\tt EDL}$ file is done .

The from keyword specifies the location of the library EDL file. Relative and full paths are accepted. Relative paths are relative to the location of the EDL file.

The import keyword specifies the functions to import. An asterisk (*) can be used to import all functions from the library. More than one function can be imported by writing a list of function names separated by commas.

Syntax

```
from "lib_filename.edl" import func_name, func2_name;
```

Or

```
from "lib filename.edl" import *;
```

Example

```
enclave {
```

```
from "secure_comms.edl" import send_email, send_sms;
from "../../sys/other_secure_comms.edl" import *;
```

};

A library EDL file may import another EDL file, which in turn, may import another EDL file, creating a hierarchical structure as shown below:

```
// enclave.edl
enclave {
    from "other/file_L1.edl" import *; // Import all functions
};
// Trusted library file_L1.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L2.edl" import *;
    trusted {
        public void test_int(int val);
      };
};
```

```
// Trusted library file_L2.edl
enclave {
    from "file_L3.edl" import *;
    trusted {
        public void test_ptr(int* ptr);
    };
};
// Trusted library file_L3.edl
enclave {
    trusted {
        public void test_float(float flt);
    };
};
```

Granting Access to ECALLs

The default behavior is that ECALL functions cannot be called by any of the untrusted functions.

To enable an ECALL to be directly called by application code as a root ECALL, the ECALL should be explicitly decorated with the <code>public</code> keyword to be a public ECALL. Without this keyword, the ECALLs will be treated as private ECALLs, and cannot be directly called as root ECALLs.

Syntax

```
trusted {
    public <function prototype>;
};
```

An enclave EDL must have one or more public ECALLs, otherwise the Enclave functions cannot be called at all and sgx_edger8r will report an error in this case.

To grant an OCALL function access to an ECALL function, specify this access using the allow keyword. Both public and private ECALLs can be put into the allow list.

Syntax

```
untrusted {
    <function prototype> allow (func_name, func2_name, ...);
};
Example
enclave {
    trusted {
         public void clear_secret();
         public void get secret([out] secret t* secret);
         void set_secret([in] secret_t* secret);
    };
    untrusted {
         void replace secret(
              [in] secret_t* new_secret,
              [out] secret t* old secret)
              allow (set secret, clear secret);
    };
};
```

In the above example, the untrusted code is granted different access permission to the ECALLs.

ECALL	called as root ECALL	called from replace_secret
clear_secret	Y	Y
get_secret	Y	Ν
set_secret	N	Y

Enclave Configuration File

The enclave configuration file is an XML file containing the user defined parameters of an enclave. This XML file is part of the enclave project. A tool named sgx_sign uses this file as an input to create the signature and metadata for the enclave. Here is an example of the configuration file:

<EnclaveConfiguration>

```
<ProdID>100</ProdID>
<ISVSVN>1</ISVSVN>
<StackMaxSize>0x50000</StackMaxSize>
<HeapMaxSize>0x100000</HeapMaxSize>
<TCSNum>1</TCSNum>
<TCSPolicy>1</TCSPolicy>
<DisableDebug>0</DisableDebug>
<MiscSelect>0</MiscSelect>
<MiscMask>0xFFFFFFF</MiscMask>
<//EnclaveConfiguration>
```

The table below lists the elements defined in the configuration file. All of them are optional. Without a configuration file or if an element is not present in the configuration file, the default value will be used.

Tag	Description	Default Value
ProdID	ISV assigned Product ID.	0
ISVSVN	ISV assigned SVN.	0
TCSNum	The number of TCS. Must be greater than 0.	1
TCSPolicy	TCS management policy. 0 – TCS is bound to the untrusted thread. 1 – TCS is not bound to the untrusted thread.	1
StackMaxSize	The maximum stack size per thread. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x40000
HeapMaxSize	The maximum heap size for the pro- cess. Must be 4KB aligned.	0x100000
DisableDebug	Enclave cannot be debugged.	0 - Enclave can be debugged
MiscSelect	The desired Extended SSA frame feature.	0
MiscMask	The mask bits of MiscSelect to enforce.	OxFFFFFFF

Table 13 Enclave Configuration Default Values

MiscSelect and MiscMask are for future functional extension. Currently, MiscSelect must be 0. Otherwise the corresponding enclave may not be loaded successfully.

To avoid wasting the valuable protected memory resource, you can properly adjust the StackMaxSize and HeapMaxSize by using the measurement tool sgx emmt. See Enclave Memory Measurement Tool for details.

An Eclipse* plug-in named **Intel(R) SGX Update Configuration** is provided to help you easily edit your configuration file. See the *Intel(R) SGX Eclipse* Plug-in User's Guide* from the Eclipse's Help content for details.

If there is no enough stack for the enclave, ECALL returns the error code SGX_ ERROR_STACK_OVERRUN. This error code gives the information to enclave writer that the StackMaxSize may need further adjustment.

Enclave Project Configurations

Depending on the development stage you are at, choose one of the following project configurations to build an enclave:

- Simulation: Under the *simulation* mode the enclave can be either built with debug or release compiler settings. However, in both cases the enclave is launched in the *enclave debug* mode. The Eclipse* plugin provides the Intel(R) SGX Simulation and Intel(R) SGX Simulation
 Debug configuration options to enable compiling and launching the enclave in the simulation mode.From the command line, an enclave can be built in this mode by passing SGX_DEBUG=1 for debug simulation and no parameters for release simulation. This is the default build mode. Single-step signing is the default method to sign a simulation enclave.
- Debug: When the Intel(R) SGX Hardware Debugconfiguration option is selected for an enclave project in Eclipse* plugin, the enclave is compiled in the *debug* mode and the resulting enclave file will contain debug information and symbols. To use this configuration for an enclave, set SGX_MODE=HW and SGX_DEBUG=1 as parameters to the Makefile during the build. Choosing this project configuration also allows the enclave to be launched in the *enclave debug* mode. This is facilitated by enabling the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG that is passed as one of the parameters to the sgx_create_enclave function. Single-step method is the default signing method for this project configuration. The signing key used in this mode does not need to be white-listed.
- Prerelease: When you choose the Intel(R) SGX Hardware Prerelease configuration option for an enclave project, Eclipse* plugin will build the enclave in *release* mode with compiler optimizations applied. An enclave is built in this mode by setting SGX_MODE=HW and SGX_
 PRERELEASE=1 in the Makefile during build. Under this configuration, the enclave is launched in *enclave debug* mode. The Makefile of the sample application defines the EDEBUG flag when SGX_PRERELEASE=1 is passed as a command line parameter to the Makefile during build. When the EDEBUG preprocessor flag is defined, it enables the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG, which in turn, launches the enclave in the *enclave debug* mode. Single-step method is also the default signing method for the *Prerelease* project configuration. Like in the *Debug* configuration, the signing key does not need to be white-listed either.

Release: The Intel(R) SGX Hardware Release configuration option for an Eclipse plugin enclave project compiles the enclave in the *release* mode and launches the enclave in the *enclave release* mode. This is done by disabling the SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. This mode is enabled in enclave by passing SGX_MODE=HW to the Makefile while building the project. SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is only enabled when NDEBUG is not defined or EDEBUG is defined. In the debug configuration NDEBUG is undefined and hence
 SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is enabled. In the prerelease configuration NDEBUG and EDEBUG are both defined, which enables SGX_DEBUG_FLAG. In the release mode, configuration NDEBUG is defined and hence it disables
 SGX_DEBUG_FLAG thereby launching the enclave in *enclave release* mode. Two-step method is the default signing method for the Release configuration. The enclave needs to be signed with a white-listed key.

For additional information on the different enclave signing methods, see Enclave Signing Tool and Enclave Signer Usage Examples

Loading and Unloading an Enclave

Enclave source code is built as a shared object. To use an enclave, the enclave.so should be loaded into protected memory by calling the API sgx_create_enclave(). The enclave.so must be signed by sgx_sign. When loading an enclave for the first time, the loader will get a launch token and save it back to the in/out parameter token. The user can save the launch token into a file, so that when loading an enclave for the second time, the application can get the launch token from the saved file. Providing a valid launch token can enhance the load performance. To unload an enclave, the user must call sgx_destroy_enclave() interface with parameter sgx_enclave_id_t.

The sample code to load and unload an Enclave is shown below.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include "sgx_urts.h"
```

#define ENCLAVE FILE T("Enclave.signed.so")

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
```

```
{
    sgx_enclave_id t
                     eid;
    sgx status t ret = SGX SUCCESS;
    sgx launch token t token = \{0\};
    int updated = 0;
    // Create the Enclave with above launch token.
    ret = sgx create enclave (ENCLAVE FILE, SGX DEBUG FLAG, &token,
    &updated, &eid, NULL);
    if (ret != SGX SUCCESS) {
        printf("App: error %#x, failed to create enclave.\n", ret);
        return -1;
    }
    // A bunch of Enclave calls (ECALL) will happen here.
    // Destroy the enclave when all Enclave calls finished.
    if (SGX SUCCESS != sgx destroy enclave (eid))
         return -1;
    return 0;
}
```

Handling Power Events

The protected memory encryption keys that are stored within an Intel SGXenabled CPU are destroyed with every power event, including suspend and hibernation.

Thus, when a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all enclave data will not be accessible after that. As a result, when the system resumes, any subsequent ECALL will fail returning the error code SGX_ ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST. This specific error code indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel SGX application should have the capability to handle any power transition that might occur while the enclave is loaded in protected memory. To handle the power event and resume enclave execution with minimum impact, the application must be prepared to receive the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST when an ECALL fails. When this happens, one and only one thread from the application must destroy the enclave, sgx_destroy_enclave(), and reload it again, sgx_create_enclave(). In addition, to resume execution from where it was when the enclave was destroyed, the application should periodically seal and save enclave state information on the

platform and use this information to restore the enclave to its original state after the enclave is reloaded.

The Power Transition sample code included in the SDK demonstrates this procedure.

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sample Code

After installing the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK, the sample code can be found from \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode.

- The SampleEnclave project shows how to create an enclave.
- The *Cxx11SGXDemo* project shows how to use C++11 library inside the enclave
- The *LocalAttestation* project shows how to use the Intel Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange library to establish a trusted channel between two enclaves running on the same platform.
- The *RemoteAttestation* project shows how to use the Intel remote attestation and key exchange library in the remote attestation process.

Sample Enclave

The project *SampleEnclave* is designed to show you how to write an enclave from scratch. This topic demonstrates the following basic aspects of enclave features:

- Initialize and destroy an enclave
- Create ECALLs and/or OCALLs
- Call trusted libraries inside the enclave

The source code is shipped with an installation package of the Intel(R) SGX SDK in \$ (SGXSDKInstallPath) SampleCode/SampleEnclave. A Makefile is provided to build the SampleEnclave on Linux.

NOTE:

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Initialize an Enclave

Before establishing any trusted transaction between an application and an enclave, the enclave itself needs to be correctly created and initialized by calling sgx_create_enclave provided by the uRTS library.

Saving and Retrieving the Launch Token

A launch token needs to be passed to sgx_create_enclave for enclave initialization. If the launch token was saved in a previous transaction, it can be retrieved and used directly. Otherwise, you can provide an all-O buffer. sgx_ create_enclave will attempt to create a valid launch token if the input is not valid. After the enclave is correctly created and initialized, you may need to save the token if it has been updated. The fourth parameter of sgx_create_ enclave indicates whether or not an update has been performed.

The launch token should be saved in a per-user directory or a registry entry in case it would be used in a multi-user environment.

ECALL/OCALL Functions

This sample demonstrates basic EDL syntax used by ECALL/OCALL functions, as well as using trusted libraries inside the enclave. You may see Enclave Definition Language Syntax for syntax details and Trusted Libraries for C/C++ support.

Destroy an Enclave

To release the enclave memory, you need to invoke sgx_destroy_enclave provided by the sgx_urts library. It will recycle the EPC memory and untrusted resources used by that enclave instance.

Power Transition

If a power transition occurs, the enclave memory will be removed and all the enclave data will be inaccessible. Consequently, when the system is resumed, each of the in-process ECALLS and the subsequent ECALLs will fail with the error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_LOST which indicates the enclave is lost due to a power transition.

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions project should have the capability to handle the power transition which might impact its behavior. The project named *PowerTransition* describes one method of developing Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions projects that handle power transitions. See ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry for more info.

PowerTransition demonstrates the following scenario: an enclave instance is created and initialized by one main thread and shared with three other child threads; The three child threads repeatedly ECALL into the enclave, manipulate secret data within the enclave and backup the corresponding encrypted data outside the enclave; After all the child threads finish, the main thread destroys the enclave and frees the associated system resources. If a power transition happens, one and only one thread will reload the enclave and restore the

secret data inside the enclave with the encrypted data that was saved outside and then continues the execution.

The PowerTransition sample code is released with Intel(R) SGX SDK in \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/PowerTransition. A Makefile is provided to build the sample code on Linux* OS.

NOTE:

If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

ECALL-Error-Code Based Retry

After a power transition, an Intel(R) SGX error code SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_ LOST will be returned for the current ECALL. To handle the power transition and continue the project without impact, you need to destroy the invalid enclave to free resources first and then retry with a newly created and initialized enclave instance, as depicted in the following figure.




Figure 1 Power Transition Handling Flow Chart

ECALLs in Demonstration

PowerTransition demonstrates handling the power transition in two types of ECALLs:

- 1. Initialization ECALL after enclave creation.
- 2. Normal ECALL to manipulate secrets within the enclave.

Initialization ECALL after Enclave Creation

PowerTransition illustrates one initialization ECALL after enclave creation which is shown in the following figure:




Figure 2 Enclave Initialization ECall after Enclave Creation Flow Chart

sgx_create_enclave is a key API provided by the uRTS library for enclave creation. For sgx_create_enclave, a mechanism of power transition handling is already implemented in the uRTS library. Therefore, it is unnecessary to manually handle power transition for this API.

NOTE:

To concentrate on handling a power transition, PowerTransition assumes the enclave file and the launch token are located in the same directory as the application. See Sample Enclave for how to store the launch token properly.

Normal ECALL to Process Secrets within the Enclave

This is the most common ECALL type into an enclave. *PowerTransition* demonstrates the power transition handling for this type of ECALL in a child thread after the enclave creation and initialization by the main thread, as depicted in the figure below. Since the enclave instance is shared by the child threads, it is required to make sure one and only one child thread to re-creates and re-initializes the enclave instance after the power transition and the others utilize the re-created enclave instance directly. *PowerTransition* confirms this point by checking whether the Enclave ID is updated.




Figure 3 Regular ECALL Flow Chart

NOTE:

During the ECALL process, it is recommended to back up the confidential data as cipher text outside the enclave frequently. Then we can use the backup data to restore the enclave to reduce the power transition impacts.

C++11 Demo

The project *Cxx11SGXDemo* is designed to illustrate some of the C++11 library features supported inside the enclave provided by the Intel[®] SGX SDK and the compiler features supported by GCC. This sample provides practical use cases for each of the C++11 features currently supported.

The code is shipped with the Intel SGX SDK and is located in \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)SampleCode/Cxx11SGXDemo. A Makefile is provided to build the Cxx11SGXDemo on Linux.

NOTE:

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privileges are required to open the project. You can copy the project folder to your directory if an administrator permission cannot be granted. The sample covers a subset of C++11 features inside the enclave as listed in the table below.

Table 14 Overview of C++11 features covered

Headers	#include <typeinfo></typeinfo>
	#include <functional></functional>
	#include <algorithm></algorithm>
	#include <unordered_set></unordered_set>
	#include <unordered_map></unordered_map>
	#include <initializer_list></initializer_list>
	#include <tuple></tuple>
	#include <memory></memory>
	#include <atomic></atomic>
	#include <mutex></mutex>
	#include <condition_variable></condition_variable>
	#include <map></map>
Classes	std::function, std::all_of, std::any_of, std::none_of,
	std::initializer_list, std::unordered_set,
	std::unordered_map, std::unordered_multiset,
	std::unordered_multimap, std::tuple,
	std::shared_ptr, std::unique_ptr, std::auto std::mutex,
	std::condition_variable
Compiler fea-	lambda expressions, auto, decltype,
tures	strongly typed enum classes,
	range-based for statements,
	static_assert, new virtual function controls,
	delegating constructors, variadic templates,
	substitution failure is not an error (SFINAE),
	rvalue references and move semantics, nullptr type

Attestation

In the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions architecture, attestation refers to the process of demonstrating that a specific enclave was established on the platform. The Intel(R) SGX Architecture provides two attestation mechanisms:

- One creates an authenticated assertion between two enclaves running on the same platform referred to as local attestation.
- The second mechanism extends local attestation to provide assertions to 3rd parties outside the platform referred to as remote attestation. The remote attestation process leverages a quoting service.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides APIs used by applications to implement the attestation process.

Local Attestation

Local attestation refers to two enclaves on the same platform authenticating to each other using the Intel SGX REPORT mechanism before exchanging information. In an Intel(R) SGX application, multiple enclaves might collaborate to perform certain functions. After the two enclaves verify the counterpart is trustworthy, they can exchange information on a protected channel, which typically provides confidentiality, integrity and replay protection. The local attestation and protected channel establishment uses the REPORT based Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* protocol.

You can find a sample solution shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK at \$ (SGXSDKInstallPath) SampleCode/Local_Attestation directory. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

NOTE:

If the sample project locates in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

The sample code shows an example implementation of local attestation, including protected channel establishment and secret message exchange using enclave to enclave function call as an example.

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Library and Local Attestation Flow

The local attestation sample in the SDK uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange library to establish a protected channel between two enclaves. The DH key exchange APIs are described in $sgx_dh.h$. The key exchange library

is part of the Intel(R) SGX application SDK trusted libraries. It is statically linked with the enclave code and exposes APIs for the enclave code to generate and process local key exchange protocol messages. The library is combined with other libraries and is built into the final library called libsgx_ tservice.a that is part of the SDK release.




Figure 4 Local Attestation Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

The figure above represents the usage of DH key exchange library. A local attestation flow consists of the following steps:

- 1. ISV Enclave 1 calls the Intel ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the initiator role.
- 2. The Enclave 1 does an OCALL into the untrusted code requesting the Diffie-Hellman Message 1 and session id.
- 3. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2.
- 4. Enclave 2 in turn calls the ECDH key exchange library to initiate the session with the responder role.
- 5. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library to generate DH Message 1 ga
- DH Message 1 is sent back from Enclave 2 to Enclave 1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
- 7. Enclave 1 processes the Message 1 using the key exchange library API and generates DH Message 2 gb || [Report Enclave 1 (h (ga || gb))] SMK.
- 8. DH Message 2 is sent to the untrusted side through an OCALL.
- 9. The untrusted code does an ECALL into Enclave 2 giving it the DH Message 2 and requesting DH Message 3.
- 10. Enclave 2 calls the key exchange library API to process DH Message 2 and generates DH Message 3 [ReportEnclave2(h(gb || ga)) || Optional Payload] SMK.
- DH Message 3 is sent back from Enclave2 to Enclave1 through an ECALL return to the untrusted code followed by an OCALL return into Enclave 1.
- 12. Enclave 2 uses the key exchange library to process DH Message 3 and establish the session.
- 13. Messages exchanged between the enclaves are protected by the AEK.

Protected Channel Establishment

The following figure illustrates the interaction between two enclaves, namely the source enclave and the destination enclave, to establish a session. The application initiates a session between the source enclave and the destination enclave by doing an ECALL into the source enclave, passing in the enclave id of the destination enclave. Upon receiving the enclave id of the destination enclave, the source enclave does an OCALL into the core untrusted code which then does an ECALL into the destination enclave to exchange the messages required to establish a session using ECDH Key Exchange* protocol.




Figure 5 Secure Channel Establishment Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

Secret Message Exchange and Enclave to Enclave Call

The following figure illustrates the message exchange between two enclaves. After the establishment of the protected channel, session keys are used to encrypt the payload in the message(s) being exchanged between the source and destination enclaves. The sample code implements interfaces to encrypt the payload of the message. The sample code also shows the implementation of an enclave calling a function from another enclave. Call type, target function ID, total input parameter length and input parameters are encapsulated in the payload of the secret message sent from the caller (source) Enclave and the callee (destination) enclave. As one enclave cannot access memory of another enclave, all input and output parameters, including data indirectly referenced by a parameter needs to be marshaled across the two enclaves. The sample code uses Intel(R) SGX SDK trusted cryptographic library to encrypt the payload of the message. Through such encryption, message exchange is just the secret and in case of the enclave to enclave call is the marshaled destination enclave's function id, total parameter length and all the parameters. The destination enclave decrypts the payload and calls the appropriate function. The results of the function call are encrypted using the session keys and sent back to the source enclave.




Figure 6 Secret Message Exchange Flow with the DH Key Exchange Library

Remote Attestation

Generally speaking, Remote Attestation is the concept of a HW entity or of a combination of HW and SW gaining the trust of a remote provider or producer of some sort. With Intel(R) SGX, Remote Attestation software includes the

app's enclave and the Intel-provided Quoting Enclave (QE) and Provisioning Enclave (PvE). The attestation HW is the Intel(R) SGX enabled CPU.

Remote Attestation alone is not enough for the remote party to be able to securely deliver their service (secrets or assets). Securely delivering services also requires a secure communication session. Remote Attestation is used during the establishment of such a session. This is analogous to how the familiar SSL handshake includes both authentication and session establishment.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes sample code showing:

- How an application enclave can attest to a remote party.
- How an application enclave and the remote party can establish a secure session.

The SDK includes a remote session establishment or key exchange (KE) libraries that can be used to greatly simplify these processes.

You can find the sample code for remote attestation in the directory \$ (SGXSDKInstallPath) SampleCode/RemoteAttestation.

NOTE:

To run the sample code in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet.

NOTE:

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to open it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Intel(R) SGX uses an anonymous signature scheme, Intel(R) Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel(R) EPID), for authentication (for example, attestation). The supplied key exchange libraries implement a Sigma-like protocol for session establishment. Sigma is a protocol that includes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but also addresses the weaknesses of DH. The protocol Intel(R) SGX uses differs from the Sigma protocol that's used in IKE v1 and v2 in that the Intel(R) SGX platform uses Intel(R) EPID to authenticate while the service provider uses PKI. (In Sigma, both parties use PKI.) Finally, the KE libraries require the service provider to use an ECDSA, not an RSA, key pair in the authentication portion of the protocol and the libraries use ECDH for the actual key exchange.

Remote Key Exchange (KE) Libraries

The RemoteAttestation sample in the SDK uses the remote KE libraries as described above to create a remote attestation of an enclave, and uses that

attestation during establishment of a secure session (a key exchange).

There are both untrusted and trusted KE libraries. The untrusted KE library is provided as a static library, libsgx_ukey_exchange.a. The Intel(R) SGX application needs to link with this library and include the header file sgx_ukey_exchange.h, containing the prototypes for the APIs that the KE trusted library exposes.

NOTE:

If you are unable to use either of the two pre-built untrusted key exchange static libraries, the source code for a sample untrusted key exchange library is included in the isv_app subfolder of the Remote Attestation sample application that is shipped with this SDK.

The trusted KE library is also provided as a static library. As a trusted library, the process for using it is slightly different than that for the untrusted KE library. The main difference relates to the fact that the trusted KE library exposes ECALLs called by the untrusted KE library. This means that the library has a corresponding EDL file, sgx_tkey_exchange.edl, which has to be imported in the EDL file for the application enclave that uses the library. We can see this in code snippet below, showing the complete contents of app_enclave.edl, the EDL file for the app enclave in the sample code.

```
enclave {
```

It's worth noting that $sgx_key_exchange.h$ contains types specific to remote key exchange and must be included as shown above as well as in the untrusted code of the application that uses the enclave. Finally, $sgx_tkey_$ exchange.h is a header file that includes prototypes for the APIs that the trusted library exposes, but that are not ECALLs, i.e., APIs called by ISV code in the application enclave.

Remote Attestation and Protected Session Establishment

This topic describes the functionality of the remote attestation sample in detail.

NOTE:

In the sample code, the service provider is modeled as a Shared Object, service_provider.so. The sample service provider does not depend on Intel® SGX headers, type definitions, libraries, and so on. This was done to demonstrate that the Intel SGX is not required in any way when building a remote attestation service provider.




Figure 7 Remote Attestation and Trust Channel Establishment Flow

An Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) application would typically begin by requesting service (for example, media streaming) from a service provider (SP) and the SP would respond with a challenge. This is not shown in the figure. The figure begins with the app's reaction to the challenge.

- 1. The flow starts with the app entering the enclave that will be the endpoint of the KE, passing in b_pse, a flag indicating whether the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
- 2. If b_pse is true, then the isv enclave shall call trusted AE support library with sgx create pse session() to establish a session with PSE.
- 3. Code in the enclave calls sgx_ra_init(), passing in the SP's ECDSA public key, g_sp_pub_key, and b_pse. The integrity of g_sp_pub_key is a public key is important so this value should just be built into isv_enclave.
- 4. Close PSE session by sgx_close_pse_session() if a session is established before. The requirement is that, if the app enclave uses Platform Services, the session with the PSE must already be established before the app enclave calls sgx ra init().
- 5. sgx_ra_init() returns the KE context to the app enclave and the
 app enclave returns the context to the app.
- The application calls sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id() and sends the value returned in p_extended_epid_group_id to the server in msg0.
- 7. The server checks whether the extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is supported. If the ID is not supported, the server aborts remote attestation.

NOTE:

Currently, the only valid extended Intel(R) EPID group ID is zero. The server should verify this value is zero. If the Intel(R) EPID group ID is not zero, the server aborts remote attestation.

- 8. The application calls sgx_ra_get_msg1(), passing in this KE's context. Figure 3 shows the app also passing in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to sgx_ra_get_ga, exposed by the TKE. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.
- 9. sgx_ra_get_msg1() builds an S1 message = (ga || GID) and returns it to the app.
- 10. The app sends S1 to the service provider (SP) by ra_network_send_ receive(), it will call sp_ra_proc_msg1_req() to process S1 and generate S2.
- 11. Application eventually receives S2 = gb || SPID || 2-byte
 TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga) || CMAC_{SMK}(gb

|| SPID || 2-byte TYPE || 2-byte KDF-ID || SigSP(gb, ga)) || SigRL.

- 12. The application calls sgx_ra_proc_msg2(), passing in S2 and the context.
- 13. The code in sgx_ra_proc_msg2() builds S3 = CMAC_{SMK}(M) | | M where M = ga | | PS_SECURITY_PROPERTY | | QUOTE and returns it. Platform Services Security Information is included only if the app/enclave uses Platform Services.
- 14. Application sends the msg3 to the SP by ra_network_send_ receive(), and the SP verifies the msg3.
- 15. SP returns the verification result to the application.

At this point, a session has been established and keys exchanged. Whether the service provider thinks the session is secure and uses it depends on the security properties of the platform as indicated by the S3 message. If the platform's security properties meet the service provider's criteria, then the service provider can use the session keys to securely deliver a secret and the app enclave can consume the secret any time after it retrieves the session keys by calling $sgx_ra_get_keys()$ on the trusted KE library. This is not shown in the figure, nor is the closing of the session. Closing the session requires entering the app enclave and calling $sgx_ra_close()$ on the trusted KE library, among other app enclave-specific cleanup.

Remote Attestation with a Custom Key Derivation Function (KDF)

By default, the platform software uses the KDF described in the definition of the sgx_ra_get_keys API when the sgx_ra_init API is used to generate the remote attestation context. If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the sgx_ra_ init_ex API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API sgx_ ra_get_keys (SK, MK, and VK). The decision to use a different KDF is a policy of the ISV, but it should be approved by the ISV's security process.

Debugging a Remote Attestation Service Provider

As an ISV writing the remote attestation service provider, you may want to debug the message flow. One way to do this would be to provide pre-generated messages that can be replayed and verified. However, not that S1 message = (GID || ga) includes the random component ga generated inside an enclave. Also, the remote attestation service provider generates a random public+private key pair as part of its msg2 generation, but without

any interaction with Intel(R) SGX. Finally, each of these has state or context that is associated with cryptographic operations and is used to ensure that certain calls being made are in the correct order and that the state is consistent. These characteristics help protect the remote attestation flow against attacks, but also make it more difficult to replay pre-generated messages.

To overcome these, the cryptographic library is modified and used (only) by the sample service provider. Any time that key generation, signing, or other operation requests a random number, the number 9 is returned. This means that the crypto functions from libsample_libcrypto.so are predictable and cryptographically weak. If we can replay msg1 send from the isv_app, the sample service_provider. will always generate the exact same msg2. We now have a sufficient system to replay messages sent by the isv_app and have it verify that the responses sent by the remote service are the expected ones.

To replay messages and exercise this verification flow, pass in 1 or 2 as a command-line argument when running the sample application isv_app. The isv_app will ignore errors generated by the built-in checks in the Intel SGX. Developers wishing to debug their remote attestation service provider should be able to temporarily modify their cryptographic subsystem to behave in a similar manner as the libsample_libcrypto.so and replay the pre-computed messages stored in sample_messages.h. The responses from their own remote attestation service provider should match the ones generated by ours, which are also stored in sample_messages.h.

NOTE

Do not use the sample cryptographic library provided in this sample in production code.

Using a Different Extended Intel(R) EPID Group for Remote Attestation

The Intel(R) SGX platform software can generate Quotes signed by keys belonging to a more than one extended Intel(R) EPID Group. Before remote attestation starts, the ISV Service provider (SP) needs to know which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the PSW supports. The ISV SP will use this information to request Quote generation and verification in the correct extended Intel(R) EPID Group. The API sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id returns the extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID. The ISV application should query the currently configured extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID from the platform software using this API and sending it to the ISV SP. The ISV SP then knows which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use for remote attestation. If the ISV SP does not support the provided extended Intel(R) EPID Group, it will terminate the remote attestation attempt.

Sealed Data

The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides APIs to encrypt and integrity-protect enclave secrets to store them outside the enclave, such as on disk. The Intel(R) SGX Platform SW provides Monotonic Counter and Trusted Time service to ISV enclaves. The Monotonic Counter can be used to implement replay-protected policy, and the Trusted Time can be used to enforce time based policy. Both of them are in a form of Sealed Data. The requirement of replay-protected data blob and time based policy data blob is quite subtle. The Intel(R) SGX SDK will provide reference code to help ISV to implement them correctly.

The sample code SealedData is shipped with the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK in \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)SealedData folder. A Makefile is provided to compile the project.

NOTE:

If the sample project is located in a system directory, administrator privilege is required to modify it. You can copy the project folder to your directory if administrator permission cannot be granted.

Replay Protected Policy

In Enterprise Rights Management (ERM) type usages, an offline activity log might need to be maintained and periodically audited by the enterprise, for example, depending on whether and/or how many times a secret document is viewed or printed offline. If the offline activity log is tampered with or deleted, the ERM application will disable the offline use capability. A functional secure document viewing ERM application is quite complex, involving credential verification, document key provisioning, secure document rendering, secure display and many other security processes.

The Replay Protected policy sample code will not implement a full secure document viewing functionality, instead, it will demonstrate:

- Initializing a replay protected policy, to create an offline activity log together with a secret, protected by a Monotonic Counter.
- Verifying and updating the replay protected policy, to verify and update the activity log before the secret can be used to perform a function.
- Deleting the replay protected policy, to delete the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter after the secret is invalidated.

Initializing a Policy

- 1. The Enclave creates a new Monotonic Counter using sgx_create_ monotonic_counter.
- 2. The Enclave fills the activity log with the sample usage secret and usage data, the Monotonic Counter_UUID and the Monotonic Counter_ Value returned by sgx_create_monotonic_counter.
- 3. The Enclave seals the activity log into sealed data using <code>sgx_seal_data</code>.

Verifying a Policy

- The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using sgx_unseal_ data
- 2. The Enclave retrieves the current Monotonic Counter value of the associated Monotonic Counter using sgx_read_monotonic_counter. If it fails, abort the operation.
- 3. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter_Value returned by sgx_ read_monotonic_counter is the same as the Monotonic Counter_ Value in the activity log.
- 4. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

Updating a Policy

- 1. The Enclave verifies activity log.
- 2. The Enclave checks that the secret and usage data inside the activity log has not been invalidated or expired, for example, by comparing the use count in the activity log against a predetermined threshold. If the secret is invalidated or expired, the function that requires the secret will not be rendered.
- 3. The Enclave Increases the Monotonic Counter value of the associated MC using sgx_increment_monotonic_counter. If it fails, abort the operation.
- 4. The Enclave verifies the Monotonic Counter value returned in sgx_ increment_monotonic_counter is equal to the old value, previously returned by sgx read monotonic counter, plus one.
- 5. The Enclave updates the activity log and the Monotonic Counter_ Value.
- 6. The Enclave seals the activity log into Sealed Data using <code>sgx_seal_</code>

data.

7. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

Deleting a Policy

- 1. The Enclave follows the process of updating the Replay-Protected Activity Log to set the use counter to the maximum number of uses allowed, before releasing the secret for the last time.
- 2. User connects to the network to upload the activity log and receives a new secret.
- 3. The Enclave deletes the activity log and the associated Monotonic Counter using sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter. If it is blocked by the attacker, the associated activity log does not allow releasing of the secret as the secret inside the activity log is invalidated or expired.

Time Based Policy

The sample code demonstrates a proper implementation of a Time-Based Policy in the form of an offline Digital Rights Management (DRM) Key that expires after a certain period of time. The sample code will not implement full DRM functionality. Instead, it demonstrates:

- Creating offline sealed data with the DRM key, a time stamp and the expiration policy.
- Verifying the DRM key has not expired before releasing the key to perform function.

Initializing a Policy

- The Enclave retrieves the time reference and the time source nonce using sgx_get_trusted_time.
- 2. The Enclave fills the policy structure with the sample usage secret, the time policy, the time reference and the time source nonce returned by sgx get trusted time.
- 3. The Enclave seals the policy structure into Sealed Data using <code>sgx_seal_data</code>.

Verifying a Policy

 The Enclave verifies and decrypts the sealed data using sgx_unseal_ data.

- 2. The Enclave retrieves the current time using <code>sgx_get_trusted_time</code>.
- 3. The Enclave verifies the time source nonce returned by sgx_get_trusted_time is the same as the time source nonce in the policy structure.
 If not, abort the operation.
- 4. Calculate time elapsed.
- 5. Verify the policy. If the time limit has expired, abort the operation.
- 6. The Enclave releases the secret to perform functions.

Library Functions and Type Reference

This topic includes the following sub-topics to describe library functions and type reference for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK:

- Untrusted Library Functions
- Trusted Libraries
- Function Descriptions
- Types and Enumerations
- Error Codes

Untrusted Library Functions

The untrusted library functions can only be called from application code - outside the enclave.

The untrusted libraries built for the hardware mode contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as the prefix, is defined when the library is built. The string version consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all untrusted libraries shipped in a given Intel[®] SGX PSW/SDK release have the same version number and allows quick identification of the untrusted libraries linked into an untrusted component.

For instance, <code>libsgx_urts.so</code> contains a string version <code>SGX_URTS_VERSION_1.0.0.</code> The last digit varies depending on the specific Intel SGX PSW/SDK release number.

Enclave Creation and Destruction

These functions are used to either create or destroy enclaves:

- sgx_create_enclave
- sgx_destroy_enclave

Quoting Functions

These functions allow application enclaves to ensure that they are running on an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions environment.

NOTE:

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- sgx_init_quote
- sgx_calc_quote_size
- sgx_get_quote_size
- sgx_get_quote
- sgx_report_attestation_status

Untrusted Key Exchange Functions

These functions allow exchanging of secrets between ISV's server and enclaves. They are used in concert with the trusted Key Exchange functions.

NOTE:

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- sgx_ra_get_msg1
- sgx_ra_proc_msg2
- sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id

Untrusted Platform Service Function

This function helps ISVs determine what Intel(R) SGX Platform Services are supported by the platform.

NOTE:

To run this function in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

sgx_get_ps_cap

Intel(R) SGX Launch Control Functions

Use sgx_get_whitelist_size to get the size of current Enclave Signing
Key White List Certificate Chain. Use sgx get whitelist to get the chain.

- sgx_get_whitelist_size
- sgx_get_whitelist

Trusted Libraries

The trusted libraries are static libraries that linked with the enclave binary. The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK ships with several trusted libraries that cover domains such as standard C/C++ libraries, synchronization, encryption and more.

These functions/objects can only be used from within the enclave.

Trusted libraries built for HW mode (for example, not for simulation) contain a string with the release number. The string version, which uses the library name as prefix, is defined when the SDK is built and consists of various parameters such as the product number, SVN revision number, build number, and so on. This mechanism ensures all trusted libraries shipped in a given SDK release will have the same version number and allows quick identification of the trusted libraries linked into an enclave.

For instance, <code>libsgx_tstdc.a</code> contains a string version like <code>SGX_TSTDC_VERSION_1.0.0.O</code>. Of course, the last digits vary depending on the SDK release.

CAUTION:

Do not link the enclave with any untrusted library including C/C++ standard libraries. This action will either fail the enclave signing process or cause a runtime failure due to the use of restricted instructions.

Trusted Runtime System

The Intel(R) SGX trusted runtime system (tRTS) is a key component of the Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK. It provides the enclave entry point logic as well as other functions to be used by enclave developers.

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions
- Custom Exception Handling

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Helper Functions

The tRTS provides the following helper functions for you to determine whether a given address is within or outside enclave memory.

- sgx_is_within_enclave
- sgx_is_outside_enclave

The tRTS provides a wrapper to the RDRAND instruction to generate a true random number from hardware. The C/C++ standard library functions rand and srand functions are not supported within an enclave because they only provide pseudo random numbers. Instead, enclave developers should use the sgx_read_rand function to get true random numbers.

sgx_read_rand

Custom Exception Handling

NOTE:

Custom exception handling is only supported in HW mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

NOTE:

OCALLs are not allowed in the exception handler.

NOTE:

Custom exception handing only saves general purpose registers in <code>sgx_exception_info_t</code>. You should be careful when touching other registers in the exception handlers.

Note:

If the exception handlers can not handle the exceptions, <code>abort()</code> is called. <code>abort()</code> makes the enclave unusable and generates another exception.

The Custom Exception Handling APIs are listed below:

- sgx_register_exception_handler
- sgx_unregister_exception_handler

Custom Exception Handler for CPUID Instruction

If an ISV requiresusing the CPUID information within an enclave, then the enclave code must make an OCALL to perform the CPUID instruction in the untrusted application. The Intel(R) SGX SDK provides two functions in the lib-rary sgx_tstdc to obtain CPUID information through an OCALL:

- sgx_cpuid
- sgx_cpuid_ex

In addition, the Intel SGX SDK also provides the following intrinsics which call the above functions to obtain CPUID data:

- ___cpuid
- ___cpuidex

Both the functions and intrinsics result in an OCALL to the uRTS library to obtain CPUID data. The results are returned from an untrusted component in the system. It is recommended that threat evaluation be performed to ensure that CPUID return values are not problematic. Ideally, sanity checking of the return values should be performed.

If an ISV's enclave uses a third party library which executes the CPUID instruction, then the ISV would need to provide a custom exception handler to handle the exception generated from issuing the CPUID instruction (unless the third party library registers its own exception handler for CPUID support). The ISV is responsible for analyzing the usage of the specific CPUID result provided by the untrusted domain to ensure it does not compromise the enclave security properties. Recommended implementation of the CPUID exception handler involves:

- 1. ISV analyzes the third party library CPUID usages, identifying required CPUID results.
- 2. ISV enclave code initialization routine populates a *cache* of the required CPUID results inside the enclave. This *cache* might be maintained by the RTS or by ISV code.
- 3. ISV enclave code initialization routine registers a custom exception handler.

- 4. The custom exception handler, when invoked, examines the exception information and faulting instruction. If the exception is caused by a CPUID instruction:
 - 1. Retrieve the *cached* CPUID result and populate the CPUID instruction output registers.
 - 2. Advance the RIP to bypass the CPUID instruction and complete the exception handling.

Trusted Service Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library named sgx_tservice for secure data manipulation and protection. The sgx_tser-vice library provides the following trusted functionality and services:

- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions
- Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions
- Untrusted Platform Service Function
- Diffie–Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Instruction Wrapper Functions

The sgx_tservice library provides functions for getting specific keys and for creating and verifying an enclave report. The API functions are listed below:

- sgx_get_key
- sgx_create_report
- sgx_verify_report

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Sealing and Unsealing Functions

The sgx_tservice library provides the following functions:

- Exposes APIs to create sealed data which is both confidentiality and integrity protected.
- Exposes an API to unseal sealed data inside the enclave.
- Provides APIs to authenticate and verify the input data with AES-GMAC.

See the following related topics for more information.

- sgx_seal_data
- sgx_seal_data_ex
- sgx_unseal_data
- sgx_mac_aadata
- sgx_mac_aadata_ex
- sgx_unmac_aadata

The library also provides APIs to help calculate the sealed data size, encrypt text length, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) text length.

- sgx_calc_sealed_data_size
- sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len
- sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len

SealLibrary Introduction

When an enclave is instantiated, it provides protections (confidentiality and integrity) to the data by keeping it within the boundary of the enclave. Enclave developers should identify enclave data and/or state that is considered secret and potentially needs preservation across the following enclave destruction events:

- Application is done with the enclave and closes it.
- Application itself is closed.
- The platform is hibernated or shutdown.

In general, the secrets provisioned within an enclave are lost when the enclave is closed. However if the secret data needs to be preserved during one of these events for future use within an enclave, it must be stored outside the enclave boundary before closing the enclave. In order to protect and preserve the data, a mechanism is in place which allows enclave software to retrieve a key unique to that enclave. This key can only be generated by that enclave on that particular platform. Enclave software uses that key to encrypt data to the platform or to decrypt data already on the platform. Refer to these *encrypt* and *decrypt* operations as *sealing* and *unsealing* respectively as the data is cryptographically sealed to the enclave and platform.

To provide strong protection against potential key-wear-out attacks, a unique seal key is generated for each data blob encrypted with the <code>sgx_seal_data</code> API call. A key ID for each encrypted data blob is stored in clear alongside the

encrypted data blob. The key ID is used to re-generate the seal key to decrypt the data blob.

AES-GCM (AES – Advanced Encryption Standard) is utilized to encrypt and MAC-protect the payload. To protect against software-based side channel attacks, the crypto implementation of AES-GCM utilizes Intel® Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (Intel® AES-NI), which is immune to software-based side channel attacks. The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. If the GCM input contains only data that is not to be encrypted, the resulting specialization of GCM, called GMAC (Galois Message Authentication Code), is simply an authentication mode for the input data. The sgx mac aadata API call restricts the input to nonconfidential data to provide data origin authentication only. The single output of this function is the authentication tag.

Example Use Cases

One example is that an application may start collecting secret state while executing that needs to be preserved and utilized on future invocations of that application. Another example is during application installation, a secret key may need to be preserved and verified upon starting the application.

For these cases the seal APIs can be utilized to seal the secret data (key or state) in the examples above, and then unseal the secret data when needed.

Sealing

- Use sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.
- 2. Allocate memory for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.
- 3. Call sgx seal data to perform sealing operation
- 4. Save the sealed data structure for future use.

Unsealing

1. Use sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len and sgx_get_add_mac_txt_ len to determine the size of the buffers to allocate in terms of bytes.

- 2. Allocate memory for the decrypted text and additional text buffers.
- 3. Call sgx_unseal_data to perform the unsealing operation.

Trusted Platform Service Functions

The sgx_tservice library provides the following functions that allow an ISV to use platform services and get platform services security property.

NOTE:

To run these functions in the hardware mode, you need to access to Internet. Configure the system network proxy settings if needed.

- sgx_create_pse_session
- sgx_close_pse_session
- sgx_get_ps_sec_prop
- sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex
- sgx_get_trusted_time
- sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex
- sgx_create_monotonic_counter
- sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter
- sgx_increment_monotonic_counter
- sgx_read_monotonic_counter

NOTE

One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in the simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

Diffie-Hellman (DH) Session Establishment Functions

These functions allow an ISV to establish secure session between two enclaves using the EC DH Key exchange protocol.

- sgx_dh_init_session
- sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1
- sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1
- sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2
- sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3

C Standard Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C standard library. The library is named sgx_tstdc (trusted standard C), and can only be used inside an enclave. Standard C headers are located under \$(SGXSDKInstallPath)include/tlibc.

sgx_tstdc provides a subset of C99 functions that are ported from the OpenBSD* project. Unsupported functions are not allowed inside an enclave for the following reasons:

- The definition implies usage of a restricted CPU instruction.
- The definition is known to be unsafe or insecure.
- The definition implementation is too large to fit inside an enclave or relies heavily on information from the untrusted domain.
- The definition is compiler specific, and not part of the standard.
- The definition is a part of the standard, but it is not supported by a specific compiler.

See Unsupported C Standard Functions for a list of unsupported C99 definitions within an enclave.

Locale Functions

A trusted version of locale functions is not provided primarily due to the size restriction. Those functions rely heavily on the localization data (normally 1MB to 2MB), which should be preloaded into the enclave in advance to ensure that it will not be modified from the untrusted domain. This practice would increase the footprint of an enclave, especially for those enclaves not depending on the locale functionality. Moreover, since localization data is not available, wide character functions inquiring enclave locale settings are not supported either.

Random Number Generation Functions

The random functions srand and rand are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. A true random function sgx_read_rand is provided in the tRTS library by using the RDRAND instruction. However, in the Intel(R) SGX simulation environment, this function still generates pseudo random numbers because RDRAND may not be available on the hardware platform.

String Functions

The functions strcpy and strcat are not supported in the Intel(R) SGX SDK C library. You are recommended to use strncpy and strncat instead.

Abort Function

The abort () function is supported within an enclave but has a different behavior. When a thread calls the abort function, it makes the enclave unusable by setting the enclave state to a specific value that allows the tRTS and application to detect and report this event. The aborting thread generates an exception and exits the enclave, while other enclave threads continue running normally until they exit the enclave. Once the enclave is in the unusable state, subsequent enclave calls and OCALL returns generate the same error indicating that the enclave is no longer usable. After all thread calls abort, the enclave is locked and cannot be recovered. You have to destroy, reload and reinitialize the enclave to use it again.

Thread Synchronization Primitives

Multiple untrusted threads may enter an enclave simultaneously as long as more than one thread context is defined by the application and created by the untrusted loader. Once multiple threads execute concurrently within an enclave, they will need some forms of synchronization mechanism if they intend to operate on any global data structure. In some cases, threads may use the atomic operations provided by the processor's ISA. In the general case, however, they would use synchronization objects and mechanisms similar to those available outside the enclave.

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK already supports mutex and conditional variable synchronization mechanisms by means of the following API and data types defined in the Types and Enumerations section. Some functions included in the trusted Thread Synchronization library may make calls outside the enclave (OCALLs). If you use any of the APIs below, you must first import the needed OCALL functions from $sgx_tstdc.edl$. Otherwise, you will get a linker error when the enclave is being built; see Calling Functions outside the Enclave for additional details. The table below illustrates the primitives that the Intel(R) SGX Thread Synchronization library supports, as well as the OCALLs that each API function needs.

	Function API	OCall Function
	sgx_thread_ mutex_init	
	sgx_thread_ mutex_destroy	
	sgx_thread_ mutex_lock	sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_ event_ocall

	sgx_thread_ mutex_trylock	
	sgx_thread_ mutex_unlock	sgx_thread_set_untrusted_ event_ocall
Condition Variable Syn- chronization	sgx_thread_cond_ init	
	sgx_thread_cond_ destroy	
	sgx_thread_cond_ wait	sgx_thread_wait_untrusted_ event_ocall
		sgx_thread_setwait_untrusted_ events_ocall
	sgx_thread_cond_ signal	sgx_thread_set_untrusted_ event_ocall
	sgx_thread_cond_ broadcast	sgx_thread_set_multiple_untrus- ted_events_ocall
Thread Management	sgx_thread_self sgx_thread_equal	

Query CPUID inside Enclave

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK provides two functions for enclave developers to query a subset of CPUID information inside the enclave:

- sgx_cpuid
- sgx_cpuidex

GCC* Built-in Functions

GCC* provides built-in functions with optimization purposes. When GCC recognizes a built-in function, it will generate the code more efficiently by leveraging its optimization algorithms. GCC always treats functions with _____ builtin_prefix as built-in functions, such as __bultin_malloc, ____ builtin_strncpy, and so on. In many cases, GCC tries to use the built-in variant for standard C functions, such as memcpy, strncpy, and abort. A call to the C library function is generated unless the -fno-builtin compiler option is specified. GCC optimizes built-in functions in certain cases. If GCC does not expand the built-in function directly, it will call the corresponding library function (without the __builtin_ prefix). The trusted C library must supply a version of the functions to ensure the enclave is always built correctly.

The trusted C library does not contain any function considered insecure (for example, strcpy) or that may contain illegal instructions in Intel SGX (for example, fprintf). However, the ISV should be aware that GCC may introduce security risks into an enclave if the compiler inlines the code corresponding to an insecure built-in function. In this case, the ISV may use the – fno-builtin or –fno-builtin-function options to suppress any unwanted built-in code generation.

See Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions within an enclave for a list of unsupported GCC built-ins.

Non-Local Jumps

The C standard library provides a pair of functions, setjmp and longjmp, that can be used to perform non-local jumps. setjmp saves the current program state into a data structure. longjmp can later use this data structure to restore the execution context. This means that after longjmp, execution continues at the setjmp call site.

Since setjmp/longjmp may transfer execution from one function to a predetermined location in another function, normal stack unwinding does not occur. As a result, you must use this functionality carefully, ensuring that an enclave only calls setjmp in a valid context. You should also perform extensive security validation to ascertain that the enclave never uses these functions in such a way it could result in undefined behavior. Typical use of setjmp/longjmp is the implementation of an exception mechanism (error handling). However, you must never use these functions in C++ programs. You should use the standard CEH instead. You are recommended to review the information provided at cert.org on how to use setjmp/longjmp securely.

As a precaution, the Intel[®] SGX SDK includes the setjmp/longjmp functionality in its own library, rather than within the trusted C library. In this way, enclaves will not incorporate this functionality by mistake. To access this functionality, you must explicitly give the linker the specific library.

Requirements

Header	setjmp.h
Library	libsgx_tsetjmp.a

C++ Language Support

The Intel[®] Software Guard Extensions SDK provides a trusted library for C++ support inside the enclave. C++ developers would utilize advanced C++ features that require C++ runtime libraries.

The ISO/IEC 14882: C++ standard is chosen as the baseline for the Intel[®] Software Guard Extensions SDK trusted library. Most of standard C++ features are fully supported inside the enclave, and including:

- 1. Dynamic memory management with new/delete;
- 2. Global initializers are supported (usually used in the construction of global objects);
- 3. Run-time Type Identification (RTTI);
- 4. C++ exception handling inside the enclave.

Currently, global destructors are not supported due to the reason that EPC memory will be recycled when destroying an enclave.

NOTE

C++ objects are not supported in enclave interface definitions. If an application needs to pass a C++ object across the enclave boundary, you are recommended to store the C++ object's data in a C struct and marshal the data across the enclave interface. Then you need to instantiate the C++ object inside the enclave with the marshaled C struct passed in to the constructor (or you may update existing instantiated objects with appropriate operators).

C++ Standard Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the C++ standard library (including STL) that conforms to the C++11 standard. However, a different version of this library will be linked depending on the Makefile you use to develop enclaves. The newer Makefile version uses sgx_tcxx.a by default, which has been ported from libc++ and supports most C++11 features. On the other hand, previous Makefile versions use sgx_tstdcxx.a. This library was ported from STLport but provides limited C++11 support. If you update an enclave project and want access to all the new C++11 features, you need to manually add the new C++ trusted library. If sgx_tstdcxx.a to the linker dependency list of the Makefile.

As for the C++ standard library, most functions will work just as its untrusted counterpart, but here is a high level summary of features that are not supported inside the enclave:

- I/O related functions and classes, like <iostream>;
- 2. Functions depending on a locale library;
- 3. Any other functions that require system calls.

However, only C functions can be used as the language for trusted and untrusted interfaces. While you can use C++ to develop your enclaves, you should not pass C++ objects across the enclave boundary.

Cryptography Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted cryptography library named <code>sgx_tcrypto</code>. It includes the cryptographic functions used by other trusted libraries included in the SDK, such as the <code>sgx_tservice</code> library. Thus, the functionality provided by this library is somewhat limited.

- sgx_sha256_msg
- sgx_sha256_init
- sgx_sha256_update
- sgx_sha256_get_hash
- sgx_sha256_close
- sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt
- sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt
- sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg
- sgx_cmac128_init
- sgx_cmac128_update
- sgx_cmac128_final
- sgx_cmac128_close
- sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt
- sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt
- sgx_ecc256_open_context
- sgx_ecc256_close_context
- sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair
- sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey
- sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey512
- sgx_ecc256_check_point

- sgx_ecdsa_sign
- sgx_ecdsa_verify
- sgx_rsa3072_sign
- sgx_rsa3072_verify

Trusted Key Exchange Functions

These functions allow an ISV to exchange secrets between its server and its enclaves. They are used in concert with untrusted Key Exchange functions.

- sgx_ra_init
- sgx_ra_init_ex
- sgx_ra_get_keys
- sgx_ra_close

Intel[®] Protected File System Library

Intel[®] Protected File System Library provides protected files API for Intel[®] SGX enclaves. It supports a basic subset of the regular C file API and enables you to create files and work with them as you would normally do from a regular application.

With this API, the files are encrypted and saved on the untrusted disk during a write operation, and they are verified for confidentiality and integrity during a read operation.

To encrypt a file, you should provide a file encryption key. This key is a 128 bits key, and is used as a key derivation key, to generate multiple encryption keys. According to "NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions": "The key that is input to a key derivation function is called a key derivation key. To comply with this Recommendation, a key derivation key shall be a cryptographic key (see Section 3.1). The key derivation key used as an input to one of the key derivation functions specified in this Recommendation can be generated by an approved cryptographic random bit generator (e.g., by a deterministic random bit generator of the type specified in [5]), or by an approved automated key-establishment process (e.g., as defined in [1] and [2])". For more details, please refer to NIST SP 800-108 document.

Another option is to use automatic keys derived from the enclave sealing key (see disadvantages of this approach in the topic Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API).

- sgx_fopen
- sgx_fopen_auto_key
- sgx_fclose
- sgx_fread
- sgx_fwrite
- sgx_fflush
- sgx_ftell
- sgx_fseek
- sgx_feof
- sgx_ferror
- sgx_clearerr
- sgx_remove
- sgx_fexport_auto_key
- sgx_fimport_auto_key
- sgx_fclear_cache

Protected FS Usage Limitation

Since the Protected Files have meta-data embedded in them, only one file handle can be opened for writing at a time, or many file handles for reading. OS protection mechanism is used for protecting against accidentally opening more than one 'write' file handle. If this protection is bypassed, the file will get corrupted. An open file handle can be used by many threads inside the same enclave, the APIs include internal locks for handling this and the operations will be executed by one.

Protected FS Error Codes

The Protected File System (FS) API tries to preserve the original C file API errors. A local errno (enclave internal) is also set for APIs that require this according to the original C file API documentation.

When the Protected FS API is accessing the OS file system, if an error is returned, that error will be provided back to the caller of the Protected FS API. In addition, when possible, it returns an EXXX error code for internal

errors (for example, the EACCES error code is returned when trying to write a file that was opened as read-only, or ENOMEM is returned when an internal attempt to allocate memory fails). Several special error codes were added, like SGX_ERROR_FILE_NAME_MISMATCH, for the cases when the current file name does not match the internal file name. You can find these error codes and their explanations in sgx_error.h.

Protected FS Application Layout

The following figure demonstrates how the Protected File System (FS) works inside an Intel[®] SGX application:




Figure 8 Protected File System Layout

To use the Intel SGX Protected File System libraries:

- 1. The enclave must be linked with libsgx_tprotected_fs.a
- 2. The application must be linked with libsgx_uprotected_fs.a
- 3. The enclave's EDL file must 'import' all the functions from sgx_tprotected fs.edl
- 4. The source files should 'include' sgx_tprotected_fs.h

Protected FS S3/S4 Important Note

To enhance the performance of the Protected File System, cache is used to save the user's data inside the enclave, and only when the cache is full it is flushed to disk.

In case of S3/S4 transitions, data in the cache will be lost (the entire enclave is los). Therefore, all file handles must be flushed or closed before entering S3/S4. If no action is taken, the file integrity is not harmed, only the latest written data that was not flushed will be lost.

Using the Protected FS Automatic Keys API

Automatic keys are derived from the enclave sealing key (with MRSIGNER), so the files are bound to all the enclaves signed by the same signer on this particular machine. To transfer a file from one machine to another, you should follow the key export and import procedure below. There are several cases when using automatic keys is not recommended.

- Disaster recovery trying to open files created on one machine on a different machine will fail (unless you follow the procedure described below). Therefore, automatic disaster recovery may not work properly.
- VM migrations currently, Intel[®] SGX does not support automatic enclave keys transfer in VM migration. Therefore, enclaves running on servers that use VM migrations cannot use the auto key API.

File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API

For files that were created with <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>, to transfer a file from one enclave to another, or to another enclave on a different machine, follow this procedure:

- 1. Close all open handles to the file.
- 2. Call the sgx_fexport_auto_key API. This API returns the last encryption key that was used to encrypt the meta-data node of the file.
- 3. Transfer the file to the destination enclave, and provide the key in a safe method to that enclave.

- 4. Call the sgx_fimport_auto_key API. This API will re-encrypt the meta-data node with a new encryption key, derived from the local enclave seal key.
- 5. Open the file with sgx_fopen_auto_key as usual.

Protected FS Security Non-Objectives

In order to mitigate file swapping attacks (with two valid files), file names are checked during a file open operation (verifies that the current name is equal to the file name the file was created with). However, if two files are created with the same file name, there is no way to protect against such a swapping attack.

Since the files are saved in the regular FS, there is no protection against malicious file deletion or modification – this will only be detected when trying to read or write the modified section from the file (decryption will fail).

There are several things that are not protected when using the Protected FS API, and anyone who can access the OS can see them:

- 1. File name
- 2. File size (up to 4KB granularity)
- 3. File modification date
- 4. Key type (user or auto)
- 5. Usage patterns
- 6. Read/Write offsets

If any of those items might expose sensitive information, and help a potential attacker, the enclave developer should add defense mechanisms on their own to protect against this. For example, an implementation of a "secure browser" should not save the 'cookies' with the names of their related websites, because an attacker can learn from that the user's browsing history.

TCMalloc Library

The Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions SDK includes a trusted version of the TCMalloc library. The library is named $sgx_tcmalloc$, and can only be used inside an enclave. $sgx_tcmalloc$ provides high performance memory allocation and deallocation functions that are ported from gperftools-2.5:

- malloc
- free
- realloc

- calloc
- memalign

Do the following to enable TCMalloc in Intel(R) SGX:

1.Set the enclave HeapMaxSize equal or larger than 0x900000 in Enclave.config.xml.

For example:

<HeapMaxSize>0x900000</HeapMaxSize>

2.Add "-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-wholearchive" into enclave linking options in the Makefile.

For example:

```
Enclave_Link_Flags := $(SGX_COMMON_CFLAGS) -Wl,--no-
undefined -nostdlib -nodefaultlibs -nostartfiles -
L$(SGX_LIBRARY_PATH) \
-Wl,--whole-archive -l$(Trts_Library_Name) -Wl,--no-
whole-archive \
-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-whole-
archive \
-Wl,--start-group -lsgx_tstdc -lsgx_tstdcxx -l$(Crypto_
Library_Name) -l$(Service_Library_Name) -Wl,--end-group
\
-Wl,-Bstatic -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--no-undefined \
-Wl,-pie,-eenclave_entry -Wl,--export-dynamic \
-Wl,--defsym,__ImageBase=0 \
-Wl,--version-script=Enclave/Enclave.lds
```

NOTE:

```
The flags "-Wl,--whole-archive -lsgx_tcmalloc -Wl,--no-
whole-archive" must be inserted before "-Wl,--start-group -
lsgx tstdc -lsgx tstdcxx -Wl,--end-group".
```

Otherwise, the enclave build will fail.

Function Descriptions

This topic describes various functions including their syntax, parameters, return values, and requirements.

NOTE

When an API function lists an EDL in its requirements, users need to explicitly import such library EDL file in their enclave's EDL.

sgx_create_enclave

Loads the enclave using its file name and initializes it using a launch token.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_enclave(
    const char *file_name,
    const int debug,
    sgx_launch_token_t *launch_token,
    int *launch_token_updated,
    sgx_enclave_id_t *enclave_id,
    sgx_misc_attribute_t *misc_attr
);
```

Parameters

file_name [in]

Name or full path to the enclave image.

debug [in]

The valid value is 0 or 1.

0 indicates to create the enclave in non-debug mode. An enclave created in non-debug mode cannot be debugged.

1 indicates to create the enclave in debug mode. The code/data memory inside an enclave created in debug mode is accessible by the debugger or other software outside of the enclave and thus is *not* under the same memory access protections as an enclave created in non-debug mode.

Enclaves should only be created in debug mode for debug purposes. A helper macro SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is provided to create an enclave in debug mode. In release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 0. In debug and pre-release builds, the value of SGX_DEBUG_FLAG is 1 by default.

launch_token [in/out]

A pointer to an sgx_launch_token_t object used to initialize the enclave to be created. Must not be NULL. The caller can provide an all-0 buffer as the sgx_launch_token_t object, in which case, the function will attempt to create a valid sgx_launch_token_t object and store it in the buffer. The caller should store the sgx_launch_token_t object and re-use it in future calls to create the same enclave. Certain platform configuration changes can invalidate a pre-viously stored sgx_launch_token_t object. If the token provided is *not* valid, the function will attempt to update it to a valid one.

launch_token_updated [out]

The output is 0 or 1.0 indicates the launch token has not been updated. 1 indicates the launch token has been updated.

enclave_id [out]

A pointer to an sgx_enclave_id_t that receives the enclave ID or handle. Must not be NULL.

misc_attr [out, optional]

A pointer to an sgx_misc_attribute_t structure that receives the misc select and attributes of the enclave. This pointer may be NULL if the information is not needed.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The enclave was loaded and initialized successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE

The enclave file is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The 'enclave_id', 'updated' or 'token' parameter is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory available to complete sgx create enclave().

SGX_ERROR_ENCLAVE_FILE_ACCESS

The enclave file can't be opened. It may be caused by enclave file not being found or no privilege to access the enclave file.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_METADATA

The metadata embedded within the enclave image is corrupt or missing.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION

The enclave metadata version (created by the signing tool) and the untrusted library version (uRTS) do not match.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

The signature for the enclave is not valid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

The protected memory has run out. For example, a user is creating too many enclaves, the enclave requires too much memory, or we cannot load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_NO_DEVICE

The Intel SGX device is not valid. This may be caused by the Intel SGX driver not being installed or the Intel SGX driver being disabled.

SGX_ERROR_MEMORY_MAP_CONFLICT

During enclave creation, there is a race condition for mapping memory between the loader and another thread. The loader may fail to map virtual address. If this error code is encountered, create the enclave again.

SGX_ERROR_DEVICE_BUSY

The Intel SGX driver or low level system is busy when creating the enclave. If this error code is encountered, we suggest creating the enclave again.

SGX_ERROR_MODE_INCOMPATIBLE

The target enclave mode is incompatible with the mode of the current RTS. For example, a 64-bit application tries to load a 32-bit enclave or a simulation uRTS tries to load a hardware enclave.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

sgx_create_enclave() needs the AE service to get a launch token. If the service is not available, the enclave may not be launched.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

The request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_INVALID_PRIVILEGE

The request requires some special attributes for the enclave, but is not privileged.

SGX_ERROR_NDEBUG_ENCLAVE

The enclave is signed as a product enclave and cannot be created as a debuggable enclave.

SGX_ERROR_UNDEFINED_SYMBOL

The enclave contains an undefined symbol.

The signing tool should typically report this type of error when the enclave is built.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_MISC

The MiscSelct/MiscMask settings are not correct.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error is detected.

Description

The sgx_create_enclave function will load and initialize the enclave using the enclave file name and a launch token. If the launch token is incorrect, it will get a new one and save it back to the input parameter "token", and the parameter "updated" will indicate that the launch token was updated.

If both enclave and launch token are valid, the function will return a value of SGX_SUCCESS. The enclave ID (handle) is returned via the enclave_id parameter.

The library libsgx_urts.a provides this function to load an enclave with Intel(R) SGX hardware, and it cannot be used to load an enclave linked with the simulation library. On the other hand, the simulation library libsgx_urts_sim.a exposes an identical interface which can only load a simulation enclave. Running in simulation mode does not require Intel(R) SGX hard-ware/driver. However, it does not provide hardware protection.

The randomization of the load address of the enclave is dependent on the operating system. The address of the heap and stack is not randomized and is at a constant offset from the enclave base address. A compromised loader or operating system (both of which are outside the TCB) can remove the randomization entirely. The enclave writer should not rely on the randomization of the base address of the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_urts.h
Library	libsgx_urts.a or libsgx_urts_sim.a (simulation)

sgx_destroy_enclave

The <code>sgx_destroy_enclave</code> function destroys an enclave and frees its associated resources.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_enclave(
    const sgx_enclave_id_t enclave_id
);
```

Parameters

enclave_id [in]

An enclave ID or handle that was generated by sgx_create_enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The enclave was unloaded successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ENCLAVE_ID

The enclave ID (handle) is not valid. The enclave has not been loaded or the enclave has already been destroyed.

Description

The sgx_destroy_enclave function destroys an enclave and releases its associated resources and invalidates the enclave ID or handle.

The function will block until no other threads are executing inside the enclave.

It is highly recommended that the <code>sgx_destroy_enclave</code> function be called after the application has finished using the enclave to avoid possible deadlocks.

The library libsgx_urts.aexposes this function to destroy a previously created enclave in hardware mode, while libsgx_urts_sim.a provides a simulative counterpart.

See more details in Loading and Unloading an Enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_urts.h
Library	libsgx_urts.a or libsgx_urts_sim.a (simulation)

sgx_init_quote

sgx_init_quote returns information needed by an Intel(R) SGX application
to get a quote of one of its enclaves.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_init_quote(
    sgx_target_info_t *p_target_info,
    sgx_epid_group_id_t *p_gid
);
```

Parameters

p_target_info [out]

Allows an enclave for which the quote is being created, to create report that only QE can verify.

p_gid [out]

ID of platform's current Intel(R) EPID group.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All of the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

Calling sgx_init_quote is the first thing an Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions application does in the process of getting a quote of an enclave. The content of p_target_info changes when the QE changes. The content of p_gid changes when the platform SVN changes.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_calc_quote_size

sgx calc quote size returns the required buffer size for the quote.

```
sgx_status_t sgx_calc_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

Parameters

p_sig_rl [in]

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

sig_rl_size [in]

```
Size of <code>p_sig_rl</code>, in bytes. If <code>p_sig_rl</code> is NULL, then <code>sig_rl_size</code> will be 0.
```

p_quote_size [out]

Indicate the size of quote buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The $\texttt{p_quote_size}$ pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call <code>sgx_calc_quote</code>, call <code>sgx_calc_quote_size</code> first to calculate the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_get_quote_size

```
sgx_get_quote_size is deprecated. Use the sgx_calc_quote_
size function instead.
```

sgx get quote size returns the required buffer size for the quote.

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote_size(
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t *p_quote_size
);
```

Parameters

p_sig_rl [in]

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

p_quote_size [out]

Indicate the size of quote buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The $\texttt{p_quote_size}$ pointer is invalid or the other input parameters are corrupted.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call <code>sgx_get_quote</code>, call <code>sgx_get_quote_size</code> first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_get_quote

sgx get quote generates a linkable or un-linkable QUOTE.

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_quote(
    const sgx_report_t *p_report,
    sgx_quote_sign_type_t quote_type,
    const sgx_spid_t *p_spid,
    const sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce,
    const uint8_t *p_sig_rl,
    uint32_t sig_rl_size,
    sgx_report_t *p_qe_report,
    sgx_quote_t *p_quote,
    uint32_t quote_size
```

);

Parameters

p_report [in]

Report of enclave for which quote is being calculated.

quote_type [in]

SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE for unlinkable quote or SGX_LINKABLE_ SIGNATURE for linkable quote.

p_spid [in]

ID of service provider.

p_nonce [in]

Optional nonce, if $\texttt{p_qe_report}$ is not NULL, then nonce should not be NULL as well.

p_sig_rl [in]

Optional revoke list of signatures, can be NULL.

sig_rl_size [in]

Size of <code>p_sig_rl</code>, in bytes. If the <code>p_sig_rl</code> is NULL, then <code>sig_rl_size</code> shall be 0.

p_qe_report [out]

Optional output. If not NULL, report of QE target to the calling enclave will be copied to this buffer, and in this case, nonce should not be NULL as well.

p_quote [out]

The major output of get_quote, the quote itself, linkable or unlinkable depending on quote type input. quote cannot be NULL.

quote_size [in]

Indicates the size of the quote buffer. To get the size, user shall call <code>sgx_calc_quote_size</code> first.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED

The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

Both Intel(R) EPID Member and Verifier need to know the Group Public Key and the Intel(R) EPID Parameters used. These values not being returned by either sgx_init_quote() or sgx_get_quote() reflects the reliance on the Attestation Service for Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions. With the Attestation Service in place, simply sending the GID to the Attestation Service (through the Intel(R) SGX application and PS) is sufficient for the Attestation Service to know which public key and parameters to use.

The purpose of p_qe_report is for the ISV enclave to confirm the QUOTE it received is not modified by the untrusted SW stack, and not a replay. The implementation in QE is to generate a REPORT targeting the ISV enclave (target info from p_report), with the lower 32Bytes in report.data = SHA256 (p_nonce||p_quote). The ISV enclave can verify the p_qe_report and report.data to confirm the QUOTE has not be modified and is not a replay. It is optional.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_ra_get_msg1

sgx_ra_get_msg1 is used to get the remote attestation and key exchange
protocol message 1 to send to a service provider. The application enclave
should use sgx_ra_init or sgx_ra_init_ex function to create the
remote attestation and key exchange process context, and return to the
untrusted code, before the untrusted code can invoke this function.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_msgl(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t p_get_ga,
    sgx_ra_msgl_t *p_msgl
);
```

Parameters

context [in]

Context returned by the <code>sgx_ra_init</code> or <code>sgx_ra_init_ex</code> function inside the application enclave.

eid [in]

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

p_get_ga [in]

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_get_ga generated by sgx_ edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_tkey_exchange library and import sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the enclave EDL file to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_get_ga.

p_msg1 [out]

Message 1 used by the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED

The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The application also passes in a pointer to the untrusted proxy corresponding to sgx_ra_get_ga, which is exposed by the trusted key exchange library. This reflects the fact that the names of untrusted proxies are enclave-specific.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

Requirements

Header	sgx_ukey_exchange.h
Library	libsgx_ukey_exchange.a

sgx_ra_proc_msg2

sgx_ra_proc_msg2 is used to process the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 2 from the service provider and generate message 3 to send to the service provider. If the service provider accepts message 3, negotiated session keys between the application enclave and the service provider are ready for use. The application enclave can use sgx_ra_ get_keys function to retrieve the negotiated keys and can use sgx_ra_ close function to release the context of the remote attestation and key exchange process. If processing message 2 results in an error, the application should notify the service provider of the error or the service provider needs a time-out mechanism to terminate the remote attestation transaction when it does not receive message 3.

Syntax

```
sgx status t sgx ra proc msg2(
```

```
sgx_ra_context_t context,
sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t p_proc_msg2,
sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t p_get_msg3,
const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
uint32_t msg2_size,
sgx_ra_msg3_t **pp_msg3,
uint32_t *p_msg3_size
);
```

Parameters

context [in]

Context returned by sgx ra init.

eid [in]

ID of the application enclave which is going to be attested.

p_proc_msg2 [in]

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted_t generated by sgx_edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_ tkey_exchange library and import the sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_ proc_msg2.

p_get_msg3 [in]

Function pointer of the ECALL proxy sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted_t generated by sgx_edger8r. The application enclave should link with sgx_ tkey_exchange library and import the sgx_tkey_exchange.edl in the EDL file of the application enclave to expose the ECALL proxy for sgx_ra_ get_msg3.

p_msg2 [in]

sgx_ra_msg2_t message 2 from the service provider received by application.

msg2_size [in]

The length of p_msg2 (in bytes).

pp_msg3 [out]

sgx_ra_msg3_t message 3 to be sent to the service provider. The message buffer is allocated by the sgx_ukey_exchange library. The caller should free the buffer after use.

p_msg3_size [out]

The length of pp_msg3 (in bytes).

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_EPID_MEMBER_REVOKED

The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revocation.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

The signature is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH

Indicates verification error for reports, sealed data, etc.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH

Indicates key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The sgx_ra_proc_msg2 processes the incoming message 2 and returns message 3. Message 3 is allocated by the library, so the caller should free it after use.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

Requirements

Header	sgx_ukey_exchange.h
Library	libsgx_ukey_exchange.a

sgx_report_attestation_status

sgx_report_attestation_status reports information from the Intel Attestation Server during a remote attestation to help to decide whether a TCB update is required. It is recommended to always call sgx_report_ attestation_status after a remote attestation transaction when it results in a Platform Info Blob (PIB). The attestation_status indicates whether the ISV server decided to trust the enclave or not.

- The value <code>pass:0</code> indicates that the ISV server trusts the enclave. If the ISV server trusts the enclave and platform services, <code>sgx_report_</code> attestation_status will not take actions to correct the TCB that will cause negative user experience such as long latencies or requesting a TCB update.
- The value fail: !=0 indicates that the ISV server does not trust the enclave. If the ISV server does not trust the enclave or platform services, sgx_report_attestation_statuswill take all actions to correct the TCB which may incur long latencies and/or request the application to update one of the Intel SGX's TCB components. It is the ISV's responsibility to provide the TCB component updates to the client platform.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_report_attestation_status (
    const sgx_platform_info_t* p_platform_info
    int attestation_status,
    sgx_update_info_bit_t* p_update_info
);
```

Parameters

p_platform_info [in]

Pointer to opaque structure received from Intel Attestation Server.

attestation_status [in]

The value indicates whether remote attestation succeeds or fails. If attestation succeeds, the value is 0. If it fails, the value will be others.

p_update_info [out]

Pointer to the buffer that receives the update information only when the return value of sgx_report_attestation_status is SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_INVALID_EPIDBLOB

The Intel(R) EPID blob is corrupted.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

This service is temporarily unavailable.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The application calls <code>sgx_report_attestation_status</code> after remote attestation to help to recover the TCB.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

$sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id$

The function sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id reports which extended Intel(R) EPID Group the client uses by default. The key used to sign a Quote will be a member of the extended Intel(R) EPID Group reported in this API.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_extended_epid_group_id(
    uint32_t *p_extended_epid_group_id
);
```

Parameters

p_extended_epid_group_id [out]

The extended Intel(R) EPID Group ID.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The p_extended_epid_group_id pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error was detected.

Description

The application uses this value to tell the ISV Service Provider which extended Intel(R) EPID Group to use during remote attestation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_get_ps_cap

sgx get ps cap returns the platform service capability of the platform.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_cap(
    sgx_ps_cap_t* p_sgx_ps_cap
);
```

Parameters

p_sgx_ps_cap [out]

A pointer to sgx_ps_cap_t structure indicates the platform service capability of the platform.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ps_cap pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error is detected.

Description

Before using Platform Services provided by the trusted Architecture Enclave support library, you need to call <code>sgx_get_ps_cap</code> first to get the capability of the platform.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_get_whitelist_size

sgx_get_whitelist_size returns the required buffer size for the whitelist.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist_size(
    uint32_t *p_whitelist_size
);
```

Parameters

p_whitelist_size [out]

Indicate the size of white-list buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The p whitelist size pointer is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The white-list is invalid.

Description

You cannot allocate a chunk of memory at compile time because the size of the quote is not a fixed value. Instead, before trying to call <code>sgx_get_whitel-ist, call sgx_get_whitelist_size</code> first to get the buffer size and then allocate enough memory for the quote.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_get_whitelist

sgx get whitelist returns the white-list used by aesm service.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_whitelist(
    uint8_t *p_whitelist,
    uint32_t whitelist_size
);
```

Parameters

p_whitelist [out]

The white-list.

whitelist_size [in]

Indicate the size of white-list buffer. To get the size, call sgx_get_whitelist_size first.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The p_whitelist pointer is invalid or p_whitelist_size is not correct.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The white-list is invalid.

Description

You can get current white-list used by aesm service.

Requirements

Header	sgx_uae_service.h
Library	libsgx_uae_service.aorlibsgx_uae_service_sim.a
	(simulation)

sgx_is_within_enclave

The sgx_is_within_enclave function checks that the buffer located at the pointer addr with its length of size is an address that is strictly within the calling enclave address space.

Syntax

```
int sgx_is_within_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

Parameters

addr [in]

The start address of the buffer.

size [in]

The size of the buffer.

Return value

1

The buffer is strictly within the enclave address space.

0

The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

Description

sgx_is_within_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address. Given a function pointer, you sometimes need to confirm whether such a function is within the enclave. In this case, it is recommended to use sgx_is_within_enclave with a size of 1.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts.h
Library	libsgx_trts.aorlibsgx_trts_sim.a(simulation)

sgx_is_outside_enclave

The sgx_is_outside_enclave function checks that the buffer located at the pointer addr with its length of size is an address that is strictly outside the calling enclave address space.

Syntax

```
int sgx_is_outside_enclave (
    const void *addr,
    size_t size
);
```

Parameters

addr [in]

The start address of the buffer.

size [in]

The size of the buffer.

Return value

1

The buffer is strictly outside the enclave address space.

0

The whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave, or the buffer is wrapped around.

Description

sgx_is_outside_enclave simply compares the start and end address of the buffer with the calling enclave address space. It does not check the property of the address.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts.h
Library	libsgx_trts.aorlibsgx_trts_sim.a(simulation)

sgx_read_rand

The sgx_read_rand function is used to generate a random number inside the enclave.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(
    unsigned char *rand,
    size_t length_in_bytes
);
```

Parameters

rand [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the random number. The pointer cannot be NULL. The rand buffer can be either within or outside the enclave, but it is not allowed to be across the enclave boundary or wrapped around.

length_in_bytes [in]

The length of the buffer (in bytes).

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Invalid input parameters detected.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the valid random number generation process.

Description

The sgx_read_rand function is provided to replace the C standard pseudorandom sequence generation functions inside the enclave, since these standard functions are not supported in the enclave, such as rand, srand, etc. For HW mode, the function generates a real-random sequence; while for simulation mode, the function generates a pseudo-random sequence.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts.h
Library	libsgx_trts.aorlibsgx_trts_sim.a(simulation)

sgx_register_exception_handler

sgx_register_exception_handler allows developers to register an
exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when is_first_handler is equal to 1) or append the handler to the handler chain.

Syntax

```
void* sgx_register_exception_handler(
    int is_first_handler,
    sgx_exception_handler_t exception_handler
);
```

Parameters

is_first_handler [in]

Specify the order in which the handler should be called. If the parameter is nonzero, the handler is the first handler to be called. If the parameter is zero, the handler is the last handler to be called.

exception_handler [in]

The exception handler to be called

Return value

Non-zero

Indicates the exception handler is registered successfully. The return value is an open handle to the custom exception handler.

NULL

The exception handler was not registered.

Description

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. You can write your own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. For example, a CPUID instruction inside an enclave will effectively result in a #UD fault (Invalid Opcode Exception). ISV enclave code can have an exception handler to prevent the enclave from being trapped into an exception condition. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling sgx_register_exception_handler allows you to register an exception handler, and specify whether to prepend (when is_first_hand-ler is nonzero) or append the handler to the handler chain.

After calling sgx_register_exception_handler to prepend an exception handler, a subsequent call to this function may add another exception handler at the beginning of the handler chain. Therefore the order in which exception handlers are called does not only depend on the value of the is_first_handler parameter, but more importantly depends on the order in which exception handlers are registered.

NOTE:

Custom exception handling is only supported in hardware mode. Although the exception handlers can be registered in simulation mode, the exceptions cannot be caught and handled within the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
Library	libsgx_trts.aorlibsgx_trts_sim.a(simulation)

sgx_unregister_exception_handler

sgx_unregister_exception_handler is used to unregister a custom
exception handler.

```
int sgx_unregister_exception_handler(
    void* handler
);
```

Parameters

handler [in]

A handle to the custom exception handler previously registered using the sgx_register_exception_handler function.

Return value

Non-zero

The custom exception handler is unregistered successfully.

0

The exception handler was not unregistered (not a valid pointer, handler not found).

Description

The Intel(R) SGX SDK supports the registration of custom exception handler functions. An enclave developer can write their own code to handle a limited set of hardware exceptions. See Custom Exception Handling for more details.

Calling sgx_unregister_exception_handler allows developers to unregister an exception handler that was registered earlier.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
Library	libsgx_trts.aorlibsgx_trts_sim.a(simulation)

sgx_spin_lock

The sgx spin lock function acquires a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_spin_lock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

Parameters

lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be acquired.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is acquired.

Description

sgx_spin_lock modifies the value of the spin lock by using compiler atomic operations. If the lock is not available to be acquired, the thread will always wait on the lock until it can be acquired successfully.

Requirements

Header	sgx_spinlock.h
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_spin_unlock

The sgx_spin_unlock function releases a spin lock within the enclave.

Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_spin_unlock(
    sgx_spinlock_t * lock
);
```

Parameters

lock [in]

The trusted spin lock object to be released.

Return value

0

This function always returns zero after the lock is released.

Description

sgx_spin_unlock resets the value of the spin lock, regardless of its current state. This function simply assigns a value of zero to the lock, which indicates the lock is released.

Requirements

Header	sgx_spinlock.h
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_mutex_init

The sgx_thread_mutex_init function initializes a trusted mutex object within the enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_init(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex,
    const sgx_thread_mutexattr_t * unused
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object to be initialized.

unused [in]

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined mutex attributes. [NOT USED]

Return value

0

The mutex is initialized successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

Description

When a thread creates a mutex within an enclave, sgx_thread_mutex_
init simply initializes the various fields of the mutex object to indicate that
the mutex is available.sgx_thread_mutex_init creates a non-recursive
mutex. The results of using a mutex in a lock or unlock operation before it has
been fully initialized (for example, the function call to sgx_thread_mutex_
init returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a
trusted mutex, it is recommended statically initializing the mutex with the
macro SGX_THREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, SGX_THREAD_NON_

RECURSIVE_MUTEX_INITIALIZER ,of, or SGX_THREAD_RECURSIVE_ MUTEX INITIALIZER instead.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_mutex_destroy

The sgx_thread_mutex_destroy function destroys a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_destroy(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object to be destroyed.

Return value

0

The mutex is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside of enclave memory.

EBUSY

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

Description

sgx_thread_mutex_destroy resets the mutex, which brings it to its initial status. In this process, certain fields are checked to prevent releasing a mutex that is still owned by a thread or on which threads are still waiting.

NOTE:

Locking or unlocking a mutex after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a mutex is destroyed, it must be re-created before it can be used again.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_mutex_lock

The sgx_thread_mutex_lock function locks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_lock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object to be locked.

Return value

0

The mutex is locked successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

Description

To acquire a mutex, a thread first needs to acquire the corresponding spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread checks whether the mutex is available. If the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue the thread will now become the owner of the mutex. To confirm its ownership, the thread updates the refcount and owner fields. If the mutex is not available, the thread searches the queue. If the thread is already in the queue, but not at the head, it means that the thread has previously tried to lock the mutex, but it did not succeed and had to wait outside the enclave and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. If the thread is trying to lock the mutex for the first time, it will update the waiting queue and make an OCALL to get suspended. Note that threads release the spin lock after acquiring the mutex or before leaving the enclave.

NOTE

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tsrdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_mutex_trylock

The sgx_thread_mutex_trylock function tries to lock a trusted mutex
object within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_trylock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object to be try-locked.

Return value

0

The mutex is locked successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid.

EBUSY

The mutex is locked by another thread or has pending threads to acquire the mutex.

Description

A thread may check the status of the mutex, which implies acquiring the spin lock and verifying that the mutex is available and that the queue is empty or the thread is at the head of the queue. When this happens, the thread acquires the mutex, releases the spin lock and returns 0. Otherwise, the thread releases the spin lock and returns EINVAL/EBUSY. The thread is not suspended in this case.

NOTE

A thread should not exit an enclave returning from a root ECALL after acquiring the ownership of a mutex. Do not split the critical section protected by a mutex across root ECALLs.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_mutex_unlock

The sgx_thread_mutex_unlock function unlocks a trusted mutex object within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_mutex_unlock(
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object to be unlocked.

Return value

0

The mutex is unlocked successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted mutex object is invalid or it is not locked by any thread.

EPERM

The mutex is locked by another thread.

Description

Before a thread releases a mutex, it has to verify it is the owner of the mutex. If that is the case, the thread decreases the refcount by 1 and then may either continue normal execution or wakeup the first thread in the queue. Note that to ensure the state of the mutex remains consistent, the thread that is awakened by the thread releasing the mutex will then try to acquire the mutex almost as in the initial call to the sgx thread mutex lock routine.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgxtstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_cond_init

The <code>sgx_thread_cond_init</code> function initializes a trusted condition variable within the enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_init(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    const sgx_thread_condattr_t * unused
);
```

Parameters

cond [in]

The trusted condition variable.

attr [in]

Unused parameter reserved for future user defined condition variable attributes. [NOT USED]

Return value

0

The condition variable is initialized successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

Description:

When a thread creates a condition variable within an enclave, it simply initializes the various fields of the object to indicate that the condition variable is available. The results of using a condition variable in a wait, signal or broadcast operation before it has been fully initialized (for example, the function call to $sgx_thread_cond_init$ returns) are undefined. To avoid race conditions in the initialization of a condition variable, it is recommended statically initializing the condition variable with the macro SGX_THREAD_COND_ INITIALIZER.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_cond_destroy

The <code>sgx_thread_cond_destroy</code> function destroys a trusted condition variable within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx thread cond destroy(
```

```
sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
```

);

Parameters

cond [in]

The trusted condition variable to be destroyed.

Return value

0

The condition variable is destroyed successfully.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid. It is either NULL or located outside enclave memory.

EBUSY

The condition variable has pending threads waiting on it.

Description

The procedure first confirms that there are no threads waiting on the condition variable before it is destroyed. The destroy operation acquires the spin lock at the beginning of the operation to prevent other threads from signaling to or waiting on the condition variable.

NOTE

Acquiring or releasing a condition variable after it has been destroyed results in undefined behavior. After a condition variable is destroyed, it must be recreated before it can be used again.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_cond_wait

The sgx_thread_cond_wait function waits on a condition variable within an enclave.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_wait(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond,
    sgx_thread_mutex_t * mutex
);
```

Parameters

cond [in]

The trusted condition variable to be waited on.

mutex [in]

The trusted mutex object that will be unlocked when the thread is blocked in the condition variable.

Return value

0

The thread waiting on the condition variable is signaled by other thread (without errors).

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable or mutex object is invalid or the mutex is not locked.

EPERM

The trusted mutex is locked by another thread.

Description:

A condition variable is always used in conjunction with a mutex. To wait on a condition variable, a thread first needs to acquire the condition variable spin lock. After the spin lock is acquired, the thread updates the condition variable waiting queue. To avoid the lost wake-up signal problem, the condition variable spin lock is released after the mutex. This order ensures the function atomically releases the mutex and causes the calling thread to block on the condition variable, with respect to other threads accessing the mutex and the condition variable. After releasing the condition variable spin lock, the thread makes an OCALL to get suspended. When the thread is awakened, it acquires the condition variable spin lock. The thread then searches the condition variable queue. If the thread is in the queue, it means that the thread was already waiting on the condition variable outside the enclave, and it has been awakened unexpectedly. When this happens, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock, makes an OCALL and simply goes back to sleep. Otherwise, another thread has signaled or broadcasted the condition variable and this thread may proceed. Before returning, the thread releases the condition variable spin lock and acquires the mutex, ensuring that upon returning from the function call the thread still owns the mutex.

NOTE

Threads check whether they are in the queue to make the Intel SGX condition variable robust against attacks to the untrusted event.

A thread may have to do up to two OCALLs throughout the <code>sgx_thread_cond_wait</code> function call.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_cond_signal

The sgx_thread_cond_signal function wakes a pending thread waiting on the condition variable.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_signal(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

Parameters

cond [in]

The trusted condition variable to be signaled.

Return value

0

One pending thread is signaled.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid.

Description

To signal a condition variable, a thread starts acquiring the condition variable spin-lock. Then it inspects the status of the condition variable queue. If the queue is empty it means that there are not any threads waiting on the condition variable. When that happens, the thread releases the condition variable and returns. However, if the queue is not empty, the thread removes the first thread waiting in the queue. The thread then makes an OCALL to wake up the thread that is suspended outside the enclave, but first the thread releases the condition variable spin-lock. Upon returning from the OCALL, the thread continues normal execution.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

$sgx_thread_cond_broadcast$

The sgx_thread_cond_broadcast function wakes all pending threads waiting on the condition variable.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_cond_broadcast(
    sgx_thread_cond_t * cond
);
```

Parameters

cond [in]

The trusted condition variable to be broadcasted.

Return value

0

All pending threads have been broadcasted.

EINVAL

The trusted condition variable is invalid.

ENOMEM

Internal memory allocation failed.

Description

Broadcast and signal operations on a condition variable are analogous. The only difference is that during a broadcast operation, the thread removes all the threads waiting on the condition variable queue and wakes up all the threads suspended outside the enclave in a single OCALL.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_self

The sgx thread self function returns the unique thread identification.

Syntax

```
sgx_thread_t sgx_thread_self(
            void
);
```

Return value

The return value cannot be NULL and is always valid as long as it is invoked by a thread inside the enclave.

Description

The function is a simple wrap of get_thread_data() provided in the tRTS, which provides a trusted thread unique identifier.

NOTE:

This identifier does not change throughout the life of an enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_thread_equal

The sgx thread equal function compares two thread identifiers.

Syntax

```
int sgx_thread_equal(sgx_thread_t
    sgx_thread_t t1,
    sgx_thread_t t2
);
```

Return value

A nonzero value if the two thread IDs are equal, 0 otherwise.

Description

The function compares two thread identifiers provided by <code>sgx_thread_self</code> to determine if the IDs refer to the same trusted thread.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_cpuid

The sgx_cpuid function performs the equivalent of a cpuid() function call or intrinisic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

NOTE:

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuid(
```

```
int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf
);
```

Parameters

cpuinfo [in, out]

The information returned in an array of four integers. This array must be located within the enclave.

leaf [in]

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

Description

This function provides the equivalent of the cpuid() function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information that is returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. sgx_cpuid performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

NOTE

 As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed. 2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

Requirements

Header	sgx_cpuid.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_cpuidex

The $sgx_cpuidex$ function performs the equivalent of a $cpuid_ex()$ function call or intrinisic which executes the CPUID instruction to query the host processor for the information about supported features.

NOTE:

This function performs an OCALL to execute the CPUID instruction.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cpuidex(
    int cpuinfo[4],
    int leaf,
    int subleaf
);
```

Parameters

cpuinfo [in, out]

The information returned in an array of four integers. The array must be located within the enclave.

leaf[in]

The leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

subleaf[in]

The sub-leaf specified for retrieved CPU info.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates the parameter cpuinfo is invalid, which would be NULL or outside the enclave.

Description

This function provides the equivalent of the cpuid() function or intrinsic. The function executes the CPUID instruction for the given leaf (input). The CPUID instruction provides processor feature and type information returned in cpuinfo, an array of 4 integers to specify the values of EAX, EBX, ECX and EDX registers. sgx_cpuid performs an OCALL by invoking oc_cpuidex to get the info from untrusted side because the CPUID instruction is an illegal instruction in the enclave domain.

For additional details, see Intel(R) 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual for the description on the CPUID instruction and its individual leafs. (Leaf corresponds to EAX in the PRM description).

NOTE

- 1. As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.
- 2. The implementation of this function performs an OCALL and therefore, this function will not have the same serializing or fencing behavior of executing a CPUID instruction in an untrusted domain code flow.

Requirements

Header	sgx_cpuid.h sgx_tstdc.edl
Library	libsgx_tstdc.a

sgx_get_key

The sgx_get_key function generates a 128-bit secret key using the input information. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EGETKEY instruction.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_key(
    const sgx_key_request_t *key_request,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

Parameters

key_request [in]

A pointer to a sgx_key_request_t object used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within the enclave. See details on the sgx_key_request_t to understand initializing this structure before calling this function.

key [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic key output. The pointer cannot be NULL and must be located within enclave memory.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

key request buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.

key buffer must be non-NULL and located within the enclave.

key_request and key_request->key_policy should not have any
reserved bits set.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Indicates an error that the enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE

Indicates the ${\tt key_request}$ requests a key for a <code>KEYNAME</code> which the enclave is not authorized.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN

Indicates key request->cpu svn is beyond platform CPUSVN value

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN

Indicates key request->isv svn is greater than the enclave's ISVSVN

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME

Indicates key_request->key_name is an unsupported value

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the key generation process.

Description

The sgx_get_key function generates a 128-bit secret key from the processor specific key hierarchy with the $key_request$ information. If the function fails with an error code, the key buffer will be filled with random numbers. The $key_request$ structure needs to be initialized properly to obtain the requested key type. See $sgx_key_request_t$ for structure details.

Requirements

Header	sgx_utils.h
Library	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim-
	ulation)

sgx_create_report

The sgx_create_report function tries to use the information of the target enclave and other information to create a cryptographic report of the enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EREPORT instruction.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_report(
    const sgx_target_info_t *target_info,
    const sgx_report_data_t *report_data,
    sgx_report_t *report
);
```

Parameters

target_info [in]

A pointer to the sgx_target_info_t object that contains the information of the target enclave, which will be able to cryptographically verify the report calling sgx_verify_report.

- If the pointer value is NULL, sgx_create_report retrieves information about the calling enclave, but the generated report cannot be verified by any enclave.
- If the pointer value is not NULL the target_info buffer must be within the enclave.

See sgx_target_info_t for structure details.

report_data [in]

A pointer to the sgx_report_data_t object which contains a set of data used for communication between the enclaves. This pointer is allowed to be NULL. If it is not NULL, the report_data buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_data_t for structure details.

report [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the cryptographic report of the enclave. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave. See sgx_report_t for structure details.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

An error is reported if any of the parameters are non-NULL pointers but the memory is not within the enclave or the reserved fields of the data structure are not set to zero.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Indicates that the enclave is out of memory.

Description

Use the function <code>sgx_create_report</code> to create a cryptographic report that describes the contents of the calling enclave. The report can be used by other enclaves to verify that the enclave is running on the same platform. When an enclave calls <code>sgx_verify_report</code> to verify a report, it will succeed only if the report was generated using the <code>target_info</code> for said enclave. This function is a wrapper for the Intel SGX EREPORT instruction.

Before the source enclave calls <code>sgx_create_report</code> to generate a report, it needs to populate <code>target_info</code> with information about the target enclave that will verify the report. The target enclave may obtain this information calling <code>sgx_create_report</code> with a <code>NULL</code> pointer for <code>target_info</code> and pass it to the source enclave at the beginning of the inter-enclave attestation process.

Header	sgx_utils.h
--------	-------------

Library	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim-
	ulation)

sgx_verify_report

The sgx_verify_report function provides software verification for the report which is expected to be generated by the sgx_create_report function.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_verify_report(
    const sgx_report_t * report
);
```

Parameters

report[in]

A pointer to an sgx_report_t object that contains the cryptographic report to be verified. The pointer cannot be NULL and the report buffer must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Verification success: The input report was generated using a target_info that matches the one for the enclave making this call.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The report object is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH

Indicates report verification error.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs during the report verification process.

Description

The sgx_verify_report performs a cryptographic CMAC function of the input sgx_report_data_t object in the report using the report key. Then the function compares the input report MAC value with the calculated MAC value to determine whether the report is valid or not.

Header	sgx_utils.h
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

sgx_calc_sealed_data_size

The sgx_calc_sealed_data_size function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure.

Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(
    const uint32_t add_mac_txt_size,
    const uint32_t txt_encrypt_size
);
```

Parameters

add_mac_txt_size [in]

Length of the optional additional data stream in bytes. The additional data will not be encrypted, but will be part of the MAC calculation.

txt_encrypt_size [in]

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. This data will also be part of the MAC calculation.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the return value is the minimum number of bytes that need to be allocated for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. If the function fails, the return value is $0 \times FFFFFFF$. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description

The function calculates the number of bytes to allocate for the sgx_sealed_ data_t structure. The calculation includes the fixed portions of the structure as well as the two input data streams: encrypted text and optional additional MAC text.

Header	sgx_tseal.h
--------	-------------

Library	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim-
	ulation)

sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len

The sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to determine how much memory to allocate for the additional_MAC_text buffer output from the sgx_unseal_data function.

Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

p_sealed_data [in]

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated by the sgx_seal_data function.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the optional additional MAC data buffer is returned. If this function fails, the return value is $0 \times FFFFFFFF$. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the output MAC data buffer returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len

The sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len function is a helper function for the seal library which should be used to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

Syntax

```
uint32_t sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t *p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

p_sealed_data [in]

Pointer to the sealed data structure which was populated during by the sgx_seal_data function.

Return value

If the function succeeds, the number of bytes in the encrypted data buffer is returned. Othewise, the return value is $0 \times FFFFFFFF$. It is recommended that you check the return value before use it to allocate memory.

Description

The function calculates the minimum number of bytes to allocate for decrypted data returned by the sgx_unseal_data function.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_seal_data

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
```

```
);
```

Parameters

additional_MACtext_length [in]

Length of the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p_addtional_MACtext [in]

Pointer to the additional Message Authentication Code (MAC) data. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional MACtext length must be zero in this case).

NOTE:

This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

text2encrypt_length [in]

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

p_text2encrypt [in]

Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

sealed_data_size [in]

Number of bytes allocated for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The calling code should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]

Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed data.

NOTE:

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If additional_MACtext_length is non-zero, p_additional_MACtext cannot be NULL.
- p_additional_MACtext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- p_text2encrypt must be non-zero.
- p text2encrypt buffer must be within the enclave.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which
 is calculated by the function sgx calc sealed data size.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates a crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The sgx_seal_data function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to encrypt the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to preserve secret data after the enclave is destroyed. The sealed data blob can be unsealed on future instantiations of the enclave.

The additional data buffer will not be encrypted but will be part of the MAC calculation that covers the encrypted data as well. This data may include information about the application, version, data, etc which can be utilized to identify the sealed data blob since it will remain plain text

Use sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to calculate the number of bytes to
allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The input sealed data buffer and
text2encrypt buffers must be allocated within the enclave.

Header	sgx_tseal.h
--------	-------------

Library	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim-
	ulation)

sgx_seal_data_ex

This function is used to AES-GCM encrypt the input data. Two input data sets are provided: one is the data to be encrypted; the second is optional additional data that will not be encrypted but will be part of the GCM MAC calculation which also covers the data to be encrypted. This is the expert mode version of function sgx_seal_data.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_seal_data_ex(
    const uint16_t key_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
    const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint32_t text2encrypt_length,
    const uint8_t * p_text2encrypt,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

key_policy [in]

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function <code>sgx_seal_data</code> uses the MRSIGNER policy.

Key policy name	Value	Description
KEYPOLICY_	0x00-	Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE
MRENCLAVE	01	measurement register
KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER	0x00-	Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER meas-
	02	urement register

Key policy name Value Description

attribute_mask [in]

Identifies which platform/enclave attributes to use in the key derivation. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t to determine which attributes will be checked. Function sgx_seal_data uses flags=0xFF00000000000000, xfrm=0.

misc_mask [in]

Identifies the mask bits for the Misc feature to enforce. Function sgx_seal_data uses $0 \times F0000000$. The misc mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

additional_MACtext_length [in]

Length of the additional data to be MAC'ed in bytes. The additional data is optional and thus the length can be zero if no data is provided.

p_addtional_MACtext [in]

Pointer to the additional data to be MAC'ed of variable length. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary (NULL pointer can be passed, but additional_MACtext_length must be zero in this case).

NOTE:

This data will not be encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

text2encrypt_length [in]

Length of the data stream to be encrypted in bytes. Must be non-zero.

p_text2encrypt [in]

Pointer to the data stream to be encrypted of variable length. Must not be NULL. Must be within the enclave.

sealed_data_size [in]

Number of bytes allocated for sealed_data_t structure. The calling code
should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine
the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

NOTE:

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to determine the required buffer size. The sealed data must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If additional_MACtext_length is non-zero,p_additional_MACtext cannot be NULL.
- p_additional_MACtext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- p_text2encrypt must be non-zero.
- p text2encrypt buffer must be within the enclave.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which
 is calculated by the function sgx calc sealed data size.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The sgx_seal_data_ex is an extended version of sgx_seal_data. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use sgx_seal_data and the default values provided for key_policy (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Users of this function should have a clear understanding of the impact on using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in sgx_seal_data.

Header	sgx_tseal.h
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_unseal_data

This function is used to AES-GCM decrypt the input sealed data structure. Two output data sets result: one is the decrypted data; the second is the optional additional data that was part of the GCM MAC calculation but was not encrypted. This function provides the converse of <code>sgx_seal_data</code> and <code>sgx_seal_data</code> ex.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_unseal_data(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
    uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
    uint8_t * p_decrypted_text,
    uint32_t * p_decrypted_text_length
);
```

Parameters

p_sealed_data [in]

Pointer to the sealed data buffer to be AES-GCM decrypted. Must be within the enclave.

p_addtional_MACtext [out]

Pointer to the additional data part of the MAC calculation. This additional data is optional and no data is necessary. The calling code should call helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the required buffer size to allocate. (NULL pointer can be passed, if additional_MACtext_length is zero).

p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]

Pointer to the length of the additional MAC data buffer in bytes. The calling code should call helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the minimum required buffer size. The sgx_unseal_data function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream.

p_decrypted_text [out]

Pointer to the decrypted data buffer which needs to be allocated by the calling code. Use <code>sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len</code> to calculate the minimum number of bytes to allocate for the <code>p_decrypted_text</code> buffer. Must be within the enclave.

p_decrypted_text_length [in, out]

Pointer to the length of the decrypted data buffer in byte. The buffer length of p_decrypted_text must be specified in p_decrypted_text_length as input. The sgx_unseal_data function returns the actual length of decrypted addition data stream. Use sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len to calculate the number of bytes to allocate for the p_decrypted_text buffer. Must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- If additional_mactext_length is non-zero, p_additional_mactext cannot be NULL.
- p_additional_mactext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot across the enclave boundary.
- p_decrypted_text and p_decrypted_text_length must be within the enclave.
- p_decrypted_text and p_addtitional_MACtext buffer must be big enough to receive the decrypted data.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN

The CPUSVN in the sealed data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN

The ISVSVN in the sealed data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH

The tag verification failed during unsealing. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or sealed data blob corruption. This error is also reported if other corruption of the sealed data structure is detected.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

Description

The sgx_unseal_data function AES-GCM decrypts the sealed data so that the enclave data can be restored. This function can be utilized to restore secret data that was preserved after an earlier instantiation of this enclave saved this data.

The calling code needs to allocate the additional data buffer and the decrypted data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for these buffers, helper functions sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len and sgx_get_ encrypt_txt_len are provided. The decrypted text buffer must be allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_mac_aadata

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata(
    const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
    const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
    const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
    sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

additional_MACtext_length [in]

Length of the plain text to provide authentication for in bytes.

p_addtional_MACtext [in]

Pointer to the plain text to provide authentication for.

NOTE:

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

sealed_data_size [in]

Number of bytes allocated for the sealed_data_t structure. The calling
code should utilize the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to
determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]

Pointer to the buffer to store the sealed_data_t structure.

NOTE:

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function <code>sgx_calc_sealed_data_size</code> with O as the <code>txt_encrypt_size</code> to determine the required buffer size. The <code>sealed_data_t</code> structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- p_additional_mactext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which
 is calculated by the function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size.
- p_sealed_data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates a crypto library failure, or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The sgx_mac_aadata function retrieves a key unique to the enclave and uses that key to generate the authentication tag based on the input data buffer. This function can be utilized to provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. The data origin authentication can be demonstrated on future instantiations of the enclave using the MAC stored into the data blob.

Use sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to calculate the number of bytes to
allocate for the sgx_sealed_data_t structure. The input sealed data buffer
must be allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h
	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_mac_aadata_ex

This function is used to authenticate the input data with AES-GMAC. This is the expert mode version of the function sgx mac addata.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_mac_aadata_ex(
```

```
const uint16_t key_policy,
const sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask,
const sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask,
const uint32_t additional_MACtext_length,
const uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
const uint32_t sealed_data_size,
sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data
);
```

Parameters

key_policy [in]

Specifies the policy to use in the key derivation. Function <code>sgx_mac_aadata</code> uses the MRSIGNER policy.

Key policy name	Value	Description
KEYPOLICY_	0x00-	Derive key using the enclave's ENCLAVE
MRENCLAVE	01	measurement register
KEYPOLICY_MRSIGNER	0x00-	Derive key using the enclave's SIGNER meas-
	02	urement register

attribute_mask [in]

misc_mask [in]

The ${\tt MISC_SELECT}$ mask bits for the enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

additional_MACtext_length [in]

Length of the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed in bytes.

p_addtional_MACtext [in]

Pointer to the plain text data stream to be MAC'ed of variable length.

NOTE:

This data is not encrypted. This data can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.

sealed_data_size [in]

Number of bytes allocated for the sealed_data_t structure. The calling
code should utilize the helper function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size to
determine the required buffer size.

p_sealed_data [out]

Pointer to the buffer that is populated by this function.

NOTE:

The calling code must allocate the memory for this buffer and should utilize the helper function <code>sgx_calc_sealed_data_size</code> with O as the <code>txt_encrypt_size</code> to determine the required buffer size. The <code>sealed_data_t</code> structure must be within the enclave.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- p_additional_mactext buffer can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- sealed_data_size must be equal to the required buffer size, which
 is calculated by the function sgx_calc_sealed_data_size.
- p sealed data buffer must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates crypto library failure or the RDRAND instruction fails to generate a random number.

Description

The sgx_mac_aadata_ex is an extended version of sgx_mac_aadata. It provides parameters for you to identify how to derive the sealing key (key policy and attributes_mask). Typical callers of the seal library should be able to use sgx_mac_aadata and the default values provided for key_policy (MR_SIGNER) and an attribute mask which includes the RESERVED, INITED and DEBUG bits. Before you use this function, you should have a clear understanding of the impact of using a policy and/or attribute_mask that is different from that in sgx mac_aadata.

Requirement

Header	sgx_tseal.h
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_unmac_aadata

This function is used to verify the authenticity of the input sealed data structure using AES-GMAC. This function verifies the MAC generated with <code>sgx_mac_aadata_ex</code>.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_unmac_aadata(
    const sgx_sealed_data_t * p_sealed_data,
```

```
uint8_t * p_additional_MACtext,
uint32_t * p_additional_MACtext_length,
);
```

Parameters

p_sealed_data [in]

Pointer to the sealed data structure to be authenticated with AES-GMAC. Must be within the enclave.

p_addtional_MACtext [out]

Pointer to the plain text data stream that was AES-GMAC protected. You should call the helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len to determine the required buffer size to allocate.

p_additional_MACtext_length [in, out]

Pointer to the length of the plain text data stream in bytes. Upon successful tag matching,sgx_unmac_datasets this parameter with the actual length of the plaintext stored in p additional MACtext.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The authentication tag in the <code>sealed_data_t</code> structure matches the expected value.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

This parameter indicates an error if the parameters do not meet any of the following conditions:

- p_additional_MACtext buffers can be within or outside the enclave, but cannot cross the enclave boundary.
- p_addtitional_MACtext buffers must be big enough to receive the plain text data.
- p_sealed_data buffers must be within the enclave.
- Input buffers cannot cross an enclave boundary.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN

The CPUSVN in the data blob is beyond the CPUSVN value of the platform.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN

The ISVSVN in the data blob is greater than the ISVSVN value of the enclave.

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH

The tag verification fails. The error may be caused by a platform update, software update, or corruption of the sealed data t structure.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates a cryptography library failure.

Description

The sgx_unmac_aadata function verifies the tag with AES-GMAC. Use this function to demonstrate the authenticity of data that was preserved by an earlier instantiation of this enclave.

You need to allocate additional data buffer. To determine the minimum memory to allocate for additional data buffers, use the helper function sgx_get_add_mac_txt_len.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h	
Library	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>	

sgx_sha256_msg

The sgx_sha256_msg function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_msg(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t *p_hash
);
```

Parameters

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

p_hash [out]

A pointer to the output 256bit hash resulting from the SHA256 calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The SHA256 hash function is performed successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Input pointers are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The SHA256 hash calculation failed.

Description

The sgx_sha256_msg function performs a standard SHA256 hash over the input data buffer. Only a 256-bit version of the SHA hash is supported. (Other sizes, for example 512, are not supported in this minimal cryptography library).

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a SHA256 bit hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported but the pointer must be non-NULL.

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_sha256_init

 sgx_sha256_init returns an allocated and initialized SHA algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the SHA hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommend call is sgx_sha256_msg to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_init(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t* p_sha_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_sha_handle [out]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The SHA256 state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The pointer p sha handle is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The SHA256 state is not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

Calling sgx_sha256_init is the first set in performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the SHA256 state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library; thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, sgx_sha256_close should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_sha256_update

sgx_sha256_update performs a SHA256 hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the sha_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

sha_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The input parameter(s) are NULL.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the SHA256 hash calculation.

Description

This function should be used as part of a SHA256 calculation over multiple datasets. If a SHA256 hash is needed over a single data set, function sgx_sha256_msg should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the sgx_sha256_init function must be called first to allocate and initialize the SHA256 state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function $sgx_sha256_get_hash$ should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_sha256_get_hash

sgx_sha256_get_hash obtains the SHA256 hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to sgx_sha256_update).

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_get_hash(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle,
    sgx_sha256_hash_t* p_hash
```

);

Parameters

sha_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple datasets.

p_hash [out]

This is a pointer to the 256-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The hash is obtained successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The pointers are NULL.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The SHA256 state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function returns the hash after performing the SHA256 calculation over one or more datasets using the sgx_sha256_update function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling function. The handle to SHA256 state used in the sgx_sha256_update calls must be passed in as input.

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_sha256_close

sgx_sha256_close cleans up and deallocates the SHA256 state that was allocated in function sgx_sha256_init.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_sha256_close(
    sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle
);
```

Parameters

sha_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative SHA256 hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The SHA256 state was deallocated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The input handle is NULL.

Description

Calling sgx_sha256_close is the last step after performing a SHA256 hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used to store the SHA256 calculation state.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt

sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM encryption
operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
    const uint8_t *p_iv,
    uint32_t iv_len,
    const uint8_t *p_aad,
    uint32_t aad_len,
    sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_out_mac
```

);

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted. This could be zero but <code>p_src</code> and <code>p_dst</code> should be NULL and <code>aad_len</code> must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]

A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is used in the GCM MAC calculation. The data in this buffer will not be encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

aad_len [in]

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

p_out_mac [out]

This is the output GCM MAC performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data). The calling code should allocate this buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the source and destination data buffers are allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory. The use of AAD data buffer could be information identifying the encrypted data since it will remain in clear text.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt

sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-GCM decryption
operation. Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(
```

```
const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
const uint8_t *p_src,
uint32_t src_len,
uint8_t *p_dst,
const uint8_t *p_iv,
uint32_t iv_len,
const uint8_t *p_aad,
uint32_t aad_len,
const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t *p_in_mac
);
```

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-GCM decryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted. Buffer could be NULL if there is AAD text.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be decrypted. This could be zero but <code>p_src</code> and <code>p_dst</code> should be NULL and <code>aad_len</code> must be greater than zero.

p_dst [out]

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

p_iv [in]

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-GCM calculation. NIST AES-GCM recommended IV size is 96 bits (12 bytes).

iv_len [in]

Specifies the length on input initialization vector. The length should be 12 as recommended by NIST.

p_aad [in]

A pointer to an optional additional authentication data buffer which is provided for the GCM MAC calculation when encrypting. The data in this buffer was not encrypted. The field is optional and could be NULL.

aad_len [in]

Specifies the length of the additional authentication data buffer. This buffer is optional and thus the size can be zero.

p_in_mac [in]

This is the GCM MAC that was performed over the input data buffer (data to be encrypted) as well as the additional authentication data (this is optional data) during the encryption process (call to sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt).

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

If key, MAC, or IV pointer is NULL.

If AAD size is > 0 and the AAD pointer is NULL.

If source size is > 0 and the source pointer or destination pointer are NULL.

If both source pointer and AAD pointer are NULL.

If IV Length is not equal to 12 (bytes).

SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH

The input MAC does not match the MAC calculated.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a mode of operation of the AES algorithm. GCM [NIST SP 800-38D] uses a variation of the counter mode of operation for encryption. GCM assures authenticity of the confidential data (of up to about 64 GB per invocation) using a universal hash function defined over a binary finite field (the Galois field).

GCM can also provide authentication assurance for additional data (of practically unlimited length per invocation) that is not encrypted. GCM provides stronger authentication assurance than a (non-cryptographic) checksum or error detecting code. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental modifications of the data and intentional, unauthorized modifications.

It is recommended that the destination data buffer is allocated within the enclave. The AAD buffer could be allocated within or outside enclave memory.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg

The sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg function performs a standard 128bit CMAC hash over the input data buffer.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t *p_mac
);
```

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

p_mac [out]

A pointer to the output 128-bit hash resulting from the CMAC calculation. This pointer must be non-NULL and the caller allocates memory for this buffer.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The CMAC hash function is performed successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The key, source or MAC pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected internal cryptography library.

Description

The sgx_rijndael128_cmac_msg function performs a standard CMAC hash over the input data buffer. Only a 128-bit version of the CMAC hash is supported.

The function should be used if the complete input data stream is available. Otherwise, the Init, Update... Update, Final procedure should be used to compute a CMAC hash over multiple input data sets.

A zero-length input data buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_cmac128_init

sgx_cmac128_init returns an allocated and initialized CMAC algorithm context state. This should be part of the Init, Update ... Update, Final process when the CMAC hash is to be performed over multiple datasets. If a complete dataset is available, the recommended call is sgx_rijndael128_cmac_ msg to perform the hash in a single call.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_init(
    const sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t* p_cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the CMAC hash operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_cmac_handle [out]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC 128-bit hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The CMAC hash state is successfully allocated and initialized.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The key or handle pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

Calling sgx_cmac128_init is the first set in performing a CMAC 128-bit hash over multiple datasets. The caller does not allocate memory for the CMAC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the hash over the desired datasets is completed or any error occurs during the hash calculation process, sgx_cmac128_close should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_cmac128_update

sgx_cmac128_update performs a CMAC 128-bit hash over the input dataset provided. This function supports an iterative calculation of the hash over multiple datasets where the cmac_handle contains the intermediate results of the hash calculation over previous datasets.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_update(
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    uint32_t src_len,
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported, but the pointer must be non-NULL.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be hashed. A zero length input buffer is supported.

cmac_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The source pointer or cmac handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred while performing the CMAC hash calculation.

NOTE:

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is *not* freed (CMAC handle). In this case, call <code>sgx_cmac128_close</code> to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

Description

This function should be used as part of a CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over multiple datasets. If a CMAC hash is needed over a single data set, function $sgx_rijndael128_cmac128_msg$ should be used instead. Prior to calling this function on the first dataset, the $sgx_cmac128_init$ function must be called first to allocate and initialize the CMAC state structure which will hold intermediate hash results over earlier datasets. The function $sgx_cmac128_$ final should be used to obtain the hash after the final dataset has been processed by this function.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_cmac128_final

sgx_cmac128_final obtains the CMAC 128-bit hash after the final dataset has been processed (by calls to sgx_cmac128_update).

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_final(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle,
    sgx cmac 128bit tag t* p hash
```

);

Parameters

cmac_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

p_hash [out]

This is a pointer to the 128-bit hash that has been calculated. The memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The hash is obtained successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The hash pointer or CMAC handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The CMAC state passed in is likely problematic causing an internal cryptography library failure.

NOTE:

If an unexpected error occurs, then the CMAC state is freed (CMAC handle). In this case, please call sgx_cmac128_close to free the CMAC state to avoid memory leak.

Description

This function returns the hash after performing the CMAC 128-bit hash calculation over one or more datasets using the <code>sgx_cmac128_update</code> function. Memory for the hash should be allocated by the calling code. The handle to CMAC state used in the <code>sgx_cmac128_update</code> calls must be passed in as input.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_cmac128_close

sgx_cmac128_close cleans up and deallocates the CMAC algorithm context state that was allocated in function sgx_cmac128_init.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_cmac128_close(
    sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle
);
```

Parameters

cmac_handle [in]

This is a handle to the context state used by the cryptography library to perform an iterative CMAC hash. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of performing the hash calculation over multiple data sets.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The CMAC state was deallocated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The CMAC handle is NULL.

Description

Calling sgx_cmac128_close is the last step after performing a CMAC hash over multiple datasets. The caller uses this function to deallocate memory used for storing the CMAC algorithm context state.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt

sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt performs a Rijndael AES-CTR encryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_encrypt(
    const sgx_aes_ctr_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8_t *p_dst,
);
```

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR encryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be encrypted.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length on the input data stream to be encrypted.

p_ctr [in]

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

ctr_inc_bits [in]

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

p_dst [out]

A pointer to the output encrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

This function encrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For

a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the encryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt

sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt performs a Rijndael AES-CTR decryption operation (counter mode). Only a 128bit key size is supported by this Intel(R) SGX SDK cryptography library.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_aes_ctr_decrypt(
    const sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_key_t *p_key,
    const uint8_t *p_src,
    const uint32_t src_len,
    uint8_t *p_ctr,
    const uint32_t ctr_inc_bits,
    uint8 t *p_dst
```

);

Parameters

p_key [in]

A pointer to key to be used in the AES-CTR decryption operation. The size *must* be 128 bits.

p_src [in]

A pointer to the input data stream to be decrypted.

src_len [in]

Specifies the length of the input data stream to be decrypted.

p_ctr [in]

A pointer to the initialization vector to be used in the AES-CTR calculation.

ctr_inc_bits [in]

Specifies the number of bits in the counter to be incremented.

p_dst [out]

A pointer to the output decrypted data buffer. This buffer should be allocated by the calling code.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

All the outputs are generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

If key, source, destination, or counter pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

This function decrypts the input data stream of a variable length according to the CTR mode as specified in [NIST SP 800-38A]. The counter can be thought of as an IV which increments on successive encryption or decryption calls. For a given dataset or data stream, the incremented counter block should be used on successive calls of the decryption process for that given stream. However, for new or different datasets/streams, the same counter should not be reused, instead initialize the counter for the new data set.

It is recommended that the source, destination and counter data buffers are allocated within the enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_open_context

sgx_ecc256_open_context returns an allocated and initialized context for the elliptic curve cryptosystem over a prime finite field, GF(p). This context must be created prior to calling sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair or sgx_ ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey. When the calling code has completed its set of ECC operations, sgx_ecc256_close_context should be called to cleanup and deallocate the ECC context.

NOTE:

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_open_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t *p_ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_ecc_handle [out]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The ECC256 GF(p) state is allocated and initialized properly.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The ECC context state was not initialized properly due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

sgx_ecc256_open_context is utilized to allocate and initialize a 256-bit GF(p) cryptographic system. The caller does not allocate memory for the ECC state that this function returns. The state is specific to the implementation of the cryptography library and thus the allocation is performed by the library itself. If the ECC cryptographic function using this cryptographic system is completed or any error occurs, sgx_sha256_close_context should be called to free the state allocated by this algorithm.

Public key cryptography successfully allows to solving problems of information safety by enabling trusted communication over insecure channels. Although elliptic curves are well studied as a branch of mathematics, an interest to the cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves is constantly rising due to the advantages that the elliptic curve algorithms provide in the wireless communications: shorter processing time and key length.

Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) implement a different way of creating public keys. As elliptic curve calculation is based on the addition of the rational points in the (x,y) plane and it is difficult to solve a discrete logarithm from these points, a higher level of safety is achieved through the cryptographic schemes that use the elliptic curves. The cryptographic systems that encrypt messages by using the properties of elliptic curves are hard to attack due to the extreme complexity of deciphering the private key.

Using of elliptic curves allows shorter public key length and encourages cryptographers to create cryptosystems with the same or higher encryption strength as the RSA or DSA cryptosystems. Because of the relatively short key length, ECCs do encryption and decryption faster on the hardware that requires less computation processing volumes.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_close_context

sgx_ecc256_close_context cleans up and deallocates the ECC 256 GF
(p) state that was allocated in function sgx_ecc256_open_context.

NOTE:

Only a field element size of 256 bits is supported.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_close_context(
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The ECC 256 GF(p) state was deallocated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The input handle is NULL.

Description

sgx_ecc256_close_context is used by calling code to deallocate
memory used for storing the ECC 256 GF(p) state used in ECC cryptographic
calculations.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair

sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair generates a private/public key pair on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. The calling code is responsible for allocating memory for the public and private keys. sgx ecc256 <code>open_context</code> must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to making this call.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_private [out]

A pointer to the private key which is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_public [out]

A pointer to the public key which is an elliptic curve point such that:

public key = private key * G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, private key or public key is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function populates private/public key pair. The calling code allocates memory for the private and public key pointers to be populated. The function generates a private key p_private and computes a public key p_public of the elliptic cryptosystem over a finite field GF(p).

The private key $p_{private}$ is a number that lies in the range of [1, n-1] where n is the order of the elliptic curve base point.

The public key p_public is an elliptic curve point such that p_public = p_private *G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

The context of the point p_public as an elliptic curve point must be created by using the function sgx_ecc256_open_context.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey

sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey generates a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ecc256_dh_shared_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_private_b [in]

A pointer to the local private key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_public_ga [in]

A pointer to the remote public key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_shared_key [out]

A pointer to the secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes the Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number sharedKey, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (sharedKey). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key pubKeyA by using her private key

privKeyA: pubKeyA = privKeyA * G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.

3. Bob calculates his own public key pubKeyB by using his private key

```
privKeyB: pubKeyB = privKeyB * G, where G is a base point of the elliptic curve.
```

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.

5. Alice gets Bob's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyA. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob's public key and applies the following formula:

```
shareKeyA = privKeyA * pubKeyB = privKeyA * privKeyB *
G.
```

6. Bob gets Alice's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyB. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice's public key and applies the following formula:

```
shareKeyB = privKeyB * pubKeyA = privKeyB * privKeyA *
G.
```

As the following equation is true privKeyA * privKeyB * G = privKeyB * privKeyA * G, the result of both calculations is the same,

that is, the equation shareKeyA = shareKeyB is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

Shared secret shareKey is an x-coordinate of the secret point on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: sgx_ecc256_open_context.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey512

sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey512 generates a 512-bit secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem. The calling code should allocate memory for the shared key to be generated by this function.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey512(
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private_b,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public_ga,
    sgx_ecc256_dh_shared512_t *p_shared_key,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_private_b [in]

A pointer to the local private key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_public_ga [in]

A pointer to the remote public key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_shared_key [out]

A pointer to the 512-bit secret key generated by this function which is a common point on the elliptic curve.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The public/private key pair was successfully generated.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, private key, public key, or shared key pointer is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The key creation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes a 512-bit Diffie-Hellman shared key based on the enclave's own (local) private key and remote enclave's public Ga Key. The calling code allocates memory for shared key to be populated by this function.

The function computes a secret number sharedKey, which is a secret key shared between two participants of the cryptosystem.

In cryptography, metasyntactic names such as Alice as Bob are normally used as examples and in discussions and stand for participant A and participant B.

Both participants (Alice and Bob) use the cryptosystem for receiving a common secret point on the elliptic curve called a secret key (sharedKey). To receive a secret key, participants apply the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme involving public key exchange. The value of the secret key entirely depends on participants.

According to the scheme, Alice and Bob perform the following operations:

1. Alice calculates her own public key pubKeyA by using her private key

privKeyA: pubKeyA = privKeyA * G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

2. Alice passes the public key to Bob.

3. Bob calculates his own public key pubKeyB by using his private key

```
privKeyB: pubKeyB = privKeyB * G, where G is a base point of the elliptic curve.
```

4. Bob passes the public key to Alice.

5. Alice gets Bob's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyA. When calculating, she uses her own private key and Bob's public key and applies the following formula:

```
shareKeyA = privKeyA * pubKeyB = privKeyA * privKeyB *
G.
```

6. Bob gets Alice's public key and calculates the secret point shareKeyB. When calculating, he uses his own private key and Alice's public key and applies the following formula:

```
shareKeyB = privKeyB * pubKeyA = privKeyB * privKeyA *
G.
```

As the following equation is true privKeyA * privKeyB * G = privKeyB * privKeyA * G, the result of both calculations is the same, that is, the equation shareKeyA = shareKeyB is true. The secret point serves as a secret key.

The 512-bit shared secret shareKey is an x-coordinate of privKeyB and pub-KeyA on the elliptic curve. The elliptic curve domain parameters must be hitherto defined by the function: sgx ecc256 open context.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecc256_check_point

sgx_ecc256_check_point checks whether the input point is a valid point
on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system. sgx_ecc256_open_
context must be called to allocate and initialize the ECC context prior to
making this call.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecc256_check_point(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_point,
    const sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle,
    int *p_valid
);
```

Parameters

p_point [in]

A pointer to the point to perform validity check on.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

p_valid [out]

A pointer to the validation result.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The validation process is performed successfully. Check p_valid to get the validation result.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

If the input ecc handle, p_point or p_valid is NULL.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An internal cryptography library failure occurred.

Description

sgx_ecc256_check_point validates whether the input point is a valid point on the ECC curve for the given cryptographic system.

The typical validation result is one of the two values:

- 1 The input point is valid
- 0 The input point is not valid

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecdsa_sign

sgx_ecdsa_sign computes a digital signature with a given private key over an input dataset.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    sgx_ec256_private_t *p_private,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_data [in]

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

data_size [in]

The size of the data to be signed.

p_private [in]

A pointer to the private key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_signature [out]

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The digital signature is successfully generated.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the input private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which the given function computes.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The keys can be generated and set up by the function: sgx_ecc256_cre- ate_key_pair.

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: sgx_ ecc256_open_context.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_ecdsa_verify

sgx_ecdsa_verify verifies the input digital signature with a given public
key over an input dataset.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ecdsa_verify(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_ec256_public_t *p_public,
    sgx_ec256_signature_t *p_signature,
    uint8_t *p_result,
    sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle
);
```

Parameters

p_data [in]

A pointer to the signed dataset to verify.

data_size [in]

The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

p_public [in]

A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_signature [in]

A pointer to the signature to be verified.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_result [out]

A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

ecc_handle [in]

This is a handle to the ECC GF(p) context state allocated and initialized used to perform elliptic curve cryptosystem standard functions. The algorithm stores the intermediate results of calculations performed using this context.

NOTE:

The ECC set of APIs only support a 256-bit GF(p) cryptography system.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p_result to get the verification result.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The ECC context handle, public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input public key.

A digital signature over a message consists of a pair of large numbers, 256-bits each, which could be created by function: sgx_ecdsa_sign. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the ECDSA scheme, an elliptic curve of the DSA scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

SGX_EC_VALID - Digital signature is valid

SGX EC INVALID SIGNATURE - Digital signature is not valid

The elliptic curve domain parameters must be created by function: sgx_
ecc256_open_context.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_rsa3072_sign

sgx_rsa3072_sign computes a digital signature for a given dataset based
on RSA 3072 private key.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_rsa3072_sign(
    const uint8_t *p_data,
    uint32_t data_size,
    const sgx_rsa3072_private_key_t *p_private,
    sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
);
```

Parameters

p_data [in]

A pointer to the data to calculate the signature over.

data_size [in]

The size of the data to be signed.

p_private [in]

A pointer to the private key.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_signature [out]

A pointer to the signature generated by this function.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The digital signature is successfully generated.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The private key, data, or signature pointer is NULL. Or the data size is 0.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The signature generation process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function computes a digital signature over the input dataset based on the RSA 3072 private key.

A message digest is a fixed size number derived from the original message with an applied hash function over the binary code of the message. (SHA256 in this case)

The signer's private key and the message digest are used to create a signature.

The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1- v1_5 scheme.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_rsa3072_verify

sgx_rsa3072_verify verifies the input digital signature for the given dataset based on the RSA 3072 public key.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t ssgx_rsa3072_verify(
```

```
const uint8_t *p_data,
uint32_t data_size,
const sgx_rsa3072_public_key_t *p_public,
const sgx_rsa3072_signature_t *p_signature
```

```
sgx_rsa_result_t *p_result
);
```

Parameters

p_data [in]

A pointer to the signed dataset to be verified.

data_size [in]

The size of the dataset to have its signature verified.

p_public [in]

A pointer to the public key to be used in the calculation of the signature.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_signature [in]

A pointer to the signature to be verified.

NOTE:

Value is LITTLE ENDIAN.

p_result [out]

A pointer to the result of the verification check populated by this function.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The digital signature verification was performed successfully. Check p_result to get the verification result.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

The public key, data, result or signature pointer is NULL or the data size is 0.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

The verification process failed due to an internal cryptography library failure.

Description

This function verifies the signature for the given data set based on the input RSA 3072 public key.

A digital signature over a message is a buffer of 384-bytes, which could be created by function: sgx_rsa3072_sign. The scheme used for computing a digital signature is of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme.

The typical result of the digital signature verification is one of the two values:

SGX RSA VALID - Digital signature is valid

SGX RSA INVALID SIGNATURE - Digital signature is not valid

Requirements

Header	sgx_tcrypto.h
Library	libsgx_tcrypto.a

sgx_create_pse_session

sgx create pse session creates a session with the PSE.

Syntax

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Session is created successfully.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UPDATE_NEEDED

Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH

Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_PLATFORM

Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the platform was not recognized by the back-end server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description

An Intel(R) SGX enclave first calls <code>sgx_create_pse_session()</code> in the process to request platform service.

It's suggested that the caller should wait (typically several seconds to tens of seconds) and retry this API if **SGX_ERROR_BUSY** is returned.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

sgx_close_pse_session

```
sgx_close_pse_session closes a session created by sgx_create_pse_
session.
```

Syntax

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Session is closed successfully.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

An Intel(R) SGX enclave calls <code>sgx_close_pse_session()</code> when there is no need to request platform service.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_get_ps_sec_prop

sgx_get_ps_sec_prop gets a data structure describing the security property of the platform service.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop (
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t* security_property
);
```

Parameters

security_property [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Security property is returned successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

Description

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex

sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex gets a data structure describing the security
property of the platform service with extended platform service information.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_ps_sec_prop_ex (
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t* security_property
);
```

Parameters

security_property [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the security property descriptor of the platform service and platform service information. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Security property is returned successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

Description

Gets a data structure that describes the security property of the platform service.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
,	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_get_trusted_time

sgx get trusted time gets trusted time from the AE service.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_get_trusted_time(
    sgx_time_t* current_time,
    sgx_time_source_nonce_t* time_source_nonce
);
```

Parameters

current_time [out]

Trusted Time Stamp in seconds relative to a reference point. The reference point does not change as long as the time_source_nonce has not changed. The pointer cannot be NULL.

time_source_nonce [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the nonce which indicates time source. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Trusted time is obtained successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

current_time contains time in seconds and time_source_nonce contains nonce associate with the time. The caller should compare time_ source_nonce against the value returned from the previous call of this API if it needs to calculate the time passed between two readings of the Trusted Timer. If the time_source_nonce of the two readings do not match, the difference between the two readings does not necessarily reflect time passed.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Requirements

Header	<pre>sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl</pre>
Library	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

$sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex$

sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex creates a monotonic counter.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex(
    uint16_t owner_policy,
    const sgx_attributes_t * owner_attribute_mask,
    sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

Parameters

owner_policy [in]

The owner policy of the monotonic counter.

- 0x1 means enclaves with same signing key can access the monotonic counter
- 0x2 means enclave with same measurement can access the monotonic counter
- 0x3 means enclave with same measurement as well as signing key can access the monotonic counter.
- Owner policy values of 0x0 or any bits set beyond bits 0 and 1 will cause SGX ERROR INVALID PARAMETER

owner_attribute_mask [in]

Mask of owner attribute, in the format of sgx_attributes_t.

counter_uuid [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

counter_value [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Monotonic counter is created successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the parameters is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA

The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP

Monotonic counters are used out.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by the architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

Call sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex to create a monotonic counter with the given owner policy and owner attribute mask.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the

memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of monotonic counters (MC) an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should record the MC UUID that sgx_create_monotonic_counter_ex returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel(R) SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

NOTE

One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)

sgx_create_monotonic_counter

sgx_create_monotonic_counter creates a monotonic counter with
default owner policy and default user attribute mask.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_create_monotonic_counter(
    sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
);
```

Parameters

counter_uuid [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter ID. The pointer cannot be NULL.

counter_value [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Monotonic counter is created successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA

The enclave has reached the quota of Monotonic Counters it can maintain.

SGX_ERROR_MC_USED_UP

Monotonic counters are used out.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

Creating a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Intel(R) SGX limits the number of MCs an enclave can create. To avoid exhausting the available quota, an Intel SGX application should record the MC UUID that sgx_create_monotonic_counter returns and destroy a MC when it is not needed any more. If an enclave reaches its quota and previously created MC UUIDs have not been recorded, you may restore the MC service after uninstalling the Intel(R) SGX PSW and installing it again. This procedure deletes all MCs created by any enclave in that system.

NOTE

One application is not able to access the monotonic counter created by another application in simulation mode. This also affects two different applications using the same enclave.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

$sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter$

```
sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter destroys a monotonic counter cre-
ated by sgx_create_monotonic_counter or sgx_create_mono-
tonic counter ex.
```

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid
);
```

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]

The monotonic counter ID to be destroyed.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Monotonic counter is destroyed successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND

The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT

The enclave doesn't have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

Calling sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter after a monotonic counter is not needed anymore.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

sgx_destroy_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Destroying a Monotonic Counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter increments a monotonic counter
value by 1.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(
    const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
    uint32_t * counter_value
```

);

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]

The Monotonic Counter ID to be incremented.

counter_value [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the Monotonic Counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Monotonic Counter is incremented successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_BUSY

The requested service is temporarily not available.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND

The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NO_ACCESS_RIGHT

The enclave does not have the access right to specified Monotonic Counter.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by architectural enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurs.

Description

Call sgx_increment_monotonic_counter to increase a monotonic counter value by 1.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

sgx_increment_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Incrementing a monotonic counter (MC) involves writing to the non-volatile memory available in the platform. Repeated write operations could cause the memory to wear out during the normal lifecycle of the platform. Intel(R) SGX prevents this by limiting the rate at which MC operations can be performed. If you exceed the limit, the MC operation may return SGX_ERROR_BUSY for several minutes.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
,	libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)

sgx_read_monotonic_counter

sgx read monotonic counter returns the value of a monotonic counter.

Syntax

```
sgx status t sgx increment monotonic counter(
```

```
const sgx_mc_uuid_t * counter_uuid,
uint32_t * counter_value
```

);

Parameters

counter_uuid [in]

The monotonic counter ID to be read.

counter_value [out]

A pointer to the buffer that receives the monotonic counter value. The pointer cannot be NULL.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Monotonic counter is read successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the pointers is invalid.

SGX_ERROR_MC_NOT_FOUND

the Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

Session is not created or has been closed by the user or the Architectural Enclave service.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE

The AE service did not respond or the requested service is not supported.

SGX_ERROR_SERVICE_TIMEOUT

A request to the AE service timed out.

SGX_ERROR_NETWORK_FAILURE

Network connecting or proxy setting issue was encountered.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_EPC

There is not enough EPC memory to load one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete this operation.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates an unexpected error occurred.

Description

Call sgx_read_monotonic_counter to read the value of a monotonic counter.

The caller should call <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> to establish a session with the platform service enclave before calling this API.

sgx_read_monotonic_counter fails if the calling enclave does not match the owner policy and the attributes specified in the call that created the monotonic counter.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tae_service.h sgx_tae_service.edl
-	<pre>libsgx_tservice.a or libsgx_tservice_sim.a (sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_ra_init

The sgx_ra_init function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

Parameters

p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

b_pse [in]

If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using <code>sgx_create_pse_session</code> before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

p_context [out]

The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in sgx ra get msg1 and sgx ra proc msg2.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

Description

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tkey_exchange.h sgx_tkey_exchange.edl
Library	libsgx_tkey_exchange.a

sgx_ra_init_ex

The sgx_ra_init_ex function creates a context for the remote attestation and key exchange process while it allows the use of a custom defined Key Derivation Function (KDF).

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_init_ex(
    const sgx_ec256_public_t * p_pub_key,
    int b_pse,
    sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t derive_key_cb,
    sgx_ra_context_t * p_context
);
```

Parameters

p_pub_key [in] (Little Endian)

The EC public key of the service provider based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

b_pse [in]

If true, platform service information is needed in message 3. The caller should make sure a PSE session has been established using <code>sgx_create_pse_</code>

session before attempting to establish a remote attestation and key exchange session involving platform service information.

derive_key_cb [in]

This a pointer to a call back routine matching the funtion prototype of sgx_ ra_derive_secret_keys_t. This function takes the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK).

p_context [out]

The output context for the subsequent remote attestation and key exchange process, to be used in sgx_ra_get_msg1 and sgx_ra_proc_msg2.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

SGX_ERROR_AE_SESSION_INVALID

The session is invalid or ended by the server.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

Description

This is the first API user should call for a key exchange process. The context returned from this function is used as a handle for other APIs in the key exchange library.

Requirements

Header	<pre>sgx_tkey_exchange.h sgx_tkey_exchange.edl</pre>
Library	libsgx_tkey_exchange.a

sgx_ra_get_keys

The sgx_ra_get_keys function is used to get the negotiated keys of a remote attestation and key exchange session. This function should only be called after the service provider accepts the remote attestation and key exchange protocol message 3 produced by sgx_ra_proc_msg2.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_keys(
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ra_key_type_t type,
    sgx_ra_key_128_t *p_key
);
```

Parameters

context [in]

Context returned by sgx_ra_init.

type [in]

The type of the keys, which can be SGX_RA_KEY_MK, SGX_RA_KEY_SK, or SGX_RA_VK.

If the RA context was generated by <code>sgx_ra_init</code>, the returned <code>SGX_RA_KEY_MK</code>, <code>SGX_RA_KEY_SK</code> or <code>SGX_RA_VK</code> is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave using the following Key Derivation Function (KDF):

```
KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, gab x-coordinate)
SGX_RA_KEY_VK = AES-CMAC(KDK,
0x01||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
SGX_RA_KEY_MK = AES-CMAC(KDK,
0x01||'MK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
SGX_RA_KEY_SK = AES-CMAC(KDK,
0x01||'SK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
```

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the Key derivation calculation is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format. The plain text used in each key calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of one of the strings 'VK', 'MK' or 'SK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

If the RA context was generated by the <code>sgx_ra_init_ex</code> API, the KDF used to generate <code>SGX_RA_KEY_MK</code>, <code>SGX_RA_KEY_SK</code> and <code>SGX_RA_VK</code> is defined in the implementation of the call back function provided to the <code>sgx_ra_init</code> ex function.

p_key [out]

The key returned.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

Indicates this API is invoked in incorrect order, it can be called only after a success session has been established. In other words, sgx_ra_proc_msg2
should have been called and no error returned.

Description

After a successful key exchange process, this API can be used in the enclave to get specific key associated with this remote attestation and key exchange session.

Requirements

Header	<pre>sgx_tkey_exchange.h sgx_tkey_exchange.edl</pre>
Library	libsgx_tkey_exchange.a

sgx_ra_close

Call the sgx_ra_close function to release the remote attestation and key exchange context after the process is done and the context isn't needed any-more.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_ra_close(
    sgx_ra_context_t context
);
```

Parameters

context [in]

Context returned by sgx ra init.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates the context is invalid.

Description

At the end of a key exchange process, the caller needs to use this API in an enclave to clear and free memory associated with this remote attestation session.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tkey_exchange.h sgx_key_exchange.edl
Library	libsgx_tkey_exchange.a

sgx_dh_init_session

Initialize DH secure session according to the caller's role in the establishment.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_init_session(
    sgx_dh_session_role_t role,
    sgx_dh_session_t * session
);
```

Parameters

role [in]

Indicates which role the caller plays in the secure session establishment.

The value of role of the initiator of the session establishment must be SGX_ DH SESSION INITIATOR.

The value of role of the responder of the session establishment must be SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER.

session [out]

A pointer to the instance of the DH session which contains entire information about session establishment.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Session is initialized successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
Library	<pre>libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)</pre>

sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1

Generates MSG1 for the responder of DH secure session establishment and records ECC key pair in session structure.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1(
    sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

Parameters

msg1 [out]

A pointer to an sgx_dh_msg1_t msg1 buffer. The buffer holding the msg1 message, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

The DH msg1 contains the responder's public key and report based target info.

dh_session [in/out]

A pointer that points to the instance of sgx_dh_session_t. The buffer holding the DH session information, which is referenced by this parameter, must be within the enclave.

NOTE

As output, the DH session structure contains the responder's public key and private key for the current session.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

MSG1 is generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1

The initiator of DH secure session establishment handles msg1 sent by responder and then generates msg2, and records initiator's ECC key pair in DH session structure.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg1(
    const sgx_dh_msg1_t * msg1,
    sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session
);
```

Parameters

msg1 [in]

Point to dh message 1 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

msg2 [out]

Point to dh message 2 buffer, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in/out]

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

msg1 is processed and msg2 is generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim-ulation)

sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2

The responder handles msg2 sent by initiator and then derives AEK, updates session information and generates msg3.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2(
    const sgx_dh_msg2_t * msg2,
    sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * initiator_identity
);
```

Parameters

msg2 [in]

Point to dh message 2 buffer generated by session initiator, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

msg3 [out]

Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder in this function, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in/out]

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

aek [out]

A pointer that points to instance of sgx_key_128bit_t. The aek is derived
as follows:

```
KDK := CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

AEK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'AEK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80)

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

initiator_identity [out]

A pointer that points to instance of sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t. Identity information of initiator includes isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide whether to trust the peer and use the aek.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

msg2 is processed and msg3 is generated successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH

Indicates the key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3

The initiator handles msg3 sent by responder and then derives AEK, updates session information and gets responder's identity information.

Syntax

```
sgx_status_t sgx_dh_initiator_proc_msg3(
    const sgx_dh_msg3_t * msg3,
    sgx_dh_session_t * dh_session,
    sgx_key_128bit_t * aek,
    sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t * responder_identity
);
```

Parameters

msg3 [in]

Point to dh message 3 buffer generated by session responder, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

dh_session [in]

Point to dh session structure that is used during establishment, and the buffer must be in enclave address space.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

aek [out]

A pointer that points to instance of sgx_key_128bit_t. The aek is derived as follows:

```
KDK:= CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

AEK = AES-CMAC (KDK, 0x01 || 'AEK' || 0x00 || 0x80 || 0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the AEK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'AEK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

responder_identity [out]

Identity information of responder including isv svn, isv product id, the enclave attributes, MRSIGNER, and MRENCLAVE. The buffer must be in enclave address space. The caller should check the identity of the peer and decide

whether to trust the peer and use the aek or the msg3_body.additional_ prop field of msg3.

NOTE

The value of the pointer must be a valid address within an enclave, as well as the end address of the session structure.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

The function is done successfully.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Any of the input parameters is incorrect.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE

The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

The enclave is out of memory.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

An unexpected error occurred.

Requirements

Header	sgx_dh.h
-	libsgx_tservice.aorlibsgx_tservice_sim.a(sim- ulation)

sgx_fopen

```
The sgx fopen function creates or opens a protected file.
```

Syntax

```
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

Parameters

filename [in]

The name of the file to be created or opened.

mode [in]

The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of 'r', 'w' or 'a', with possible '+' and possible 'b' (since string functions are currently not supported, 'b' is meaningless).

key [in]

The encryption key of the file. This key is used as a key derivation key, used for deriving encryption keys for the file. If the file is created with <code>sgx_fopen</code>, you should protect this key and provide it as input every time the file is opened.

Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description

sgx_fopen is similar to the C file API fopen. It creates a new Protected File
or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to sgx_
fopen. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\tt fopen$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	<pre>sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</pre>
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fopen_auto_key

The sgx fopen auto key function creates or opens a protected file.

Syntax

```
SGX_FILE* sgx_fopen_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    const char* mode
);
```

Parameters

filename [in]

The name of the file to be created or opened.

mode [in]

The file open mode string. Allowed values are any combination of 'r', 'w' or 'a', with possible '+' and possible 'b' (since string functions are currently not supported, 'b' is meaningless).

Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns a valid file pointer, which can be used by all the other functions in the Protected FS API, otherwise, NULL is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description

sgx_fopen_auto_key is similar to the C file API fopen. It creates a new Protected File or opens an existing Protected File created with a previous call to sgx_fopen_auto_key. Regular files cannot be opened with this API.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ${\tt fopen}$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fclose

The sgx_fclose function closes a protected file handle.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fclose(
    SGX FILE* stream
```

);

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

0

The file was closed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation.

Description

sgx_fclose is similar to the C file API fclose. It closes an open Protected File handle created with a previous call to sgx_fopen or sgx_fopen_ auto_key. After a call to this function, the handle is invalid even if an error is returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\tt fclose$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fread

The sgx_fread function reads the requested amount of data from the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

Syntax

```
size_t sgx_fread(
    void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

ptr[out]

A pointer to a buffer of at least <code>size*count</code> bytes, to receive the data read from the file.

size [in]

The size of each block to be read.

count [in]

The number of blocks to be read.

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

The number of blocks of size size that were read from the file.

Description

sgx_fread is similar to the C file API fread. In case of an error, sgx_ferror can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ${\tt fread}$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fwrite

The sgx_fwrite function writes the given amount of data to the file, and extends the file pointer by that amount.

Syntax

```
size_t sgx_fwrite(
    const void* ptr,
    size_t size,
    size_t count,
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

ptr [in]

A pointer to a buffer of at least size*count bytes, that contains the data to write to the file

size [in]

The size of each block to be written.

count [in]

The number of blocks to be written.

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

The number of blocks of size size that were written to the file.

Description

sgx_fwrite is similar to the C file API fwrite. In case of an error, sgx_ferror can be called to get the error code.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ${\tt fwrite}$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fflush

The sgx_fflush function forces a cache flush, and if it returns successfully, it is guaranteed that your changes are committed to a file on the disk.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fflush(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

There were errors during the operation. <code>sgx_ferror</code> can be called to get the error code.

Description

sgx_fflush is similar to the C file API fflush. This function flushes all the modified data from the cache and writes it to a file on the disk. In case of an error, sgx_ferror can be called to get the error code. Note that this function does not clear the cache, but only flushes the changes to the actual file on the disk. Flushing also happens automatically when the cache is full and page eviction is required.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\tt fflush$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_ftell

The sgx ftell function creates or opens a protected file.

Syntax

```
int64_t sgx_ftell(
```

SGX_FILE* stream

);

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

If the function succeeds, it returns the current value of the position indicator of the file, otherwise, -1 is returned and errno is set with an appropriate error code. See Protected FS Error Codes for more details about errors.

Description

sgx ftell is similar to the C file API ftell.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\tt ftell$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fseek

The ${\tt sgx_fseek}$ function sets the current value of the position indicator of the file.

Syntax

```
int64_t sgx_fseek(
    SGX_FILE* stream,
    int64_t offset,
    int origin
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen</code> auto key.

offset [in]

The new required value, relative to the origin parameter.

origin [in]

The origin from which to calculate the offset (SEEK_SET, SEEK_CUR or SEEK_END).

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

-1

There were errors during the operation. ${\tt sgx_ferror}$ can be called to get the error code.

Description

sgx fseek is similar to the C file API fseek.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\tt fseek$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_feof

The sgx_feof function tells the caller if the file's position indicator hit the end of the file in a previous read operation.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_feof(
        SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that was returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

0

End of file was not reached.

1

End of file was reached.

Description

sgx feof is similar to the C file API feof.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the $\verb"feof"$ doc-umentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_ferror

The sgx ferror function returns the latest operation error code.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_ferror(
    SGX FILE* stream
```

);

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

The latest operation error code is returned. 0 indicates that no errors occurred.

Description

sgx_ferror is similar to the C file API ferror. In case the latest operation failed because the file is in a bad state, SGX_ERROR_FILE_BAD_STATUS will be returned.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ${\tt ferror}$ documentation.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_clearerr

The sgx_clearerr function attempts to repair a bad file status, and also clears the end-of-file flag.

Syntax

```
void sgx_clearerr(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

None

Description

sgx_clearerr is similar to the C file API clearerr. This function attempts
to repair errors resulted from the underlying file system, like write errors to

the disk (resulting in a full cache that cannot be emptied). Call sgx_ferror or sgx_feof after a call to this function to learn if it was successful or not.

sgx_clearerr does not repair errors resulting from a corrupted file, like decryption errors, or from memory corruption, etc.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the <code>clearerr</code> documentation.

Requirements

Header	<pre>sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</pre>
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_remove

The sgx remove function deletes a file from the file system.

Syntax

```
int32 t sgx remove(
```

const char* filename,

);

Parameters

filename [in]

The name of the file to delete.

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx remove is similar to the C file API remove.

For more details about this API and its parameters, check the ${\tt remove}$ documentation.

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fexport_auto_key

The sgx_fexport_auto_key function is used for exporting the latest key used for the file encryption. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fexport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
).
```

);

Parameters

filename [in]

The name of the file to be exported. This should be the name of a file created with the <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code> API.

key [out]

The latest encryption key.

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx_fexport_auto_key is used to export the last key that was used in the encryption of the file. With this key you can import the file in a different enclave or system.

NOTE:

- 1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.
- 2. This function only works with files created with <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Header	<pre>sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl</pre>
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fimport_auto_key

The sgx_fimport_auto_key function is used for importing a Protected FS auto key file created on a different enclave or platform. See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fimport_auto_key(
    const char* filename,
    sgx_key_128bit_t *key
);
```

Parameters

filename [in]

The name of the file to be imported. This should be the name of a file created with the sgx fopen auto key API, on a different enclave or system.

key [in]

The encryption key, exported with a call to <code>sgx_fexport_auto_key</code> in the source enclave or system.

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, check errno for the error code.

Description

sgx_fimport_auto_key is used for importing a Protected FS file. After this
call returns successfully, the file can be opened normally with sgx_fexport_
auto_key.

NOTE:

1. In order for this function to work, the file should not be opened in any other process.

2. This function only works with files created with sgx_fopen_auto_key.

See File Transfer with the Automatic Keys API for more details.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

sgx_fclear_cache

The sgx_fclear_cache function is used for clearing the internal file cache. The function scrubs all the data from the cache, and releases all the allocated cache memory.

Syntax

```
int32_t sgx_fclear_cache(
    SGX_FILE* stream
);
```

Parameters

stream [in]

A file handle that is returned from a previous call to <code>sgx_fopen</code> or <code>sgx_fopen_auto_key</code>.

Return value

0

The operation completed successfully.

1

An error occurred, call sgx ferror to get the error code.

Description

sgx_fclear_cache is used to scrub all the data from the cache and release all the allocated cache memory. If modified data is found in the cache, it will be written to the file on disk before being scrubbed.

This function is especially useful if you do not trust parts of your own enclave (for example, external libraries you linked against, etc.) and want to make sure there is as little sensitive data in the memory as possible before transferring control to the code they do not trust. Note, however, that the SGX_FILE struc-

ture itself still holds sensitive data. To remove all such data related to the file from memory completely, you should close the file handle.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tprotected_fs.h sgx_tprotected_fs.edl
Library	libsgx_tprotected_fs.a

Types and Enumerations

This topic introduces the types and error codes in the following topics:

- Type Descriptions
- Error Codes

Type Descriptions

This topic section describes the following data types provided by the Intel(R) SGX:

- sgx_enclave_id_t
- sgx_status_t
- sgx_launch_token_t
- sgx_exception_vector_t
- sgx_exception_type_t
- sgx_cpu_context_t
- sgx_exception_info_t
- sgx_exception_handler_t
- sgx_spinlock_t
- sgx_thread_t
- sgx_thread_mutex_t
- sgx_thread_mutexattr_t
- sgx_thread_cond_t
- sgx_thread_condattr_t
- sgx_misc_select_t
- sgx_attributes_t
- sgx_misc_attribute_t

- sgx_isv_svn_t
- sgx_cpu_svn_t
- sgx_key_id_t
- sgx_key_128bit_t
- sgx_key_request_t
- sgx_measurement_t
- sgx_mac_t
- sgx_report_data_t
- sgx_prod_id_t
- sgx_target_info_t
- sgx_report_body_t
- sgx_report_t
- sgx_aes_gcm_data_t
- sgx_sealed_data_t
- sgx_epid_group_id_t
- sgx_basename_t
- sgx_quote_t
- sgx_quote_sign_type_t
- sgx_spid_t
- sgx_quote_nonce_t
- sgx_time_source_nonce_t
- sgx_time_t
- sgx_ps_cap_t
- sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t
- sgx_mc_uuid_t
- sgx_ra_context_t
- sgx_ra_key_128_t
- sgx_ra_key_type_t
- sgx_ra_msg1_t
- sgx_ra_msg2_t

- sgx_ra_msg3_t
- sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t
- sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t
- sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t
- sgx_platform_info_t
- sgx_update_info_bit_t
- sgx_dh_msg1_t
- sgx_dh_msg2_t
- sgx_dh_msg3_t
- sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
- sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
- sgx_dh_session_role_t
- sgx_dh_session_t

sgx_enclave_id_t

An enclave ID, also referred to as an enclave handle. Used as a handle to an enclave by various functions.

Enclave IDs are locally unique, i.e. within the platform, and the uniqueness is guaranteed until the next machine restart.

Syntax

```
typedef uint64 t sgx enclave id t;
```

Requirements

Header

sgx_status_t

Specifies the return status from an Intel SGX function call. For a list containing all possible values of this data type, see Error Codes.

Syntax

typedef enum _status_t { . . . } sgx_status_t;

Requirements

Header sgx_error.h

sgx_launch_token_t

An opaque type used to hold enclave launch information. Used by sgx_create_ enclave to initialize an enclave. The license is generated by the Launch Enclave.

See more details in Loading and Unloading an Enclave.

Syntax

```
typedef uint8 t sgx launch token t[1024];
```

Requirements

Header	sgx_urts.h
--------	------------

sgx_exception_vector_t

The sgx_exception_vector_t enumeration contains the enclave supported exception vectors. If the exception vector is #BP, the exception type is SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE; otherwise, the exception type is SGX_ EXCEPTION_HARDWARE.

Syntax

```
typedef enum sgx exception vector t
```

```
{
```

```
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DE = 0, /* DIV and DIV instructions */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_DB = 1, /* For Intel use only */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BP = 3, /* INT 3 instruction */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_BR = 5, /* BOUND instruction */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_UD = 6, /* UD2 instruction or reserved
opcode */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_MF = 16, /* x87 FPU floating-point or
WAIT/FWAI instruction. */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_AC = 17, /* Any data reference in memory */
SGX_EXCEPTION_VECTOR_XM = 19, /* SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction */
```

```
} sgx_exception_vector_t;
```

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h
--------	----------------------

sgx_exception_type_t

The sgx_exception_type_t enumeration contains values that specify the exception type. If the exception vector is #BP (BreakPoint), the exception type is SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE; otherwise, the exception type is SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE.

Syntax

```
typedef enum _sgx_exception_type_t
```

```
{
```

```
SGX_EXCEPTION_HARDWARE = 3,
SGX_EXCEPTION_SOFTWARE = 6,
} sgx_exception_type_t;
```

Requirements

Header sgx trts exception.h

sgx_cpu_context_t

The sgx_cpu_content_t structure contains processor-specific register data. Custom exception handling uses sgx_cpu_context_t structure to record the CPU context at exception time.

```
#if defined ( M X64) || defined ( x86 64 )
    typedef struct _cpu_context_t
    {
         uint64 t rax;
         uint64 t rcx;
         uint64 t rdx;
         uint64 t rbx;
         uint64 t rsp;
         uint64 t rbp;
         uint64 t rsi;
         uint64 t rdi;
         uint64 t r8;
         uint64 t r9;
         uint64 t r10;
         uint64 t r11;
         uint64 t r12;
         uint64 t r13;
         uint64 t r14;
         uint64 t r15;
         uint64 t rflags;
        uint64 t rip;
    } sgx cpu context t;
```

```
#else
   typedef struct _cpu_context_t
    {
        uint32_t eax;
        uint32_t ecx;
        uint32_t edx;
        uint32_t ebx;
        uint32_t esp;
        uint32_t esp;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t edi;
        uint32_t eflags;
        uint32_t eip;
        } sgx_cpu_context_t;
#endif
```

rax, rcx, rdx, rbx, rsp, rbp, rsi, rdi, r8 - r15

64-bit general purpose registers

rflags

64-bit program status and control register

rip

64-bit instruction pointer

eax, ecx, edx, ebx, esp, ebp, esi, edi

32-bit general purpose registers

eflags

32-bit program status and control register

eip

32-bit instruction pointer

Requirements

Header sgx trts exception.h

sgx_exception_info_t

A structure of this type contains an exception record with a description of the exception and processor context record at the time of exception.

```
typedef struct _exception_info_t
{
    sgx_cpu_context_t cpu_context;
    sgx_exception_vector_t exception_vector;
    sgx_exception_type_t exception_type;
} sgx_exception_info_t;
```

cpu_context

The context record that contains the processor context at the exception time.

exception_vector

The reason the exception occurs. This is the code generated by a hardware exception.

exception_type

The exception type.

SGX EXCEPTION HARDWARE(3) indicates a HW exception.

SGX EXCEPTION SOFTWARE(6) indicates a SW exception.

Requirements

Header	sgx_trts_exception.h	
--------	----------------------	--

sgx_exception_handler_t

Callback function that serves as a custom exception handler.

Syntax

```
typedef int (* sgx_exception_handler_t) (sgx_exception_
info t *info);
```

Members

info

A pointer to <code>sgx_exception_info_t</code> structure that receives the exception information.

Return value

EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH (0)

The exception handler did not handle the exception and the RTS should call the next exception handler in the chain.

EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION (-1)

The exception handler handled the exception and the RTS should continue the execution of the enclave.

```
Requirements
```

Header sgx trts exception.h

sgx_spinlock_t

Data type for a trusted spin lock.

Syntax

```
typedef volatile uint32 t sgx spinlock t;
```

Members

sgx spinlock t defines a spin lock object inside the enclave.

Requirements

Header sgx spinlock.h

sgx_thread_t

Data type to uniquely identify a trusted thread.

Syntax

```
typedef uintptr * sgx thread t;
```

Members

sgx_thread_t is an opaque data type with no member fields visible to users. This data type is subject to change. Thus, enclave code should not rely on the contents of this data object.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

sgx_thread_mutex_t

Data type for a trusted mutex object.

Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex
{
    size_t m_refcount;
    uint32_t m_control;
    volatile uint32_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_t m_owner;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx_thread_mutex_t;
```

Members

m_control

Flags to define whether a mutex is recursive or not.

m_refcount

Reference counter of the mutex object. It will be increased by 1 if the mutex is successfully acquired, and be decreased by 1 if the mutex is released.

NOTE

The counter will be greater than one only if the mutex is recursive.

m_lock

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the mutex object.

m_owner

The thread that currently owns the mutex writes its unique thread identifier in this field, which otherwise is NULL. This field is used for error checking, for instance to ensure that only the owner of a mutex releases it.

m_queue

Ordered list of threads waiting to acquire the ownership of the mutex. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

Requirements

Header	sgx_thread.h
--------	--------------

sgx_thread_mutexattr_t

Attribute for the trusted mutex object.

Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_mutex_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx thread mutexattr t;
```

Members

m_dummy

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

Requirements

Header sgx thread.h

sgx_thread_cond_t

Data type for a trusted condition variable.

Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond
{
    sgx_spinlock_t m_lock;
    sgx_thread_queue_t m_queue;
} sgx thread cond t;
```

Members

m_lock

The spin lock used to guarantee atomic updates to the condition variable.

m_queue

Ordered list of threads waiting on the condition variable. The queue itself is a structure containing a head and a tail for quick insertion and removal under FIFO semantics.

Header

$sgx_thread_condattr_t$

Attribute for the trusted condition variable.

Syntax

```
typedef struct sgx_thread_cond_attr
{
    unsigned char m_dummy;
} sgx_thread_condattr_t;
```

Members

m_dummy

Dummy member not supposed to be used.

Requirements

Header sgx thread.h

sgx_misc_select_t

Enclave misc select bits. The value is 4 byte in length. Currently all the bits are reserved for future extension.

Requirements

Header	sgx_attributes.h
--------	------------------

sgx_attributes_t

Enclave attributes definition structure.

NOTE

When specifying an attributes mask used in key derivation, at a minimum the flags that should be set are INITED, DEBUG and RESERVED bits.

NOTE

The XGETBV instruction can be executed to determine the register sets which are part of the XSAVE state which corresponds to the xfrm value of attributes. Since the save state is dependent on the host system and operating system, an attributes mask generally does not include these bits (XFRM is set to 0).

```
typedef struct _sgx_attributes_t
```

```
{
    uint64_t flags;
    uint64_t xfrm;
} sgx attributes t;
```

flags

Flags is a combination of the following values.

Value	Description
SGX_FLAGS_INITTED	The enclave is initialized
0x000000000000001ULL	
SGX_FLAGS_DEBUG	The enclave is a debug enclave
0x000000000000002ULL	
SGX_FLAGS_MODE64BIT	The enclave runs in 64 bit mode
0x000000000000004ULL	
SGX_FLAGS_PROVISION_KEY	The enclave has access to a provision key
0x0000000000000010ULL	
SGX_FLAGS_EINITTOKEN_KEY	The enclave has access to a launch key
0x000000000000020ULL	
SGX_FLAGS_RESERVED	A mask used to ensure that reserved bits are zero.
0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFC8ULL	Reserved bits are bit 3 and bits 6-63.

xfrm

Similar to XCR0, xfrm is a combination of the following values.

Value	Description
SGX_XFRM_LEGACY	FPU and Intel(R) Streaming SIMD Extensions states are
0x00000000000003ULL	saved
SGX_XFRM_AVX	Intel(R) Advanced Vector Extensions state is saved
0x000000000000000000000000000000000000	

Requirements

Header sgx_attributes.h

sgx_misc_attribute_t

Enclave misc select and attributes definition structure.

Syntax

typedef struct _sgx_misc_attributes_t

```
{
    sgx_attributes_t secs_attr;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
} sgx_misc_attribute_t;
```

secs_attr

The Enclave attributes.

misc_select

The Enclave misc select configuration.

Requirements

Header	sgx_attributes.h
--------	------------------

sgx_isv_svn_t

ISV security version. The value is 2 bytes in length. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (sgx create report).

Requirements

|--|

sgx_cpu_svn_t

sgx_cpu_svn_t is a 128-bit value representing the CPU security version. Use this value in key derivation and obtain it by getting an enclave report (sgx create report).

Syntax

```
#define SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE 16
typedef struct _sgx_cpu_svn_t {
    uint8_t svn[SGX_CPUSVN_SIZE];
} sgx_cpu_svn_t;
```

Header	sgx_key.h
--------	-----------

sgx_key_id_t

sgx_key_id_t is a 256 bit value used in the key request structure. The
value is generally populated with a random value to provide key wear-out protection.

Syntax

```
#define SGX_KEYID_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_key_id_t {
    uint8_t id[SGX_KEYID_SIZE];
} sgx_key_id_t;
```

Requirements

Header so

sgx_key_128bit_t

A 128 bit value that is the used to store a derived key from for example the sgx_get_key function.

Requirements

Header	sgx_key.h	
--------	-----------	--

sgx_key_request_t

Data structure of key request which is used for selecting the appropriate key and any additional parameters required in the derivation of that key. This is the input parameter for the sgx_get_key function.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _key_request_t {
    uint16_t key_name;
    uint16_t key_policy;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint16_t reserved1;
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_attributes_t attribute_mask;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_mask;
    uint8_t reserved2[436];
} sgx key request t;
```

Members

key_name

The name of the key requested. Possible values are below:

Key Name	Value	Description
SGX_KEYSELECT_ EINITTOKEN	0x0000	Launch key
SGX_KEYSELECT_ PROVISION	0x0001	Provisioning key
SGX_KEYSELECT_ PROVISION_SEAL	0x0002	Provisioning seal key
SGX_KEYSELECT_ REPORT	0x0003	Report key
SGX_KEYSELECT_ SEAL	0x0004	Seal key

key_policy

Identify which inputs are required to be used in the key derivation. Possible values are below:

Key policy name	Value	Description
SGX_KEYPOLICY_	0x0001	Derive key using the enclave's
MRENCLAVE		ENCLAVE measurement
		register
SGX_KEYPOLICY_	0x0002	Derive key using the enclave's
MRSIGNER		SIGNER measurement register

NOTE

If MRENCLAVE is used, then that key can only be rederived by that particular enclave.

NOTE

If MRSIGNER is used, then another enclave with the same ISV_SVN could derive the key as well which is useful for applications that instantiate more than one enclave and would like to pass data. The key derived could be used in the encryption process for the data passed between the enclaves.

isv_svn

The ISV security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

reserved1

Reserved for future use. Must be zero.

cpu_svn

The TCB security version number that should be used in the key derivation.

attribute_mask

The attributes mask used to determine which enclave attributes must be included in the key. It only impacts the derivation of seal key, provisioning key and provisioning seal key. See the definition of sgx_attributes_t.

key_id

Value for key wear-out protection. Generally initialized with a random number.

misc_mask

The misc mask used to determine which enclave misc select must be included in the key. Reserved for future function extension.

reserved2

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

Requirements

|--|

sgx_measurement_t

sgx_measurement_t is a 256-bit value representing the enclave measurement.

Syntax

```
#define SGX_HASH_SIZE 32
typedef struct _sgx_measurement_t {
    uint8_t m[SGX_HASH_SIZE];
} sgx_measurement_t;
```

Requirements

Header	sgx_report.h	
--------	--------------	--

sgx_mac_t

This type is utilized as storage for the 128-bit CMAC value of the report data.

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

sgx_report_data_t

sgx_report_data_t is a 512-bit value used for communication between
the enclave and the target enclave. This is one of the inputs to the sgx_create_report function.

Syntax

```
#define SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE 64
typedef struct _sgx_report_data_t {
    uint8_t d[SGX_REPORT_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx_report_data_t;
```

Requirements

Header	sgx_report.h	
--------	--------------	--

sgx_prod_id_t

A 16-bit value representing the ISV enclave product ID. This value is used in the derivation of some keys.

Requirements

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

sgx_target_info_t

Data structure of report target information. This is an input to function <code>sgx_create_report</code> and <code>sgx_init_quote</code> which is used to identify the enclave (its measurement and attributes) which will be able to verify the REPORT that is generated.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _targe_info_t
{
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    uint8_t reserved1[4];
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved2[456];
} sgx target info t;
```

Members

mr_enclave

The enclave hash of the target enclave

attributes

The attributes of the target enclave

reserved1

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

misc_select

The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

reserved2

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

Requirements

Header sgx report.h

sgx_report_body_t

This data structure, which is part of the <code>sgx_report_t</code> structure, contains information about the enclave.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _report_body_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    sgx_misc_select_t misc_select;
    uint8_t reserved1[28];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved3[96];
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
    uint8_t reserved4[60];
    sgx_report_data_t report_data;
} sgx_report_body_t;
```

Members

cpu_svn

The security version number of the host system TCB (CPU).

misc_select

The misc select bits for the target enclave. Reserved for future function extension.

reserved1

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

attributes

The attributes for the enclave. See sgx_attributes_t for the definitions of these flags.

mr_enclave

The measurement value of the enclave.

reserved2

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

mr_signer

The measurement value of the public key that verified the enclave.

reserved3

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

isv_prod_id

The ISV Product ID of the enclave.

isv_svn

The ISV security version number of the enclave.

reserved4

Reserved for future use. Must be set to zero.

report_data

A set of data used for communication between the enclave and the target enclave.

Header	sgx_report.h
--------	--------------

sgx_report_t

Data structure that contains the report information for the enclave. This is the output parameter from the <code>sgx_create_report</code> function. This is the input parameter for the <code>sgx_init_quote</code> function.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _report_t
{
    sgx_report_body_t body;
    sgx_key_id_t key_id;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
} sgx_report_t;
```

Members

body

The data structure containing information about the enclave.

key_id

Value for key wear-out protection.

mac

The CMAC value of the report data using report key.

Requirements

Header sgx_report.h

sgx_aes_gcm_data_t

The structure contains the AES GCM* data, payload size, MAC* and payload.

```
typedef struct _aes_gcm_data_t
{
    uint32_t payload_size;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    uint8_t payload_tag[SGX_SEAL_TAG_SIZE];
    uint8_t payload[];
} sgx aes gcm data t;
```

payload_size

Size of the payload data which includes both the encrypted data followed by the additional authenticated data (plain text). The full payload array is part of the AES GCM MAC calculation.

reserved

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

payload_tag

AES-GMAC of the plain text, payload, and the sizes

payload

The payload data buffer includes the encrypted data followed by the optional additional authenticated data (plain text),which is not encrypted.

NOTE

The optional additional authenticated data (MAC or plain text) could be data which identifies the seal data blob and when it was created.

Requirements

Header	sgx_tseal.h	
--------	-------------	--

sgx_sealed_data_t

Sealed data blob structure containing the key request structure used in the key derivation. The data structure has been laid out to achieve 16 byte alignment. This structure should be allocated within the enclave when the seal operation is performed. After the seal operation, the structure can be copied outside the enclave for preservation before the enclave is destroyed. The sealed_data structure needs to be copied back within the enclave before unsealing.

```
typedef struct _sealed_data_t
{
    sgx_key_request_t key_request;
    uint32_t plain_text_offset;
    uint8_t reserved[12];
    sgx_aes_gcm_data_t aes_data;
} sgx_sealed_data_t;
```

key_request

The key request used to derive the seal key.

plain_text_offset

The offset within the <code>aes_data</code> structure payload to the start of the optional additional MAC text.

reserved

Padding to allow the data to be 16 byte aligned.

aes_data

Structure contains the AES GCM data (payload size, MAC, and payload).

Requirements

Header sgx_tseal.h

sgx_epid_group_id_t

Type for Intel(R) EPID group id

Syntax

```
typedef uint8 t sgx epid group id t[4];
```

Requirements

Header sgx_quote.h

sgx_basename_t

Type for base name used in sgx_quote.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _basename_t
{
    uint8_t name[32];
} sgx_basename_t;
```

Members

name

The base name used in sgx_quote.

Requirements

```
Header sgx quote.h
```

sgx_quote_t

Type for quote used in remote attestation.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _quote_t
{
    uint16_t version;
    uint16_t sign_type;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t epid_group_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t qe_svn;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pce_svn;
    uint32 xeid;
    sgx_basename_t basename;
    sgx_report_body_t report_body;
    uint32_t signature_len;
    uint8_t signature[];
} sgx_quote_t;
```

Members

version

The version of the quote structure.

sign_type

The indicator of the Intel(R) EPID signature type.

epid_group_id

The Intel(R) EPID group id of the platform belongs to.

qe_svn

The svn of the QE.

pce_svn

The svn of the PCE.

xeid

The extended Intel(R) EPID group ID.

basename

The base name used in sgx_quote.

report_body

The report body of the application enclave.

signature_len

The size in byte of the following signature.

signature

The place holder of the variable length signature.

Requirements

Header sgx quote.h

sgx_quote_sign_type_t

Enum indicates the quote type, linkable or un-linkable

Syntax

```
typedef enum {
    SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE,
    SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE
} sgx_quote_sign_type_t;
```

Requirements

Header sgx_quote.h

sgx_spid_t

Type for a service provider ID.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _spid_t
{
    uint8_t id[16];
} sgx_spid_t;
```

Members

id

The ID of the service provider.

Requirements

Header sgx quote.h

sgx_quote_nonce_t

This data structure indicates the quote nonce.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_quote_nonce
{
    uint8_t rand[16];
} sgx_quote_nonce_t;
```

Members

rand

The 16 bytes random number used as nonce.

Requirements

Header	sgx quote.h
--------	-------------

sgx_time_source_nonce_t

Nonce of time source. It's opaque to users.

Syntax

```
typedef uint8_t sgx_time_source_nonce_t[32];
```

Requirements

```
Header sgx tae service.h
```

sgx_time_t

Type for trusted time.

Syntax

```
typedef uint64_t sgx_time_t;
```

Header	sgx_tae_service.h
--------	-------------------

sgx_ps_cap_t

Type indicating the platform service capability.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ps_cap_t
{
    uint32_t ps_cap0;
    uint32_t ps_cap1;
} sgx_ps_cap_t;
```

Members

ps_cap0

Bit 0 : Trusted Time service

Bit 1 : Monotonic Counter service

Bit 2 : Reserved

Bit 3 : Secure Message service

Bit 4-31 : Reserved

ps_cap1

Bit 0-31 : Reserved

Requirements

Header sgx uae service.h

sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t

Security property descriptor of platform service. It's opaque to users.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc
{
    uint8 t sgx ps sec prop desc[256];
```

```
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t;
```

Header	sgx_tae_service.h	
--------	-------------------	--

sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t

Security property descriptor of platform service with extended platform service information.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _ps_sec_prop_desc_ex
{
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop_desc;
    sgx_measurement_t pse_mrsigner;
    sgx_prod_id_t pse_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t pse_isv_svn;
} sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_ex_t;
```

Requirements

|--|--|

sgx_mc_uuid_t

The data structure of a monotonic counter.

Syntax

```
#define SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE 3
#define SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE 13
typedef struct _mc_uuid
{
    uint8_t counter_id[SGX_MC_UUID_COUNTER_ID_SIZE];
    uint8_t nonce[SGX_MC_UUID_NONCE_SIZE];
} sgx mc uuid t;
```

Members

counter_id

ID number of the monotonic counter.

nonce

Nonce associated with the monotonic counter.

|--|

sgx_ra_context_t

Type for a context returned by the key exchange library.

Syntax

```
typedef uint32 t sgx ra context t;
```

Requirements

Header sgx key exchange.h

sgx_ra_key_128_t

Type for 128 bit key used in remote attestation.

Syntax

typedef uint8_t sgx_ra_key_128_t[16];

Requirements

Header sgx key exchange.h

sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t

The sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t function should take the Diffie-Hellman shared secret as input to allow the ISV enclave to generate their own derived shared keys (SMK, SK, MK and VK). Implementation of the function should return the appropriate return value.

Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t(*sgx_ra_derive_secret_keys_t)(
    const sgx_ec256_dh_shared_t* p_shared_key,
    uint16_t kdf_id,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_smk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_sk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_mk_key,
    sgx_ec_key_128bit_t* p_vk_key
);
```

Parameters

p_shared_key [in]

The the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.

kdf_id [in]

Key Derivation Function ID.

p_smk_key [out]

The output SMK.

p_sk_key [out]

The output SK.

p_mk_key [out]

The output MK.

p_vk_key [out]

The output VK.

Return value

SGX_SUCCESS

Indicates success.

SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER

Indicates an error that the input parameters are invalid.

SGX_ERROR_KDF_MISMATCH

Indicates key derivation function does not match.

SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY

Not enough memory is available to complete this operation, or contexts reach the limits.

SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED

Indicates that an unexpected error occurred.

Description

A pointer to a call back routine matching the function prototype.

Requirements

Header sgx_tkey_exchange.h

sgx_ra_key_type_t

Enum of the key types used in remote attestation.

```
typedef enum _sgx_ra_key_type_t
{
     SGX_RA_KEY_SK = 1,
     SGX_RA_KEY_MK,
     SGX_RA_KEY_VK,
} sgx_ra_key_type_t;
```

Requirements

Header sgx key exchange.h

sgx_ra_msg1_t

This data structure describes the message 1 that is used in remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msgl_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_epid_group_id_t gid;
} sgx_ra_msgl_t;
```

Members

g_a (Little Endian)

The public EC key of an application enclave, based on NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

gid (Little Endian)

ID of the Intel(R) EPID group of the platform belongs to.

Requirements

|--|

sgx_ra_msg2_t

This data structure describes the message 2 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_spid_t spid;
    uint16_t quote_type;
    uint16_t kdf_id;
    sgx_ec256_signature_t sign_gb_ga;
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    uint32_t sig_r1_size;
    uint8_t sig_r1[];
} sgx_ra_msg2_t;
```

g_b (Little Endian)

Public EC key of service provider, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

spid

ID of the service provider

quote_type (Little Endian)

Indicates the quote type, linkable (1) or un-linkable (0).

kdf_id (Litte Endian)

Key derivation function id.

sign_gb_ga (Litte Endian)

ECDSA Signature of (g_b||g_a), using the service provider's ECDSA private key corresponding to the public key specified in sgx_ra_init or sgx_ra_ init_ex function, where g_b is the public EC key of the service provider and g_a is the public key of application enclave, provided by the application enclave, in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

mac

AES-CMAC of gb, spid 2-byte TYPE, 2-byte KDF-ID, and <code>sign_gb_ga</code> using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
```

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the <code>sgx_ra_init_ex</code> API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API <code>sgx ra get keys</code> (SK, MK, and VK).

sig_rl_size

Size of the sig rl, in bytes.

sig_rl

Pointer to the Intel(R) EPID Signature Revocation List Certificate of the Intel(R) EPID group identified by the gid in the remote attestation and key exchange message 1.

Requirements

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sgx_ra_msg3_t

This data structure describes message 3 that is used in the remote attestation and key exchange protocol.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_ra_msg3_t
{
    sgx_mac_t mac;
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
    sgx_ps_sec_prop_desc_t ps_sec_prop;
    uint8_t quote[];
} sgx_ra_msg3_t;
```

Members

mac

AES-CMAC of g_a, ps_sec_prop, GID, and quote[], using SMK. SMK is derived follows:

```
KDK = AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

```
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
```

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0x80)

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the <code>sgx_ra_init_ex</code> API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API <code>sgx ra get keys</code> (SK, MK, and VK).

g_a (Little Endian)

Public EC key of application enclave

ps_sec_prop

Security property of the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service. If the Intel(R) SGX Platform Service security property information is not required in the remote attestation and key exchange process, this field will be all Os.

quote

Quote returned from sgx_get_quote. The first 32-byte report_body.report_data field in Quote is set to SHA256 hash of ga, gb and VK, and the second 32-byte is set to all 0s. VK is derived from the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element between the service provider and the application enclave:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'VK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)
```

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label (the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format)
- a bit length (0×80).

If the ISV needs to use a different KDF than the default KDF used by Intel(R) SGX PSW, the ISV can use the <code>sgx_ra_init_ex</code> API to provide a callback function to generate the remote attestation keys used in the SIGMA protocol (SMK) and returned by the API <code>sgx_ra_get_keys</code> (SK, MK, and VK).

Requirements

|--|

sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_ exchange.edl.

Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_ga_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    sgx_ec256_public_t *g_a // Little Endian
);
```

Note that the 4th parameter this function takes should be in little endian format.

Requirements

|--|

sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_ exchange.edl.

Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_proc_msg2_trusted_t)(
```

```
sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
int* retval,
sgx_ra_context_t context,
const sgx_ra_msg2_t *p_msg2,
const sgx_target_info_t *p_qe_target,
sgx_report_t *p_report,
sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce
);
```

Requirements

Header sgx ukey exchange.h

sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t

Function pointer of proxy function generated from sgx_tkey_ exchange.edl.

Syntax

```
typedef sgx_status_t (* sgx_ecall_get_msg3_trusted_t)(
    sgx_enclave_id_t eid,
    int* retval,
    sgx_ra_context_t context,
    uint32_t quote_size,
    sgx_report_t* qe_report,
    sgx_ra_msg3_t *p_msg3,
    uint32_t msg3_size
);
```

Requirements

Header	sgx_ukey_exchange.h	
--------	---------------------	--

sgx_platform_info_t

This opaque data structure indicates the platform information received from Intel Attestation Server.

Syntax

```
#define SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE 101
typedef struct _platform_info
{
    uint8_t platform_info[SGX_PLATFORM_INFO_SIZE];
} sgx_platform_info_t;
```

Members

platform_info

The platform information.

Requirements

sgx_update_info_bit_t

Type for information of what components of Intel SGX need to be updated and how to update them.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _update_info_bit
{
    int ucodeUpdate;
    int csmeFwUpdate;
    int pswUpdate;
} sgx update info bit t;
```

Members

ucodeUpdate

Whether the ucode needs to be updated.

csmeFwUpdate

Whether the csme firmware needs to be updated.

pswUpdate

Whether the platform software needs to be updated.

Requirements

```
Header sgx_quote.h
```

sgx_dh_msg1_t

Type for MSG1 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg1_t
```

```
{
```

```
sgx_ec256_public_t g_a;
sgx_target_info_t target;
} sgx dh msg1 t;
```

Members

g_a (Little Endian)

Public EC key of responder enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

target

Report target info to be used by the peer enclave to generate the Intel(R) SGX report in the message 2 of the DH secure session protocol.

Requirements

```
Header sgx_dh.h
```

sgx_dh_msg2_t

Type for MSG2 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg2_t
{
    sgx_ec256_public_t g_b;
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
} sgx_dh_msg2_t;
```

Members

g_b (Little Endian)

Public EC key of initiator enclave of DH session establishment, based on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve.

report

Intel(R) SGX report of initiator enclave of DH session establishment. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_a and g_b , where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is

the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]

AES-CMAC value of g_b ,report, 2-byte KDF-ID, and 0x00s using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

SMK = AES-CMAC(KDK, 0x01||'SMK'||0x00||0x80||0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

Requirements

Header sqx dh.h

sgx_dh_msg3_t

Type for MSG3 used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_t
{
```

```
uint8_t cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE];
sgx_dh_msg3_body_t msg3_body;
} sgx_dh_msg3_t;
```

Members

cmac[SGX_DH_MAC_SIZE]

CMAC value of message body of MSG3, using SMK as the AES-CMAC key. SMK is derived as follows:

```
KDK= AES-CMAC(key0, LittleEndian(gab x-coordinate))
```

SMK = AES-CMAC (KDK, 0x01 | | 'SMK' | | 0x00 | | 0x80 | | 0x00)

The key0 used in the key extraction operation is 16 bytes of 0×00 . The plain text used in the AES-CMAC calculation of the KDK is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret elliptic curve field element in Little Endian format.

The plain text used in the SMK calculation includes:

- a counter (0x01)
- a label: the ASCII representation of the string 'SMK' in Little Endian format
- a bit length (0x80)

msg3_body

Variable length message body of MSG3.

Requirements

Header sgx dh.h

sgx_dh_msg3_body_t

Type for message body of the MSG3 structure used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_msg3_body_t
{
    sgx_report_t report;
    uint32_t additional_prop_length;
    uint8_t additional_prop[0];
} sgx_dh_msg3_body_t;
```

Members

report

Intel(R) SGX report of responder enclave. The first 32-byte of the report_data field of the report is set to SHA256 hash of g_b and g_a, where g_a is the EC Public key of the responder enclave and g_b is the EC public key of the initiator enclave. The second 32-byte of the report_data field is set to all 0s.

additional_prop_length

Length of additional property field in bytes.

additional_prop[0]

Variable length buffer holding additional data that the responder enclave may provide.

Requirements

|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|

sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t

Type for enclave identity of initiator or responder used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t
{
    sgx_cpu_svn_t cpu_svn;
    uint8_t reserved_1[32];
    sgx_attributes_t attributes;
    sgx_measurement_t mr_enclave;
    uint8_t reserved_2[32];
    sgx_measurement_t mr_signer;
    uint8_t reserved_3[96];
    sgx_prod_id_t isv_prod_id;
    sgx_isv_svn_t isv_svn;
} sgx dh session enclave identity t;
```

Members

cpu_svn

Security version number of CPU.

reserved_1[32]

Reserved 32 bytes.

attributes

Intel SGX attributes of enclave.

mr_enclave

Measurement of enclave.

reserved_2[32]

Reserved 32 bytes.

mr_signer

Measurement of enclave signer.

reserved_3[96]

Reserved 96 bytes.

isv_prod_id (Little Endian)

Product ID of ISV enclave.

isv_svn (Little Endian)

Security version number of ISV enclave.

Requirements

Header sgx dh.h

sgx_dh_session_role_t

Type for role of establishing a DH secure session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef enum _sgx_dh_session_role_t
{
    sGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR,
    SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER
} sgx_dh_session_role_t;
```

Members

SGX_DH_SESSION_INITIATOR

Initiator of a DH session establishment.

SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER

Responder of a DH session establishment.

Requirements

```
Header sgx dh.h
```

sgx_dh_session_t

Type for session used in DH secure session establishment.

Syntax

```
typedef struct _sgx_dh_session_t
{
    uint8_t sgx_dh_session[SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE];
} sgx dh session t;
```

Members

sgx_dh_session

Data of DH session.

The array size of sgx_dh_session SGX_DH_SESSION_DATA_SIZE is defined as 200 bytes.

Requirements

Header

sgx dh.h

Error Codes

Table 15 Error code

Value	Error Name	Description
0x0000	SGX_SUCCESS	
0x0001	SGX_ERROR_ UNEXPECTED	An unexpected error.
0x0002	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ PARAMETER	The parameter is incorrect.
0x0003	SGX_ERROR_ OUT_OF_ MEMORY	There is not enough memory available to com- plete this operation.
0x0004	SGX_ERROR_ ENCLAVE_LOST	The enclave is lost after power transition or used in child process created by fork().
0x0005	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_STATE	The API is invoked in incorrect order or state.
0x1001	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ FUNCTION	The ECALL/OCALL function index is incorrect.
0x1003	SGX_ERROR_	The enclave is out of TCS.

	OUT_OF_TCS	
0x1006	SGX_ERROR_ ENCLAVE_ CRASHED	The enclave has crashed.
0x1007	SGX_ERROR_	ECALL is not allowed at this time. For examples:
	ECALL_NOT_ ALLOWED	ECALL is not public.
		• ECALL is blocked by the dynamic entry table.
		 A nested ECALL is not allowed during global initialization.
0x1008	SGX_ERROR_ OCALL_NOT_ ALLOWED	OCALL is not allowed during exception handling.
0x1009	SGX_ERROR_ STACK_ OVERRUN	Stack overrun occurs within the enclave.
0x2000	SGX_ERROR_ UNDEFINED_ SYMBOL	The enclave contains an undefined symbol.
0x2001	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ ENCLAVE	The enclave image is incorrect.
0x2002	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ ENCLAVE_ID	The enclave ID is invalid.
0x2003	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ SIGNATURE	The signature is invalid.
0x2004	SGX_ERROR_ NDEBUG_ ENCLAVE	The enclave is signed as product enclave and can- not be created as a debuggable enclave.
0x2005	SGX_ERROR_ OUT_OF_EPC	There is not enough EPC available to load the enclave or one of the Architecture Enclaves needed to complete the operation requested.
0x2006	SGX_ERROR_ NO_DEVICE	Cannot open device.
0x2007	SGX_ERROR_ MEMORY_MAP_	Page mapping failed in driver.

	CONFLICT	
0x2009	SGX_EEROR_ INVALID_ METADATA	The metadata is incorrect.
0x200C	SGX_ERROR_ DEVICE_BUSY	Device is busy.
0x200D	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ VERSION	Metadata version is inconsistent between uRTS and sgx_sign or the uRTS is incompatible with the current platform.
0x200E	SGX_ERROR_ MODE_ INCOMPATIBLE	The target enclave (32/64 bit or HS/Sim) mode is incompatible with the uRTS mode.
0x200F	SGX_ERROR_ ENCLAVE_FILE_ ACCESS	Can't open enclave file.
0x2010	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_MISC	The MiscSelect/MiscMask settings are incorrect.
0x3001	SGX_ERROR_ MAC_MISMATCH	Indicates report verification error.
0x3002	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ ATTRIBUTE	The enclave is not authorized.
0x3003	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ CPUSVN	The CPU SVN is beyond the CPU SVN value of the platform.
0x3004	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ISVSVN	The ISV SVN is greater than the ISV SVN value of the enclave.
0x3005	SGX_ERROR_ INVALID_ KEYNAME	Unsupported key name value.
0x4001	SGX_ERROR_ SERVICE_ UNAVAILABLE	AE service did not respond or the requested ser- vice is not supported.
0x4002	SGX_ERROR_ SERVICE_ TIMEOUT	The request to AE service timed out.
0x4003	SGX_ERROR_AE_ INVALID_	Indicates an Intel(R) EPID blob verification error.

	EPIDBLOB	
0x4004	SGX_ERROR_ SERVICE_ INVALID_ PRIVILEDGE	Enclave has no privilege to get launch token.
0x4005	SGX_ERROR_ EPID_MEMBER_ REVOKED	The Intel(R) EPID group membership has been revoked. The platform is not trusted. Updating the platform and retrying will not remedy the revoc- ation.
0x4006	SGX_ERROR_ UPDATE_ NEEDED	Intel(R) SGX needs to be updated.
0x4007	SGX_ERROR_ NETWORK_ FAILURE	Network connecting or proxy setting issue is encountered.
0x4008	SGX_ERROR_AE_ SESSION_ INVALID	The session is invalid or ended by server.
0x400a	SGX_ERROR_ BUSY	The requested service is temporarily not available.
0x400c	SGX_ERROR_ MC_NOT_FOUND	The Monotonic Counter does not exist or has been invalidated.
0x400d	SGX_ERROR_ MC_NO_ ACCESS_RIGHT	The caller does not have the access right to the specified VMC.
0x400e	SGX_ERROR_ MC_USED_UP	No monotonic counter is available.
0x400f	SGX_ERROR_ MC_OVER_ QUOTA	Monotonic counters reached quota limit.
0x4011	SGX_ERROR_ KDF_MISMATCH	Key derivation function does not match during key exchange.
0x4012	SGX_ERROR_ UNRECOGNIZED_ PLATFORM	Intel(R) EPID Provisioning failed because the plat- form was not recognized by the back-end server.
0x7001	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_BAD_ STATUS	The file is in a bad status, run sgx_clearerr to try and fix it.

-	1	
	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_NO_KEY_ID	The Key ID field is all zeros, cannot re-generate the encryption key.
0x7003	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_NAME_ MISMATCH	The current file name is different than the original file name (not allowed, substitution attack).
0x7004	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_NOT_SGX_ FILE	The file is not an Intel SGX file.
	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_CANT_ OPEN_ RECOVERY_FILE	A recovery file cannot be opened, so the flush oper- ation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).
	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_CANT_ WRITE_ RECOVERY_FILE	A recovery file cannot be written, so the flush oper- ation cannot continue (only used when no EXXX is returned).
0x7007	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_RECOVERY_ NEEDED	When opening the file, recovery is needed, but the recovery process failed.
0x7008	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_FLUSH_ FAILED	fflush operation (to the disk) failed (only used when no EXXX is returned).
0x7009	SGX_ERROR_ FILE_CLOSE_ FAILED	fclose operation (to the disk) failed (only used when no EXXX is returned).

Appendix

This topic provides the following reference information:

- Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Options for Enclaves
- Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries
- Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions
- Unsupported C Standard Functions
- Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions
- Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

Unsupported GCC* Compiler Options for Enclaves

The following GCC* options are not supported to build enclaves.

Option	Category	Remark
-fopenmp	Options con-	Depends on Pthreads.
-fgnu-tm	trolling C dia-	Depends on libitm (transactional memory).
-fhosted	lect.	OS functions not supported within
		enclaves.
-fuse-cxa-atexit	Options con-	Depends on atexit(), which is not supported within
	0	an enclave.
	lect.	
All options	Options con-	Objective C/C++ not supported.
	trolling object-	
	ive-C and	
	objective-C++.	
All options	Options for	All options because of runtime support required.
	debugging a pro-	Separate Intel(R) SGX debugger support provided.
	gram.	
-fmudflap, -fmud-	Optimization	Dependent on libmudflap.
flapth, –fmudflapir	options.	
-fexec-char-	Options con-	Only providing partial support for UTF-8.
set=charset,	trolling the pre-	
-fwide-exec-char-	processor.	
set=charset		
	-	
-x objective-c		Objective-C is not supported within an

Table 16 Unsupported GCC Compiler Options

		enclave.
-lobjc	Linker options.	Objective C not supported.
-pie, -s		Used for executables.
-shared-libgcc,	1	Enclaves cannot depend on libgcc.
-static-libgcc		
-static-libstdc++	-	Intel(R) SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX version of
		the C++ standard library.
-T script	-	Need to control the format of enclave
		code.
-mglibc	Hardware	Intel SGX SDK provides an Intel SGX compatible C
		standard library.
	configurations	-
-muclibc, -mbionic, -	for	Not applicable.
mandroid, -tno-		
android-cc, -tno-	GNU*/Linux*	
android-ld	options.	
-msoft-float		Run-time emulation of floating point is not sup-
	els and con-	ported.
-m96bit-long-double		96-bit not supported.
-mthreads	Intel & AMD*	Depends on mingwthrd.
-mcmodel=small, -	x86-x64	Linker will fail.
mcmodel=kernel, -	options.	
mcmodel=medium, -		
mcmodel=large		
All options		All options because these are only used with Cyg-
	els and con-	win* or MinGW*.
	figurations for	
	Intel & AMD*	
	x86-x64 Win-	
	dows* options	
-fbounds-check	1.	Currently for Java* and Fortran* front-ends, not
	generation con-	
-fpie, -fPIE	ventions	Only pertains to executable files.
-fpie, -pie		compilation option -fpie and linking option -pie can-
		not be used at the same time under simulation
	-	mode if TLS support is required.
-fpie, -shared -fpic		compilation option -fpie and linking option -shared
		-fpic cannot be used at the same time under both
		simulation mode and 64-bit hardware mode if TLS
		support is required.

-finstrument-functions	ISV would need to provide support for functions
	_cyg_profile_func_enter and
	cyg_profile_func_exit if this option is
	needed.
-fsplit-stack	Requires libgcc runtime support.

Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Options for Enclaves

The following Intel(R) C++ Compiler options are not supported to build enclaves.

Option	Description
-hotpatch[=n]	This code generation option is not applicable.
-xcode	This option does not apply to Intel(R) SGX because for this check to be effective, the source file containing the main program or the dynamic library main function should be compiled with this option enabled. Since this compiler option does not have the intended behavior (host architecture check), then the /Qax or /arch options are recommended.
-cilk-serialize - guide-file[=fil- lename]	These advanced optimization options are not supported.
-guide-file-append [=filename]	
-ipp[=lib] -[no]opt calloc -[no-]opt- matmul -tbb	
-f[no-]instrument- functions -prof- data-order	These Profile-guided Optimization (PGO) options are not supported.
-no-prof-data- order -prof-dir - prof-file <f></f>	
-prof-func-groups - no-prof-func- groups	

Table 17 Unsupported Intel C++ Compiler Options

Option	Description
-prof-func-order - no-prof-func-order	
-prof-gen[x] -prof- hotness- threshold=n	
-[-no]-prof-src-dir - prof-src-root=dir	
-prof-src-root-cwd -prof-use [=keyword]	
-prof-value-pro- filing[=keyword]	
-profile-functions - profile-loops- s=keyword	
-profile-loops- report[=n]	
-tcollect[lib] -tcol- lect-filter filename	These optimization report options are not supported.
–tcheck	
-openmp - openmp-stubs	These OpenMP* and parallel processing options are not supported.
-openmp-report {0 1 2} -openmp- report[=n]	
-openmp-lib=type	
-openmp-link- k=library -openmp- task=model	
-openmp- threadprivate=type	
-openmp-	

Option	Description
threadprivate=type	
-par-affinity=[mod- ifier,]type[,per- mute][,offset]	
-par-num-thread- s=n -par-report[n]	
-par-runtime-con- trol[n] -no-par- runtime-control	
-par-schedule- keyword[=n] -par- threshold[n]	
-parallel -parallel- source-info[=n]	
-no-parallel- source-info	
-[no-]inline-calloc	This inline option is not supported.
-check=keyword[, keyword]	This language option is not supported.
-Bdynamic - dynamic-linker - shared-intel	These linker options are not supported.

Unsupported Intel(R) C++ Compiler Libraries

The Intel(R) C++ Compiler libraries that are not supported within an enclave are:

Table 18 Unsupported Intel C++ Compiler Libraries

Option	Description	Remark
cilkrts.lib	Intel® Cilk™ runtime system.	
libchkp.lib	Run-time pointer checker lib-	
libchkpwrap.lib	raries.	
libiomp5mt.lib,	OpenMP* libraries.	

libiompprof5mt.lib,		
libiompstubs5mt.lib		
libipgo.lib	Profile-Guided Optimization (PGO) runtime support library.	
pdbx.lib,	Intel(R) Parallel Debugger	
pdbxinst.lib	Extension runtime libraries.	
libicaio.lib	Asynchronous I/O library.	I/O is not sup- ported in an enclave.
libbfp754.lib	Binary floating-point math lib- rary.	It is not utilized by the compiler.
libmatmul.lib	Matrix multiplication library.	It depends on the OpenMP library.

Unsupported GCC* Built-in Functions

The following table illustrates unsupported GCC* built-in functions inside the enclave. Using any of these built-in functions will result in a linker error during the compilation of the enclave.

The complete list of GCC built-in functions is available at http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.7.2/gcc/X86-Built_002din-Functions.html#X86-Built_002din-Functions.

Table 19 Unsupported GCC Compiler Built-in Functions

Non supported: Math built-ins			
builtin_signbitd32	builtin_signbitd64	builtin_signbitd128	
builtin_finited32	builtin_finited64	builtin_finited128	
builtin_isinfd32	builtin_isinfd64	builtin_isinfd128	
builtin_isnand32	builtin_isnand64	builtin_isnand64	
Not Supported: String/memory built-ins			
builtin_strcat	builtin_strcpy	builtin_strdup	
builtin_stpcpy			
Not Supported: I/O related built-ins			
builtin_fprintf	builtin_fprintf_unlocked	builtin_putc	
builtin_putc_unlocked	builtin_fputc	builtin_fputc_unlocked	
builtin_fputs	builtin_fputs_unlocked	builtin_fscanf	
builtin_fwrite	builtin_fwrite_unlocked	builtin_printf	

	1		
builtin_printf_unlocked	builtin_putchar		builtin_putchar_unlocked
builtin_puts	builtin_puts_unl	ocked	builtin_scanf
builtin_sprintf	builtin_sscanf		builtin_vfprintf
builtin_vfscanf	builtin_vprintf		builtin_vscanf
builtin_vsprintf	builtin_vsscanf		
	Not Supported: v	vctype built-in	1
builtin_iswalnum	builtin_iswalpha		builtin_iswblank
builtin_iswcntrl	builtin_iswdigit		builtin_iswgraph
builtin_iswlower	builtin_iswprint		builtin_iswpunct
builtin_iswspace	builtin_iswupper		builtin_iswxdigit
builtin_towlower	builtin_towupper	r	
N	ot Supported: Proce	ess control bui	lt-ins
builtin_execl	builtin_execlp		builtin_execle
builtin_execv	builtin_execvp		builtin_execve
builtin_exit	builtin_fork		builtinexit
Non	Supported: Object s	size checking l	built-ins
builtinfprintf_chk	builtinprintf_	chk	builtinvfprintf_chk
u			
N	on Supported: Misc	ellaneous buil	t-ins
builtin_dcgettext	builtin_dgettext		builtin_gettext
builtin_strfmon			
	Non Supported: F	Profiling Hook	S
cyg_profile_func_enter	cyg_profile_func_	_exit	
	Non Supported:	TLS Emulation	
arget.emutls.get_address	target.emutls.regist	er_common	
	Non supported: F	Ring 0 built-ins	5
_writefsbase_u32	_writefsbase_u64		_writegsbase_u32
_writegsbase_u64	rdpmc		rdtsc
rdtscp			
	Non Supported: O	oenMP* built-i	 ns
builtin_omp_get_thread		builtin_omp_get_num_threads	
builtin GOMP atomic st	-	builtin_GOMP_atomic_end	
builtin_GOMP_barrier		builtin_GOMP_taskwait	
builtin GOMP taskyield		builtin GOMP critical start	
builtin_GOMP_critical_en	d	builtin_GOMP_critical_name_start	

_builtin_GOMP_critical_name_end

_builtin_GOMP_loop_static_start

builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_guided_start
builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_static_start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_guided_
	start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_static_next
builtin_GOMP_loop_dynamic_next	builtin_GOMP_loop_guided_next
builtin_GOMP_loop_runtime_next	builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_static_next
builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_dynamic_next	builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_guided_next
builtin_GOMP_loop_ordered_runtime_next	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_
	start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_static_next
start	
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_dynamic_next
start	
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_guided_next
start	
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_runtime_next	builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_static_
	next
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_dynamic_	builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_static_start
next	
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_guided_	builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_dynamic_
next	start
builtin_GOMP_loop_ull_ordered_runtime_ next	builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_guided_start
builtin_GOMP_parallel_loop_runtime_start	builtin_GOMP_loop_end
builtin_GOMP_loop_end_nowait	builtin_GOMP_ordered_start
	builtin_GOMP_parallel_start
builtin_GOMP_ordered_end	
builtin_GOMP_parallel_end	builtin_GOMP_task
builtin_GOMP_sections_start	builtin_GOMP_sections_next
builtin_GOMP_parallel_sections_start	builtin_GOMP_sections_end
builtin_GOMP_sections_end_nowait	builtin_GOMP_single_start
builtin_GOMP_single_copy_start	builtin_GOMP_single_copy_end

Unsupported C Standard Functions

You cannot use the following Standard C functions within the enclave; otherwise, the compilation would fail.

Table 20 Unsupported C Standard Functions

Header Header Unsupported Definition file file in		tion	
	Intel SGX?	Macros/Types	Functions
complex.h	No	complex, _complex_ I, imaginary, _ima- ginary_I, I, #pragma STDC CX_ LIMITED_RANGE on- off-switch	cacos(), cacosf(), cacosl(), casin(), casinf(), casinl (), catan(), catanf(), catanl(), ccos(), ccosf(), ccosl (), csin(), csinf(), csinl(), ctan(), ctanf(), ctanl(), cacosh(), cacoshf(), cacoshl(), casinh(), casinhf(), casinhl(), catanh(), catanhf(), catanhl(), ccosh(), ccoshf(), ccoshl(), csinh(), csinhf(), csinhl(), ctanh(), ctanhf(), ctanhl(), cexp(), cexpf(), cexpl(), clog(), clogf(), clogl(), cabs(), cabsf(), cabsl(), cpow(), cpowf(), cpowl(), csqrt(), csqrtf(), csqrtl (), carg(), cargf(), cargl(), cimag(), cimagf(), cimagl (), conj(), conjf(), conjl(), cproj(), cprojf(), cprojl(), creal(), crealf(), creall()
fenv.h	No	fenv_t, fexcept_t, FE_DIVBYZERO, FE_INEXACT, FE_INVALID, FE_OVERFLOW, FE_UNDERFLOW, FE_ALL_EXCEPT, FE_DOWNWARD, FE_TONEAREST, FE_TOWARDZERO, FE_UPWARD, FE_DFL_ENV, #pragma STDC FENV_ACCESS on- off switch	feclearexcept(), fegetexceptflag(), feraiseexcept(), fesetexceptflag(), fetestexcept(), fegetround(), feset- round(), fegetenv(), feholdexcept(), fesetenv(), feupdateenv()
inttypes.h	Yes	off-switch SCNdN, SCNiN, SCNoN, SCNuN, SCNxN, SCNdLEASTN,	wcstoimax(), wcstoumax()

Header file	er Header Unsupported Definition file in		tion
	Intel SGX?	Macros/Types	Functions
		SCNILEASTN, SCNOLEASTN, SCNULEASTN, SCNXLEASTN, SCNAFASTN, SCNIFASTN, SCNOFASTN, SCNUFASTN, SCNXFASTN, SCNAMAX, SCNIMAX, SCNOMAX, SCNUMAX, SCNXMAX, SCNUMAX, SCNXMAX, SCNAPTR, SCNUPTR, SCNXPTR	
locale.h	No	LC_ALL, LC_ COLLATE, LC_CTYPE, LC_MONETARY, LC_NUMERIC,	setlocale(), localeconv()
		LC_TIME, struct lconv	
signal.h	No	sig_atomic_t, SIG_DFL, SIG_ERR, SIG_IGN, SIGABRT, SIGFPE, SIGILL, SIGINT, SIGSEGV, SIGTERM	signal(), raise()
stdio.h	Yes	_IOFBF, _IOLBF, _IONBF, FILENAME_MAX, FOPEN_MAX, L tmpnam,	remove(), rename(), tmpfile(), tmpnam (), fclose(), fflush(), fopen(), freopen(), setbuf(), setvbuf(), fprintf(), fscanf(), printf(), scanf(), sprintf(), sscanf(), vfprintf(), vfscanf(), vprintf(), vscanf(), vsprintf(), vsscanf(), fgetc(), fgets(), fputc(), fputs(), getc(), getchar(), gets(), putc(), putchar(), puts(), ungetc(), fread (), fwrite(), fgetpos(), fseek(), fsetpos(),

Header file	Header file in	Unsupported Definition			
	Intel SGX?	Macros/Types	Functions		
		SEEK_CUR, SEEK_ END, SEEK_SET, TMP_MAX, stderr, stdin, stdout	ftell(), rewind(), clearerr(), feof(), ferror (), perror()		
stdlib.h	Yes		rand(), srand(), atexit(), exit(), _Exit(), getenv(), system()		
string.h	Yes		strcpy(), strcat(), strstr()*		
tgmath.h	No				
time.h	Yes		clock(), mktime(), time(), ctime(), gmtime(), loc- altime()		
wchar.h	Yes		fwprintf(), fwscanf(), swscanf(), vfwprintf(), vfws- canf(), vswscanf(), vwprintf(), vwscanf(), wprintf (), wscanf(), fgetwc(), fgetws(), fputwc(), fputws (), fwide(), getwc(), getwchar(), putwc(), put- wchar(), ungetwc(), wcstod(), wcstof(), wcstold (), wcstol(), wcstoll(), wcstoul(), wcstoull(), wcscpy(), wcscat(), wcsftime(),wctob()		
wctype.h	Yes		iswalnum(), iswalpha(), iswblank(), iswcntrl(), iswdigit(), iswgraph(), iswlower(), iswprint(), isw- punct(), iswspace(), iswupper(), iswxdigit(), wctype(), towlower(), towupper(), towctrans(), wctrans(),		

(*) The trusted standard C library does not support char strstr(const char*, const char*). However, it does support the variant const char* strstr (const char*, const char*) is supported.

NOTE

Trusted C library is enhanced to avoid format string attacks. Any attempts to use <code>%n</code> in printf-family functions such as <code>snprintf</code> will result in a run-time error.

Unsupported C++ Standard Classes and Functions

The following table lists unsupported C++11 classes and functions inside the enclave.

Table 21 Utilities library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cstdlib	Partial	
csignal	No	
csetjmp	No	
cstdarg	Yes	
typeinfo	Partial	
typeindex	Yes	
type_traits	Yes	
bitset	Yes	
functional	Yes	
utility	Yes	
ctime	Partial	
chrono	No	
cstddef	Yes	
initializer_list	Yes	
tuple	Yes	

Table 22 Dynamic memory management

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
memory	Yes	
new	Partial	
scoped_allocator	Yes	

Table 23 Numeric limits

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cfloat	Yes	
cinttypes	Partial	
climits	Yes	
cstdint	Partial	
limits	Yes	

Table 24 Error handling

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cassert	Yes	
cerrno	Yes	
exception	Partial	nested_exception

stdexcept	Yes	
system_error	Yes	

Table 25 Strings library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cctype	Partial	
cstring	Partial	
cuchar	No	
cwchar	Partial	
cwctype	Partial	
string	Yes	

Table 26 Containers library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
array	Yes	
dequeue	Yes	
forward_list	Yes	
list	Yes	
map	Yes	
queue	Yes	
set	Yes	
stack	Yes	
unordered_map	Yes	
unordered_set	Yes	
vector	Yes	

Table 27 Algorithms library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
algorithm	Partial	

Table 28 Iterators library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
iterator	Yes	

Table 29 Numerics library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cfenv	No	

cmath	Partial	
complex	Yes	
numeric	Yes	
random	No	
ratio	Yes	
valarray	Yes	

Table 30 Input/Output library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
cstdio	Partial	
fstream	No	
iomanip	No	
ios	No	
iosfwd	No	
iostream	No	
istream	No	
ostream	No	
sstream	No	
streambuf	No	
strstream	No	

Table 31 Localization library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
clocale	No	
codecvt	No	
locale	No	

Table 32 Regular expressions library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
regex	No	

Table 33 Atomic operations library

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
atomic	Yes	

Table 34 Thread library

Header File	Support Unsupported Classes
-------------	-----------------------------

condition_ variable	Partial	
future	No	
mutex	Partial	timed_mutex, recursive_timed_mutex
thread	No	

Table 35 C compatibility headers

Header File	Support	Unsupported Classes
ccomplex	Yes	
ciso646	Yes	This header file is empty in a conforming
		implementation
cstdalign	Yes	
cstdbool	Yes	
ctgmath	Yes	

Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

The following keywords are not supported in an enclave.

Table 36 Unsupported C and C++ Keywords

transaction_atomic tr	ansaction_relaxed	transaction_cancel
------------------------	-------------------	--------------------

The following GCC* specific attributes are not supported in an enclave.

Table 37 Unsupported GCC* Compiler Attributes

destructor	transaction_callable	transaction_unsafe
transaction_safe	transaction_may_cancel_outer	transaction_pure
transaction_wrap	disinterrupt	

C++11 Support on Linux* OS

Although C++11 is considered the baseline, the availability of certain C++11 features depends on the GCC* compiler version and/or a specific compiler option. The table below summarizes the C++11 features available when you use the GCC compiler option -std=c++11 and link the enclave with sgx_tcxx as the standard C++ library.

Table 38 Supported C++11 Language Features

C++11 Langua	ge Feature
Alignment support	
Allowing move con	structors to throw [noexcept]
Bidirectional fences	5
C99 preprocessor	
Data-dependency of	ordering: atomics and memory model
Declared type of ar	expression
Default template a	rguments for function templates
Defaulted and dele	ted functions
Delegating constru	ctors
Dynamic initializati	on and destruction with concurrency
Explicit conversion	operators
Explicit virtual over	rides
Expression SFINAE	
Extended friend de	clarations
Extending sizeof	
Extern templates	
Forward declaratio	ns for enums
Generalized attribu	ites
Generalized consta	nt expressions
Inheriting construc	tors
Initialization of clas	s objects by rvalues
Initializer lists	
Inline namespaces	
Lambdas: New wor	ding for C++0x lambdas
Local and unname	d types as template arguments
Memory model	
Minimal support fo	r garbage collection
New character type	25
Non-static data me	mber initializers
Null pointer consta	int
R-value references	
Range-based for	
Raw string literals	
Right angle bracket	S
Sequence points	
Solving the SFINAE	problem for expressions

C++11 Language Feature
Standard layout types
Static assertions
Strong compare and exchange
Strongly-typed enums
Template aliases
Thread-local storage
Unicode strings literals
Universal character name literals
Unrestricted unions
User-defined literals
Variadic templates
func predefined identifier
auto-typed variables
long long